Duavit vs. CA, Sarmiento & Catuar G.R. No.

82318 May 18, 1989

Facts: Private respondents were on board a jeep when they met an accident with another jeep driven by Sabiniano. This accident caused injuries to private respondents, thus they filed a case for damages against driver Salbiniano and owner of the jeep Duavit. Duavit admits ownership of the jeep but contends that he should not be held liable since Salbiniano is not his employee and that the jeep was taken by Salbiniano without his (Duavit) consent. Issue: Whether or not the owner of a private vehicle which figured in an accident can be held liable as an employer when the said vehicle was neither driven by an employee of the owner nor taken with his consent.

Held: No, an owner of a vehicle cannot be held liable for an accident involving the said vehicle if the same was driven without his consent or knowledge and by a person not employed by him. To hold the petitioner liable for the accident caused by the negligence of Sabiniano who was neither his driver nor employee would be absurd as it would be like holding liable the owner of a stolen vehicle for an accident caused by the person who stole such vehicle.

Lim & Gunnaban vs. CA & Gonzales Facts: Gonzales purchased an Isuzu passenger jeepney from Vallarta. Vallarta remained as the holder of a certificate of public convenience and the registered owner of the jeepney. Subsequently, the jeepney collided with a ten-wheeler truck owned by Lim, driven by Gunnaban which resulted in the death of 1 passenger and injuries to all others. Failure to arrive to a settlement with Lim for the repair of the jeepney, Gonzales brought an action for damages against Lim & Gunnaban. Lim denied liability asserting that Vallarte, and not Gonzales, is the real party in interest being the registered owner of the jeepney. He further asserts that an operator of the vehicle continues to be its operator as he remains the operator of record; and that to recognize an operator under the kabit system as the real party in interest and to countenance his claim for damages is utterly subversive of public policy. Issue: WON Gonzales, an operator under the kabit system (considering that he is not the registered owner of the jeepney), may sue for damages against Lim. Or, WON Gonzales is a real party in interest.

Held: Yes, Gonzales may sue. The evil sought to be prevented in enjoining the kabit system* does not exist. 1 Neither of the parties to the pernicious kabit system is being held liable for damages.

2 The case arose from the negligence of another vehicle in using the public road to whom no representation, or misrepresentation, as regards the ownership and operation of the passenger jeepney was made and to whom no such representation, or misrepresentation, was necessary. Thus it cannot be said that Gonzales and the registered owner of the jeepney were in stoppels for leading the public to believe that the jeepney belonged to the registered owner. 3 The riding public was not bothered or inconvenienced at the very least by the illegal arrangement. On the contrary, it was private respondent himself who had been wronged and was seeking compensation for the damage done to him. Certainly, it would be the height of inequity to deny him his right. Thus, it is evident that private respondent has the right to proceed against petitioners for the damage caused on his passenger jeepney as well as on his business. ----------------N.B. The kabit system is an arrangement whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of public convenience allows other persons who own motor vehicles to operate them under his license, sometimes for a fee or percentage of the earnings. Although the parties to such an agreement are not outrightly penalized by law, thekabit system is invariably recognized as being contrary to public policy and therefore void and inexistent under Art. 1409 of the Civil Code. It would seem then that the thrust of the law in enjoining the kabit system is not so much as to penalize the parties but to identify the person upon whom responsibility may be fixed in case of an accident with the end view of protecting the riding public. The policy therefore loses its force if the public at large is not deceived, much less involved.

BA Finance Corp vs. CA G.R. No. 98275 November 13, 1992 Facts: Amare, the driver of an Isuzu truck was involved in an accident which caused the death of three persons. Amare was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence. BA Finance was found liable for damages since the truck was registered in its name. BA Finance contends that it should not be held liable since it was not Amares employer at the time of the accident. It also contends that the Isuzu truck was in the possession of Rock Component Phil, by virtue of a lease agreement. Hence, BA Finance wants to prove who the actual/real owner is at the time of the accident, and in accordance with such proof, evade liability and lay the same on the person actually owning the vehicle. Issues: 1 WON BA Finance should be held liable. 2 WON BA Finance can escape liability by proving the actual/real owner of the truck. Held: 1 Yes, BA Finance is liable.

