1

[G.R. No. 117970. July 28, 1998] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ULYSSES M. CAWALING, ERNESTO TUMBAGAHAN, RICARDO DE LOS SANTOS, and HILARIO CAJILO, accused-appellants. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: It is axiomatic that once an accused-appellant admits killing the victim, he bears the burden of establishing the presence of any circumstance like self-defense, performance of a lawful duty or, for that matter, double jeopardy, which may relieve him of responsibility, or which may mitigate his criminal liability.[1] If he fails to discharge this burden, his conviction becomes inevitable. In this Decision, we also reiterate the following doctrines: (1) the regional trial court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over informations for murder committed by public officers, including a town mayor; (2) the assessment of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies deserve great respect; (3) the equipoise rule cannot be invoked where the evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming; (4) alibi cannot be believed in the face of credible testimony identifying the appellants; and (5) conspiracy may be proven by circumstantial evidence. The Case Before us is an appeal from the 34-page Decision[2] dated October 21, 1994, promulgated by the Regional Trial Court of Romblon in Criminal Case No. OD-269. Convicted of murder were former Mayor Ulysses M. Cawaling and Policemen Ernesto Tumbagahan,[3] Ricardo De los Santos and Hilario Cajilo. Prior to the institution of the criminal case against all the appellants, an administrative case[4] had been filed before the National Police Commission, in which Policemen Ernesto Tumbagahan, Ricardo De los Santos, Hilario Cajilo (three of herein appellants) and Andres Fontamillas were charged by Nelson Ilisan[5] with the killing of his brother Ronie[6] Ilisan. On April 6, 1986, Adjudication Board No. 14[7] rendered its Decision which found Tumbagahan, De los Santos, Cajilo and Fontamillas guilty of grave misconduct and ordered their dismissal from the service with prejudice.[8] On June 26, 1986, the Board issued a resolution,[9] dismissing the respondents motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Subsequently, on June 4, 1987, Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal Alexander Mortel filed, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Odiongan, Romblon,[10] an Information for murder[11]against the appellants and Andres Fontamillas. The accusatory portion reads: That on or about the 4th day of December 1982, at around 9:00 oclock in the evening, in the Poblacion, [M]unicipality of San Jose, [P]rovince of Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, by means of treachery and with evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strenght [sic] willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot RONIE ILISAN, with the use of firearms, inflicting upon the latter multiple mortal injuries in different parts of his body which were the direct and immediate cause of his death. Accused Tumbagahan, De los Santos, Cajilo and Fontamillas, with the assistance of their lawyers Atty. Abelardo V.

Calsado and Juanito Dimaano, pleaded not guilty when arraigned on February 15, 1988;[12] while Accused Cawaling, assisted by Counsel Jovencio Q. Mayor, entered a plea of not guilty on March 16, 1988.[13] After due trial,[14] the court a quo[15] rendered its Decision dated October 21, 1994,[16] the decretal portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused (1) ULYSSES M. CAWALING, (2) ERNESTO TUMBAGAHAN, (3) RICARDO DELOS SANTOS, (4) HILARIO CAJILO, AND (5) ANDRES FONTAMILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER under the Information, dated June 4, 1987, and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law. The accused, jointly and severally, are ORDERED to pay Nelson Elisan the sum of P6,000.00 as actual damages and the heirs of the deceased Ronie Elisan the sums of P116,666.66 by way of lost earnings and P50,000.00 as indemnity for death, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The bail bonds of all the accused are ORDERED CANCELLED and all said accused are ORDERED immediately confined in jail. The slug (Exh. A); the .38 caliber revolver (with 3 empty shells and 3 live bullets) (Exh. G); and the slug of bullet (Exh. H) are confiscated in favor of the government. After the judgment has become final, the Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Clerk of Court, this Court, is ordered to deliver and deposit the foregoing Exhibits A, F, G and H, inclusive, to the Provincial Director, PNP, of the Province of Romblon properly receipted. Thereafter, the receipt must be attached to the record of the case and shall form part of the record. The period of preventive imprisonment the accused had undergone shall be credited in their favor to its full extent pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The case against co-accused ALEX BATUIGAS who is at large is ORDERED ARCHIVED pending his arrest.[17] Hence, this appeal.[18] The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

The trial court gives this summary of the facts as viewed by the prosecution witnesses: The killing occurred on December 4, 1982 at around 9:00 oclock in the evening at the ricefield of Poblacion, San Jose, Romblon when the bright moon was already above the sea at an angle of about 45 degrees, or if it was daytime, it was about 9:00 oclock in the morning (Imelda Elisan Tumbagahon, on direct examination, tsn, Jan. 17, 1989, p. 5, and on cross examination, tsn, April 18, 1989, p. 22). On December 4, 1982, about 8:00 oclock or 8:30 oclock in the evening, Vicente Elisan and his elder brother Ronie Elisan, the victim, were drinking tuba at C & J-4 Kitchenette of co-accused Andres Fontamillas in Poblacion, San Jose, Romblon. When they stood up to go home, Luz Venus, the wife of Diosdado Venus, told them not to go out because the accused were watching them outside about three (3) meters

from the restaurant. Diosdado Venus accompanied them upon their request and they went out and walked towards home. About a hundred meters from the restaurant, the six (6) accused, that is, Mayor Cawaling, the four (4) policemen, namely, Hilario Cajilo, Andres Fontamillas, Ernesto Tumbagahan and Ricardo delos Santos, and civilian Alex Batuigas, the mayors brother-in-law, flashlighted them and Diosdado Venus ran going back. The two (2) brothers also ran towards home to the house of their elder sister Imelda Elisan Tumbagahon. Co-accused Andres Fontamillas and Hilario Cajilo blocked them on the gate of the fence of their sisters house. Ronie Elisan ran towards the ricefield. The accused were chasing them. Vicente Elisan saw his brother Ronie f[a]ll down on the ricefield while he ran towards the bushes and la[y] on the ground. Ronie Elisan rose up by kneeling and raising his two (2) hands. All the six (6) accused approached him with their flashlights and shot him. Ronie fell down about twenty (20) meters from the bushes where Vicente Elisan hid behind the coconut tree. Co-accused Cawaling said []you left him, he is already dead.[] Mayor Cawaling was armed with .45 caliber, policemen Andres Fontamillas and Hilario Cajilo were both with armalites, Ernesto Tumbagahan and Ricardo delos Santos were both with .38 caliber and so with civilian Alex Batuigas. They left towards the house of Mayor Cawaling. After they were gone, Vicente Elisan ran towards the house of his older brother Nelson Elisan. Upon seeing him, Vicente told Nelson that Ronie was already dead. Nelson said nothing. While they were there, elder sister Imelda Elisan Tumbagahon, who was crying came. She said: Manong, patay ron si Ronie. (Brother, Ronie is already dead). Nelson said []do not be noisy; they might come back and kill all of us.[] Imelda stopped crying. After a while, brothers Nelson and Vicente Elisan went to the house of barangay captain Aldolfo Tumbagahon. The three (3) went to the townhall and called the police but there was none there. Going to the house of the Chief of Police Oscar Montero, they were told by his wife that Commander Montero was in the house of Mayor Cawaling. They proceeded to the place where Ronie Elisan was shot. The cadaver was brought to the house of Nelson Elisan. Vicente Elisan found an empty shell of a .45 caliber about three (3) arms length from the body of the victim. They surrendered it to the Napolcom.[19] Dr. Blandino C. Flores described the gunshot wounds of the victim as follows: Gunshot Wounds: 1. Shoulder:

Gun shot wound measuring x inch, along the vertebral column, right at the level of the 10th ribs with contussion [sic]collar. 5. Leg, Left:

Gun shot wound measuring x anterior aspect upper third leg with contussion [sic] collar, with the exit x posterior aspect upper third leg, left.[20] Based on the death certificate (Exhibit E) issued by Dr. Flores, Ronie Ilisan died of severe hemorrhage and gun shot wo[unds].[21]

