The Activity of Happiness in Aristotle'S Ethics

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The activity of happiness in aristotle's ethics

Gary M Gurtler
The Review of Metaphysics; Jun 2003; 56, 4; Research Library
pg. 801
THE ACTIVITY OF HAPPINESS IN ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS
GARY M. GURTLER, S.J.
I
THERE HAS BEEN A LONGSTANDING DEBATE about the relation of virtue
and happiness in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle seems to
have two contradictory positions. One position is found in book 1,
chapter 7, where happiness is the highest good, an activity of soul in
conformity with virtue. In context, this seems to indicate human vir
tue as a whole, involving both moral and intellectual virtues. The
other position occurs much later in book 10, chapters 6-8, where hap
piness is identified with wisdom alone. This later context seems to
posit an opposition between a supreme happiness related to wisdom
and contemplation and a secondary happiness associated with justice
and the moral virtues. The debate centers on how to reconcile these
two positions.
One group of commentators takes book 10 as determinative and
thus tortures the text in book 1 to say the same thing. This position is
described as intellectualist or exclusivist and produces certain puzzles
in reading Aristotle's ethical theory. These puzzles are not benign
since the privileged position given wisdom in book 10 seems at odds
with the discussion of virtue in book 1 and its development in the
Nicomachean Ethics as a whole. Indeed, Aristotle appears inconsis
tent or even contradictory, recommending in these two brief chapters
of book 10 a life devoted to contemplation that only grudgingly allows
for the necessity of the practical life discussed in such detail in the
rest of his ethical works. If this is the case, under what conditions are
we expected to forgo contemplation to engage in the various activities
of the moral virtues? Since no conditions are spelled out in the text,
the range of speculation is confused and ways around the apparent in
consistencies complex.
Correspondence to: Philosophy Department, Boston College, Carney
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Te Review of Metaphysics 56 (June 2003): 801-834. Copyright 2003 by The Review of
Metaphysics
802 GARY M. GURTLER
The other group takes 1. 7 as determinative for the definition of
human virtue, and its task is to explain whether 10.7-8 fits into Aisto
tle's general ethical position. In this view, virtue is understood inclu
sively, with both ethical and intellectual components. So far no satis
factory account of 10.6-8 has been able to integrate it into Aristotle's
account of vrtue and happiness, with the result that it is either ig
nored as an aberration or left as an anomaly. The goal of this paper is
to provide a reading of 10.1-8 that can show how Aristotle's account
of contemplation and the moral virtues is part of a single vision of
happiness. 1
1 In recent Anglo-American literature, W. F. R. Hardie, "The Final Good
in Aristotle's Ethics," Philosophy 40 (1965): 277-95, articulates the view of
wisdom as dominant, with Aristotle's approach appearing both intellectualis
tic and selfish, while John Ackrill, "Aristotle on Eudaimonia," Proceedings
of the British Academy 60 (1974): 339-59, proposes an inclusive reading that
defends a more humane view of Aristotle. Hardie is defended by lobert
Heinaman, "Eudaimonia and Self-sufficiency in the Nicomachean Etkics,"
Phronesis 33 (1988): 31-53; Richard Kraut, Aristotle on the Human Good
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Anthony Kenny, "The Nicoma
chean Conception of Happiness," O.'{ord Studies in Ancient Philosophy 9
(1991): 67-80; Roger Crisp, "White on Aristotelian Happiness," O.'{ord S'tud
ies in Ancient Philosophy 10 (1992): 233-40. Ackrill, in turn, has his defend
ers: T. H. Irwin, "Permanent Happiness: Aristotle and Solon," Oxford Studies
in Ancient Philosophy 3 (1985): 89-124; Timothy D. Roche, "Ergon and Eu
daimonia in Nicomachean Ethics 1," Joural of the History of Philosophy
26 (1988): 175-94; Stephen A. White, "Is Aristotelian Happiness a Good Life
or the Best Life?" Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 8 (1990): 103-43;
Jeffrey S. Purinton, "Aristotle's Definition of Happiness (NE 1, 7, 1098a16-
18)," O.ford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 16 (1998): 259-97. A few of
these articles, as well as others, appear in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed.
Amelie Oksenherg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).
This is only a selection of the literature. Roche, "Ergon and Eudaimonia,"
summing up for the inclusive view, ends with a call to reinterpret 10.7 so that
it does not confict with 1.5-13 and Aristotle's general ethical position. By
examining 10.6-8 in the context of Aristotle's discussion of pleasure in 10.1-
5, I attempt to show that the task of book 10 is to determine the precise activ
ity constitutive of happiness in the strictest sense, with practical pursuits
contributing to happiness to a secondary degree and amusements as provid
ing necessary physical rest. This yields a reading of the text that sides with
the comprehensive or inclusive view but from a philosophical perspective
different from the assumptions of either side.
THE ACTIVITY OF HAPPINESS IN ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS 803
I will endeavor to argue that the discussion of pleasure in 10. 1-5
is continuous with that of happiness in 10.6-8. One aspect of this con
tinuity is that pleasure and happiness are both defined a the same
kind of activity, one that accompanies certain other activities under
specific conditions. Another aspect of this continuity is that Aristotle
distinguishes different kinds of pleasure, those related to bodily condi
tions and those related to activities desirable in themselves. He ends
this account of pleasure by mentioning that each animal has its own
specific pleasure. This last topic leads directly into the discussion of
happiness, where Aistotle distinguishes different kinds of activities
associated with happiness and seeks to determine which activity is
the happiness specific to the human soul. The continuity of the dis
cussion as a whole also provides the context in which Aristotle distin
guishes between pleasure and happiness. Their structure as activities
makes them similar, which leads some to hold the opinion that plea
sure is in fact happiness.
Aristotle, however, holds that they are different. First, plea<ure
has its origin in the basic need of an organism to preserve itself. No
matter how much pleaure can be associated with activities done for
their own sake, this root meaning keeps Aristotle from identifying
pleasure with happiness. Second, the definition of happiness be
comes increasingly refined until it is identified with contemplation of
the divine. The first element of this discussion of contemplation has
long been recognized, evaluating the opinions that a life of plea<ure, a
practical life, or a contemplative life constitutes happiness. Aristotle
indicates that only children or the vicious take a life of pleasure for
happiness since they do not know the proper human end. In the case
of the virtuous, although pleasure cannot be the end, it still serves as a
means for resting the body so that one can engage in virtuous activi
ties. Aristotle then distinguishes between the activities of the practi
cal and intellectual virtues, with the activities of political virtue having
a secondary happiness but with contemplation as the activity consti
tuting happiness in the strictest sense. This brings us Lo the second el
ement of his discussion of contemplation, indicating the precise intel
lectual virtue and activity associated with happiness. He begins by
associating happiness with the activity of vouc and singles out wisdorn
as its specific intellectual virtue and contemplation a< the activity of
804 GARY M. GURTLER
this vrtue. In this discussion, contemplation itself is shown to have a
range of meanings that is gradually brought to precision, with its
strictest sense found in the case of the divine where other activties,
doing or making, are excluded. This clarification of the nature of con
templation indicates that happiness has its root in the divne, in con
trast to pleasure with its roots in organic well-being. Such a clarifica
tion is not meant to restrict happiness exclusively to one human
activity but to show that all activities, contemplative, political, and
pleasurable, relate in different ways and to different degrees to the
central case defining human happiness in terms of the divine. 2
II
We begin with an investigation of the nature of pleasure in Nico
rachean Ethics 10.1-5. In chapters 1-3, Aistotle provides a brief
survey of the confict in common opinions, basically the contrasting
views that pleasure is either the good or essentially base. In chapter
3, he rules out the second view because it goes against the fact that all
living things seek pleasure in order to survive, and someone who said
pleasure should be avoided would inevitably be contradicted by his
actions. The first view, by contrast, simply identifies pleasure with
happiness, but this will need careful examination before Aristotle can
determine to what extent it is true. First, in chapter 2, he notes the
Platonic distinction that pleasure is a good but not the good, which is
singled out as not being more desirable by the addition of something
to it. Second, in chapter 3, he distinguishes different kinds of plea
sure. The clearest and simplest kind of pleasure concerns desires and
emotions and applies to all livng things; pain is the correlative state.
These pleasures accompany activities that a living thing possesses by
nature and are related to the desires and appetites it needs for a par
ticular good, its physical survival. Aristotle next describes a kind of
pleasure related to activities desirable in themselves and not because
they relieve some need or restore some physical balance. This second
kind includes the pleasure of learing and the pleasures associated
with certain sense activties, as well as with memory and the posses
sion of the virtues. In distinction to the first group, this type of plea-
sure is neither opposed to pain nor essential to any of these activities
since they can be pursued even when pleasure does not accompany
them: neither all things seen nor all learning need be pleasant. So far,
Aristotle ha summarized a number of asumptions that underlie vari
ous parts of the Ethics and in fact of Greek ethical thinking in general.
Pleasure and pain, a particular bodily states, are the raw matter, as it
were, upon which the moral life is built, either positively in terms of
virtue or negatively in terms of vice. Far from being identified with
2 In the debate, there is an underlying assumption that the three lives
of pleasure, of moral virtue, and of contemplation-represent competing the
ories and exclusive choices. This reading of the three lives has a long tradi
tion and transcends philosophical approaches. For example, Thomas
Aquinas, Summa Teologiae II-II, qq. 179-82, also assumes a choice among
lives, with the comparison of the contemplative and practical lives treated
specifically in ST II-II, q. 182, a. 1-4. As White, "Aristotelian Happiness,"
136-43 (for a lengthy discussion of these sources) and Kenny, "Conception of
Happiness," 74 (more briefy) make clear, this reading traces back to late an
tiquity, in Aspasius, Heliodorus, and Alexander, and continues in the Middle
Ages, in Eustratius, Albertus Magnus, and Aquinas himself. The issue is the
meaning of "perfect" and "best" a< qualifying virtue in NE 1. 7. If this virtue is
best in an exclusive sense and perfect in the sense that nothing can be added
to it, then it is not hard to see why the tradition looked to 10.7 to find a virtue
that could fit such strict requirements. The three lives mentioned in 1.5 and
10.6-8 became completely differentiated theories, and opting for one became
an exclusion of the other two. I argue that both the tradition and its modern
interpreters miss the way in which Aristotle maintains that happiness is ex
clusive and perfect in definition but not in relation to the sage as a concrete
human being. He is constantly distinguishing the nature of the activity of
contemplation and happiness from the complex needs and activities of the
human subject. Only in the case of the gods does contemplation find an ex
clusive and absolute sense. Thus, all three activities-pleasure, practical pur
suits, and contemplation-have a role to play in the happiness of the sage,
namely, as providing necessary rest, or as a secondary happiness that is ori
ented to the leisure of contemplation, or as the final end in the strictest sense.
