Advance Copy

Reform of the Power Sector, Orissa, India

Paper Prepared for the Civil Society Consultation on the

2003 Commonwealth Finance Ministers Meeting

Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam

22 – 24 July 2003

N. Sreekumar
Prayas Energy Group, India

The published version of this report will be available in 2004 and may be subject to final editing.
Abstract

This paper reviews the reform of the power sector in the State of Orissa, India. Reforms were
initiated in 1993 in Orissa, one of the poorest states in India, under World Bank guidelines. The
state-owned Orissa State Electricity Board, which had a monopoly in the sector, was unbundled
into 7 corporations. Two of them handled generation, one was a transmission company and four
were distributors. The Thermal Generation Company and the four distribution companies were
subsequently privatised. A separate Regulatory Commission was set up. World Bank and other
Financial Institutions organised a funding of US$997 million to carry out extensive reforms over
a 5-year period, 1997-2002. This reform process was hailed as a pioneer effort and a model for
power reform in India. It was expected to turn around the loss-making sector.

It has now become clear that the results are far from this. All the utilities (private or public)
continue to make losses with the state-owned Transmission Company being the worst hit. Private
distribution companies have not improved the quality or efficiency of operation. Rural
electrification has been neglected. There have been regular tariff hikes with maximum impact on
the poorer consumers. The review committee set up by the state government in 2001 has severely
criticised the whole reform process for being non-participatory and unscientific. This paper
explains the reform process and concludes that only a consultative process can arrive at the right
diagnostics of the sector’s problems and suggest reforms which would improve it.
Democratisation of governance is the key to the solution.

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1. BACKGROUND

With an area of 156,000 km2 and a population of nearly 37 million, Orissa is one of the poorest
states in India. On most development indicators, Orissa is far below the national average,
whether for its per capita income (US$131 vs. national average of US$260) or its share of the
population below the poverty line (48 per cent vs. the national average of 26 per cent). The
economy is largely agriculture-based, with nearly 75 per cent of the population dependent on it.
The state is rich in mineral resources and has nearly 25 per cent of India's coal reserves. Orissa
has the misfortune to be ravaged by natural calamities - droughts during summer and cyclones
during the rainy season.

Orissa is the 'pioneer' in power sector reforms in India. From the early 90s, Orissa was the focus
of attention among power policy watchers. Expectations were high. Things started going wrong
in 1999-2000. A government-appointed committee pointed out the many shortcomings of the
reform programme. With very few positive outcomes after 8 years and millions of rupees spent,
today there are many critics of the Orissa reform programme.

A study of what happened in Orissa provides insight into what is wrong with the power sector,
what could be the remedies and what are the changes that may make things worse.
Section 1 gives a brief overview of the Indian power sector and captures the changes that led to
the Orissa reforms. Sections 2 and 3 give the outline of the reform process and a report card on
the programme. Section 4 summarises the major learnings from the Orissa reforms and Section 5
identifies the lessons for the Indian power sector. We have conducted this study from a
perspective of policy analysis and relied on reports, interactions with power sector personnel and
our own insights. Detailed field studies involving data collection and interaction with consumers
would be useful to gain more insights into the reform process. We have given some ideas for
conducting such studies.

1.1 The Institutional Set-up

According to the Constitution of India, electricity is a ‘concurrent’ subject handled by both the
central and state governments. In post-independence India, State Electricity Boards (SEBs) were
created at the state level. These boards, owned by the respective state governments, were
autonomous bodies. They were entrusted with electricity generation and its supply to consumers
in the state. At the national level, an autonomous institution called the Central Electricity
Authority (CEA) was created to provide financial and technical expertise to the SEBs.

1.2 Major Policies

The commendable growth of the Indian electricity sector was the result of four broad policies.
The first was government ownership and supply of capital from central and state budgets. For
many years, about one fourth to one fifth of the total plan allocation from the central and state
governments’ budgets was directed to the electricity sector.

The second major policy was developing a ‘centralised electricity supply system’ and ‘regional
and national electricity grids’. The third major policy was the thrust toward self-reliance in

2
technology and fuels. Finally, the policy of ‘cross-subsidy’ was adopted. Those who could afford
higher rates of electricity were charged more than the average cost of supplying electricity and
the surplus thus created was used to provide electricity at lower rates than the average to the
deprived sections of the society.

However, growth was only one side of the coin. There were problems too in terms of limited
access to electricity (46 per cent of households in 2000), high Transmission and Distribution
(T&D) losses, financial losses of SEBs etc which started becoming significant in the 80s. The
root causes of the various problems in the sector can be traced to the functional failures of the
same institutions and policies which created this growth. Gradually these problems developed
into a crisis-like situation, pushing the electricity sector to the brink of bankruptcy and disorder.

1.3 Crisis in the Power Sector

SEBs performed their function quite well until the 80s. From then onwards there has been a
deterioration of performance which could be traced to failures on four fronts: Techno-economic;
Policy; Planning and Governance. The distortions caused by these failures led the sector into a
crisis in the early 90s. However, the main preoccupation of the mainstream leaders in the sector
remained the financial crisis. This lopsided understanding has been largely responsible for
further aggravating the crisis.

1.4 Beginning of Economic Reform

As a solution, sector leaders suddenly found the magic wand of privatisation. This approach was
actively promoted by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) led by the World Bank.
Except for some unions, a few analysts and the left-leaning political parties, all the political
parties and the government machinery welcomed the reform.

Many fundamental and comprehensive changes were made in the laws governing the electricity
sector, in the institutional structure and in major policies and procedures. These included changes
made in the Electricity Supply Act of 1948 to allow entry of private capital, curtailing the role of
the Central Electricity Authority (CEA), and changes in the fuel policy to allow the import of oil
and gas.

1.5 Entry of the Independent Power Producers (IPPs)

The first step in the reform of the electricity sector was to allow electricity-generating plants
owned by private parties. Fundamental changes in various crucial aspects of governance were
made. ‘Obstacles’ such as permits and quotas were removed. SEBs and state governments were
allowed to seek and sanction generation projects by dealing directly with private firms. Those
private firms owning power-generation plants are known as Independent Power Producers
(IPPs).