Version of the Defense

Appellant Cawaling, in his 47-page Brief,[22] presented his own narration of the incident as follows: At around 7:00 in the evening of December 4, 1982, Ulysses Cawaling, then the mayor of the [M]unicipality of San Jose in the [P]rovince of Romblon, arrived aboard a hired motorized boat from Manila in the seashore of San Jose. From the seashore, he immediately proceeded to his home. At around 7:30 in the evening, Cawaling went to the municipal hall to check on administrative matters that piled up in the course of his trip to Manila. He also went inside the police station (located inside the municipal building) to be apprised of any developments, after which he went out and joined Pfc. Tumbagahan and Pfc. Cajilo who were standing near the flagpole in front of the municipal building. The three engaged in a conversation. Cawaling learned that the two police officers were the ones assigned for patrol/alert for that night. The three of them went inside the INP office and there Cawaling informed the two policemen that he received information from reliable persons that certain persons were plotting to kill him and a member of the towns police force. It is to be noted that this occurred at the height of the communist insurgency and political violence in the countryside in the early 80s. Hence, such information was taken very seriously, having been relayed by sources independent of each other. Cawaling, as town chief then empowered with supervisory authority over the local police, accompanied Pfc. Tumbagahan and Pfc. Cajilo in conducting patrol and surveillance operations around the small municipality. He usually did this as routine since Romblon was then plagued with political assassinations and armed conflict. On their way to the seashore, they passed by C & J-4 Kitchenette, and chanced upon Ronnie Ilisan and his brother Vicente Ilisan drinking liquor and discussing in very loud voices. They stopped right in the front of the restaurant and there they heard Ronnie Ilisan state in a every loud voice that he will kill a person that night. Inside the restaurant, without the knowledge then of Cawaling and the two police officers, witness Gil Palacio, who was buying cigarettes and Luz Venus, the cook/server of the restaurant, saw Ronnie Ilisan, very drunk, brandishing in the air a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with a protruding screw. Initially dismissing Ronnie Ilisans statement as just another hollow swagger of an intoxicated person (salitang lasing), Cawaling and the two policemen proceeded on their way. After the patrol, they returned to the municipal building and stationed themselves in front. At around 8:30 in the evening, Ronnie Elisan passed by the municipal hall walking towards the direction of the house of Nelson Ilisan, another brother, and shouted the challenge, gawas ang maisog, meaning THOSE WHO ARE BRAVE, COME OUT. Cawaling and the two police officers again brushed aside [the] challenge as just another foolish drunken revelry

Gun shot wound x inch in diameter shoulder right 2 inches from the neck with contussion [sic] collar s[u]rrounding the wound. 2. Right Axilla:

Gun shot wound x inch in diameter, 2 inches below the right nipple with contussion [sic] collar s[u]rrounding the wound. 3. Left Axilla:

Exit of the gun shot wound from the right axilla, measuring x inch with edges everted, one inch below the axilla and one inch below the level of the nipple. 4. Back:

[o]n the part of Ronnie Ilisan, a well-known troublemaker in the small municipality. A few moments later, after Ronie Ilisan had passed by, they distinctly heard a gunshot and hysterical female voices shouting, pulis, tabang meaning POLICE! HELP! four times. Impelled by the call of duty, Cawaling and the two policemen immediately ran in the direction of the gunshot and the desperate female voices until they reached the house of Nelson Ilisan in San Jose Street. At this point, they saw Ronnie Ilisan holding a .38 caliber revolver. They also saw Vicente Ilisan, Francisco Tesnado, Fe Ilisan, the wife of Nelson and Delma Ilisan, the wife of Vicente, the latter two being the same persons who cried pulis, tabang four times. Cawaling then told Ronnie to surrender his gun but the latter responded by pointing the gun at Cawaling and pulling the trigger. At the precise moment that the gun fired, Cawaling warned the two policemen to drop to the ground by shouting dapa. Fortunately, Cawaling was not hit. Ronnie Ilisan then turned around and ran towards the church. The two policemen gave chase. Cawaling, still shaken and trembling after the mischance was initially left behind but followed shortly. When Ronnie Ilisan reached the church, he turned around and again fired at the pursuing Pfc. Cajilo. Fortunately, the gun misfired. When they finally reached the ricefield, Pfc. Cajilo fired two (2) warning shots in the air for Ronnie to surrender. Ronnie responded by firing once again at Pfc. Tumbagahan but failed to hit the latter. At that instance, Pfc. Cajilo counter-fired at Ronnie Ilisan hitting him. Pfc. Tumbagahan also fired his weapon in the heat of exchange and also hit Ronnie Ilisan. As a result of the gunshot wounds, Ronnie Ilisan later on succumbed. Pfc. Tumbagahan picked up the gun still in the hand of the dead Ronnie Ilisan and gave it to Pfc. Cajilo. The three, Cawaling, who subsequently caught up with them after the incident, and the two police officers, then proceeded to the police station located in the municipal building to formally report the incident in their station blotter.[23] The Brief for All of the Accused-Appellants filed by Atty. Napoleon U. Galit and the Brief for Appellants Ernesto Tumbagahan and Hilario Cajilo submitted by Atty. Joselito R. Enriquez merely repeated the facts as narrated by the trial court.

element of surprise was lacking. It is for this reason that we hold that alevosia should be deemed absorbed or included in abuse of superiority. Even assuming ex-gratia argumenti that it should be the other way around, the situation will not be of help, penaltywise, to the accused.[24] The defenses raised by the appellants were dismissed and their witnesses declared unworthy of belief for the following reasons: 1. It was highly improbable that Defense Witness Tesnado would not tell his wife (Dory) and Bebelinia Ilisan Sacapao about the incident he had allegedly witnessed; more so when Sacapao was the victims first cousin. 2. The spot report prepared by Station Commander Oscar M. Montero, the testimonies of Cajilo and Tumbagahan and the medical findings of Dr. Flores contradicted one another on the following details: the caliber of the gun used in shooting the victim, the wounds inflicted and the whereabouts of Cawaling during the shoot-out. 3. Cawaling and his men, armed with guns, could have immediately disarmed the victim at the initial encounter. The court could not understand why the victim was able to fire his gun, run, then stop and again fire his gun, without being caught. 4. The positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses prevails over the alibi posed by De los Santos and Fontamillas, a defense that was not corroborated by any other witness. 5. The .38 caliber revolver, allegedly owned by the victim, was in fact owned and used by Alex Batuigas. 6. The defense presented a photo and a sketch to prove that Imelda Ilisan Tumabagahan had an obstructed view of the killing. The trial court ruled that such evidence was misleading, because the window, from where said witness allegedly saw the incident, was at the eastern side of her house, and thus afforded a clear view of the incident, while the window referred to by the defense was at the southern portion. 7. The questioned testimonies of Dr. Flores, Nelson Ilisan and Provincial Prosecutor Pedro Victoriano, Jr., though not formally offered as evidence, may be admitted because of the failure of the defense to object thereto at the time they were called to testify. 8. The defense failed to prove that the prosecution witnesses had any ill motive to testify falsely against the appellant. 9. Appellants had a motive to kill the victim. Nelson Ilisan testified that his brother Ronie (the victim) had witnessed Bonifacio Buenaventura (a former chief commander of the San Jose Police Force) kill a certain Ruben Ventura. Cawaling, who was Buenaventuras first cousin, wanted Ronie dead, because the latter had not followed his instruction to leave town to prevent him from testifying in said case. Assignment of Errors The appellants, through their common counsel, Atty. Napoleon Galit, assign the following errors to the lower court: 1. The trial court gravely erred in sustaining prosecutors theory of conspiracy and thus renders nugatory or has

Ruling of the Trial Court

Finding the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies credible, the court a quo convicted the appellants. The killing was qualified to murder because of the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and treachery. The trial court ruled that there was a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and his assailants, as the latter were greater in number and armed with guns. It further ruled that abuse of superior strength absorbed treachery, as it ratiocinated: Certain cases, an authority wrote, involving the killing of helpless victim by assailants superior to them in arms or numbers, or victims who were overpowered before being killed, were decided on the theory that the killing was treacherous, when perhaps the correct qualifying circumstance would be abuse of superiority. In these cases the attack was not sudden nor unexpected and the element of surprise was lacking. (Id., I Aquino, pp. 423-424). In the instant case, we earlier ruled that the qualifying treachery should be considered as an exception to the general rule on treachery because it was not present at the inception of the attack. The killing was not sudden nor unexpected and the