For an account of the issue outside the analytic tradition, see J. Donald Mo
nan, Moral Knowledge and Its Methodology in Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1968). Monan defines the confict in terms of a difference in method
and psychology. NE 1 and 10 represent a deductive method based on a psy
chology where the self is identified with no'us and happiness is limited to con
templation; the rest of NE and Eudemian Ethics utilize a broader psychology
in which the composite of body and soul and the respective virtues of body
and soul are integrated into a synthetic whole (see especially 122-6, 132-7).
Monan also discusses how this debate plays out in the wider literature of the
twentieth century, with Jaeger's theory of the development of Aristotle's
thought as the underlying issue.
806 GARY M. GURTLER
human happiness, pleasure and pain provide instead the first arena
for moral development, the goal of which is to feel pleaure or pain
for the proper things and not to be dominated by bodily appetites and
desires.:3 The divergence of opinions derives from not distinguishing
between pleasure and pain as related to particular organic states and
certain activities that can be pleasurable in themselves; further dis
tinctions will be needed to specify the nature of happiness and its re
lation to pleasure.
In his scientific discussion in 10.4-5, Aristotle explores the impli
cations of taking pleasure a an activity, vgyaa.4 In describing per
fect activities, Aristotle begins with these words: "for seeing seems to
be complete at whatever moment, since it lacks nothing which at a
later moment will complete the becoming of its form" (6oxE1 yag
JEV ogam xa8' 6vuvoDv xgovov tEA.da dvav ou yag ouv v6E
ou6cv6, 0 d UOtEQOV YEVO!EVOV tEAElCDOEl auti' tO d6o).5 Seeing
is an activity that is identical in form, whole and complete at every in
stant, with no reference to duration. Each part of a motion, on the
contrary, is incomplete and is different in form both from the other
parts and from the whole. Typing a word, for example, takes the sep
arate motions of hitting different keys, and hitting one key is not the
:J Eugene Garver, "Aistotle's Metaphysics of Morals," Journal of the
History (f Ph'losoph:I 27 (1989): 7-28, discusses pleasure and pain a part of
the material cause of ve (17). His article gives an inleresting reading of
how Aistotle uses ideas from his metaphysical and psychological works,
such a aet and potency and the faculties of the soul, in the different context
of ethics. The virtues, for example, move neither as nature (automatically)
nor as crafts (needing desire) but with aspects of both; nor is it a rational or
irrational power but somehow in between. In this way, Garver argues,
Aristotle bends his theoretical distinctions to fit the much different context
of the practical, especially in defining the nature of habit as related to choice,
with characteristics borrowed from natural powers a well a acquired skills,
but necessarily different, given that virtue defines a pattern of behavior that
is stable like nature but also related to rational choice. Garver, "Aistotle on
Virtue and Pleasure," The Greeks and the Good IAfe, ed. David Depew (Ful
lerton: California State University Press, 1980), 157-76, presents a prelimi
nary version of his thesis in terms of courage, where the rational and irratio
nal factors are particularly pronounced. Garver escapes Timothy Hoche's
critique of Irwin's attempt to connect ethics and metaphysics in "On the Al
leged Metaphysical Foundation of Aistotle's Ethics," Ancient Ph'losophy 8
(1988): 49-60, where he rightly shows that Aristotle does not need to justify
and is not interested in justifying his ethical position by importing principles
from his metaphysics.
same a hitting another, and it is only when the keys are hit in proper
order that a word emerges at the end. While Aristotle uses examples
of making or doing to illustrate the incomplete nature of motions, he
turns to the senses, especially when functioning properly in relation to
their objects, to illustrate what he means by a complete or perfect ac
tivity. There are no parts into which such activities can be divided
and, signifcantly, they are complete for a long or short as they last.
4 David Bostock, "Pleasure and Activity in Aristotle's Ethics," Phrones'is
33 (1988): 251-72, presents another reading of these first chapters of book 10.
He takes for granted that the pleasure of an activity is its completeness and
that Aristotle holds that all pleasure is the completion of an activity (251,
253). Without saying so, he infers the inverse as well, that all complete activ
ities are pleasant. Bostock points out that some pleasures are related to re
plenishing natural states, with pain indicating the loss, as in the case of hun
ger or thirst. He brings in the discussion of pleasure in book 7 to show the
connection of such pleaures with the processes of replenishing, concluding
with the subject's need to be aware of such activity for there to be pleasure
(263-70). What bothers Bostock is that this account seems to contradict
book 10, where pleasure is associated with complete activities but is illus
trated by activities that are processes, such a walking or building a house.
Bostock's solution, ironically, denies his opening premise that pleasure is just
the activity, adding nothing extra. He distinguishes between the activity and
our thought or perception of the activity, holding that pleasure is only in the
latter "activity of the mind" (271). It seems, however, that this distinction in
troduces the idea that pleasure is something extra and not just the activity as
such, which fits my argument that pleasure is different from the activity it ac
companies and that there is a distinction between activities that are always
accompanied by pleasure and those that are not. This clears up much confu
sion. Aristotle distinguishes between pleasures associated with natural re
plenishments, where awareness is automatic (due to the pain, no doubt), and
other pleasures associated with sight or the other senses, memory and lear
ing, and the virtues, where pleasure is not automatic but depends both on the
condition of the faculty and the appropriateness of the object. As Bostock
points out, in cases where the activity is a process, the pleasure comes when
such activity is looked at as whole and complete, whether anticipating or
contemplating the completed object. In this anticipation or contemplation, I
would argue that there is a stepping back from the process so that it can be
taken as complete and enjoyed (such stepping back while fully engaged in
the process would be a distraction and interfere with its completion). In the
case of complete activities, such as sensing, memory, or learning, Aristotle is
clear that not all instances are pleasant but only where the organ and its ob
jects are the best. The difference, again, seems to be a stepping back in
which the activity is enjoyed. This emphasizes the connection of pleasure
with contemplation, where both come at the end of an activity and hold it in
vew as whole and complete. I tend to see this activity as distinct and as add
ing something extra but not separable if that implies in any way that the plea
sure or contemplation could occur without the underlying activity, regardless
of whether that is complete or a process.
"NE 10.4.1174a14-16; all translations are my own.
808 GARY M. GURTLER
Aistotle begins with the senses because they are easily known to us
and thus illustrate the difference between perfect activities and mo
tions more easily.
These activities, moreover, have pleasure attached to them. "For
there is a pleaure belonging to each sense, the same as for reasoning
and contemplation, and the most complete is most pleasant, and
[each sense] is most complete that ha a well-functioning organ to
ward the best objects of those under it; thus pleasure would perfect
the activty" (xata n&oav yag a1o8'o(v onv 6ov, O!OLW< 6E xat
6uivmav xal, 8EWQLUV, 6LOt' 6' tEAELOtat', tEAELOtat' 6' tOU ij
EXOVtO< JQO< to OJO'6motatOV tWV im' autv tEAELO' 6 tV
vgycwv 6ov).6 Pleaure relates to the activity of sensing in two
ways, by accompanying and by perfecting it. Like the activity it ac
companies, pleaure is whole and complete at any moment and is,
therefore, unlike a motion, which is complete either in the whole time
it takes or only at its end. Aristotle continues with an initial descrip
tion of how pleaure completes the activity.
But pleasure would perfect the activity not as a habit inhering within it,
but as some end coming to be upon it, just as the bloom of youth for
those in their prime. Thus, so long as the intelligible or sensible object
as well as the judging or contemplating subject are as fit a need be,
there will be pleasure in the activity; for whenever the passive and ac
tive parts remain the same and have the same relation to one another,
the same result naturally happens (noAELO'L oi Tiv rvtgyaav oovl oux
ws ESLS rvunagxouoa, &A' ws myLyv6wv6v TL TEAOS, olov TOLS
G NE 10.4.1174b20-3. Kraut, Human Good, obscures the close parallel
between sensing and contemplation a activities. As a consequence, he is
not able to see fully the role of Aristotle's discussion of pleaure in his ac
count of contemplation. Kraut's discussion of pleasure does identify its role
as a means to happiness with the need for relaxation and notes also that "the
pleasure asociated with any activity . .. [affects] the way we engage in that
activity," but he seems to take this as referring to those physical pleasures
that serve as means to happiness rather than that happiness itself ha an ele
ment of pleasure intrinsic to it (236-7). In this text and the following, how
ever, Aristotle is making a much stronger claim about the relationship be
tween pleaure and happiness. Happiness and contemplation are the most
pleaant of activities, precisely as being free and complete. Happiness,
moreover, has the same role of perfecting the activities it accompanies and is
thus not the kind of activity that can be exercised independently of the activ
ities it completes or perfects. Failing to see this results in the identification
of happiness exclusively with philosophical activities (seen. 29 below).
coqwLou; cga. ECD &v ofv TO TE V01TOV ato81TOV T oTov od xat TO
xgivov 11 8rwgouv, owL v T" vrgyda oov OfLoLwv yag ovTwv xat
JLQO aAAllAa TOV a{JOV TQOJLOV EXOVTCV TOU TE :ra81TLXOU xat TOU
JLOL1'TLXOU TaU TO :rcJXE yLvw8m). 7
Pleasure cannot be engaged in as an activity on its own, apart from
sensing, but accompanies such activities as an end. This means, on
the one hand, that pleasure is not like a power or state that moves an
agent internally from possession to exercise of some kind of activity
and, on the other hand, that pleasure functions a a final cause, an end
or good that moves an agent externally.
At this point, Aristotle is a bit laconic in describing how it is an
end, providing only the contrast with the formal perfection an agent
acquires in a habit or disposition. This series of comments, moreover,
suggests that pleasure adds to the perfection of an activity under cer
tain optimal conditions, when the organ and object are at their best.