State governments and SEBs signed agreements with the private parties that gave guarantees of
high levels of fixed revenue (corresponding to fixed costs) to the private firms, while they kept

3
shouldering almost the entire burden of various risks1. The central government started providing
different types of assistance for these efforts by SEBs. For example, the central government gave
the special status of ‘fast-track projects' to eight IPP projects in different states. This implied
giving the central government's counter-guarantee (apart from the state government guarantee) in
the event of non-payments by the state governments and SEBs. Other favourable treatments,
such as the constitution of a special ministerial group at the central level to ensure that projects
were cleared in a speedy manner, were provided. Tax concessions (local as well as central) were
given, foreign investment allowed and a debt equity ratio of 80:20 permitted.

Not surprisingly, these overtures from the state governments and SEBs received tremendous
response from private firms. Within the first three years, different state governments signed
Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) for creating capacity of approximately 90,000 Mega
Watts (MW). At that time, generation capacity in the entire country was only 80,000 MW! MoUs
in these three years were being signed at the rate of 90 MW of capacity on every working day!

As a result, in the initial period of reforms, instead of seriously trying to improve the functioning
of the SEBs, all the attention, time, and resources were invested in attracting the IPPs. This only
resulted in the continued deterioration of the SEBs. It is to be noted that as late as 2003, only a
few projects have started generating power. The total generation capacity added through this
process is just about 5,000 MW.

Two important preconditions for the smooth running of these projects remained neglected by the
IPP policy: (a) uninterrupted supply of fuel and (b) getting timely payment from the SEBs for the
electricity supplied to them. As a result, the IPP project financiers did not find the state
government guarantees adequate security against non-payment by SEBs. Often the amounts
involved in these guarantees were much higher than what the state government could handle and
the credit rating of state government guarantees was not very healthy. In addition, because of the
undue secrecy maintained during the sanctioning of these projects, an atmosphere of distrust and
suspicion had been created, sparking off political and legal actions and controversies.

The IPP process opened the way for the weakening of the Indian institutions, increasing the role
of private players and providing a critical role to the International Financial Institutions.
Multinational and international lending institutions like the World Bank and DFID (Department
for International Development of the UK) gradually gained a position of strategic advantage in
the Indian power sector.

1.6 Increasing Influence of the World Bank

As the SEBs continued to deteriorate (see section 1.4), the World Bank started demanding stiff
targets for improvement in their functioning as a condition for loans. When this strategy failed,
the World Bank resorted to the extreme measure of cancelling six loans given to SEBs in the
early 90s. This did not bring about any improvement in the situation, so the World Bank reached

1
These agreements (Power Purchase Agreements-PPAs) are 20-30 year long-term contracts detailing the payment
and contractual terms which are biased heavily in favour of the IPP. For example: assured purchase of generated
power or compensating for the cost; utility agreeing to take up risks related to fuel (cost, supply), currency exchange
rate etc.; agreeing to very high capital costs - thus jacking up the fixed cost component; provision of incentives etc.

4
its current rigid position: privatisation would be the precondition for any financial assistance to
SEBs.

It is in this context that reform of the Orissa power sector was initiated by the World Bank. The
stated idea was to overhaul the loss-making sector, bring in massive capital investment and
privatise operations so that over a period of few years, the sector would make profits.

2. REFORMS IN ORISSA2

Orissa is the 'pioneer' state in power sector reforms in India. Reforms were initiated in 1993. A
few years later the World Bank said:
"Orissa, as a pioneer among the states in India, has decided to restructure and substantially
privatise its power sector. The Orissa government's ultimate objective is to withdraw from the
power sector as an operator of utilities and to have competing privately managed utilities
operating in an appropriately regulated power market. The power sector industry and market
structures established under this reform programme have been defined to reach this objective
with no further institutional restructuring, and significant private participation will be
required”3.

2.1 Orissa’s Power Sector

Before restructuring, OSEB controlled all the generation and distribution capacity in the state.
Now the state-owned Orissa Hydro Power Corporation (OHPC) owns the hydro plants and
thermal generation is owned by the Orissa Power Generation Corporation (OPGC), in which
AES Corp. of the USA has a 49 per cent stake. Apart from this generating capacity (which adds
up to 2297 MW), Orissa has a share of 1,158 MW capacity of the central sector generating
stations in the Eastern Region.

Table 2 - Power Infrastructure Summary (2001)4

Total Installed Capacity 3456
(MW)
Energy handled (MU) 11231
Consumers (million) 1.7
Agricultural Consumers 75000
Villages Electrified 35,232 (76%)
Per capita consumption 313
(kWh, 1999)
Employees (approximately) 35,000

2
For more detail, see: India Power Sector Reforms Update, Issue I (October 2001), Issue II (January 2002), Issue
III (May 2002), Issue IV (August 2002), Prayas, Pune. (Available at www.psiru.org and www.prayaspune.org )
3
Section 2.9, Ref. 7
4
Installed capacity and Energy include imported power also.
Employees are spread over GRIDCO (5,000), Distribution Companies (24,000), OHPC (6,000) and OPGC (700). It
is reported that the number of employees reduced to 26,000 after the reform. Numbers are approximate.
Source: Reference [1,5,17]

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Subsequent to the opening up of power generation to private participation by the central
government in October 1991, many Independent Power Producer (IPP) projects were planned in
Orissa as well. Norms were relaxed: this included permitting 100 per cent foreign ownership,
long-term power purchase agreements, assured profits, government guarantees on payments etc.

The government of Orissa (GoO) and OSEB agreed on a power sector reform plan in Nov 1993.
GoO set up a group to work out the details of the reform programme. Grid Corporation of Orissa
Ltd (GRIDCO) and Orissa Hydro Power Company Ltd (OHPC) were incorporated in March
1995. After the Reform Act was made effective in April 1996, GRIDCO, OHPC and OPGC took
over the functions of OSEB.

2.2 Reform Highlights

In April 1995, GoO released a policy statement on power reforms5. Reform was planned in three
phases:

Phase-1: (1992-95)

a) Setting up reform implementation organisation

b) Unbundling of OSEB (separate generation, transmission and distribution companies)
c) Finalising the reform programme
d) New generation through competitive bidding

Phase 2: (1995-97)

a) Corporatisation of generation and transmission companies

b) First steps towards privatisation of distribution
c) Reform Act, setting up Regulatory Commission
d) Tariff reform

Phase 3: (1997-2002)

a) Privatisation of distribution
b) Steps towards privatisation of transmission
c) Commercial operation of the power sector.