totally forgotten that policemen when in actual call of duty normally operate in group but not necessarily in conspiracy. 2. The trial court gravely erred in believing the theory of the prosecution that accused-appellant Ulysses Cawaling was one of the alleged co-conspirators in the killing of the deceased Ronnie Elisan. 3. The trial court gravely erred in not believing the defense of accused-appellant Ulysses Cawaling that he has nothing to do with the shooting incident except to shout to arrest the accused[,] which prompted his co-accused policemen to chase the accused and sho[o]t him when he resisted, after he fired at Mayor Cawaling. 4. The trial court gravely erred in not giving weight to accused-appellant policemen[s] testimonies which carry the presumption of regularity. 5. The trial court gravely erred in not acquitting all the accused-appellants by applying the equipoise rule thereby resulting [i]n reasonable doubts on the guilt.[25] In their joint brief,[26] Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo cite these other errors: 1. The trial court gravely erred in relying on the theory of the prosecution that accused-appellants Ernesto Tumbagahan and Hilario Cajilo were alleged co-conspirators in the killing of the victim, Ronie Ilisan. 2. The trial court gravely erred in not believing the defense that herein accused-appellants merely did a lawful duty when the shooting incident happened which led to the death of Ronnie Ilisan. 3. The trial court gravely erred in not acquitting herein accused-appellants by applying the equipoise rule, thereby resulting in reasonable doubt on their guilt. 4. Prescinding from the foregoing, herein accusedappellants do press and hold, that the lower court committed grave, serious and reversible error in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery (alevosia). 5. The lower court committed grave, serious and reversible error in convicting both accused-appellants of murder, instead merely of homicide, defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code. 6. The lower court committed grave, serious and reversible error in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength. 7. The consummated crime being merely homicide, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be considered to lower the penalty of homicide. 8. The lower court committed error in not considering double jeopardy. 9. The lower court committed error in not dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction.[27] Appellant Cawaling imputes these additional errors to the court a quo: 1. The trial court gravely erred in not acquitting herein accused-appellant, Ulysses M. Cawaling, considering that he had no part in the killing and the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt;

2. The trial court gravely erred in not finding the shooting incident a result of hot pursuit and shoot-out between the deceased Ronnie Ilisan and the police officers in the performance of their duty and self-defense, and in sustaining the prosecutions conspiracy theory; 3. The trial court gravely erred in not acquitting Accused-Appellant Ulysses M. Cawaling considering that there was blatant absence of due process in the proceedings tantamount to mistrial.[28] This Courts Ruling We affirm the conviction of the appellants. In so ruling, we will resolve the following issues: (1) jurisdiction of the trial court, (2) double jeopardy, (3) credibility of prosecution witnesses and their testimonies, (4) self-defense, (5) performance of lawful duty, (6) alibi, (7) conspiracy, (8) rule on equipoise, (9) qualifying circumstances, (10) damages and (11) attending circumstances as they affect the penalty. We shall address the first two issues as important preliminary questions and discuss the merits of the remaining ones, which we have culled from the errors cited by the appellants in their aforementioned briefs. First Issue:

Jurisdiction of the Trial Court

Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo argue that the trial court erred when it assumed jurisdiction over the criminal case. They insist that the Sandiganbayan, not the regular courts, had jurisdiction to try and hear the case against the appellants, as they were public officers at the time of the killing which was allegedly committed by reason of or in relation to their office. We do not agree. The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action. Once the court acquires jurisdiction, it may not be ousted from the case by any subsequent events, such as a new legislation placing such proceedings under the jurisdiction of another tribunal. The only recognized exceptions to the rule, which find no application in the case at bar, arise when: (1) there is an express provision in the statute, or (2) the statute is clearly intended to apply to actions pending before its enactment.[29] The statutes pertinent to the issue are PD 1606, as amended;[30] and PD 1850, as amended by PD 1952 and BP 129. Section 4 of PD 1606[31] reads: Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise: (a) x x Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: x x xxx x x

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty

prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court. x x x x x x x x x

However, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued two presidential decrees placing the members of the Integrated National Police under the jurisdiction of courtsmartial. Section 1 of PD 1952,[32] amending Section 1 of PD 1850, reads: SECTION 1. Court Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members of the Armed Forces. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding -- (a) uniformed members of the Integrated National Police who commit any crime or offense cognizable by the civil courts shall henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-martial pursuant to and in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War; (b) all persons subjects to military law under Article 2 of the aforecited Articles of War who commit any crime or offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case disposed of under the said Articles of War; Provided, that, in either of the aforementioned situations, the case shall be disposed of or tried by the proper civil or judicial authorities when court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under Article 38 of Commonwealth Act Numbered 408, as amended, or court-martial jurisdiction over the person of the accused military or Integrated National Police personnel can no longer be exercised by virtue of their separation from the active service without jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand unless otherwise provided by law: PROVIDED FURTHER, THAT THE PRESIDENT MAY, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, ORDER OR DIRECT, AT ANY TIME BEFORE ARRAIGNMENT, THAT A PARTICULAR CASE BE TRIED BY THE APPROPRIATE CIVIL COURT. As used herein, the term uniformed members of the Integrated National Police shall refer to police officers, policemen, firemen, and jail guards. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of regular courts over civil and criminal cases was laid down in BP 129, the relevant portion of which is quoted hereunder: Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. -- Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.[33] In relation to the above, Section 4-a-2 of PD 1606, as amended by PD 1861, quoted earlier, lists two requisites that must concur before the Sandiganbayan may exercise exclusive and original jurisdiction over a case: (a) the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office; and (b) the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or higher than a fine of six thousand pesos (P6,000).[34] Sanchez vs. Demetriou[35] clarified that murder or homicide may be committed both by public officers and by private citizens, and that public office is not a constitutive element of said crime, viz.:

The relation between the crime and the office contemplated by the Constitution is, in our opinion, direct and not accidental. To fall into the intent of the Constitution, the relation has to be such that, in the legal sense, the offense cannot exist without the office. In other words, the office must be a constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute, such as, for instance, the crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of the Revised Penal Code. Public office is not the essence of murder. The taking of human life is either murder or homicide whether done by a private citizen or public servant, and the penalty is the same except when the perpetrator, being a public functionary, took advantage of his office, as alleged in this case, in which event the penalty is increased. But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises, not from the allegations but on the proof, not from the fact that the criminals are public officials but from the manner of the commission of the crime. Furthermore, the Information filed against the appellants contains no allegation that appellants were public officers who committed the crime in relation to their office. The charge was for murder, a felony punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. As clarified in Aguinaldo, et al. vs. Domagas, et al.,[36] [I]n the absence of such essential allegation, and since the present case does not involve charges of violation of R.A. No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft etc. Act), the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the present case. (Bartolome vs. People, 142 SCRA 459 [1986] Even before considering the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged, it is thus essential to determine whether that offense was committed or alleged to have been committed by the public officers and employees in relation to their offices. Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information.[37] In the absence of any allegation that the offense was committed in relation to the office of appellants or was necessarily connected with the discharge of their functions, the regional trial court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.[38] Second Issue:

Double Jeopardy
In seeking their acquittal, Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo also invoke their right against double jeopardy. They argue that the first jeopardy attached when a criminal case for murder was filed before the Judge Advocate Generals Office (JAGO), which was allegedly dismissed after several hearings had been conducted.[39] We are not persuaded. There is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy has attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and, (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as that in the first. And the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.[40] For a better appreciation of appellants argument, we must consider PD 39[41] and its implementing rules,[42] which prescribe the procedure before a military commission. A summary preliminary investigation shall be conducted before

trial for the purpose of determining whether there is prima facie evidence to pursue trial before a military commission. The investigation report shall contain a summary of the evidence, the acts constituting the offense or offenses committed, and the findings and recommendations of the investigating officer. Thereafter, the report shall be forwarded to the judge advocate general, who shall determine for either the defense secretary or for the AFP chief of staff whether the case shall be referred for trial to a military commission.[43]Where a prima facie case is found against the accused, formal charges shall be signed by a commissioned officer designated by the judge advocate general.[44] The accused shall then be arraigned, during which the charge and specification shall be read and the accused shall enter his plea.[45] After hearings, a record of the trial shall be forwarded to the AFP chief of staff for proper action.[46] In the present case, the appellants have presented no sufficient and conclusive evidence to show that they were charged, arraigned and acquitted in a military commission, or that the case was dismissed therein without their consent. The defense merely offered as evidence certain disposition forms[47] and a letter,[48] dated March 8, 1983, recommending that the case against Appellants Tumbagahan, Cajilo and De los Santos be dropped and considered closed.[49] No charge sheet and record of arraignment and trial were presented to establish the first jeopardy. As pointed out by the solicitor general, appellants were never arraigned, they never pleaded before the Judge Advocate Generals Office, there was no trial, and no judgment on the merits had been rendered.[50] Third Issue:

Q. Were you able to leave that restaurant actually? A. No, sir.

Q. Why? A. Luz Venus told us not to go out when [I] stood up to go home. Q. Do you know why you were advise[d] not to go out? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why? A. Because we were being watched by Mayor Cawaling, Andres Fontamillas, Hilario Cajilo and Alex Bat[ui]gas. x x x x xxx x x

Q. When you were informed by Luz Venus that you should not go out because Mayor Cawaling and the persons you mentioned were outside watching for you, what did you do? A. We did not go out.