Pleasure thus does not accompany any chance activity of a sense but
one in which the agent is acting well in relation to the best of objects,
whether the agent is sensing, judging, or contemplating and whether
the object is sensible or intelligible. Together with the previous men
tion of reasoning and contemplation, these comments are the first in
dication that this discussion of pleasure is related to that of contem
plation and happiness that will shortly follow. Even if one argues that
contemplation in the present context has a meaning more akin to
mere sensible observation, there are aspects of this observing that
show a continuous sense of taking in an object as a whole a opposed
to discerning its several parts.
Aristotle next explains why pleasure is not continuous, in a re
stricted sense of the term. It is not because it is imperfect like a mo
tion, which is essentially noncontinuous as having a series of parts.
Pleasure is not continuous because the agent can get tired or bored
even of the most pleasant activity. The conditions, thus, pertain to the
nature of the agent, and pleasure perdures only for as long a the
agent remains in a certain state. This is significant for it indicates that
pleasure is continuous without at the same time implying that the
agent is always engaged in it. Aristotle is defining the structure and
7 NE 10.4.1174b31-1175a3.
810 GARY M. GURTLER
nature of the activity and not the amount of time the agent spends do
ing it, a point also crucial for understanding the nature of happiness
and the activities associated with it. 8 Since happiness is an activity
like pleasure, one cannot engage in it isolated from those specific ac
tivities that it accompanies under certain conditions.
Each activity, moreover, has a corresponding pleasure. This
correspondence leads to the great diversity of pleasures and thus
Aristotle's own explanation why pleasure cannot be the good or iden
tified simply with happiness. More important, however, Aristotle pro
vides crucial information about how pleasure completes the particu
lar activity it accompanies. "For its own pleasure increases an
activity: since those who do an activity with pleasure are more dis
cerning and sharper about its particulars, as those who enjoy doing
H Kraut, Human Good, 68 n. 48, discusses the difference between activ
ity ({'v{gywx) and process (xLV110Lc) in their application to contemplation.
He attempts to clear up some possible confusions: that reference to a "per
fect length of life" does not mean that "the project of contemplation" is
brought to a stage of completion, much less that the secondary happiness of
the moral virtues ha some sort of completion &" its goal. So far so good, but
then he adds that happiness, as consisting in such activities, has a temporal
duration, so that a happy life cannot be identified with only a few instances
of contem
p
lation or with the secondary ha
pp
iness of morally virtuous activ
ity. This seems to cause a dilemma. Aristotle has defined happiness as an
activity rather than a habit, so it seems, given the definition of such an activ
ity as whole, complete, and continuous, that once begun happiness might be
achieved once and for all or that contemplation must be prolonged more and
more, even to the point of driving out other activities (one of the sources of
conOict for this position). This looks at happiness abstractly, as if it could be
separate from the activity it accompanies, and also fails to take into account
the nature of the human subject, who cannot engage in such activity for very
long periods of time. Since contemplation follows upon virtuous activity, it
is indirectly dependent on the development of virtue a a habit and only fol
lows upon its active exercise. Thus, contemplation is not a project to be
completed but an activity that is more easily and more deeply engaged in as
the virtue it accompanies is developed more fully and exercised more fre
quently and easily. Contemplation is not in competition with the activity of
virtue, but they arc related to the same agent who needs both kinds of activi
ties at different and appropriate times. The failure to make this distinction
between the nature of the activity and the conditions within the subject for
its exercise leads to inevitable confusions among the commentators. Kraut
at least avoids the error of Irwin, whose comment that a "complete time will
not be a short time," he criticizes ("Aristotle and Solon," 105, as quoted in
Human Good, 68 n. 48). One can have a moment of contemplation, with its
full sense of happiness, but that does not indicate one's life is characteristi
cally contemplative and consequently happy. He does, however, tend to see
contemplation as an activity that is somehow quantifiable, with some strange
results, such a the need to prolong it, mentioned here and below, n. 28.
geometry become geometricians and understand its particulars better,
and similarly those interested in music, architecture, and the other
[arts] each give themselves freely to their own function since they en
joy it" (o'vm)/EL yag 1v fvEQyELav otxda #>ov11 tCAAov yag
xama XQLVO'OL xat 1axgLBoumv ot ftE8' 6ov1l EVEQYOUV't, oiov
yEWftE'QLXoL y(vov'm ot XCLQOV'tE 1( YEWfE'tQE'v, xat xmavooumv
xao1a dA.ov, OftOLW 6E xat ot cLAOftO'UOOL xat cLAmxo66tm xat
'WV O.AAwv xaowL b6L66amv EL 'O otxE'ov gyov XCLQOV'E
a'n().9 Pleasure, as mentioned in 10.4.1174b20-3, comes upon an ac
tivty that is already complete or perfect. For a sense like sight, seeing
a particularly pleasant object constitutes such perfection. For crafts
and virtues, however, it is not merely doing an action but doing it from
a fully formed disposition that makes it perfect and thus in a position
where pleasure may accompany its exercise (compare 1.8.1099all-21
in relation to moral virtue). Further, pleasure increases such an activ
ity. This implies two complementary aspects in the present passage,
that an activity is done more intensely at the moment of its exercise
and that the corresponding disposition is developed more fully for the
future. Aristotle uses various skills to illustrate what he means.
Someone who has become adept at geometry, for example, finds plea
sure in it, which makes it eaier to do since such an individual judges
better, is more accurate about, and has a greater grasp of the relevant
particulars. Pleasure thus frees the agent to be more sharply focused
on the activty, and this in turn leads to developing the skill more pro
ficiently and with greater interest. Both aspects indicate how closely
akin an activity and its pleasure really are.
This discussion of pleaure in 10.4 already includes ideas relevant
to Aristotle's analysis of happiness, which some scholars have taken
to be incoherent or confused, 10 but the subsequent examination of the
closeness of pleaure and activty in chapter 5 provdes the actual
D NE 10.5.1175a30-5.
HI
l{
ichard Kraut, Human Good, "Introduction," 3-14, outlines the area"
in Aristotle's presentation that are unclear, stemming from the differences
between the accounts of happiness in books 1 and 10, and seeks to resolve
these issues in the remainder of his book, primarily by comparing the two
kinds of lives and their implications for other issues (compare Heinaman,
"Self-Sufficiency," 48). Roche, "Reconsidering the Intellectualist Interpreta
tion," 192-4, and Purinton, "Definition of Happiness," 296, point out that the
problem is specific to those who hold the view that happiness is restricted to
the contemplative life and that a reinterpretation of 10.7-8 would sustain the
congruity with Aristotle's position elsewhere.
812 GARY M. GURTLER
context in which the discussion of happiness finally emerges. The
kinship between a pleasure and its activity is so close that pleaures
differ from one another baed on their respective activities. Aristotle
supports this with the observation that an activity one finds more
pleaurable is able to drive out competing activities and their plea
sures. "Since their own pleaure sharpens activities and makes them
more enduring and better, but alien pleaures spoil them, it is clear
how much they differ, for alien pleasures almost produce the same ef
fect [on activities] a proper pains" (nEL o' fEV otxda Oovl
saXQLOL tas EVEQydas xat XQOVLWtEQas xat EAtLO'S JOLEL, at ('
aAOtQL<L A'faLVOVtm, OfAOV ws JOAU OLEOtdOLV" OXEOOV yaQ at
aAOtQL<L Oovat JOLOUOLV OJEQ at OLXEL<L Aunm).11 In the earlier dis
cussion of 10.1-3, pleasure and pain were looked at a opposite or
ganic states, but here in his scientific account Aristotle changes the
frame of reference by defining pains and pleasures in terms of activi
ties. If one does not enjoy an activity, then one finds it painful on its
own and ceaes doing it. If one is engaged in one activity, but the op
portunity comes for another activity in which one finds much greater
pleaure, the new pleaure is strong enough to drive out the pleaure
of the former activity. The new pleaure is alien to the old activity
and thus functions like its pain, making it unenjoyable.
In this context, pleaure and pain are defined in relation to ac
quired habits or dispositions, not organic states, and are thus related
to the agent's interests and character. Pleaure is in this sense neu
tral, and Aristotle indicates that the differentiation between decent
and base pleasures cannot be baed on the pleasures themselves. Nor
can it be based on the agent's character or interest alone since the
agent can be virtuous or vicious. He thus concludes that good and
evil attach primarily to activities, and if pleaure increaes the wrong
activities, the effect is even more deleterious morally than following
one's desires and appetites. "The pleasures in activties are more
their own than the desires [that lead to them]; for the desires are sepa
rated in time and nature, but the pleaures are linked to the activities,
and so inseparable that it is disputable whether the activity is the
same a the pleaure" ( OLXELOtEQ<L 0 tats EVEQydau; at EV autats
oovat t<v ogsEwv at fEV yag OLWQLOfEVm dot xat wts xgovms xat
11
NE 10.5.1175bl3-17.
-f <uoEL, at ( CUVEYYU -ai EVEQYcLaL, xat atLOQLC'OL OUHD wo-'
EXELV Uf<LoB-YOLV d 'at6v souv fvtgyaa 'f 6ov
f
)
.
12
Aristotle's comments so far in this chapter have emphasized the
closeness of pleasure and activity, a closeness that might look like
identity. This closeness is used to indicate that the goodness of the ac
tivty determines the goodness of the pleaure, giving reason why the
good cannot simply be identified with pleasure and yet how pleasure
still remains relevant to the moral life. Pleasure is not naively identi
fied with desire and appetite as organic states but more dangerously
ratifies and strengthens any activity a< an end perfecting it. Desires
and appetites may prompt activities, but pleasure is the driving force
in pursuing them. Further, desires and appetites may not be suscepti
ble to moral training, but such training is absolutely crucial for taking
pleasure in the proper activities at the proper time. Morality is pecu
liarly concerned with human activities from Aristotle's point of view,
and the present discussion indicates the role of pleasure in reinforcing
the moral activities that human beings pursue.