The reform programme was reviewed in January-March 1994 and endorsed by World Bank
consultants after some modifications. In 1995, the tariff revenue was sufficient to cover the cost
of OSEB's operations. It can be said that one of the major reasons for reforms or for the failure of
reforms - i.e., unsustainable low tariffs - was not applicable to Orissa. A GoO subsidy was
required mainly to cover uncollected receivables and write-offs. The cross-subsidy burden was
also not very high, since the agricultural consumption was only about 6 per cent. An analyst
commented:

5
Power Sector Development Policy Statement, Government of Orissa, Bhubaneswar, April 1995

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"It was perhaps the small size of the power sector, small agricultural consumption, low level of political
mobilisation, minor national profile of Orissa and the Chief Minister's perception of the impending
financial bankruptcy of OSEB that made Orissa the choice for the World Bank model of power reforms in
India"6( See Table 1 in Annex 1 for the timetable of reform).

2.3 Policy Statement

The policy statement outlines the framework for reform as the solution to the problems of the
state power sector.

"The Government's ultimate objective is to provide an appropriate policy environment for growth of the
power sector and withdraw from it as an operator of facilities, having instead privately-managed utilities
operating where feasible in a competitive environment under an appropriately regulated power market.
Power sector industry and market structures being established under the reform programme have been
defined so as to facilitate the realisation of this ultimate objective. Significant private sector participation
is to be achieved during the implementation of the proposed Bank loan which we are seeking to support
our power sector reform programme"7.

The document goes on to outline the actions already taken by the GoO for reform and gives
commitments on the key performance indicators of reform. The key principles of the reform
programme are identified under five sections:

a) Restructuring of OSEB by corporatisation and commercialisation

b) Privatisation - hydro & thermal generation, distribution and grid operation
c) Competition for new generation capacity additions
d) Regulation separate from the government
e) Tariff reform at bulk, transmission and retail levels

All these are in line with the model of reforms proposed by the World Bank. The policy
document assures the employees that personnel policies and 'transition plan' (including reduction
of staff through attrition, voluntary retirement scheme, transfers to other government bodies) will
be discussed with staff and implemented with 'legal and social responsibility to the rights and
dignity of the affected staff'. It also goes on to pacify the employees:

"We also reiterate that the power sector in Orissa is poised for rapid expansion. Therefore the
seemingly redundant staff may get adequate scope for being absorbed"8.

2.4 World Bank Loan9

In 1995, the World Bank agreed to a GoO request to convert and earlier loan to power sector
assistance. Of the total US$997 million loan, the World Bank's contribution is US$350 million
6
Navroz K Dubash, Sudhir Chella Rajan: Power Politics: Process of Power Sector Reform in India, Economic and
Political Weekly , September 1, 2001
7
Orissa Electricity Reform Act 1995
8
Power Sector Development Policy Statement, Government of Orissa, Bhubaneswar, April 1995
9
Orissa Power Sector Restructuring Project - Staff Appraisal Report, World Bank, April 1996

7
(35 per cent). GoO, Indian financial institutions and GRIDCO are to raise US$292 million in
Rupees, which works out to be 29 per cent of the loan. The remaining 36 per cent is to be raised
by ADB and ODA (now DFID). Some part of the funding is grants (the DFID portion) and rest is
loan. It can be seen that the average annual restructuring fund is nearly 60 per cent of the annual
revenue of the utility! Table 2 in Annex 1 gives the financing plan.

2.5 Reform Act & Regulatory Commission

The Orissa Electricity Reform Act 1995 formalises the institutional structure of the sector after
reforms. The Act is

"to provide for the restructuring of the electricity industry for the rationalisation of the generation,
transmission, distribution and supply of electricity; for avenues for participation of private sector
entrepreneurs in the electricity industry; and generally for taking measures conducive to the development
and management of the electricity industry in the state in an efficient, economic and competitive manner
including the constitution of an electricity regulatory commission for the state and for matters connected
10
therewith or incidental thereto" .

The Orissa Electricity Regulatory Commission (OERC) became operational under the Act in
August 1996. It is a 3-member body selected by a committee constituted by the state government
and consisting of a) the Chairman of State Public Service Commission as the Chairman, b) the
Secretary in charge of Department of Energy, GoO as convenor, and c) the Chairman of the
Central Electricity Authority (CEA) or any Member of CEA. A selection committee suggests
two names for each post and the state government appoints one of them as the member. One of
the three members shall be designated as chairperson by the state government. One member is
expected to be an electrical engineer with industry experience, at least one to have qualifications
and experience in economics, commerce, accountancy, law or administration or management.
OERC has the powers of a civil court. The removal of a member of the Regulatory Commission
(RC) requires a long and complex procedure. Thus, the RC is a government-appointed body, but
has the potential of acting independently of the government.

OERC has issued six tariff orders so far. Tariff orders give details of the bulk supply and retail
tariff. They also give the revenue and expense plans of the utilities for the year and typically
contain many directives to the utilities (related to performance, targets etc). The process leading
to tariff orders involves submission of proposals by the utilities, making these available to public
who submit objections and holding public hearings. All these typically attract a lot of attention.

OERC has performed the difficult task of pioneering the regulatory process in India. There has
been appreciation for laying down a framework and facilitating some amount of transparency
and participation. There is criticism by some policy watchers that OERC gives too much
emphasis to the tariff process and limits itself to regulation, thus considering the development of
the power sector beyond its responsibility. There is also a concern that in the absence of effective
civil society participation, the RC with enormous power and little public accountability may
sabotage the reform objective of making the sector consumer-friendly and efficient. Civil Society

10
Orissa Electricity Reform Act 1995.

8
Institutions (CSIs) have been able to make some impact on the sector using the OERC. This has
been mainly in the area of transparency by making information available to the public.

2.6 Distribution Reform

The distribution system of OSEB was geographically divided into 10 distribution circles. As a
part of reform, they were grouped into four zones - Central, North Eastern, Southern and
Western. These zones were subsequently converted to Distribution Companies (DISTCOMs).
The assets, liabilities, proceedings and personnel of GRIDCO were transferred to these
respective companies in November 1998.

2.6.1 Distribution Operation Agreement with Bombay Suburban Electricity Supply Company
(BSES)

Since the regulatory mechanism was not well established and there was very little experience of
privatisation, a short-term distribution operations agreement (DOA, also called Management
Contract) path was taken up initially. In October 1996, Bombay Suburban Electricity Supply
Company (BSES) was awarded the 3-year DOA for the Central Zone. BSES was responsible for
distribution, maintenance and collection of dues.