Q. Since you remained inside, what did you do? A. I also viewed thru the window.

Q. Did you see them? A. Yes, sir.

Q. How far were they from the restaurant? A. About three meters.

Credibility of Witnesses
As a general rule, the factual findings of trial courts deserve respect and are not disturbed on appeal, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted, and would otherwise materially affect the disposition of the case.[51] This rule, however, does not apply when the judge who penned the decision was not the same one who had heard the prosecution witnesses testify,[52] as in the present case. Nonetheless, we have carefully perused and considered the voluminous records of this case, and we find no reason to alter the findings of the court a quo in regard to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies. Vicente Ilisan, the victims brother, narrated before the trial court the circumstances relevant to the crime: Q. In the evening of December 4, 1982, at about 8:00 or 8:30, where were you? A. x x I was inside the restaurant of Andres Fontamillas. x x xxx x x

Q. What were they doing outside the restaurant? A. They were also viewing us.

Q. For how long did they remain there viewing you? A. Just a short time.

Q. And later on, do you know where did they go? [sic] A. No, sir. I went out from the restaurant and when I went out, I did not see them anymore. Q. Before you went out of the restaurant, what did you do? A. Diosdado Venus accompanied us.

Q. Why did you ask Diosdado Venus to accompany you? A. Yes, sir. Because we were aware that we were being watched from outside so we asked to be accompanied by Diosdado Venus. Q. From the restaurant accompanied by Diosdado Venus, what did you do? A. Towards home.

Q. What were you doing there? A. I was drinking tuba.

Q. Were you able to reach home? A. No, sir.

Q. When you were about to finish drinking tuba, what did you do? A. I stood up preparing to go home.

Q. Why, what happened on the way?

A. Diosdado Venus ran going back because we were lighted by a flashlight. Q. How many flashlight[s] were trimed [sic] to you? A. Six.

A.

I ran towards the bushes.

Q. What did you do upon reaching the bushes? A. I la[y] on the ground with my belly touch[ing] on the ground behind the coconut tree. Q. When your brother according to you had fallen on the ricefield, what did he do thereafter? A. He rose up, [raised] his hands and surrender[ed] to them. Q A. Mayor Cawaling, Andres Fontamillas, Hilario Cajilo, Ernesto Tumbagahan, Ricardo delos Santos and Alex Batuigas. Q. How were you able to recognize them when that was night time? A. Because the flashlight[s] were bright. In rising, what was his position?

Q. Did you come to know who trimed [sic] the flashlight towards you? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Who were they?

A. He was rising like this. (Witness demonstrating by kneeling [and] raising his two hands). Q. While Ronie Elisan was kneeling and raising both of his hands, what happened? A. Mayor Cawaling approached him together with the four policemen and his brother-in-law and they shot him. Q. Do you know what weapon[s] were used in shooting your brother? A. Yes, sir.

Q. When Diosdado Venus ran back to his restaurant, what did your brother Ronie Elisan and you do? A. We also ran towards home.

Q. To whose house? Q. What weapon were used? A. That of my older sister Imelda [E]lisan. A. The weapon of Mayor Cawaling is .45 caliber and that of Andres Fontamillas and Hilario Cajilo were both armalite and that of Ernesto Tumbagahan, Alex Batuigas and Ricardo delos Santos were .38 caliber. Q. How were you able to identify their weapons? A. Because the flashlight[s] were bright.

Q. Were you able to reach that house? A. No, sir.

Q. Why, what happened when you ran away? A. Andres Fontamillas and Hilario Cajilo were blocking us on the gate of the fence of my sisters house. Q. Since your way was blocked, where did Ronie Elisan go? A. We ran towards the ricefield.

Q. Now, what happened to your brother when he was fired upon by the accused in this case? A. He fell down.

Q. When you ran, what did Mayor Cawaling do? A. They were chasing us.

Q. And how far is that spot where your elder brother had fallen down to the spot where Diosdado Venus left you when he returned to the restaurant? A. To my estimate it is about 300 meters.

Q. What about Alex Batuigas, what did he do? A. He also followed helping chasing us. [sic]

Q. What about the four policemen, what did they do? A. The same. They were also chasing us.

Q. After your brother had fallen down, what did the accused do? A. Mayor Cawaling said, []you left him, he is already dead.[] Q. Where did they go? A. They went towards the house of Mayor Cawaling.[53]

Q. About how far is that restaurant [from] the spot where you were first lighted by the flashlight of the accused? A. About one hundred meters.

Q. Now, according to you, you ran towards the ricefield, what happened while you were running towards the ricefield? A. I saw my brother fell [sic] down.

Q. Fell down where? A. On the ricefield.

Imelda Tumbagahan was at home feeding her child when she heard her brother Ronie shouting for help. After getting a flashlight and looking through the window of her house, she saw Cawaling and Alex Batuigas chasing Ronie who was running towards her house. Tumbagahan and De los Santos prevented Ronie from entering the fence of her house, as a result of which, her brother ran towards a rice field nearby. There, on bended knees and with hands raised, Ronie was shot by Cawaling and his men.[54] Nelson Ilisan also heard his younger brother Ronie shouting for help while being chased by the group of Cawaling. As

Q. What about you, where were you when your brother fell down in the ricefield?

Cajilo and Fontamillas blocked Ronie from entering the gate of Imeldas house, the victim ran towards a rice field. Nelson stopped Cawaling and asked, Nong, basi guinalagas ninyo ang acon hali? (Nong, why do you chase my brother?) But the mayor merely continued chasing Ronie. Thereafter, Nelson saw his brother, on his knees with both hands raised, shot by appellants.[55] The three aforementioned witnesses narrated in detail the assault against their brother Ronie and positively identified the appellants as the perpetrators. The trial court cannot be faulted for relying on their testimonies and accepting them as true,[56] especially when the defense failed, to prove any ill motive on their part.[57] In addition, family members who have witnessed the killing of their loved one usually strive to remember the faces of the assailants.[58] Thus, the relationship per se of witnesses with the victim does not necessarily mean that the former are biased. On the contrary, it is precisely such relationship that would impel them to seek justice and put the real culprit behind bars, rather than impute the offense to the innocent.[59] Appellant Cawaling submits that the prosecution witnesses tampered with the evidence by cleaning the cadaver before an autopsy could be done. Such irregular washing of the cadaver by a close relative of the deceased, who is educated and who presumably knew perfectly well the need to preserve it in its original state for the medico-legal examination[,] is highly suspicious. It points to the fact that the relatives of the deceased wanted to hide, or erase something that would bolster and assist the defense (that is, state of drunkenness, powder burns or lack thereof, indicating the firing of a weapon or the proximity of the weapon used on the deceased, etc.).[60] Such contention is unavailing. First, Bebelinia Sacapao merely cleaned the cadaver and made no further examination. Second, appellants had an opportunity to have the body examined again to determine or prove important matters, such as whether Ronie was drunk, if he fired a gun, how many and what caliber of guns were used in shooting him; they did not, however, avail themselves of this opportunity. As public officers, appellants knew that it was within their power to request or secure from the court, or any other competent authority, an order for another autopsy[61] or any such evidence as may affirm their innocence. Third, their conviction lies in the strong and convincing testimonial evidence of the prosecution, not in the corroborative testimony of Bebelinia Sacapao. Relying on the testimonies of Luz Venus and Gil Palacio, Appellant Cawaling also pointed out that [t]he power of observation of alleged eyewitness Vicente was severely affected by his intoxication. It may be inferred that an intoxicated persons sense[s] of sight and hearing and of touch are less acute than those of a sober person and that his observation are inexact as to what actually occurred.[62] This argument is not persuasive. The evidence presented fails to show that Vicente was so intoxicated that night as to affect his powers of observation and retrospection. Defense Witness Palacio merely saw the witness drinking tuba on the night of the killing.[63] Meanwhile the whole testimony of Luz on the matter mainly reveals that Ronie was the person she was referring to as drunk, as shown by this portion:[64] Q When Ronie and Vicente both surnamed Ilisan entered the C & J-4 kitchenette what if any did you observe? A Q I saw them so dr[u]nk (Nakita ko sila lasing na lasing). Who was lasing na lasing or so dr[u]nk?

Ronie Ilisan sir.