In the last section of 10.5, Aristotle finally attempts to determine
how one can tell which activities are good, as he shifts from the nature
of activity and its relation to pleasure to a determination of what activ
ities bring true pleasure. He begins by noting that different kinds of
animals seem to have a characteristic pleaure, perhaps seeking a par
ticular food. When it comes to specifying the typically human plea
sure, however, the issue becomes clouded with confusion since differ
ent individuals find contrary activities pleasant and the same
individual may find contrary activities pleaant at different times.
Aristotle seeks to cut through this confusion with an appeal to the
standard used from the very outset of the Ethics: the real good is what
appears so to the good man ( '0 oJouCaL\) )
.
u This narrows the scope
of relevant activities to those that are decent or good, but Aristotle
then seeks among different kinds of human activties which of their
pleaures is most distinctively human. "Or, is it clear from the ac
tivities? For pleasures accompany these activities. Whether it is one
or many, then, the activities are those of the perfect and blessed man;
the pleasures that perfect these activities would be said to be human
12
NE 10.5.1175b30-3.
t3NE 10.5.1176al6.
814 GARY M. GURTLER
pleasures strictly, but the rest are [pleasures] secondarily or to an
even lesser degree, as are their activities" ( Ex 'WV fvEgyw'Dv ofAov;
ca'au; yag nonm at 11oovaL Eh' ouv fLa Eoctv EhE nAELOU at wu
'EAdou xat w.xag(ou avOQO, at 'auw. 'EAELoDom oovat XUQLW
AEymv'' av &v8gwnou oovat dvm, at 0 AOLnat OEU'tEQC xat
noAAoa'W, wanEQ at Evgyam).14 The search for the properly hu
man pleasure joins up with the definition of happiness in terms of the
human function already given in 1. 7 and thus sets the agenda for the
discussion of happiness in 10.6-8. The context of 10.5, moreover, in
dicates that Aristotle is not comparing competing kinds of lives but
looking at those activities that belong to someone supremely perfect
and happy.
III
Aristotle begins the analysis of happiness by placing it in the con
text of the rest of the Ethics, specifically listing three areas: vrtues,
friendships, and pleasures (loosely, books 1-7, 8-9, and 10.1-5, re
spectively). This statement indicates that all three areas are impor
tant for determining the nature of happiness, although this paper will
focus primarily on references to pleasure. Aristotle refers back to
comments in 7.11-14, where happiness, or the highest good, is an ac
tivity and the nature of such an activity is some kind of pleasure ( w:;
11Cov11).15 More importantly, however, he uses the discussion just con
cluded in 10.1-5, with its careful analysis of pleasure as a activity
that accompanies and perfects the exercise of other activities. This
includes two interrelated issues, the closeness between pleasures and
their activities and the determination of the goodness of a pleasure on
the basis of the goodness of the activity it accompanies (10.5). It is
precisely this last question that leads to the case of the sage as perfect
and blessed and whose virtuous activities relate in different ways to
happiness, the topic of 10.6-8.
Aristotle reiterates that happiness is not a habit but properly an
activity (rvrgywiv uva),w points made both in 1.7-8 and 10.5. He
H NB 10.5.1176a25-9.
1'' NB 7.13.1153b9-14.
HiNB 10.6.1176bl.
adds that if activities are divided into two kinds, those chosen as
means a opposed to those chosen for themselves, then happiness will
be among those chosen for themselves. The sage, moreover, appears
to choose a variety of activities for themselves. If the last section of
10.5 has indeed set the context for the consideration of happiness,
then these activities have some claim to association with happiness,
whether in the fullest sense, secondarily, or in some lesser degree, as
Aristotle put it there.17 Further, this comment indicates that the prob
lem is neither choosing among them, depending on the circumstances,
nor avoiding one of them entirely but rather how all three activities
are related to someone perfectly blessed as a human being.
18
First, he examines how amusements contribute to happiness. "It
seems then these things pertain to happiness, since those in power
spend their leisure in them" (box1 tEV oiv EVOmovtxO -au-a dvm
Ota 'tO 'tOU< EV O'VCO'ELat< EV 'OU'tt< cmooxoAatav ).19 In response,
Aristotle associates happiness with morally good activities, where the
pleasure is pure and free (bovi< dAtXQtvou< xaL EAE'8EQLO'),20 and
not with activities asociated with power or the bodily. His point is
that the activities geared to human happiness are related to human
reason as the defning part of human nature and thus have their
source in virtue and intelligence, echoing 1. 7. Those who are morally
virtuous value what is necessarily the best, while the wicked or chil
dren identify the best with what they desire.
17 NE 10.5. 1175a27-9.
18
What is important to note in the present context is that amusement,
moral virtue, and contemplation are seen as related to happiness, at least in
common opinion. A he distinguishes the first two from the precise activity
of happiness, Aristotle will identify the particular notes that make contempla
tion different from amusement and moral activity, defining how happiness is
self-sufficient and consists in leisure, while the activities of moral virtue have
leisure as their end and the leisure afforded by amusements is actually only a
means relative to the bodily condition of the subject. These connections dis
appear in the traditional interpretation where happiness is analyzed in terms
of a choice between two lives, theoretical or practical, with pleasure simply
discarded. Most of the authors mention self-sufficiency and completeness as
the major characteristics of happiness and contemplation but almost totally
neglect the role of leisure and the link it provides among the three activities.
WNE 10.6.1176bl6-17.
2o
NE 10.6. 1176b20.
816 GARY M. GURTLER
Amusement, then, cannot be identified with the authentic happi
ness of the virtuous. Nonetheless, it continues to play a role as a
means. "For amusement is like rest; those who are not able to work
continuously have need of rest; but rest is certainly not the end, since
it is for the sake of activity" ( avaJa1OEL yag EOLXEV JaLCHCt"
a6'VaLOiVtE 6 O'VEXW JOVELV avanaUOEW Movtm ou 6 tEAO
avaJa'OL" yLvEtm yag EVEXa ti EVEQYElU).21 Aristotle reiterates a
condition of the agent that makes the rest provided by amusement
necessary. Activity involves effort and thus cannot be sustained for
long, and ausement restores our organic well-being so the activty
can be resumed. Amusement is thus distinct both from pleasures of
the senses and from happiness. It falls between the two: amusement
is not simply the exercise of one sense or another but is linked to lei
sure a a form of rest; it is thus actually only a means and so does not
count as happiness, though some may mistakenly choose it as if it
were. A a means, it is not concered with the structure of happiness
as a perfect activity but rather with the condition of the agent as sub
ject to fatigue and needing rest in order to return to those activities
which happiness can accompany. This point about the agent has its
frst articulation in his analysis of pleaure at 10.4.1175a4-10. Thus,
Aristotle's account of amusement is not of a theory or a life totally re
jected but of an activity that plays a limited role in relation to happi
ness. The limitation is twofold since amusement is not an end and
does not directly relate to virtue but concerns only the bodily well
being of the agent. Of the three options Aristotle gives at the end of
10.5, amusement is only to a lesser degree related to happiness.22
10.7-8 brings us, finally, to the crux of scholarly dispute. These
two chapters can be divided into three sections. Each section begins
with a straightforward identification of happiness with contempla
tion, which is then supported by analysis of relevant issues. The first
section identifies happiness with contemplation, listing characteris
tics derived from 1.7-8 and 10.4-5 and introducing the notion of lei
sure.23 The second revolves around the issue of life, with possible al
lusion to 1.5, but developed in terms of whether the contemplative life
is actually possible and concluding once more that happiness consists
z1
NE 10.6.1176b34-1177al.
THE ACTIVITY OF HAPPINESS IN ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS 81 7
in contemplation despite the fact that it seems to go beyond the hu
man.24 The third identifies happiness a properly contemplation since
it is the one activity the gods can have. All these arguments are then
confirmed by appeal to the opinions of the wise and lived experi
ence.25
For context, let us recall that in 1.7.1098a16-18 he sets the task of
looking for the human good in terms of an activity in conformity with
virtue and if there are several virtues with the one that is best and
most complete. In 10.5.1176a-5 and 10-16, he states that each animal
has its own proper pleasure, but this is complicated for human nature
since no pleasure is a such proper to a human being. Instead, the
proper human pleasure is found by examining the activity or activities
of someone completely perfect and blessed. Thus in both of these
pasages, Aristotle leaves open whether one or more activities is at is
sue, but in 10.7 he begins with the assertion that happiness is an activ
ity in conformity with the highest virtue, the virtue of the best part in
us. "The activity of this [part] according to its proper virtue would be
perfect happiness; but this is contemplative activity, it is said" (
2
2
This agrees with the traditional reading that amusement is not to be
identifed with happiness, but emphasizes that it is still related to happiness,
understood in relation to virtue. Amusement may not be needed for the hap
piness of the gods, who do not have the same kind of corporeal component,
but such exclusion does not fit Aristotle's account of the human subject. Al
though a life of pleasure is not so much a rival theory about a third kind of
happiness but a life that is essentially vicious (since the basis for action is
solely found in pleasure), this does not eliminate the role of amusement or
pleasure in a virtuous life characterized by moral activity and contemplation.
The qualification that pleasure or amusement concer bodily rest and the
consequent connection of happiness with virtue, moreover, emphasize that
Aristotle sees the virtues, intellectual and moral, as going together. My divi
sion of 10.7-8 is designed to show that both virtues are discussed together
throughout these two chapters. One might compare Plato's discussion of
happiness in Republic 8-9, where the happiness of the philosopher may also
be seen in contemplation but where the philosopher is distinct from others
precisely in integrating the three aspects of the soul, reason, the spirited part,
and the appetites. For Plato, cities or souls devoted to honor or pleasure
(subdivided to yield four types) cut off the activty of the higher part and are
thus not integrated wholes as are the wise. It does not seem dificult to con
strue Aristotle as saying something quite similar about a life that would be
limited to practical pursuits.
2
3 NE 10. 7.1177a12-b26.
24 NE 10. 7.1177b26-10.8.1178b7.
25 NE 10.8.1178b7-1179a2.
818 GARY M. GURTLER
'OlJOU EVEQYELU xm;a tV otxdav cQEtV EL'Y av tcAda EUOaLfOVLU'
otL b' EOtL 8EWQ'tLX, dg'tm).26 He identifies the best part of us as
intelligence (voDc), either divne or the most divine part in lis, with its
objects as the highest objects of knowledge, again the noble and di
vine. From the discussion of pleasure, it is clear that Aristotle sees in
telligence at its best and engaged with the best of its objects as the
most obvious candidate for the highest kind of happiness. In rapid
succession, he then lists the attributes of such an activity.