It was expected that this short-term agreement would develop into a long-term arrangement.
Performance was to be reviewed every 6 months. BSES was not able to improve performance
due to a variety of reasons - its inability to manage the employees (who remained GRIDCO
employees); government interference; limited management effort from the BSES side etc. The
DOA was terminated on 30 April 1997.

2.6.2 Privatisation of Distribution

After the DOA failed, GoO decided to privatise the four distribution zones. It can be said that
Orissa was able to beat the deadline (December 2000) set by the reform project for privatising
distribution. However, one company (BSES) ended up controlling three distribution companies,
when there was an understanding that one organisation would not be allowed to control more
than two distribution companies. Moreover, AES, which already had a 49 per cent stake in
OPGC, controlled the fourth distribution company. These remained as aberrations to the
paradigm of competition.

BSES with three companies ran a loss of about Rs. 2,000 million at the end of its first year of
operation. The reasons were many: tariffs were fixed by OERC based on 35 per cent T&D losses
whereas the actual losses (as claimed by BSES) were 45-47 per cent; targets of billings prepared
by GRIDCO were too optimistic; it was not easy to change the operational culture etc. However,
BSES is reported to be planning micro-privatisation with the involvement of village communities
to improve distribution management. BSES was working to turn around the situation and Mr RV
Shahi (then Chairman, BSES) was quite optimistic:

"… We found that out of a million consumers, almost 70% did not have energy meters or had defective
meters. We launched a massive meter installation programme. .. By next year, hopefully, 100% metering
will be in place….. The distribution loss has reduced from around 50% to around 44% in 1999-2000 and

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to around 42% in 2000-2001… I had felt that gestation period (for turnaround) would be about two to
three years. But now I think a slightly longer gestation period, may be four to five years"11.

BSES now plans to take corrective steps like improvement in billing, giving extensive training to
field staff (at Mumbai and at international distribution companies), conducting consumer
awareness programmes, forming village committees and implementing WB supported projects
speedily12. BSES has asked for support from OERC, GoO, WB, and DFID to tide over the crisis.
In September 2002, Reliance Industries, one of the biggest industrial houses in India, has become
the single largest shareholder in BSES with a 40 per cent holding. With the backing of Reliance,
BSES (renamed as Reliance Energy in early 2003) has become a major player in the Indian
power sector.

There has been criticism of AES taking over a distribution company when it already had a 49 per
cent stake in the Generation Company, OPGC. CESCO, the AES-owned distribution company,
covers eight coastal districts with a majority of domestic consumers. The T&D loss in CESCO is
the highest. Power supply to nearly 19,000 villages was affected in the super cyclone of October
1999. AES had committed to restore supply by 31 March 2000. OERC issued a show cause
notice to CESCO on 01 May 2000 since it failed to meet the commitment. In its order dated 18
Jul 2001, OERC imposed a fine of Rs. 0.1 million on CESCO for failure to comply with the
tariff order of 19 Jan 2001. The Managing Director of CESCO (an AES representative) resigned
in July 2001 saying that "it is impossible to do distribution business here" and that he is
"frustrated with the current regulatory and contractual structure of the distribution system in
Orissa"13.

Following a petition by GRIDCO, OERC had to take a radical step and it appointed a CEO and
administrator (as per the reform act) at CESCO. This was the first instance of the use of such
strong regulatory powers in India. AES has said that there is too much interference by
government and wished to walk out of CESCO by end 2001, but GoO maintains that the
contractual agreement requires AES to stay till 2002. AES is attempting to sell its share in
CESCO, but there has been no success so far. The reform review committee (set up by the state
government in May 2001) has severely criticised AES for its mismanagement of CESCO (see
section 3.1).

All the distribution companies feel that OERC is conservative with tariff hikes. For example, in
2000-1, CESCO asked for an 18.8 per cent hike and was granted 9.6 per cent. GRIDCO had
asked for a 13 per cent hike, but was granted only 9 per cent. It is said that OERC used
unrealistic T&D loss and collection efficiency figures to calculate the tariff.

DISTCOMs were to start making profits from 2001. But the aggregate losses by the four
DISTCOMs have been mounting. In July 2002, the performance of the DISTCOMs was
reviewed by the OERC. The review showed that the losses have been increasing, bill collection

11
Interview with Mr RV Shahi, Powerline, May 2001.
12
Field studies would be needed to understand the impact of these efforts.
13
India Power Sector Reforms Update, Issue I (October 2001), Issue II (January 2002), Issue III (May 2002), Issue
IV (August 2002), Prayas, Pune. (Available at www.psiru.org and www.prayaspune.org )

10
reducing, and billing efficiency dropping. This has in turn caused problems to GRIDCO, which
has not been paid by the DISTCOMs.

2.7 Transmission Sector - GRIDCO

The government-owned GRIDCO manages the transmission system. It is the single buyer of
power from all generating stations and is the sole supplier to the DISTCOMs. GRIDCO has been
one of the main victims of the reform process. GRIDCO's finances have taken a nosedive after
unbundling and the privatisation of distribution. Some major reasons are:

a) The liabilities of distribution companies were transferred to GRIDCO - Rs. 16,000

million to GRIDCO and Rs. 6,000 million for all four DISTCOMs
b) The assets of GRIDCO were 'up-valued' (a book adjustment suggested by reform
consultants) to match liabilities during unbundling. This has increased depreciation
and all other factors that depend on the 'bloated' capital base14.
c) OHPC aligned tariffs to the new asset base and a 16 per cent rate of return. Tariffs to
GRIDCO went up from Rs.0.1/kWh to Rs.0.49/kWh in April 1996.
d) OERC asked GRIDCO to meet a T&D loss target of 35 per cent when it was claimed
to be around 50 per cent. Tariffs were calculated based on these targets. Neither
GRIDCO nor the DISTCOMs were able to meet these targets.
e) OERC did not grant tariff hikes of 15-18 per cent as planned in the SAR. Instead the
tariff increases were 11, 9.3 and 4.5 per cent respectively, in the first three years.
f) Budgetary support from GoO by means of subsidy was cut off right from the first
year.
g) Central sector power was costly and GRIDCO had to purchase it to meet the
requirement.
h) The privately owned distribution companies persistently defaulted payments to
GRIDCO. By September 2001 they owed GRIDCO a sum of Rs. 10,800 million.