Granting that Vicente was drunk, the conviction of the appellants is still inevitable in view of the positive declarations of Witnesses Nelson and Imelda, who unequivocally identified appellants as perpetrators of the senseless killing of their brother Ronie. Appellant Cawaling also questions the trial courts reliance on the testimonies of Dr. Blandino Flores,[65] Nelson Ilisan[66] and Prosecutor Pedro Victoriano, Jr.,[67] for failure of the prosecution to offer them as evidence. In People vs. Java,[68] this Court ruled that the testimony of a witness, although not formally offered in evidence, may still be admitted by the courts, if the other party does not object to its presentation. The Court explained: Section 36 of [Rule 132] requires that an objection in the course of the oral examination of a witness should be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent. Since no objection to the admissibility of evidence was made in the court below, an objection raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered. In the present case, a cursory reading of the stenographic notes reveals that the counsel for the appellants did not raise any objection when said witnesses testified on the matters now being impugned. Moreover, they repeatedly cross-examined the witnesses, which shows that they had waived their objections to the said testimonies of such witnesses. Lastly, Appellant Mayor Cawaling questions the motive of Prosecutor Pedro Victoriano Jr. This contention is likewise bereft of merit. Unlike judges who are mandated to display cold neutrality in hearing cases,[69] prosecutors are not required to divest themselves of their personal convictions and refrain from exhibiting partiality. In this case, there is reasonable ground for Prosecutor Victoriano to believe that an offense has been committed and that the accused was probably guilty thereof.[70] Under the circumstance, it is his sworn duty to see that justice is served.[71] Thus, [h]e may prosecute with earnestness and vigor - - indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.[72] Further, Under the prevailing criminal procedure, the fiscals sphere of action is quite extensive, for he has very direct and active intervention in the trial, assuming as the Governments representative the defense of society, which has been disturbed by the crime, and taking public action as though he were the injured party, for the purpose of securing the offenders punishment, whenever the crime has been proved and the guilt of the accused as the undoubted perpetrator thereof established.[73] Fourth Issue:

Self-Defense
To escape criminal liability, the appellants also invoke the justifying circumstances of self-defense and lawful performance of duty.[74] Allegedly, Ronie was firing his gun and shouting Guwa ang maisog! (Come out who is brave!). Then the mayor and the policemen arrived at the scene to pacify him. Ronie fired at them, which forced them to chase him and return fire. We find this scenario bereft of plausibility. Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is a condition sine qua non for the successful invocation of self-

defense.[75] As factually found by the trial court, unlawful aggression did not start with the victim, but rather with the appellants. Cawaling and his men proceeded to the C & J-4 Kitchenette and waited for Ronie to come out. When the victim did, they chased and shot him without giving him any opportunity to defend himself. Granting arguendo the veracity of the defenses factual version, it is important to note that appellants admitted that Ronie was running away from them when they chased and shot him. Thus, unlawful aggression -- assuming it was initially present had ceased, and the appellants no longer had any right to pursue the offender. Basic is the rule that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has the right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. Upon the cessation of the unlawful aggression and the danger or risk to life and limb, there should be a corresponding cessation of hostilities on the part of the person defending himself.[76] Furthermore, the means employed to ward off the attack was unreasonably excessive. Being armed, the appellants could have easily ordered the victim to surrender. Even the first shot at his shoulder would have been sufficient to immobilize him, yet they fired a succession of shots at him while he was in no position to put up a defense. Jurisprudence teaches that when an accused admits having committed the crime but invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, the burden of proof is reversed and shifted to him. He must then prove the elements of selfdefense.[77] It necessarily follows that he must now rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution; for even if the latter evidence were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing.[78] Thus, appellants must establish with clear and convincing evidence that the killing was justified, and that they incurred no criminal liability therefor.[79] They failed to do so, and their conviction thus becomes inevitable.[80] Fifth Issue:

We likewise brush aside the defenses of alibi and denial raised by Appellant De los Santos. Prosecution witnesses positively identified him and Fontamillas as part of the group which chased and shot Ronie Ilisan. It is elementary that alibi and denial are outweighed by positive identification that is categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter. Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.[83] In fact, De los Santos failed to establish with clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime during its commission.[84] The evidence he had presented demonstrated only that, at the time, he was sleeping in his house, which was near the locus criminis. Alibi is always considered with suspicion and received with caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also because it is easily fabricated and concocted.[85] It is therefore incumbent upon the appellant to prove that he was at another place when the felony was committed, and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed.[86] This he failed to prove. Seventh Issue:

Conspiracy
The trial court correctly appreciated the presence of conspiracy. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found, for criminals do not write down their lawless plans and plots. The agreement to commit a crime, however, may be deduced from the mode and manner of the commission of the offense or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of intent.[87] It does not matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as the act of one is the act of all, and each incurs the same criminal liability.[88] We concur with the trial courts elucidation: All of the accused chased the victim and his brother; four (4) of whom blocked their ways, first, to their elder brother Nelson Elisans house and, second, to their elder sister Imelda Elisan Tumbagahons house. Having changed course by proceeding to the ricefield in their desperate attempt to evade the accused, all the six (6) armed accused continued their pursuit. Their victim, having fallen on the rice paddy, and rising and kneeling on it with raised hands, all the said accused with their flashlights beamed on their victim, in a united and concerted manner, shot him. After Ronie Elisan had fallen down, co-accused Mayor Cawaling was even heard as saying (Y)ou left [sic] him, he is already dead. x x x.[89] Eighth Issue:

Lawful Performance of Duties

Appellants contend that the killing of Ronie resulted from the lawful performance of their duties as police officers. However, such justifying circumstance may be invoked only after the defense successfully proves that (1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty, and (2) the injury or offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of such duty.[81] These two requisites are wanting in this case. The appellants, except Mayor Cawaling, were men in uniform who happened to be on duty when they killed Ronie. The victim was not committing any offense at the time. Killing the victim under the circumstances of this case cannot in any wise be considered a valid performance of a lawful duty by men who had sworn to maintain peace and order and to protect the lives of the people. As aptly held in People vs. De la Cruz,[82] Performance of duties does not include murder. That Ronie was a troublemaker in their town is not an excuse; as the Court declared in the same case of People vs. De la Cruz, Murder is never justified, regardless of the victim. Sixth Issue:

Equipoise Rule
We reject appellants position that the equipoise rule should apply to this case.[90] In People vs. Lagnas,[91] the Court through Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado described this rule, as follows: Once again, albeit in effect a supportive and cumulative consideration in view of the preceding disquisition, the equipoise rule finds application in this case, that is, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or

Alibi

10

more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and is not sufficient to support a conviction. In this case, the inculpatory facts point to only one conclusion: appellants are guilty. As amplified in the discussion above, the Court agrees with the trial court that the guilt of the appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt. Ninth Issue:

consequences of his act.[96] Nothing in the records shows how and when the plan to kill was hatched, or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out. Tenth Issue:

Damages
The trial court awarded the following: (a) P50,000.00, as civil indemnity; (b) P6,000.00, as actual damages; and (c) P116,666.66, for lost earnings. In computing the latter, the trial court used the following formula: Total annual net income = 10% x total annual gross income = .10 x P25,000.00 = P2,500.00 xxx xxx xxx

Murder or Homicide?
The Information alleges three qualifying circumstance s: treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength. If appreciated, any one of these will qualify the killing to murder. However, Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo posit that there was no treachery, reasoning that Ronie was not an unsuspecting victim, as he had been forewarned by Diosdado Venus of the presence of the appellants inside the restaurant and there had been a chase prior to the killing. Further, they contend that abuse of superior strength is deemed absorbed in treachery, and that the addition of abuse of superior strength to qualify the case to murder is nothing more than mere repetition - a legal chicanery, so to say. Similarly, where treachery is not proved, there can be no abuse of superior strength, viceversa.[92] We partly agree. Treachery exists when the malefactors employ means and methods that tend directly and especially to insure their execution without risk to themselves arising from the defense which the victims might make. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked.[93] While we do not disregard the fact that the victim, together with his brother Vicente, was able to run towards a rice field, we still believe that treachery attended the killing. In People vs. Landicho,[94] we ruled that treachery might still be appreciated even when the victim was warned of danger to his person, for what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. The appellants waited for Ronie to come out of the restaurant. All of them chased the victim and prevented him from seeking refuge either in the house of his sister Imelda or that of his brother Nelson. All of them carried firearms and flashlights. They fired their guns at the victim while he was on his knees with arms raised, manifesting his intention not to fight back. We cannot appreciate the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, however, as we have consistently ruled that it is deemed absorbed in treachery.[95] We also affirm the finding of the trial court that the prosecution failed to prove the attending circumstance of evident premeditation. To prove this aggravating circumstance, the prosecution must show the following: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time, between the determination to commit the crime and the execution thereof, sufficient to allow the offender to reflect upon the

Loss of earning capacity of Ronie Elisan = 2/3 (90-20) x P2,500.00 = P116,666.66.[97] Consistent with jurisprudence, we affirm the ruling of the trial court awarding the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim.[98] We cannot do the same to the award of actual damages and lost earnings, however. The award of actual damages has no basis, as no receipts were presented to substantiate the expenses allegedly incurred. An alleged pecuniary loss must be established by credible evidence before actual damages may be awarded.[99] Similarly erroneous is the award for loss of earning capacity, which should be computed as follows:[100] 2/3 x [80 - age of victim at the time of death] x [reasonable portion of the annual net income which would have been received as support by heirs] As testified to by Nelson Ilisan, the deceased had been earning an average of P100 daily or P3,000 monthly.[101] From this monthly income must be deducted the reasonable amount ofP1,000 representing the living and other necessary expenses of the deceased. Hence, the lost earnings of the deceased should be computed as follows: = = = 2/3 x [80 - 22] x [P24,000] 2/3 x [58] x [P24,000] 2[P 1,392,000] 3 = P2,784,000 3 = P928,000.