For this activity is itself the highest-for intelligence is [the highest] of
the things in us and [the highest] of knowable objects [are those] about
which intelligence [thinks]; and it is the most continuous, for we are
able to contemplate more continuously than to do anything else what
ever. We also think it necessary that pleaure be mixed with happiness,
and the most pleasant of activities in conformity with virtue is confess
edly the one in conformity with wisdom; indeed philosophy seems to
have pleasures amazing iii. purity and certainty, and it is reasonable that
enjoyment of ideas is more pleasant than investigating them ( XQatL0Y
't yaQ av't' o1Lv vQyLa-xaL yaQ 6 vois 1wv v fLV, xaL 1wv
YVWO'tWV, JEQL & 0 vois- E'L ( ouvcxwn', 8EWQELV ' yaQ
ouvaf.Lc8a ouvcxws fdAA.ov f rtQanLv ouoiv. ot6f.c8a 't oLv oovv
rtaQaf.Ef.L'X8m 1f VOaLfLOVl\, oLo''l 0 1wv xat' UQE'tv EVEQYELWV
xa1a 'v oo<Lav Of.OA.oyouf.LEVWS o1Lv ooxci yoiv <LA.ooo<La
8auf.aOta< oovas xLv xa8aQCLO'YtL xaL_1( caLQ, d)Aoyov 6 wi<
dMoL 'WV SY'UV'WV oLw 'V OLaywyv dvm).27
These first three attributes, that contemplation is the activity that
is highest, most continuous, and most pleasant, are presented as un
controversial. The first attribute is based on Aristotle's constant posi
tion that intellect is the highest part, indicated implicitly in 1. 7 and ex
plicitly in 6.6. That this activty is most continuous is related to the
continuous nature of perfect activities, discussed in relation to plea
sure at 10. 4.1175a4-10 and to amusement at 10.6.1176b34-1177al. In
10.4, pleasures are perfect activities that accompany the activities of
the senses and, although they are continuous in the sense of being
whole and complete all at once, we do not engage in them continu
ously because they are relative to the condition of the agent, espe
cially as having sense organs. Contemplation as not related to a cor
poreal organ is intrinsically more continuous as a perfect activity, but
engaging in contemplation also depends on our physical condition as
2fNE 10.7. 1177al6-19.
27 NE 10.7.1177a19-27.
THE ACTIVITY OF HAPPINESS IN ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS 81 9
composite beings, as the rest provided by amusement attests in 10.6.
To be continuous thus does not imply that we are engaged in contem
plation all the time or that we should be engaged in it as long as possi
ble to the exclusion of other activities. 28 Finally, that happiness is
most pleasant indicates that Aristotle distinguishes it from pleasure
but nevertheless sees them as closely related. He adds further that
pleasure is associated with contemplation precisely because it is in
conformity with wisdom.
These comments are presented positively and without any com
parison to other virtues or activities. They define what Aistotle
means by happiness in terms of intellect as the highest part in us and
thus peculiar to human beings. The happiness of intellect is more pre
cisely defined in terms of wisdom, its virtue, and contemplation, the
most pleasant activity in conformity with wisdom. The other intellec
tual virtues, whether crafts or sciences (1xvm xed mo"fm), are not
asociated with happiness, nor are their activities, although they were
featured in the analysis of pleasure in 10.4. The further description of
the pleasures of philosophy indicates something about the character
of contemplation. It is not about investigating or studying idea but
about those things known with purity and certainty. Contemplation is
thus not associated with any kind of philosophical activity but with
that enjoyment that comes at the end of study or investigation and
constitutes a free and continuous resting in the truth.
This argues against identifying the activity of contemplation with
various forms of reasoning, inductive or deductive, or the work of
study or investigation. These activities are not contemplative in the
sense intended here because they are motions and thus not complete.
28In this context, Kraut's claim inHuman Good (15, 27), that one should
engage in contemplative activities a much as possible, with a heavy stress
on the quantity of time spent in it, needs to be examined. He further argues
that maximizing contemplation (11, 12, 29, 30 n. 15, 32, 76, 80, 82) brings up
the issue of egoism, which would have us maximize such activity &' much &'
possible, in contrast to a nonegoist reading, where it may in fact be limited
within the context of other responsibilities proper to one's life. My argument
rests on the idea that contemplation is not an activty that one can engage in
by itself but only as accompanying other activities related to wisdom a the
virtue of intelligence. Such activity is essentially nonquantifiable as complete
and perfect, but becomes more frequent and thus more characteristic of the
individual as wisdom is increased. Such virtues, moreover, eliminate by their
very nature a dichotomy based on egoism and altruism. See n. 8 above.
820 GARY M. GURTLER
So, not everything a philosopher does is automatically contemplative,
with its accompanying pleasure. Writing a philosophical paper, pre
paring a class, or doing research in philosophy remain motions or
becomings, with beginnings, middles, and ends. They involve steps
and their goals may or may not be attained and are, therefore, imper
fect, however philosophical they may be.29 Contemplation, however,
comes at the end of these motions, like amusement, but while amuse
ment provides rest, contemplation perfects and increases them, like
pleasure.
Contemplation is also most self-sufficient, leisured, and an end in
itself. With these next three attributes, Aristotle distinguishes how
they apply to contemplation more completely than they do to the best
and noblest activities of other virtues. He contrasts the wise, the just,
and those with other virtues. 30 All three groups need the necessities
of life. In the case of the just, the self-controlled, the brave, and so
forth, they need other people as part of the very structure of their re
spective activities, whether as objects of the activity or as helps to
carry them out. In the case of the wise, however, contemplation ha
its objects within it and can be carried out by one's self, especially as
20
Kaut, Huran Good, in identifying philosophy tout court with con
templation, tends to identify any philosophical activity with contemplation
and thus intrinsically as manifestations of happiness (6, 15-77, especially 47
and 73). He writes: "it occurs not only when one silently reflects, but also
when one lectures or writes about a certain subject, when one reads a book,
when one listens to a book being read, or when one hears someone present
ing a lecture. The teacher who is preparing lectures and notes, or who is
orally presenting a subject to students and colleagues, is consciously consid
ering truths that he has already come to understand, and so he is contemplat
ing" (73). Perhaps he is taking contemplative as a general term that covers
all actions that are not practical, thus including the activities of all the intel
lectual virtues. In the present context, however, Aistotle is making a dis
tinction between complete activities that are in a strict sense contemplative
and motions, however intellectual, that are not contemplative in this sense.
The view that underlies Kraut's comments has some undesirable conse
quences if applied to these activities. The claim would be suspect if it meant,
for example, that a philosopher always enjoyed such activities as preparing
notes or lecturing to students. If happiness, like pleasure, is a supervening
activity, then one cannot engage in it by itself and, as it were, independently
of other activities, such as those of the intellectual and moral virtues. It is
also necessary to remember that Aristotle does not hold that such activities
are necessarily accompanied by pleasure or happiness (compare n. 4).
These factors seem to argue in favor of taking contemplation in a more re
stricted sense in the present passage, a move that is not all that unusual for
Aristotle.
:loNE 10.7.1177a29.
the individual increases in wisdom. These comments refer to the
nature of the activity itself and not how wisdom, a a virtue, is
acquired and maintained or how contemplation, a its activity, may
normally occur. Self-sufficiency, further, presumes the comments
from 1. 7.1097b6-15, that define it a what makes life desirable and de
ficient in nothing, but within the context of our social nature. So the
structure of contemplation a an activity does not need others, but
other people are essential for the wise, a Aristotle maintains in the
discussion of complete friendship.31 The very structure of contempla
tion does not include other people, however, because they are not in
herently needed for its exercise. The attribute of self-sufciency thus
pertains in the highest degree to the wise. It is important to note that
Aristotle is not comparing lives or choosing among them but indicat
ing differences intrinsic to the activities of contemplation and the vir
tues. The same individual could be wise, just, self-controlled, or brave
at different times.
Aristotle next discusses contemplation a an end and a involving
leisure. These two attributes are crucial for his claim that this particu
lar intellectual activity constitutes complete happiness and not the ac
tivities of the moral virtues. "It seems that this [activity] alone is loved
for itself; for nothing comes from it beyond contemplating, but from
practical pursuits we acquire something more or less beyond the
action. Happiness seems to be in leisure, for we are busy so that we
may have leisure a we go to war so that we may gain peace" (o6sm 1'
av a1J fOV' OL' a{nv ayanao8m OUOEV yag an' au'f YLVE'm
naga 10 8wgfom, &no 0 1wv ngaxnxwv ntEov Aanov
nQLJOLOUf8a naga 'V JQUSLV. ooxEI ' EUOaLfOVLa EV Tf OXOA'
cvav aoxotouf8a yag tva oxotaWfEV xaL noAEfOUfEV tv' dgV'V
31 NE 8.3-4 discuss perfect friendship, while 8. 1. 1 155a23-32 and 9.8-9
discuss the importance of friendship for the political order and for the virtu
ous individual. It is interesting that the same objections made against con
templation are also made about perfect friendship, such as the problem of
egoism. Keeping in mind Aistotle's notion of the kinds of virtues in those ca
pable, equally, of perfect friendship and contemplation, it seems such individ
uals have moved beyond the instrumental categories that characterize justice
and regard their friend in no sense as a competitor but as the object of that
good will which seeks the friend's success. Aristotle makes a similar claim in
Politics 2.4. 1262b3-24 but in the context of a strong criticism of Socrates'
proposal in Republic 450b-c, 457 and following that wives and children be
held in common. His point is that Socrates' "altruistic" proposal would have
the opposite effect from that intended, the watering down of all relationships
in the city; only the more egoistic "mine" has the possibility of building up the
bonds of unity in the city.
822 GARY M. GURTLER
ayW[EV).32 In 1.7. 1097a0-4, when Aristotle examines ends in them
selves, he distinguishes those that are only ends and never means
from those that are both ends and means together, and he concludes
that happiness is final in the unqualified sense. In 10.6-7, he applies
this distinction to the three kinds of activities chosen by one su
premely blessed and happy. Amusement, a we saw, is only seen as
an end by children or the vicious and is not really an end at all but
only a means, given the need of the agent for rest. Practical pursuits
and contemplation, however, qualify both as activties in conformity
with virtue and as ends chosen for themselves, but Aristotle argues
that practical pursuits, even the best and noblest, have an end beyond
themselves. Aristotle takes the best, most noble activities of the
moral vrtues to be politics and war. The rest of this section argues
that they are engaged in not for themselves but for some further end:
war is waged for the sake of peace and politics for the sake of the ad
vantage, prestige, or happiness of the statesman or his fellow citizens.
They are unleisurely but oriented toward leisure.
Leisure thus functions a a subtle link among the three activities
considered in 10.6-8 and as key for understanding their differences
and the nature of happiness as an activity. Thus amusements give a
spurious kind of leisure, though it is still necessary for bodily well-be
ing, while politics and war have leisure a their end but not as compo
nent parts of the activities themselves. 33 Contemplation, therefore, is
the only candidate for happiness that is an end in itself in the strictest
sense. Leisure is asociated with such an end since it denotes an ac
tivity that is essentially pure and free, a having nothing beyond itself.
Leisure is discussed here in 10.6-8 and at 8.9. 1160a20-7, where it also
occurs in a context where politics has an aim beyond itself. Leisure is
the mark of contemplation and key for identifying it with happiness.
This discussion also emphaizes that happiness is not asociated
with virtues a dispositions of the agent but with the exercise of these
virtues in their proper activities. The structure is exactly like that of
pleaure, where pleasure comes from the exercise of powers such a<
the senses or developed habits such as the crafts or sciences. So too,
the exercise of wisdom in contemplation or of the moral virtues in
politics and warfare is the locus for determining which activity has
claim to be the proper happiness of a human being. Aristotle thus
notes that politics and warfare, although they surass all other ac-
:l2NE 10.7.1177bl-6.
tions related to virtue in nobility and grandeur, are still unleisurely
since they are for the sake of some end other than themselves and
thus cannot be identified with perfect happiness. He then concludes
that contemplation alone contains all the elements of perfect happi
ness.
But the activity of intelligence, being contemplative, seems to surpass in
esteem [these other activities] and to aim at no end besides itself, and to
have its proper pleasure (which itself increases the activity), and further
[this activity is] as self-suficient, inclined to leisure, and untiring as [is
possible] for a man and assigns many other things to one blessed: these
things appear to be owing to this activity itself; indeed this would itself
be the perfect happiness of man q oc rol vo tvtpco oouo :c
otoqcpctv oot 0cup|rtxq ooo oi o' oiqv ocv tqtc0o
ttI.ou, tctv :c ]oovqv oitov oiq oc ouvoct :jv tvtpcuv), oi
t o1opxc oq oi ooIootv oi o1p1v o ov0mn( oi oo
o/ / o t0 jtoxop(+ o:rovrjtctot, ro oo 1ou1qv tqv tvrpctov qotvto
vtqtc/tooj tuootpovtooi vti| ov0mnou).
Happiness is as closely associated with contemplation as pleaure is
with its proper activity and with the same results. Happiness in
creases contemplation in the twofold way that pleasure increases its
activity: contemplation is intensified while it is going on, and wisdom,
its proper virtue, is strengthened for the future. The agent becomes
33 In 8.9, moreover, Aristotle suggests how a more authentic kind of lei
sure is present in the practical sphere. He describes the unity the polis gives
to the communities within it, taking "polis" in the wider sense of culture.
"But all these [communities] seem to be under the polis, for the political
[community] does not aim at a present advantage, but one for the whole of
life. [They] offer sacrifices and hold gatherings for such sacrifices, rendering
honor to the gods and providing for themselves rest with pleasure. For the
ancient sacrifices and festive gatherings appear to be after the harvest as an
offering of first fruits, for at these times people used to have most leisure"
ooo o' oro u tqv oInqv totootv cvot ov o tol ovtO
oqrpovto q :to/tq rqtcrot, o/I' s ovto rv ov. 0uoto tc
ouvtc oi :tcpttt ouvoou, ttpo tc onovcovtc tOi 0coi oi
ourOi ovo:touoct :rot,ovtc jtc0' qoovq. o o ooio 0uoto oi
OUVOOOL catvOV'aL ytvw0m !e'U 1ac 'WV XUQJWV ouyxOLOac, c|cv
ooot jto toro o tv ttot toIo(ov t i ooi) (8.9.1160a20-7).
He is not speaking in this context of the activities of individuals, whether mil
itary or political leaders, but rather of the community as a whole, gathered in
leisure, with the freedom to look at the human situation as a whole, through
ritual and drama. In either case, such activities have the characteristics of
contemplation, a perfect activity done not as a means but as that which is
whole and complete. One can also refer here to Aristotle's idea that drama is
more philosophical than history, since it points toward the universal (Poetics
1.9.1451b5-10).
34NE 10.7.1177bl9-25.
824 GARY M. GURTLER
formally wiser, more identified with wisdom. Contemplation, more
over, also functions a a proper end that draws the agent into exercis
ing this virtue more frequently and being more adept at doing it. In
this way, more opportunities for contemplation arise, showing how
Aristotle can hold that happiness is an activity, not a habit or charac
teristic, and yet can describe a life a happy since happiness can be in
creaingly exercised a the virtue it accompanies and perfects be
comes more dominant in the individual's life. The activity of
contemplation, in sum, brings into play those things that are most hu
man because they are most free, pleaant, and self-sufficient, all char
acteristics of leisure.
The second section explores an issue brought up at 1. 7.1098a18,
and echoed here at 10. 7.1177b25, that happiness demands a complete
span of life.35 This section ha been taken as being about the choice
between the contemplative life and a life of virtue. The background
for this is in the three lives listed in 1.5, so that Aristotle seems here to
contrat the two lives left (10.6 having excluded amusements or a life
of pleaure), exhorting us to choose the contemplative life over the
life of moral virtue. A closer look at the text, however, reveals that
Aristotle is actually referring back to 1.7.1098a18 about a "complete
span of life" and thus has other issues in mind. First, the happiness
associated with the activity of contemplation cannot be an isolated or
chance event but must somehow characterize the life of the sage a a
whole. Since it cannot be a habit and is a divine activity, it could oc
cur only accidentally or haphazardly in the cae of a human being and
thus a contemplative lot would be impossible. Aristotle is asuring
us that this is not the case but that contemplation concerns a "com
plete life," even if it is defined in terms of one part of the soul, intelli
gence. Despite going beyond the needs and activities of the compos
ite, the activity of this small part remains nonetheless the defining
element, distinguishing us from other creatures, with the conclusion
that human happiness consists properly in contemplation.
In addition, a complete span of life is not concerned with ques
tions of how much time is spent contemplating a opposed to doing
anything else but with whether a life in conformity with intelligence is
possible for the sage a a mere mortal. Aristotle thus begins with the
paradox that a life in conformity with intelligence is in fact more than
human: it is divine. As higher than human, such a life is not lived in
virtue of our being composite but in virtue of having some part within
us that is divine. That intelligence is divine rests also on the idea that
35 David Keyt, "The Meaning of BLo< in Aristotle's Ethics and Politics,"
Ancient Philosophy 9 (1989): 15-21, seeks to widen the range of meaning of
Lo<, arguing against John Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Arstotle
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 159-60. By this means, he
wants to support what he sees as the growing consensus that 10.7-8 is con
sistent with the rest of the ethics as advocating a mixed life of political and
contemplative activity. He uses passages from the Politics to show that
Aristotle does think that one can have more than one Lo< at a time, so that
his comments in 10.7-8 need not be taken as modes of life that are mutually
exclusive or that intellectual activity as such includes attention to all the vir
tues (a suggested by John Cooper, "Contemplation and Happiness: Recon
sideration," Synthese 72 [1987]: 208). In contrasting tw and Lo<, he sees
the one as more related to faculties of soul and the other to different occupa
tions or careers. The use of tw is more straightforward, with Aristotle dif
ferentiating the specific human function in 1. 7 as that power of the soul that
differentiates human beings from animals. The use of Lo< is more difficult to
categorize. I find three different locutions in EN, of which two are relevant
to the discussion in 10.7-8. The first occurs twice, at 1.7.1098a18 (v LQ
'EAELQ) and here at 10.7.1177b25 (!ixo< LOU 'tEAELou). The second also oc
curs twice, at 8.9.1160a23-4 (EL< cbmvm n)v Lov, quoted above in n. 33) and
at 10.8.1178b26 (ana< o Lo<). The third occurs numerous times and consists
of Lo< with different adjectives or prepositional phrases. The frst locution
concers a "complete life," but it is not clear what Aristotle means by this. A
indicated in n. 28, this has been taken quantitatively, with the corollary that
Aistotle is exhorting one to contemplate as much and for as long as possible.
This does not seem plausible to me since the context deals instead with the
possibility of contemplation for a human being. Aristotle argues that it is
most human precisely as a divine activity, and thus a contemplative Lo< is
not only possible but the proper end. His second use refers to a "whole life,"
in relation to the polis in one instance, where happiness is the aim of politics,
and to the gods in the other, where it serves to contrast what the gods have
by nature with what human beings have to the extent that they have a like
ness to that divine activity. In the first case, the aim of politics (no doubt in a
wider sense than currently used) is not for a present advantage, but for the
whole of life. The festival refers to the whole of life, not in a quantitative
sense but precisely as free from temporal contingencies and giving a glimpse
of human existence as a whole. This supports the notion that a "complete
life" in 10.7-8 includes all the aspects of human existence in relation to con
templation. In the second case, there is a contrast between the gods, whose
sole activity is contemplation, and human beings, who have a variety of activ
ities, including contemplation. These uses allow us to see that a life of con
templation, for the sage as a man, need not exclude other activities. At the
same time, contemplation as an activity need not include other activities,
such as those of the virtues. For the other uses of Lo<, Keyt is conect that
they can be successive or simultaneous. Finally, Keyt's description of Lo< as
a career or occupation is a move away from the rigid sense of mode of life but
is perhaps a bit too extrinsic. Perhaps "personality" can provide an analogy
(rather than a translation) for what it means. Thus, a contemplative person
ality can be dominant without being exclusive, allowing a secondary, virtu
ous personality to function. A personality in conformity with moral virtue,
however, is dominant in a more restrictive sense, allowing for instances of
contemplation, but only occasionally and accidentally. This allows Aistotle
to hold that a life exclusively devoted to pleasure cuts off the possibility of a
virtuous life, or that a life exclusively devoted to practical pursuits similarly
cuts off a contemplative life, but that a contemplative life necessarily in
cludes the other two, in proper proportion, as complete and whole.
826 GARY M. GURTLER
God is intelligence, taken up in the third section. A life in conformity
with intelligence is thus divine in comparison with human life; thus,
Aristotle spells out what is implicit in his initial statements in 10.7 that
intelligence is the most divine part in us and its objects are noble and
divine. He then replies to those who would confine us to the human
by encouraging us to do everything to live according to this highest
part. He adds that this is the true self (literally that each one is this:
dvm !: xcwws wuw ), 36 the ruling and better part of us, however small
it may appear. At 10.7.11 78a5-8, he refers back to the end of the dis
cussion on pleaure,37 where what is best and most pleasant for each
creature is what is proper to it by nature. With this background in
place, he concludes once more that a life in conformity with intelli
gence, a of the best part and a most what it is to be human, will be
the happiest; a such, he repeats the identification of happiness with
the activity of intelligence, already asserted in the first section.
He moves quickly to consider human life in the restricted sense
of the moral virtues. "A life in conformity with the other virtue [is
happy] secondarily, for the activities according to this vrtue are hu
man" (6E'EQWt 6' 6 xata tV aAlYV cQEtV. at yag xata taUtYV
vgyam &v8gwmxal).38 The moral virtues are human rather than di
vine because they necessarily involve elements outside intelligence.
The moral virtues, such as justice, courage, and the other virtues, re
late us to other people, whether by agreements, needs, or actions in
general. Some virtues, moreover, are concered with our bodily con
dition or emotions, thus making clear their seat in the composite.
Most significant, however, is the description of practical wisdom
( cQOVYOLt), the intellectual virtue closest to wisdom. Practical wis-
36 NE 10. 7.1178a2.
:37 NE 10.5.11763-6.
38 NE 10.8.1178a9-10. The life of moral virtue is ranked second not be
cause it is a secondary kind of happiness but because it consists in activities
that are essentially for the sake of something else. Leisure, to which the ac
tivities of the practical virtues, especially political and military pursuits, are
ordered a to their end, is the controlling concept in this regard (compare n.
2). A life characterized by practical pursuits, consequently, is secondarily
happy because it is unleisurely and consists in those activities that are for the
sake of leisure and not because it is a second best option. Leisure is identi
fied with the happiness of contemplation since it is an activity done for its
own sake, glimpses the wholeness of life, and is pure and free. Contempla
tion, in other words, is that to which practical pursuits are ordered.
dom receives its first principles from the moral virtues, which in turn
receive their standard from practical wisdom. These principles and
this standard are intimately concered with activities involving other
people, our own bodies, and sensible particulars around us. Since it
must operate with knowledge of particulars, neither its activities nor
its objects are the best. In sum, the moral virtues are not concerned
exclusively with the highest part in us but with our composite nature,
and the virtues and happiness of our composite nature are merely hu
man, prescinding from the divine part in us. A life in conformity with
the moral virtues is, therefore, secondary both in terms of the nature
of its activities a well as its objects.
While the happiness of the moral life is related to our composite
nature, the happiness of intellect is separate. Aristotle does not say
why it is separate but seems to direct us to other works where intel
lect39 and its objects40 are separate. How it is separate can be inferred
in the present context a not concerned with the composite and its
particular needs. His concern shifts from how other people fit into the
structure of contemplation and practical pursuits to the extent that
external goods are necessary for their exercise. Both activities are
more or less equal in terms of the necessities of life, thus continuing
Aristotle's attention to the condition of the agent as relevant for the
exercise of all activities, including contemplation, but they differ in
terms of the goods needed for their specific activities. Property,
strength, and opportunities (XQl[Hhwv, 6uvcEWS, ouo(as),41 for ex
ample, are needed for the virtues of generosity, justice, bravery, and
self-control. Further, moral virtue includes both choice and particular
actions. Choice, as the deliberation of the agent, is internal and thus
does not need external things for its exercise. Particular actions, how
ever, need a diversity of external goods or bodily strength to carry out
the choice, especially for greater and nobler actions.
In contrast, contemplation needs none of these things in its exer
cise, and they may in fact hinder it. Aristotle is again referring to the
structure of the activity itself. He thus adds that a human and as
living with others, an individual will need these things both for vir
tuous actions and to live humanly, thereby including both benefit to
others and perfecting oneself within the purview of a complete human
30 De Anima 3.5.
40 Metaphysics 1.2.
41 NE 10.8.1178a29, 32, 33.
828 GARY M. GURTLER
life. Thus, Aristotle's argument actually examines the role of external
goods in relation to the two kinds of activities, with virtuous activities
needing a variety of things to carry them out but contemplation either
not needing these things or finding them a hindrance. It is important
to note that Aristotle continues to focus on the activities involved. He
does not say that the sage chooses a life of contemplation to the ex
clusion of a life of moral virtue. In fact, he says just the opposite, that
the sage "chooses to act in conformity with virtue, thus there will be
need of these things in order to act a a human being" ( aigEhm 1a
xa1a 1i)v agEci)v ng<h'ELV' bcOE'm o:v 1wv 'OLOu'wv JQO 10
av8gonuca8m).42
The third section brings Aristotle's own account to a conclusion,
adding opinions and experiences that serve to confirm it. He begins
with the point to be proven. "But happiness is perfect because it is a
contemplative activity, as the following will show" ( b 'EAda
EUOULLOVLa OtL 8EWQ'YtL' 'l f(tLV fVEQyHa, xat fV'EU8EV av
<avd').43 He states that the gods are regarded as eminently happy
and asks the kind of actions we attribute to them. He mentions sev
eral virtuous actions, whether just, brave, generous, self-controlled, or
any others one could list, and says that all of them are trivial and un
worthy of the gods. The gods, however, are alive and so active. Thus,
if doing is taken away from them and making even more, then only
contemplation remains for such a living being. "Therefore the activity
of God, surpassing in blessedness, would be contemplative. Ad thus,
of human activities the one most akin to it will be the one most condu
cive to happiness" (woe wu 8cou vgyLa, 1LaxaQLO''n
DLa<EQO'Oa, 8EWQ'LL'l av EL'. xat 'WV av8gwnlvwv bi] 'allT
O"YYEVEOL' EUDmLOVLXW'c'').44 He confirms this by noting the in
verse, that animals cannot share in happiness because they are inca
pable of contemplation. Aristotle presents a comparison between the
life of the gods, which is solely manifest in contemplation, since doing
and making are inappropriate to the gods, and human beings, whose
activities include doing and making, but are akin to the gods by their
ability to contemplate. The comparison is extended to show that hu
man beings are also distinct from other animals that may have a par
ticular pleasure but cannot share in happiness. Human beings thus
42 NE 10.8.1178b6-7.
43 NE 10.8.1178b7-8.
44 NE 10.8.1178b21-3.
fall in between: not completely blessed as are the gods nor completely
bereft of happiness a are other animals but happy insofar as they
have some likeness to this divine activity. This returs to and com
pletes the search for the specific virtue of the human function, begun
already at 1. 7, as well as the specific human pleasure that is set a the
task at 10.5. In 1. 7, Aristotle states that it is not living or nutritive ac
tivities or sensing but reason that defines the human function. In 10.5,
he argues that each animal has a specific pleasure, and he searches for
that activity which defines the specific pleasure for human beings, in
terms of the sage. Happiness, as the activity of contemplation, is this
specific human pleasure, but it is unlike the pleaure of an animal
since it is defned in terms of contemplation, an activity that has its
central cae in terms of the gods.
It is worth noting that this is the only time in these two chapters
that a comparison is drawn about different kinds of lives, between the
gods and human beings on the one side and human beings and animals
on the other. The major part of the argument compares and contrasts
activities and what is needed to carry them out. The conclusion that
follows is the clearest statement identifying happiness and contempla
tion. "A far as contemplation extends, so does happiness, and the
more it belongs to certain beings to contemplate, so [it belongs to
them] to be happy, not accidentally but owing to the contemplation:
for contemplation is in itself valuable. Happiness would, therefore, be
contemplation in some form" (<' ooov ( 6La-ELVEL 8EWQLa, xaL
EU6aL!,OVLa, xaL o
i
r wxAov UJUQXEL 10 8EWQELV, xaL EU6aL!,OVELV, ou
xa1a O'!EYXO a/.( xm:a 'V 8EWQLav au1 yaQ xa8' au'V
'L!La. wo1' ELY &v Eu6m!ovta 8EWQLa u<).45
This conclusion is more than just the clearest expression of Aris
totle's argument that happiness is proper to contemplation. He also
articulates what is implicit all the way through these eight chapters of
book 10: why pleasure and happiness are not the same thing. At times
in the course of his discussion happiness may sound like a particular
form of pleasure in relation to human beings, but the two differ more
essentially. Pleasure accompanies some activity of the body or com
posite being, whether activties of the senses or of habits and dis
positions, and includes desires and appetites for external objects.
45 NE 10.8.1178b28-32.
830 GARY M. GURTLER
Pleasure is, then, a bodily state that, a it were, results from an activ
ity or inclines to it. Happiness, on the contrary, is defined by contem
plation. Contemplation is not a bodily state but an activity of intelli
gence, which Aristotle ha been at pains to show needs neither the
body nor external objects as internal components of the activity itself.
Contemplation is thus a perfect activity in the most precise sense of
the term since it is whole, complete, and continuous in a way that
moves beyond the merely human to include a sharing in the divine.
The central case of contemplation is in fact God, who can have no
other kind of activity, such as doing or making, from Aristotle's point
of view.
After reaching this height, Aristotle concludes with the reminder
that the structure of contemplation is one thing and being human an
other. While contemplation in itself is self-sufficient, being human is
not, so that for us to contemplate, external goods are needed, begin
ning with health and food for the body but including those resources
needed for virtuous activity. In this lat section, Aristotle gives vari
ous arguments for being content with moderate resources, with only
what is needed to be able to contemplate on one's own a well as for
engaging in virtuous activity, and he indicates that the wise are also
virtuous. He finds confirmation for this moderation in the opinions of
philosophers, as he mentions Solon and Anaxagoras a finding those
happy whose moderate resources are sufficient for noble deeds, and
not the rich and powerful mistakenly preferred in the opinion of the
many. He concludes this section with the favor bestowed by the gods
on those active with intelligence, and he argues that this is one more
bit of evidence that the wise are indeed the happiest.46
IV
In using the analysis of pleaure to shed light on the nature of
happiness, the consistency of Aristotle's position and the unity of
10.6-8 both become clear. Aristotle is insistent that happiness is de
fined in terms of contemplation rather than moral virtue, but this is
neither inconsistent with his position in 1.7-8 nor does it imply an ex
clusively intellectualist view. The key is his analysis in 10.7-8 that
contemplation is precisely an activity. The traditional debate, how
ever, brings a number of assumptions to the text. The three lives are
seen as choices that are exclusive of one another. In recent literature,
this exclusivity is combined with a quantitative understanding of the
preference for contemplation that sees Aristotle as encouraging maxi
mum engagement in this activity. Choosing a life of contemplation
thus means either that all one's time and energy are directed solely to
contemplative activity, to the exclusion of other activities, or, with a
more benign reading, that more and more of one's time and energy are
so directed. This reading, however, does not take into account the
task Aristotle sets for himself in 10.5 of finding that activity of the sage
that is distinctively human and thus constitutive of human happiness
in the strictest, formal sense. It also tends to obscure Aristotle's com
ments that qualify the nature of contemplation as an activity in rela
tion to the human agent, who has a spectrum of needs and of activities
designed to take care of them.
Central to clearing up what Aristotle means in 10.7-8 is his use of
the term "life." The introduction of the "complete span of life" has
been taken to mean that contemplative activity needs to be quantita
tively dominant, with the implication that Aristotle wants an individ
ual to spend more and more time in contemplation. A I mentioned
46 A problem remains: is happiness restricted just to philosophers or
not? I have shown above that happiness cannot a such be identified simplis
tically with philosophical activities but is identified with contemplation of di
vine and noble objects. This can come a the end of philosophical refection,
a Aristotle makes clear in Metaphysics 1.1-2, but the question is whether he
restricts contemplation of the divine to this. Hints in the Poetics indicate that
some philosophical value is present in drama, and the Metaphysics itself
seems to imply that the Unmoved Mover can be contemplated in the motions
of the heavenly sphere. In principle, then, Aristotle need not restrict contem
plation to the philosopher, but it does seem true that, in practice, he and the
rest of the Greek philosophical tradition have a tendency to restrict it.
Merrill Ring, "Aristotle and the Concept of Happiness," in Depew, Greeks and
the Good Life, 69-90, is extreme in taking Aristotle's comments on happiness
a contemplation to mean that he advocates only one standard and only one
conception for happiness (85-9). However much Aristotle in practice identi
fies happiness with the wise, it is clear that the narrow view Ring describes
does not give due regard to the complex happiness of the wise, nor is Aristo
tle so single minded a to preclude any vestige of happiness to others. In this
regard, Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, "The Place of Contemplation in Aristotle's
Nicomachean Ethics," in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, 377-94, is helpful in
widening the range of what Aristotle means by contemplation (378), espe
cially in her analysis of the use of 8EWQLV in relationship to friendship in 9.9
(388-91). Rorty tends, however, to amalgamate contemplation and wisdom,
a if contemplation and practical wisdom were the two virtues that Aristotle
compares. Her discussion of 9. 9 indicates, however, the sense of contempla
tion that I have attempted to clarify by distinguishing it a the activity that
comes a an end in relation to wisdom a its virtue.
832 GARY M. GURTLER
earlier, if that is the intent, it is odd that Aristotle actually addresses a
very different issue: whether a contemplative life is possible or appro
priate for a human being. Does a "complete span of life" have a differ
ent meaning? If we look back to the occurrence of the same phrase in
1. 7, Aristotle is concerned that a life according to virtue (not further
specified in that early passage) cannot be a single event or even a few
isolated events. It cannot be accidental but something substantial;
one's whole life must be essentially contemplative. The issue is then
formal rather than quantitative, and the discussion in 10.7-8 confirms
this. Aristotle is concerned to show that intelligence is in fact part of
us, however small it may appear and however much its activity goes
beyond the human. The perfection of this part through contemplation
is the highest perfection for a human being, and this perfection is ow
ing to the nature of intelligence a separate and of contemplation as
needing nothing external for its exercise. Its perfection formally ex
ceeds the secondary perfection of moral virtue, which thinks about
particulars and which needs exteral resources to carry out its activi
ties.
Further, contemplation does not perfect intelligence as a habit or
disposition since it is essentially an activity. This fact is perhaps the
reason Aristotle uses the locution, "a complete span of life." Contem
plation and happiness do not perfect us in the formal way virtues do
but in the way pleasure does in accompanying a sense and its object
under the best of conditions. Thus, contemplation and happiness per
fect us as a final cause, with its twofold aspect of increasing the activ
ity a it is going on a well as the corresponding disposition for the fu
ture. That is, we formally become wiser so that our life may indeed be
said to be in conformity with intelligence without the necessity of en
gaging in contemplation all the time or even most of the time. When is
it appropriate to engage in contemplation, or the secondary happiness
of moral virtue, or in amusements? Aristotle takes notice throughout
the present discussion of the concrete human being, with the com
mon needs of life, health, and rest, as well as those needs arising from
our social nature. I would seem reasonable, therefore, that we en
gage in these various activities according to the criteria of book 2:
when the circumstances make it appropriate and to the extent that it
is appropriate.
To be sure, Aristotle compares three kinds of life but not as mu
tually exclusive options. Rather, in both 1.5 and 10.6-8, he examines
them a common opinions about the happy life. We must keep in
mind, however, Aristotle's usual procedure in examining common
opinions.47 He criticizes what is false in them but also attempts to in
dicate the kernel of truth that underlies the opinion and continues to
make it relevant, even for the wise. Thus, some identify happiness
with a life of amusement. This opinion is based on the fact that
amusement does have a role to play in a happy life but only as the rest
needed by the human subject to engage in properly virtuous activities.
If one were to take it as the end, one leaves out this subordinate role
relative to the moral and intellectual virtues that are central for defin
ing human happiness. The opinion that happiness can be found in
moral pursuits is based on the fact that such activities are directly as
sociated with human virtue, but they are only secondary because such
activities are ordered to something else as their end, namely, the lei
sure that characterizes contemplation.
Throughout 10. 6-8, Aristotle is careful to distinguish the essential
nature of contemplation that establishes it a perfect human happi
ness from the complex character of the human agent as a living being
with a variety of needs and activities. Aristotle's procedure in dealing
with common opinions is thus not meant to exclude such opinions to
tally but to show how they can be held by some in mistaken fahion
and yet continue to have a kernel of truth when understood with
proper philosophical precision. His intent is clear from his constant
reintegration of these activities into the life of the sage. Aristotle ob
serves throughout this discussion that human beings exercise contem
plation under certain conditions and that contemplation, while the
highest activity, is not the only activity. Thus, though its activity is
highest and most valuable, intelligence remains part of a complex be
ing that ha other activities a well. Aristotle states quite simply
toward the end of his discussion48 that the activity of intelligence is
47 For a discussion of the dialectical relationship between common opin
ion and philosophical reflection see Monan, Moral Knowledge, 98-104.
Monan does not recognize that this dialectical pattern applies to the discus
sion of the three lives in NE 10. (He is not alone in this: no one in the current
debate considers the possibility either). My argument, however, takes this a
exactly the procedure Aristotle is using in 10.6-8, with the result that these
chapters no longer need to be taken a being in disagreement with Aristotle's
general ethical position. It follows from this that Monan's notion that
Aristotle is using a distinctive psychology in 10. 7-8 (122-6; 132-7), where the
individual is identified with nous rather than the composite of body and soul,
and other attempts to make these chapters distinctive are no longer needed.
4RNE 10. 8. 1 1 78b33-5.
834 GARY M. GURTLER
self-sufficient but that our nature is not self-sufficient for contempla
tion.
Aristotelian happiness thus has a complex structure as an activ
ity. It is, first of all, like pleasure, whole, complete, and continuous
and perfects the activity it accompanies. This means that happiness is
neither an activity that stands alone nor a disposition or virtue but
that it accompanies its proper activity and thereby enhances it. A the
particular pleasure of human beings, it concerns the highest human
activity functioning in relation to its best objects. Aristotle identifies
this with contemplation, making happiness an activity of intelligence
characterized by leisure. Contemplation is the free and complete ex
ercise of wisdom, the only intellectual virtue whose activity is perfect
since the crafts and sciences are imperfect and practical wisdom is
exercised through actions dependent on factors external to intelli
gence. Contemplation perfects an individual much as pleasure per
fects its proper activity. It reinforces wisdom, making the individual
more proficient at the activities of this virtue and motivating contin
ued interest in such activities. This means that contemplation is like
pleasure in structure, for it comes at the end of activities as a free and
pure activity, one of leisure. Leisure, in tur, indicates how contem
plation relates to amusement and practical pursuits since it is their
goal. Insofar as practical pursuits relate to virtue and intelligence,
they have a share in happiness, but since these activities consist of el
ements external to intelligence, this happiness can only be secondary.
While happiness is defined strictly in terms of a part small in bulk
within a human being, that part nevertheless constitutes what is cen
tral for human identity, with all one's other activities done for the
sake of this activity as their end. Thus, Aistotle uses his notion of
happiness to integrate the best of human activities rather than to put
us in the dilemma of choosing which human good to pursue.40
Boston College
4u A earlier version of this paper was presented in April 1998 at John
Carroll University when I was visiting professor holding the Edmund F.
Miller, S.J., Chair in Classical Studies. My thanks are due to the Administra
tion and the Department of Classical and Modem Languages for their kind
support of my research and to the audience for their receptive comments on
that early paper that have sustained me in revising it for publication.

The Activity of Happiness in Aristotle'S Ethics

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The activity of happiness in aristotle's ethics

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