Thus GRIDCO had two problems: first, generating stations with high rates, and second,
DISTCOMs which could not streamline operations fast enough, and therefore would not pay
their dues. The reviewers of the reform project (including the World Bank) have pointed out this
crisis and GoO has been asked to take corrective steps. The government of India has prepared a
bail-out package for GRIDCO, which includes securitisation of dues to central generating
stations, reduction of staff by 10 per cent etc.

14
The transmission and distribution assets were transferred to GRIDCO at a value of Rs.19,580 Million when their
historical cost was Rs. 8,380 Million. This meant a revaluation of assets by 11,200 Million.

11
2.8 Structural Changes

The following table sums up the changes in Orissa’s electricity sector:

Table 3 – Structural Changes in the Industry in Orissa

Function Before Reforms After Reforms
Generation State-owned utilities: State-owned corporation
OSEB, NTPC, NHPC, Few and Private owned. Selling
Private Captive power power to GRIDCO
plants
Transmission State-owned: OSEB State-owned corporation:
GRIDCO
Distribution State-owned: OSEB 4 private companies
Policy State Government State Government, Funding
agencies, Consultants and
OERC

3. GOALS AND ACHIEVEMENTS: A REPORT CARD OF REFORMS

3.1 Stated Goals

Power sector reform in Orissa was lauded as an essential step to make the sector economically
viable with private participation.

"The new utilities will improve the efficiency of power supply in Orissa and close the chronic power
demand/supply gap to the benefit of all electricity consumers. Visible progress in system improvement
with Bank support under the new loan will strengthen the credibility and help gain public acceptance and
support for the reform programme. The programme will promote fiscal adjustment as it enables the
Government to cut its power subsidies and reduce public spending in the power sector. Finally, we are
proud to state, the programme is already providing a model for state power sector reform in India"15.

In broad terms, it was expected that after investing US$ 1,000 million, in 5 years’ time the Orissa
power sector would become a healthy profit-making enterprise. It would start contributing to the
state economy and thus help the government perform better in other social sectors. Several
quantitative indicators are given in the Staff Appraisal report of the Bank and include expected
values (for the period 1997-2003) for annual demand growth, T&D loss reduction targets, profit
targets, average tariff etc. We see in Section 4 that the majority of these projections on
performance have not been met. It is a matter of irony that the only parameter that has met the
reform script is the tariff increase!

15
From the policy statement of the state government (1995)

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3.2 Review of Reform

A six-member committee headed by Mr. Sovan Kanungo was appointed by the state government
on May 30, 2001 to review the reform programme. The Kanungo committee held extensive
consultations with the state power utilities, OERC, the World Bank, DFID, consultants,
employee associations, consumer organisations, industry forums and many concerned citizens. It
submitted a 100-plus pages report in October 2001. This report highlights many shortcomings of
the reform programme and points out that no benefits have resulted.

a) No reduction in transmission and distribution losses: Even after five years of restructuring
the T & D losses which were expected to reduce to 21 per cent are still at the pre-
restructuring level of 45 per cent.
b) Collection efficiency deteriorated: During the five years of the restructuring process there has
been a substantial decrease in the collection efficiency from 84 to 77 per cent.
c) Quantum jump in debt burden: Due to large capital investments and revaluation of existing
assets, GRIDCO's loan burden has increased four times. Obviously this burden will be
transferred to consumers in the form of higher tariffs.
d) Increase in the cost of generation due to asset revaluation: Due to the revaluation of the assets
not only did GRIDCO's loan burden increase, but also the cost of generation increased
extensively. For example, before restructuring, the cost of generation of hydroelectric power
station was Rs.0.20/unit, which increased to Rs.0.50/unit after restructuring.
e) Steep tariff increase but losses continue: In the past 9 years, electricity tariffs in Orissa have
increased by a huge 15 per cent per year. Such a steep tariff increase implied that tariffs
nearly quadrupled in the last decade. But in spite of such a tariff increase, the power sector
continues making losses to the tune of Rs. 4,000 million every year. (Total annual revenue
collection is only Rs.18,000 million).
f) No capital investment: As per the findings of the Kanungo committee, the management of all
four distribution companies has not improved. These companies have neither brought in
additional capital nor made adequate provisions for working capital requirements as
promised to the government.
g) Incomplete projects: Rs. 41,250 million of capital works to streamline the transmission and
distribution system was planned. Not even half of this has been committed, not a single work
completed and no benefit realised.

Annex 9 of the report, titled 'Exit of AES', unveils the callous attitude and at times illegal
operations of AES corp. AES did not bring in working capital and failed to pay GRIDCO on
time. This resulted in great financial stress for GRIDCO. Other aspects of the practices of AES
are even more shocking. For example, the company did not implement the concessions given to
various bigger consumers sanctioned by the regulatory commission. Months before they resigned
in July 2001, many board members and senior officers of AES would stay in New Delhi and
manage from there, without even visiting Orissa. Towards the end, the AES office in Orissa was
locked and daily activities were made impossible. Following a petition from GRIDCO, OERC
appointed an administrator in August 2001 to take over the operations of the company.

13
The Kanungo committee has noted that the restructuring process was carried out under the
guidance of the World Bank, DFID and various international advisors. Expenses on account of
foreign consultants have been to the tune of Rs.3,060 million. But all these have not been able to
result in visible benefits for the consumer as yet. Problems like T & D losses, inefficiency in
recovery of electricity bills and financial losses have become more serious.

The committee has made various suggestions like filling up vacant posts in the regulatory
commission, reviewing asset revaluation, eliminating the dependence on external advisors,
appointing experts to high posts in the power companies and appointing professionals. In order
to turnaround the sector, the committee states that the World Bank, the British government and
the Indian government should provide a total amount of Rs.32,400 million to the Orissa power
sector in the next five years.

3.3 Lessons: Some Good, Some Bad

The regulatory process in the power sector has been set up in Orissa and many other states have
benefited from this experience. Tariff filings, public petitions, public hearings, orders,
formulation of performance guidelines etc were done for the first time in Orissa. There has been
some increase in transparency and participation. There have been attempts to evolve some
alternate governance models like micro-privatisation to manage distribution by some
DISTCOMs. These could give some good lessons on improving the distribution system
management.

Participation of local expertise in the reform process has been very poor. International
consultants dominated the scene. The only Indian consultant was the Xavier Institute of
Management, which was paid a sum of Rs. 1.2 million! It is perhaps the dominance of
international consultants who were anxious to promote the success of the reform model which
resulted in over-projection of benefits, unrealistic time estimates for project completion and poor
project implementation. The participation of Indian experts may have given more realistic
projections.

14
Rural electrification has suffered in the process. All private DISTCOMs have neglected this
sector, which is not financially attractive. The number of villages electrified has remained
constant for the past few years and so has the number of pump sets energised. The Kanungo
committee has suggested setting up a Rural Electrification Planning Organisation to give focus
and direction to rural electrification.

RC has not been able to sense the crisis in time and take corrective actions. It is also regrettable
that the civil society institutions could not gather enough strength to pressurise a comprehensive
mid-term review a few years earlier. Also, the way DISTCOMs handled the massive cyclone
disaster needs further study.

The very high fees given to external consultants, the capital-intensive projects (from which many
private companies have benefited), the Indian government's blind pursuit of the reform agenda
and World Bank pressure contributed to the model’s collapse. Even the review commissioned by
the Bank in 2000 failed to provide any danger signals. The few sane voices raising caution and
criticism were ignored16.

There is criticism that the privatisation of distribution was hurried. None of the transmission and
distribution projects were completed on time. Time overruns may make the costs go up. BSES
was given three companies, and AES was requested to take over the fourth company, even as
AES held a 49 per cent stake in the generation utility. AES’ arrogance has shown an ugly face of
reform. As mentioned before, all four private companies have defaulted payments to GRIDCO,
pushing it into a financial crisis. It is to be noted that many reasons for this crisis collapse can be
traced back to the reform prescription of the World Bank.

4. SUMMARY OF LESSONS LEARNED

The reform was not as effective as expected17. Most of the key parameters did not improve (see
graphs below). GRIDCO and DISTCOM profits did not grow as projected; and so the total
economic benefits of reform were not realised. In fact, the Kanungo committee estimates that
nearly the same amount of money and time has to be invested to restore the sector.

The graphs below capture the variation of some important parameters during the reform period.
It can be seen that the reform plan had forecast a very high percentage of load growth (7-16 per
cent annual growth), whereas the load did not grow at that pace (Graph-1). Graph-2 captures the
behaviour of T&D losses. The World Bank had projected a T&D loss reduction from 39.5 to
21.7 per cent from 1997 to 2002. It has now emerged that losses in 1997 were much higher at an
estimated 49.5 per cent and the estimated loss figure in 2002 is 46 per cent. Graph-3 shows the
revenue collection efficiency data. It was expected that from 1997 onwards, 100 per cent
collection would be possible. But even in 2001, the figure remains at 77 per cent. Graph-4 shows

16
These included the analysis by Prayas (1998), articles by Sudha Mahalingam (1999 onwards), RP Mahapatra etc
[9,13,15]
17
Table 3 in Annex 1 gives the plan for performance indicators over the course of reform along with some actual
data, to highlight the variation between plans and actual achievements.

15
the average tariff variation. This is one area where the plans and the actual values are close. It
was planned to increase the tariff from 207 paise/kWh (1997) to 266 paise/kWh (2001). It has
actually gone up from 201 paise/kWh to 281 paise/kWh. Against a planned percentage increase
of 29 per cent from 1997-2001, reforms have resulted an increase of 40 per cent!

Plan Plan
1. Energy Input 2. T&D Loss
20000 A ctual Actual
15000
60
50
MU

10000
40
30

%
5000
20
0 10
0
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Plan Plan
3. Revenue Collection 4. Average Tariff
A ctual 300 Actual

120 250
Paise/kWh

100 200
80 150
60
%

100
40
20 50
0 0
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Graph 5 shows the category-wise increase of tariff for a few selected consumer categories (see
also Table 4, Annex 1). Tariff values are normalised using 1997 values to prepare the graph.
Between 1997 and 2001 the irrigation tariff has gone up by 85 per cent, domestic by 60 per cent
and small industry by 110 per cent. The large industry tariff has gone up only by 9 per cent. Thus
tariff revisions have benefited the big consumers at the cost of the small.

Domestic
250%
Irrigation
Normalised % Tariff

200% Commercial
Small Indy
150%
Large Indy
100%

50%

0%
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Year

Graph 5: Category-wise Tariff

The official Kanungo review committee ends the report on a sober note:

16
"The state's power sector is now on the brink of a crisis. It is high time all the agencies, namely, the State
government, the Central government, the World Bank and the DFID got together and took a holistic view
on what can be done by each to rescue the reform. If electricity reform fails in Orissa, it would have its
inevitable adverse impact on reform all over the country. What has taken place in the electricity industry
of Orissa is only restructuring, privatisation and establishment of a Regulatory Commission. The real
reform, which brings in its wake benefits to consumers, strength to industry and growth for the economy
has yet to come"18.

5. LESSONS AND ALTERNATIVES IN THE ALL-INDIA CONTEXT

Many states have used the 'Orissa Model' for reforming their power sectors. The reform act and
many procedures were almost copied. After it became clear that the 'Orissa Model' has
limitations, there has been some caution in blindly following it. However, reforms are being
pursued vigorously, with 19 of the 28 states having established Regulatory Commissions and the
Electricity Act 2003 enacted in June 2003. It is therefore important to look closely at the Orissa
reform process to understand the positives and negatives. This could give some idea of the
possible alternatives when reforming the power sector, for which there is an urgent need.

5.1 Criticism of the Reform Process

Non-Participatory and Hasty Process: The entire process of evolution and detailing of the
model was completed in an extremely hasty manner. The process was conducted without any
semblance of public debate or participation. Further, the model lacked the sound analytical basis
that was necessary to address the techno-economic and institutional complexities of the sector.
Projecting privatisation as the solution to distribution inefficiencies and pushing the privatisation
process is a good case of this haste and lack of debate. As remarked by some, the reform model
was not built through a consensus process; rather, consensus was sought over a prescribed
reform model.

Sabotage-Prone Regulatory System: The regulatory system in this model is expected to play a
critical role in discouraging non-competitive behaviour by market players. However, because of
many lacunae - mainly inadequate and discretionary provisions for transparency, accountability,
and public participation - these regulatory structures were prone to sabotage and high-jacking by
strong market players. A detailed study of the proceedings of the commission and study of orders
would prevent this happening any further.

Impact on Developmental Aspirations of the Disadvantaged: The vast majority of

disadvantaged people in developing countries do not have access to electricity. The model treats
electricity as a tradable commodity to be purchased, without subsidy, by those who can afford it.
As a result, the model effectively puts severe constraints on the aspirations of disadvantaged
areas that require electricity as a key input for their development but cannot afford to buy it at
commercial prices. At a broad level, reports indicate that rural electrification efforts have slowed
down. The impact of reforms on rural electrification and poor consumers needs to be assessed in
field surveys.

18
Kanungo Committee Report, Government of Orissa, October 2002.

17
Impact on Democratic Rights of Disadvantaged: By conceptualising electricity as a private
good that market players should and can supply, the model takes this core developmental sector
out of the realms of public affairs and of 'politics'. The model divests the state - which is
somewhat amenable to political pressures by disadvantaged sections - of its control over the
sector. Further, it substitutes the state with independent regulatory mechanisms that are
technocratic and legalistic. This further marginalises the disadvantaged sections as they lack the
techno-economic and legal capabilities necessary to influence the working of these regulatory
institutions. Effectively, the model constrains democratic rights of the disadvantaged to influence
decisions in a sector that involves critical societal interests.
5.2 Limitations of the World Bank Model/ Privatisation as the Solution
The state’s withdrawal from the sector and privatisation are key components of the World Bank
model. It has been demonstrated that mere changes in the ownership of utilities will not empower
the public to effectively challenge the powerful members of the unholy alliances controlling the
sector. In fact, there is a danger that, with the entry of powerful corporations, the new and
equally (if not more) powerful and equally unholy alliances of corporations, politicians, and
bureaucrats might take over control of the sector’s governance. The situation after the entry of
Enron and other IPPs has demonstrated that this apprehension is not ill-founded. Thus, the
solution of privatisation does not effectively address the core malady haunting the sector, its
governance crisis.
In a way, even the protagonists of privatisation acknowledge this. They agree to the need for
stringent and independent regulation to keep in check the ‘non-competitive behaviour’ of private
players, especially in view of the natural monopoly in the Indian power sector, which is likely to
persist at least for some decades to come.
In this model, the regulation is to be independent of the state (i.e. from political interference) and
‘investor-friendly’. This is because the main objective guiding the design of the regulatory
system in this scheme is to protect private players and investors from state "interference". Such a
system will not automatically serve the purpose of protecting consumers, and the disadvantaged
sections of the population in particular. This is mainly because such a system does not pay the
necessary attention to the special needs of these sections. Neither does it emphasise creating
space for these sections in the regulatory process and building their capabilities to utilise this
space. This effectively excludes them from participating. Thus the new regulatory system
becomes an unrestricted domain for investors and private players. Further, as our earlier study of
the World Bank’s Orissa model demonstrates, the regulatory institutions in this model are
severely prone to sabotage by powerful vested interests.
In short, neither privatisation nor the accompanying ‘independent’ regulation envisaged by the
World Bank and its followers is geared to address and resolve the core malady plaguing the
sector.

18
5.3 The Core Remedy: Democratisation of Sector Governance
According to our diagnosis, at the root of the financial and performance crises in the electricity
sector lies the governance crisis manifested in the form of the take-over of the governance
functions (decision making, implementation of decisions and regulation) by unholy alliances of
powerful interests. Further, our diagnosis also suggests that at the root of this take-over of
governance functions lies a lack of transparency, accountability, and public participation.
Thus in order to address the financial and performance crisis in a fundamental manner, we need
to eliminate the control of the alliances of vested interests over the three governance functions.
To be more precise, these requirements should be articulated as: complete transparency towards
the public, direct accountability primarily not towards investors but towards the public and
meaningful public participation in all three functions. This makes the process essentially ‘public-
friendly’ as against the ‘investor-friendly’ process envisaged by the World Bank.
In other words, opening up the governance functions along these criteria is the core remedy for
resolving the financial, performance, and governance crises besetting the sector. How would it
eliminate these ills? It would bring about the direct and effective control of people, on the three
governance functions and would thus help ensure that governance functions are geared to serve
the public interest. This direct public control over the governance functions could be called
“democratisation of governance”. Thus, as we saw earlier, the core remedy lies not in sector
privatisation, but rather in the democratisation of the sector’s governance.

19
ANNEX 1

Table 1: Orissa: Timetable of reforms

IPP's planned 1991 4 planned , None operational
Broad plan of Nov 1993 GoO agreement with World
Reform Bank
Unbundling of Mar 1995 GRIDCO & OHPC in Mar 95
OSEB OPGC (Thermal generation)
in 1984
Policy Statement Apr 1995
Reform Act Apr 1996 Passed in assembly in 1995
WB Loan Jul 1996
agreement
OERC constituted Aug 1996
Privatisation of Oct 1996 - Apr Management Contract of
Distribution -1 1997 Central Zone with BSES
Distribution Nov 1998 4 DISCOMS: CESCO,
Companies formed NESCO, SOUTHCO &
WESCO
Privatisation of Sep 1999 CESCO: AES; remaining 3:
Distribution -2 BSES
Privatisation of Jan 1999 AES takes 49% stake in OPGC
Generation
Tariff orders Mar 97, Nov 98, Average per cent hike: 10.5, 9,
Dec 99, Jan 4, 10, 0,0
01,Apr 02, Jun
03
CESCO - AES Mid 01 - AES wishes to withdraw
issue
High Power review May 01- Oct 01 Set up by GoO to review
Committee reforms
Source: References 1 and 10

20
 Table 2: ORISSA Power Restructuring Project- Financing Plan 1997-
2002
Source Amount (US $M) % of Remarks
Local Foreig Tota Total
n l
Orissa 25.6 0.0 25.6 2.6
Government
ADB 0.0 56.8 56.8 5.7 Routed through PFC
ODA 65.1 45.0 110. 11.0 Grant, mainly for
(DFID) 1 Technical Assistance
Other 233.0 0.0 233. 23.4 Indian financial institutions
0 like PFC, IDBI, GIC, LIC
Internal 33.8 188.1 221. 22.2 To be raised by GRIDCO
9
IBRD (WB) 0.0 350.0 350. 35.1
0
Total 357.5 639.7 997. 100.0
2
Source: Reference 7

21
 Table 3: Quantitative Indicators - Plan Vs Actual
S. Parameter 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
No
1 Load Growth 5.0 11.4 16.7 9.2 7
%
Actual -0.2 5.0 3.7 1.0 9.8
2 Energy Input - 9785 1090 1272 1390 1480 15560
MU 2 6 2 9
Actual 9306 9771 1012 1022 1123 12345
8 9 1
3 T&D Loss % 39.5 34.8 29.2 24.3 22.7 21.7 20.6
Actual 49.5 49.2 48.6 43.8 46.6
4 Revenue 100 100 100 100 100 100
Collection
Actual 84 80 80 75 77
5 GRIDCO -7.5 2.6 4.2 3.6 3.4 3.3 3.1
Profits (%)
Actual -26 -22 -40 -16 -12
(approx)
6 DISTOM -1320 900 2820
Profits (Rs.
million)
Actual -3780 -4930 -5720
7 Reform -72 -58 -31 7 72 63 125
Benefits %
Actual Rs. 32,400 million to be invested in the next 5 years
to turn around the sector
8 DSM - Load 240
relief (MW)
9 Average Tariff 207 244 242 252 266
(Paise/kWh)
Actual 201 234 261 264 281
Source: References 3, 4, 7, 18

22
 Table 4: Category-wise Tariff : Paise/Unit & Normalised to 1997 values
Year Domestic- Irrigation Commercial Small Large
1 -1 Industr Industry-2
y
1997 94 65 210 165 273
1998 106 80 235 205 293
1999 130 100 290 263 283
2000 130 100 300 307 281
2001 150 120 340 347 298
Normalised Values
1997 100 100 100 100 100
1998 113 123 112 124 107
1999 138 154 138 159 204
2000 138 154 143 186 103
2001 160 185 162 210 109
Source: References 4, 18

ANNEX 2: GLOSSARY OF TERMS

ADB Asian Development Bank

AES AES Corporation (A Global Power Company)
BSES Bombay Suburban Electricity Supply Company
CEA Central Electricity Authority
CESCO Central Electricity Supply Company
CSIs Civil Society Institutions
DFID Department for International Development (of UK, called ODA before)
DISTCOM Distribution Company
DOA Distribution Operation Agreement
ERC Act Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act
Financial Year Indian Financial Year - 1st April to 31st March. Typically represented as FY
98-99 etc.
GIC General Insurance Company
GoI Government of India
GoO Government of Orissa
GRIDCO Grid Corporation
IDBI Industrial Development Bank of India
IDFC Infrastructure Development Finance Company Ltd
IPPs Independent (Private) Power Producers
JV Joint Venture
kW Kilo Watt
kWh Kilo Watt Hour
MoU Memoranda of Understanding
MU Million Units (million kWh)
MW Mega Watts

23
NESCO North Eastern Electricity Supply Company
NGOs Non-Government Organisations
NHPC National Hydro Power Corporation
NPC Nuclear Power Corporation
NTPC National Thermal Power Corporation
ODA Overseas Development Agency, UK (now called DFID)
OECF Overseas Economic Corporation Fund of Japan (Now called JBIC)
OERC Orissa Electricity Regulatory Commission
OHPC Orissa Hydro Power Corporation
OPGC Orissa Power Generation Corporation
O&M Operation & Maintenance
OSEB Orissa State Electricity Board
PFC Power Finance Corporation (a GoI-owned financing agency for the power
sector)
PLF Plant Load Factor (also called Capacity Utilisation Factor)
PPA Power Purchase Agreement
R&M Repair & Maintenance
RC Regulatory Commission
REC Rural Electrification Corporation, New Delhi
Rs Rupees (Indian currency. 1 US$ equal to about 40-45 Rs.)
SAR Staff Appraisal Report (the project appraisal document from the WB)
SEBs State Electricity Boards (vertical monopoly power utility owned by the state
government)
SOUTHCO Southern Electricity Supply Corporation
T&D Transmission and Distribution
TEC Techno Economic Clearance (given by the CEA)
TEC Tata Electric Company
WB The World Bank group
WESCO Western Electricity Supply Corporation

REFERENCES

1. India Power Sector Reforms Update, Issue I (October 2001), Issue II (January 2002), Issue
III (May 2002), Issue IV (August 2002), Prayas, Pune. (Available at www.psiru.org and
www.prayaspune.org )
2. Power Sector Development Policy Statement, Government of Orissa, Bhubaneswar, April
1995
3. Kanungo Committee Report, Government of Orissa, October 2002.
4. Website of OERC (www.orierc.org) for Orders and Regulations
5. Website of the Government of Orissa (www.orissagov.com), Energy Department for Power
status and Plans
6. Orissa Electricity Reform Act 1995
7. Orissa Power Sector Restructuring Project - Staff Appraisal Report, World Bank, Apr 1996
8. Electricity Tariffs Regulators - The Orissa Experience, TL Sankar & Usha Ramachandra,
Economic and Political Weekly, 27 May 2000

24
9. WB-Orissa Model of Power Sector Reform- Cure Worse than Disease, Shantanu Dixit,
Girish Sant & Subodh Wagle, Economic and Political Weekly, Apr 25, 1998
10. Power Politics: Process of Power Sector Reform in India, Navroz K Dubash, Sudhir Chella
Rajan, Economic and Political Weekly , September 1, 2001
11. State Power Sector reform - A review of the Orissa Experience - Final report submitted to
World Bank, Frontier Economics, July 2000
12. Orissa Power Sector Reforms: Getting back on track, Sidharth Sinha, India Infrastructure
Report 2002
13. Reforms in Electricity Sector: The Orissa Experience, RP Mahapatra (Retired Member,
OSEB), Silver Jubilee Commemoration Lecture, Karnataka Electricity Board Engineer's
Association, Bangalore, January 2002.
14. Assessing the Impact of Power Sector Reforms in Orissa, Haribandhu Panda, IRMA, 2002
15. The Unravelling of the Reform Experiment in Orissa, Sudha Mahalingam, April 2001
16. Orissa Power Reforms not worth emulating, Supriti Mishra, PSEB Engineers Association,
2003
17. Annual Report on the working of State Electricity Boards, Power & Energy Division,
Planning Commission, Government of India, May 2002.
18. Privatisation of Electricity Distribution - The Orissa Experience, Ramnathan K and Hasan S,
TERI, New Delhi 2003

25