Eleventh Issue:

Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances

Prior to the amendment of Section 248 of the Revised Penal Code,[102] the imposable penalty for murder was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. In their Brief, Appellants Cajilo and Tumbagahan argue for the imposition of the lower penalty of reclusion temporal, contending that their filing of bail bonds/property bonds, before the order for

11

their arrest was issued, should be treated as voluntary surrender.[103] We cannot accept this contention. In the first place, it has no factual basis. The warrant for the arrest of herein appellants was issued on August 18, 1987,[104] but appellants counsel filed the Urgent Motion for Bail only thereafter, on September 2, 1987.[105] In the second place, appellants failed to prove the requisites for voluntary surrender, which are: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority or to the latters agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary.[106] The records reveal that a warrant of arrest was actually served on Tumbagahan and Cajilo[107] on September 2, 1987 and that they were in fact detained.[108] In view of the absence of any other aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the trial court correctly imposed reclusion perpetua. WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the award of P6,000 as actual damages is DELETED, and (2) the award for loss of earning capacity is INCREASED to P928,000. Costs against appellant. SO ORDERED.

feloniously with malicious intent of impeaching the virtue, honesty, integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said daily publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article entitled MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY PHYSICIAN, quoted verbatim hereunder, to wit: MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY PHYSICIAN PHYSICIAN (sic) are duly sworn to help to do all their best to promote the health of their patients. Especially if they are employed by a company to serve its employees. However, the opposite appears to be happening in the Local San Miguel Corporation office, SMC employees are fuming mad about their company physician, Dr. Portigo, because the latter is not doing well in his sworn obligation in looking after the health problems of employees, reports reaching Aim.. Fire say. One patient, Lita Payunan, wife of employee Wilfredo Payunan, and residing in Burgos, Lapaz, Iloilo City, has a sad tale to say about Dr. Portigo. Her story began September 19 last year when she felt ill and had to go to Dr. Portigo for consultation. The doctor put her under observation, taking seven months to conclude that she had rectum myoma and must undergo an operation. Subsequently, the family sought the services of a Dr. Celis and a Dr. de los Reyes at Doctor's Hospital. Incidentally, where Dr. Portigo also maintains a clinic. Dr. Portigo got angry, sources said, after knowing that the family chose a surgeon (Dr. Celis) on their own without his nod as he had one to recommend. Lita was operated by Dr. de los Reyes last March and was released from the hospital two weeks after. Later, however, she again complained of difficulty in urinating and defecating[. On] June 24, she was readmitted to the hospital. The second operation, done by Dr. Portigo's recommendee, was devastating to the family and the patient herself who woke to find out her anus and vagina closed and a hole with a catheter punched on her right side. This was followed by a bad news that she had cancer.

Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 167764 VICENTE FOZ, JR. and DANNY G. FAJARDO, Petitioners, - versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION PERALTA, J.: Before the court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City, dated November 24, 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Iloilo City, dated December 4, 1997 in Criminal Case No. 44527 finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of libel. Also assailed is the CA Resolution[2] dated April 8, 2005 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. In an Information[3] dated October 17, 1994 filed before the RTC of Iloilo City, petitioners Vicente Foz, Jr. and Danny G. Fajardo were charged with the crime of libel committed as follows: That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court, both the accused as columnist and Editor-Publisher, respectively, of Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and

12

Dr. Portigo recommended another operation, this time to bore another hole on the left side of Lita. But a Dr. Rivera to whom he made the referral frankly turned it down because it would only be a waste of money since the disease was already on the terminal state. The company and the family spent some P150,000.00 to pay for the wrong diagnosis of the company physician. My sympathy for Lita and her family. May the good Lord, Healer of all healers, be on your side, May the Healer of all healers likewise touch the conscience of physicians to remind them that their profession is no license for self-enrichment at the expense of the poor. But, sad to say, Lita passed away, July 2, 1994. Lita is not alone. Society is replete with similar experience where physicians treat their patients for profits. Where physicians prefer to act like agents of multinational corporations prescribing expensive drugs seen if there are equivalent drugs sold at the counter for much lower price. Yes, Lita, we also have hospitals, owned by a so-called charitable religious institutions and so-called civic groups, too greedy for profits. Instead of promoting baby-and mother-friendly practices which are cheaper and more effective, they still prefer the expensive yet unhealthy practices. The (sic) shun breast feeding and promote infant milk formula although mother's milk is many times cheaper and more nutrious (sic) than the brands they peddle. These hospitals separate newly born from their moms for days, conditioning the former to milk formula while at the same time stunting the mother's mammalia from manufacturing milk. Kadiri to death! My deepest sympathy to the bereaved family of Mrs. Lita Payunan who died July 2, 1994, Her body lies at the Payunan residence located at 236-G Burgos St., Lapaz, Iloilo City. May you rest in peace, Inday Lita. wherein said Dr. Portigo was portrayed as wanting in high sense of professional integrity, trust and responsibility expected of him as a physician, which imputation and insinuation as both accused knew were entirely false and malicious and without foundation in fact and therefore highly libelous, offensive and derogatory to the good name, character and reputation of the said Dr. Edgar Portigo.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

Upon being arraigned[5] on March 1, 1995, petitioners, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in the Information. Trial thereafter ensued. On December 4, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision[6] finding petitioners guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: WHEREFORE, in the light of the facts obtaining and the jurisprudence aforecited, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered finding both accused Danny Fajardo and Vicente Foz, Jr. GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT for the crime of Libel defined in Article 353 and punishable under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentencing aforenamed accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Three (3) Months and Eleven (11) Days of Arresto Mayor, as Minimum, to One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of Prision Correccional, as Maximum, and to pay a fine of P1,000.00 each.[7] Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order[8] dated February 20, 1998. Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA. On November 24, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision which affirmed in toto the RTC decision. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution dated April 8, 2005. Hence, herein petition filed by petitioners based on the following grounds: I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE SUBJECT ARTICLE LIBELOUS WITHIN THE MEANING AND INTENDMENT OF ARTICLE 353 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE. II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE EXISTENCE OF MALICE IN THIS CASE AND IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUBJECT ARTICLE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AS PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FAJARDO WHO HAPPENS TO BE MERELY PUBLISHER OF PANAY NEWS AND COULD NOT POSSIBLY SHARE ALL THE OPINIONS OF THE NEWSPAPER'S OPINION COLUMNISTS.[9] Petitioners argue that the CA erred in finding that the element of defamatory imputation was satisfied when petitioner Foz, as columnist, portrayed Dr. Portigo as an incompetent doctor and an opportunist who enriched himself at the expense of the poor. Petitioners pose the question of whether a newspaper opinion columnist, who sympathizes with a patient and her family and expresses the family's outrage in print, commits libel when the columnist criticizes the doctor's competence or lack of it, and such criticism turns out to be lacking in basis if not entirely false.