The registered owner of a certificate of public convenience is liable to the public for the injuries or damages suffered by passengers or third persons caused by the operation of said vehicle, even though the same had been transferred to a third person. Under the same principle the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for a public service, should primarily be responsible to the public or to the third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle is being driven on the highways or streets. 2 No, the law does not allow him. The law, with its aim and policy in mind, does not relieve him directly of the responsibility that the law fixes and places upon him as an incident or consequence of registration. This may appear harsh but nevertheless, a registered owner who has already sold or transferred a vehicle has the recourse to a third-party complaint, in the same action brought against him to recover for the damage or injury done, against the vendee or transferee of the vehicle. While the registered owner is primarily responsible for the damage caused, he has a right to be indemnified by the real or actual owner of the amount that he may be required to pay as damage for the injury caused.

Philtranco & Manilhig vs. CA & Heirs of Acuesta G.R. No. 120553 June 17, 1997 Facts: Acuesta was riding his easy rider bicycle. One of the buses of Philtranco driven by Manilhig, on the other hand, was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine. Subsequently, the engine started which occurred at the time when Acuesta was directly in front of the bus. Acuesta was run over by the bus. Trial court rendered a decision ordering Philtranco & Manilhig to be jointly and severally liable to the Heirs of Acuesta. CA affirmed, holding that Philtranco has a solidary liability with Manilhig under Art 2194 of the Civil Code. Issue: WON Philtrancos liability is solidary (jointly & severally) with Manilhig. Or, WON Art 2194 is applicable. Held: Yes. It had been consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle, like petitioner Philtranco, for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary, direct, and joint and several orsolidary with the driver. As to solidarity, Article 2194 expressly provides: Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Since the employers liability is primary, direct and solidary, its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict. Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.

Tamayo vs. Aquino et al & Rayos G.R. Nos. L-12634 and L-12720 May 29, 1959

Facts: Epifania Gonzales (wife of Aquino) boarded a truck owned by Tamayo, holder of a certificate of public convenience to operate. Allegedly, while Epifania was making a trip aboard the truck, it bumped against a culvert on the side of the road, causing her death. Aquino et al filed an action for damages against Tamayo. Tamayo answered alleging that the truck is owned by Rayos, so he filed a 3rd party complaint against him (Rayos). The CFI ruled that Tamayo is the registered owner, under a public convenience certificate but such truck was sold to Rayos one month after the accident, but he (Tamayo) did not inform the Public Service Commission of the sale. CFI held Tamayo and Rayos jointly and severally liable to Aquino. CA affirmed, holding that, both the registered owner (Tamayo) and the actual owner and operator (Rayos) should be considered as joint tortfeasors and should be made liable in accordance with Article 2194 of the Civil Code (solidary). Issue: WON Art 2194 (solidary liability) is applicable; and, if NOT, how should Tamayo (holder of the cert. of public convenience) participate with Rayos (transferee/operator) in the damages recoverable. Held: No, Art 2194 is not applicable. The action instituted in this case is one for breach of contract, for failure of the defendant to carry safety the deceased for her destination. The liability for which he is made responsible, i.e., for the death of the passenger, may not be considered as arising from a quasi-delict. As the registered owner Tamayo and his transferee Rayos may not be held guilty of tort or a quasi-delict; their responsibility is NOT SOLIDARY. As Tamayo is the registered owner of the truck, his responsibility to the public or to any passenger riding in the vehicle or truck must be direct. If the policy of the law is to be enforced and carried out, the registered owner should not be allowed to prove that a third person or another has become the owner, so that he may thereby be relieved of the responsibility to the injured. But as the transferee, who operated the vehicle when the passenger died, is the one directly responsible for the accident and death he should in turn be made responsible to the registered owner for what the latter may have been adjudged to pay. In operating the truck without transfer thereof having been approved by the Public Service Commission, the transferee acted merely as agent of the registered owner and should be responsible to him (the registered owner), for any damages that he may cause the latter by his negligence.

Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Lucita Suyom, Facts: A tractor driven by Raul Tutor rammed into a house-cum-store in Tondo, Manila. Part of the house was destroyed. Two people died and four were injured. Tutor was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicides and multiple physical injuries. Verification with the Land Transportation Office revealed that the registered owner of the tractor was Equitable Leasing Corporation who leased it to Edwin Lim. The relatives of the victims filed a civil case for damages. The Regional Trial Court ruled against Equitable and ordered it to pay damages to the victims relatives. Upon Equitable appeal; the Court of Appeals sustained the RTC. Equitable filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court. Issue:

Whether Equitable Leasing is liable for damages Held/Ratio: Yes, Equitable Leasing is liable. The petition is denied and the CA decision is affirmed. As the registered owner of the tractor, Equitable Leasing is liable for the acts of Raul Tutor even if he was actually the employee of Equitable former lessee, Ecatine Corporation, who became the actual owner of the tractor by virtue of a deed of sale not registered with the LTO. Regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are concerned; consequently, it is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences of its operation. In the eyes of the law, the owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual owner/operator being considered as merely the agent of the registered owner/operator. The principle applies even if the registered owner of any vehicle does not use it for public service. The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle, responsibility can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. Failure to register the deed of sale should not prejudice victims, who have the right to rely on the principle that the registered owner is liable for damages caused by the negligence of the driver. Equitable Leasing cant hide behind the allegation that Tutor was Ecatine Corps employee, because it will prevent victims from recovering their loss on the basis of Equitable inaction in failing to register the sale. The non-registration is Equitable fault, which should face the legal consequences thereof

EREZO VS. JEPTE Facts: Aguedo Jepte is the registered owner of a six by six truck bearing plate No. TC-1253. On August 9, 1949, while the same was being driven by Rodolfo Espino y Garcia, it collided with a taxicab at the intersection of San Andres and Dakota Streets, Manila. As the truck went off the street, it hit Ernesto Erezo and another, and the former suffered injuries, as a result of which he died. The driver was prosecuted for homicide through reckless negligence. The accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to pay the heirs of Erezo. As the amount of the judgment could not be enforced against him, Gaudioso Erezo, Ernestos father, brought the action against the registered owner of the truck, Jepte. Jepte did not deny that at the time of the fatal accident the cargo truck driven by Rodolfo Espino y Garcia was registered in his name. He, however, claims that the vehicle belonged to the Port Brokerage, of which he was the broker at the time of the accident. The trial court held that as Jepte represented himself to be the owner of the truck and the Motor Vehicles Office, relying on his representation, registered the vehicles in his name, the Government and all persons affected by the representation had the right to rely on his declaration of ownership and registration. It, therefore, held that Jepte is liable because he cannot be permitted to repudiate his own declaration. ISSUE: WON the registered owner is liable for the injuries suffered by passengers or third person. HELD: The registered owner of a certificate of public convenience is liable to the public for the injuries or damages suffered by passengers or third persons caused by the operation of said vehicle, even though the same had been transferred to a third person. The principle upon which this doctrine is based is that

in dealing with vehicles registered under the Public Service Law, the public has the right to assume or presume that the registered owner is the actual owner thereof, for it would be difficult for the public to enforce the actions that they may have for injuries caused to them by the vehicles being negligently operated if the public should be required to prove who the actual owner is. The doctrine however does not imply that the registered owner may not recover whatever amount he had paid by virtue of his liability to third persons from the person to whom he had actually sold, assigned or conveyed the vehicle. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from, with costs against Jepte.

Calalas v. CA Facts: Private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was already full, Calalas gave Sunga an stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. Along the way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Sunga stepped down to give way when an Isuzu truck owned by Francisco Salva and driven by Iglecerio Verena bumped the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. Sunga filed a complaint against Calalas for violation of contract of carriage. Calalas filed a third party complaint against Salva. The trial court held Salva liable and absolved Calalas, taking cognisance of another civil case for quasi-delict wherein Salva and Verena were held liable to Calalas. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and found Calalas liable to Sunga for violation of contract of carriage. Issues: (1) Whether the decision in the case for quasi delict between Calalas on one hand and Salva and Verena on the other hand, is res judicata to the issue in this case (2) Whether Calalas exercised the extraordinary diligence required in the contract of carriage (3) Whether moral damages should be awarded Held: (1) The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply. Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation. Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733

and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasidelict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. (2) We do not think so. First, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers. We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioner's contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. This requires that the following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway. (3) As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220. In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage.