You are on page 1of 5

LEGRES CASE DIGESTS

RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO [39 PHIL 660; NO. 14078; 7 MAR 1919] FACTS: Petitioner Rubi and other Mangyanes were recommended by the Provincial Governor of Mindoro to take their habitation on an unoccupied land of Tigbao on Naujan Lake to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they run. The Mangyanes had to stay there for a reason of cultivation under certain plans. Over 300 Mangyanes were confined on a 800 hectares whereas the land is under the resolution of the Provincial Board. Then Dabalos, one of the Mangyanes, was taken by the provincial sheriff and imprisoned him at Calapan solely because he escaped from the reservation. Habeas Corpus was made on behalf of Rubi and the Mangyans for an application that alleged the virtue of the resolution of the provincial board creating the reservation whereas they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. The validity of Sec.2145 of the Administrative Code was challenged.

ISSUE: WON Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprives a person of his liberty of abode.

HELD: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty of abode and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement inreservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional. Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes. One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the generalgood of the Philippines. Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases.

None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.

Agustin vs Edu, 88 SCRA 195, L- 49112, February 22, 1979 FACTS: This is a petition questioning the validity of a Letter of Instruction providing for an early warning device mandatory for motor vehicles. It is assailed in this prohibition proceeding as being violative to the constitutional guarantee of due process in as far as the rules and regulations for its implementation are concerned. Petitioner herein, was an owner of a beetle car which already equipped with blinking lights which could serve as an early warning device for other motorist in case of emergencies mentioned in the Instruction No. 29, as amended the Land Transportation Commission. Herein, respondent, Commissioner Edu, had issued a memorandum circular 32 pursuant to the Instruction no. 29 that requires the used of early warning device to all vehicles.

ISSUE: WON the Letter of Instructions as well as the implementing rules and regulations were unlawful and constitutional.

HELD: The court held that the letter of instructions No. 229 as amended as well as the implementing rules and regulations were valid and constitutional as a valid police power measure. The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction. Whereas the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nation ratified by the Philippine local legislation for the installation of road safety sign and devices. It cannot be disputed then that this declaration of principle found in the constitution possesses relevance because our country adopts the generally accepted principle, thus become part of the law of the land.

TATAD VS. SEC OF ENERGY

FACTS: Oil in the Philippines is not commonly to be found that Government is always finding better resolution in lessening the oil industry, then they made a law which one is the RA 8910 that allows any person or entity to import or purchase any quantity of oil and petroleum products from a foreign and domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil companies such as crude oil or use the same for his own requirement. that subjects only to the monitoring by the DOE. Sec. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the said law, and claims that the imposition of tariff rates on imported goods, such as crude oil and petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3-7% tariff differential is favoring the 3 oil big companies against prospective investors in the oil industry who do not have their own refineries that will source petroleum products abroad. ISSUE: WON RA 8180 is unconstitutional. HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the Constitution. It violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which is contrary to free competition. It cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream. RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the new players insofar as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis--vis the established oil companies by requiring them to meet certain conditions already being observed by the latter.

CASE SYNTHESIS

The SC has decided six cases on Undue Delegation of Legislative Powers under the Constitution: In the case of People vs. Vera (65 Phil 56), the Court adopted the direct injury test for determining whether a petitioner in a public action had locus standi. There, the Court held that the person who would assail the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. In US vs. Barrias (11 Phil 327), the court posits the doctrine "on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. In US vs. Panlilio (28 Phil 608), the Court held that the fact that the information in its preamble charged a violation of Act No. 1760 does not prevent us from finding the accused guilty of a violation of an article of the Penal Code. To the same effect is our ruling in United States v. Guzman (25 Phil. 22) where the appellant was convicted of the crime of estafa in the lower court, but on appeal, he was instead convicted of the crime of embezzlement of public funds as defined and penalized by Act No. 1740. As long as the information clearly recites all the elements of the crime of bribery and the facts proved during the trial show is having been committed beyond reasonable doubt, an error in the designation of the crime's name is not a denial of due process. In People vs. Dacuycuy (173 SCRA 90), it was held by the Supreme Court of the United States that the principle of separation of powers is not violated by vesting in courts discretion as to the length of sentence or the amount of fine between designated limits in sentencing persons convicted of a crime. Therefore, the SC ruled on the proper interpretation of the actual term of imprisonment, as may have been intended by Congress, would be pointless and academic. It is, however, worth mentioning that the suggested application of the so-called rule or principle of parallelism, whereby a fine of P1,000.00 would be equated with one year of imprisonment, does not merit judicial acceptance. A fine, whether imposed as a single or as an alternative penalty, should not and cannot be reduced or converted into a prison term; it is to be considered as a separate and independent penalty consonant with Article 26 of the Revised Penal Code. From the above cases, the SC has laid down their jurisprudence on cases regarding undue delegation of powers which is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other department of the government, -the executive and legislative, subject to the exception that local governments may over local

affairs contribute in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority is. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make laws which necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally cant be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection can be made. The Constitution is thus, not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.

You might also like