13

Petitioners claim that the article was written in good faith in the belief that it would serve the public good. They contend that the CA erred in finding the existence of malice in the publication of the article; that no malice in law or actual malice was proven by the prosecution; and that the article was printed pursuant to the bounden duty of the press to report matters of public interest. Petitioners further contend that the subject article was an opinion column, which was the columnists exclusive views; and that petitioner Fajardo, as the editor and publisher of Panay News, did not have to share those views and should not be held responsible for the crime of libel. The Solicitor General filed his Comment, alleging that only errors of law are reviewable by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45; that petitioners are raising a factual issue, i.e., whether or not the element of malice required in every indictment for libel was established by the prosecution, which would require the weighing anew of the evidence already passed upon by the CA and the RTC; and that factual findings of the CA, affirming those of the RTC, are accorded finality, unless there appears on records some facts or circumstance of weight which the court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, may alter the result of the case a situation that is not, however, obtaining in this case. In their Reply, petitioners claim that the first two issues presented in their petition do not require the evaluation of evidence submitted in court; that malice, as an element of libel, has always been discussed whenever raised as an issue via a petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners raise for the first time the issue that the information charging them with libel did not contain allegations sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo City. The Court finds that the threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 23, had jurisdiction over the offense of libel as charged in the Information dated October 17, 1994. The Court notes that petitioners raised for the first time the issue of the RTC's jurisdiction over the offense charged only in their Reply filed before this Court and finds that petitioners are not precluded from doing so.

civil case, which justified the departure from the general rule are not present in the instant criminal case.[11]

The Court finds merit in the petition. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The Court held in Macasaet v. People[12] that: It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)[13]

Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, provides the specific rules as to the venue in cases of written defamation, to wit: 360. Persons person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.

responsible.Any

Article

In Fukuzume v. People,[10] the Court ruled: It is noted that it was only in his petition with the CA that Fukuzume raised the issue of the trial courts jurisdiction over the offense charged. Nonetheless, the rule is settled that an objection based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged may be raised or considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise, since such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority which organized the court, and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law. While an exception to this rule was recognized by this Court beginning with the landmark case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, wherein the defense of lack of jurisdiction by the court which rendered the questioned ruling was considered to be barred by laches, we find that the factual circumstances involved in said case, a

The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof. The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of theprovince or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or

14

where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

of Iloilo and throughout the region only showed thatIloilo was the place where Panay News was in considerable circulation but did not establish that the said publication was printed and first published in Iloilo City. In Chavez v. Court of Appeals,[16] which involved a libel case filed by a private individual with the RTC of Manila, a portion of the Information of which reads: That on or about March 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused [Baskinas and Manapat] conspiring and confederating with others whose true names, real identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, with malicious intent of impeaching the honesty, virtue, character and reputation of one FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, former Solicitor General of the Philippines, and with the evident purpose of injuring and exposing him to public ridicule, hatred and contempt, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and maliciously cause to be published in Smart File, a magazine of general circulation in Manila, and in their respective capacity as Editor-in-Chief and Author-Reporter, ....[17] the Court ruled that the Information did not sufficiently vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Manila to hear the libel charge in consonance with Article 360. The Court made the following disquisition: x x x Still, a perusal of the Information in this case reveals that the word published is utilized in the precise context of noting that the defendants cause[d] to be published in 'Smart File', a magazine of general circulation in Manila. The Information states that the libelous articles were published in Smart File, and not that they were published in Manila. The place Manila is in turn employed to situate where Smart File was in general circulation, and not where the libel was published or first printed. The fact that Smart File was in general circulation in Manila does not necessarily establish that it was published and first printed in Manila, in the same way that while leading national dailies such as the Philippine Daily Inquirer or the Philippine Star are in general circulation in Cebu, it does not mean that these newspapers are published and first printed in Cebu. Indeed, if we hold that the Information at hand sufficiently vests jurisdiction in Manila courts since the publication is in general circulation in Manila, there would be no impediment to the filing of the libel action in other locations where Smart File is in general circulation. Using the example of the Inquirer or the Star, the granting of this petition would allow a resident of Aparri to file a criminal case for libel against a reporter or editor in Jolo, simply because these newspapers are in general circulation in Jolo. Such a consequence is precisely what Rep. Act No. 4363 sought to avoid.[18] In Agustin v. Pamintuan,[19] which also involved a libel case filed by a private individual, the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club, with the RTC of

In Agbayani v. Sayo,[14] the rules on venue in Article 360 were restated as follows: 1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published. 2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense. 3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. 4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.[15]

Applying the foregoing law to this case, since Dr. Portigo is a private individual at the time of the publication of the alleged libelous article, the venue of the libel case may be in the province or city where the libelous article was printed and first published, or in the province where Dr. Portigo actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense. The relevant portion of the Information for libel filed in this case which for convenience the Court quotes again, to wit: That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court, both the accused as columnists and Editor-Publisher, respectively, of Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with malicious intent of impeaching the virtue, honesty, integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said daily publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article entitled MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY PHYSICIAN.... The allegations in the Information that Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City

15

Baguio City where the Information therein alleged that the libelous article was published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Baguio and the entire Philippines, the Court did not consider the Information sufficient to show that Baguio City was the venue of the printing and first publication of the alleged libelous article. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as amended provides that a private individual may also file the libel case in the RTC of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense. The Information filed against petitioners failed to allege the residence of Dr. Portigo. While the Information alleges that Dr. Edgar Portigo is a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, such allegation did not clearly and positively indicate that he was actually residing in Iloilo City at the time of the commission of the offense. It is possible that Dr. Portigo was actually residing in another place. Again, in Agustin v. Pamintuan,[20] where the Information for libel alleged that the offended party was the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club and of good standing and reputation in the community, the Court did not find such allegation sufficient to establish that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio City. The Court explained its ruling in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 24, 2004 and the Resolution dated April 8, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522 are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Iloilo City. Criminal Case No. 44527 is DISMISSED without prejudice. SO ORDERED.

[G. R. No. 156747. February 23, 2005]

ALLEN A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., and ALFIE LORENZO, petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSELITO TRINIDAD, respondents. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Decision[1] dated 22 March 2002 and Resolution dated 6 January 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22067 entitled, People of the Philippines v. Alfie Lorenzo, et al. The factual antecedents are as follows: In an Information dated 10 July 1997, Alfie Lorenzo, Allen Macasaet, Nicolas Quijano, Jr., and Roger Parajes, columnist, publisher, managing editor, and editor, respectively of the newspaperAbante were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, with the crime of libel. The information, which was raffled off to Branch 93 of said court, reads: The undersigned accuses ALFIE LORENZO, ALLEN MACASAET, NICOLAS QUIJANO JR., ROGER B. PARAJES and JORDAN CASTILLO, of the crime of LIBEL, committed as follows: That on or about the 13th day of July, 1996 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused ALFIE LORENZO, columnist, ALLEN MACASAET, publisher, NICOLAS QUIJANO JR., managing editor, ROGER B. PARAJES, editor, respectively of Abante a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, and JORDAN CASTILLO, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, with evident intent of exposing JOSELITO MAGALLANES TRINIDAD, a.k.a. JOEY TRINIDAD a.k.a. TOTO TRINIDAD to public hatred, dishonor, discredit and contempt and ridicule, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and maliciously write, publish, exhibit and circulate and/or cause to be written, published, exhibited and circulated in the aforesaid newspaper, in its issue of July 13, 1996 an article which reads as follows: Humarap sa ilang reporters si Jordan Castillo hindi para magkaroon ng writeups kundi para ituwid lang ang ilang bagay na baluktot at binaluktot pang lalo ng isang Toto Trinidad. Hindi namin naging barkada si Joey Trinidad. Bah, Toto na pala siya ngayon. Anong palagay niya sa sarili niya, si Direk Toto Natividad siya? Nakikibuhat lang talaga yang taong yan sa amin sa Liberty Ave. noon. Ni hindi nga pinapansin ni Tito Alfie yan dahil nga sa amoy-pawis siya pagkatapos magbarbell. Kami naka-shower na, si Joey punas lang nang punas sa katawan niya ng T-shirt niyang siya ring isusuot niya pagkatapos na gawing pamunas!

The residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation or his actual residence or place of abode provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency; no particular length of time of residence is required. However, the residence must be more than temporary. The term residence involves the idea of something beyond a transient stay in the place; and to be a resident, one must abide in a place where he had a house therein. To create a residence in a particular place, two fundamental elements are essential: The actual bodily presence in the place, combined with a freely exercised intention of remaining there permanently or for an indefinite time. While it is possible that as the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club, the petitioner may have been actually residing in Baguio City, the Informations did not state that he was actually residing therein when the alleged crimes were committed. It is entirely possible that the private complainant may have been actually residing in another place. One who transacts business in a place and spends considerable time thereat does not render such person a resident therein. Where one may have or own a business does not of itself constitute residence within the meaning of the statute. Pursuit of business in a place is not conclusive of residence there for purposes of venue.[21]

Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information, and the offense must have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.[22] Considering that the Information failed to allege the venue requirements for a libel case under Article 360, the Court finds that the RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of the crime of libel should be set aside for want of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with the court of competent jurisdiction.

16

Madalas ngang makikain sa amin yan noon. Galit na galit nga ang mayordoma naming si Manang Hilda noon dahil nagkukulang ang rasyon namin dahil dagdag pakainin nga yang si Joey. Tamang-tama nga lang sa amin ang kanin at ulam, pero sinusugod pa niya ang kaldero para magkayod ng natitirang tutong sa kaldero. Naaawa nga ako madalas diyan kaya sineshare ko na lang ang pagkain ko sa kanya. Ewan ko kung anong naisipan ng taong yan at pagsasalitaan pa niya ng masama si Tito Alfie. Hindi man lang siya tumanaw ng utang na loob na kahit konti at kahit na sandali ay naitawid ng gutom niya. Hindi ko alam kung may kunsenya pa ang gangyang klaseng tao, pero sana naman ay makunsensya ka, Pare! Madalas nga itinatago ka na nga namin ni Tito Alfie para hindi mahighblood sa iyo, ganyan pa ang gagawin mo. Napupuyat nga si Manang Hilda sa pagbabantay sa iyo at hindi makatulog ang matanda hanggat hindi ka pa umuuwi, magsasalita ka pa ng mga inimbento mo. Pati nga si Eruel ay madalas mabanas sa iyo, natatandaan mo pa ba, dahil sa kakulitan mo! Pilit mo kaming binubuyo na sabihin kay Tito Alfie na tulungan ka rin tulad ng tulong na ibinibigay ni Tito Alfie na pag-aalaga sa amin. Pero hate na hate ka nga ni Tito Alfie dahil sa masamang ugali, natatandaan mo pa ba yun? Kaya tiyak ko na imbento mo lang ang lahat ng pinagsasabi mo para makaganti ka kay Tito Alfie, ani Jordan sa mga nag-interbyu sa kanyang legitimate writers. Hindi na siguro namin kailangan pang dagdagan ang mga sinabi ng sinasabi ni Toto Trinidad na mga barkada niya at kapwa niya kuno Liberty Boys! thereby publicly imputing a crime, vice or defect, real or imaginary or an act, omission, condition, status or circumstance and causing in view of their publication, discredit and contempt upon the person of said JOSELITO MAGALLANES TRINIDAD a.k.a. JOEY TRINIDAD a.k.a. TOTO TRINIDAD, to his damage and prejudice.[2] In an Order dated 16 July 1997, Judge Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., presiding judge of RTC, Branch 93, Quezon City, set the arraignment of the petitioners on 27 August 1997.[3] On 22 August 1997, petitioners filed before the court a quo an Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and/or Defer

1997.[6] Petitioners argued therein that the trial court committed grave error when it denied the petitioners Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and/or Defer Proceedings and continued with the scheduled arraignment on 27 August 1997. According to petitioners and their co-accused, by the trial judges denial of their Urgent Motion to Defer Arraignment and/or Defer Proceedings, he had effectively denied them their right to obtain relief from the Department of Justice. Moreover, banking on the case of Roberts, et al. v. Court of Appeals,[7] the petitioners and their fellow accused contended that since they had already manifested their intention to file a petition for review of the Resolution of the city prosecutor of Quezon City before the DOJ, it was premature for the trial court to deny their urgent motion of 21 August 1997. Finally, petitioners and their co-accused claimed that regardless of the outcome of their petition for review before the DOJ, the withdrawal of their not guilty pleas is in order as they planned to move for the quashal of the information against them. In an Order dated 26 September 1997,[8] Judge Bruselas, Jr., ruled that with the filing of the Motion to Dismiss, the court considers the accused to have abandoned their Motion for Reconsideration and to Withdraw Plea and sees no further need to act on the same. In his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss dated 23 September 1997,[9] the public prosecutor argued that the RTC, Quezon City, had jurisdiction over the case. He maintained that during the time material to this case, private respondent (private complainant below) was a resident of both 28-D Matino St. corner Malumanay St., Sikatuna Village, Quezon City and Karen St., Paliparan, Sto. Nio, Marikina, Metro Manila, as shown in his Reply-Affidavit of 11 October 1996 filed during the preliminary investigation of the case. For their part, the petitioners and their co-accused countered that it was incorrect for the public prosecutor to refer to the affidavit purportedly executed by private respondent as it is axiomatic that the resolution of a motion to quash is limited to a consideration of the information as filed with the court, and no other. Further, as both the complaint-affidavit executed by private respondent and the information filed before the court state that private respondents residence is in Marikina City, the dismissal of the case is warranted for the rule is that jurisdiction is determined solely by the allegations contained in the complaint or information.[10] On 16 October 1997, petitioners and their fellow accused filed a Supplemental Reply[11] attaching thereto certifications issued by Jimmy Ong and Pablito C. Antonio, barangay captains ofBarangay Malaya, Quezon City and Barangay Sto. Nio, Marikina City, respectively. The pertinent portion of the barangay certification[12] issued by Barangay Captain Ong states: This is to certify that this office has no record on file nor with the list of registered voters of this barangay regarding a certain person by the name of one MR. JOSELITO TRINIDAD. This further certifies that our BSDOs (have) been looking for said person seeking information regarding his whereabouts but to no avail. On the other hand, the certification[13] issued by Barangay Captain Antonio, reads in part: This is to certify that JOSELITO TRINIDAD of legal age, single/married/separate/widow/widower, a resident of Karen Street, Sto. Nio, Marikina City is a bonafide member of this barangay. ... This is being issued upon request of the above-named person for IDENTIFICATION.

Proceedings dated 21 August 1997 claiming that they intended to elevate the adverse Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for review. Despite this motion, the scheduled arraignment of petitioners pushed through on 27 August 1997. During said proceeding, petitioners Lorenzo and Quijano, Jr., together with their co-accused Parajes and Castillo, refused to enter any plea and so the trial court ordered that a plea of not guilty be entered into the records on their behalf.[4] As for petitioner Macasaet, his arraignment was rescheduled to 20 October 1997 due to his failure to attend the previously calendared arraignment. On 12 September 1997, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the libel case on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the offense charged. According to petitioners, as the information discloses that the residence of private respondent was in Marikina, the RTC of Quezon City did not have jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense[5] (Emphasis supplied.) Subsequently, on 23 September 1997, the trial court received by way of registered mail, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and to Withdraw Plea dated 3 September

17

During the hearing on 20 October 1997, the trial court received and marked in evidence the two barangay certifications. Also marked for evidence were page 4 of the information stating the address of private respondent to be in Marikina City and the editorial box appearing in page 18 of Abante indicating that the tabloid maintains its editorial and business offices at Rm. 301/305, 3/F BF Condominium Bldg., Solana cor. A. Soriano Sts., Intramuros, Manila. The prosecution was then given five (5) days within which to submit its comment to the evidence submitted by the petitioners and their fellow accused. In his Rejoinder to Supplemental Reply,[14] private respondent contended that the certification issued by the barangay captain of Barangay Malaya was issued after he had already moved out of the apartment unit he was renting in Sikatuna Village, Quezon City; that owners of residential houses do not usually declare they rent out rooms to boarders in order to avoid payment of local taxes; and that there is no showing that a census was conducted among the residents of Barangay Malaya during the time he resided therein. As regards the certification issued by the barangay chairman of Sto. Nio, Marikina City, private respondent argued that it is of judicial notice that barangay and city records are not regularly updated to reflect the transfer of residence of their constituents and that a perusal of said certification reveals that the barangay captain did not personally know him (private respondent). Finally, private respondent claimed that his receipt of the copy of petitioners Appeal to the DOJ, which was sent to his alleged address in Sikatuna Village, Quezon City, proved that he did, in fact, reside at said place. On 24 November 1997, the trial court rendered an Order dismissing the case due to lack of jurisdiction.[15] The court a quo noted that although the information alleged the venue of this case falls within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, the evidence submitted for its consideration indicated otherwise. First, the editorial box of Abante clearly indicated that the purported libelous article was printed and first published in the City of Manila. In addition, the trial court relied on the following matters to support its conclusion that, indeed, jurisdiction was improperly laid in this case: a) on page 4 of the information, the address of private respondent appeared to be the one in Marikina City although right below it was a handwritten notation stating 131 Sct. Lozano St., Barangay Sacred Heart, QC; b) the two barangay certifications submitted by the petitioners; and c) the Memorandum for Preliminary Investigation and Affidavit-Complaint attached to the information wherein the given address of private respondent was Marikina City. On 03 December 1997, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration[16] insisting that at the time the alleged libelous article was published, he was actually residing in Quezon City. According to him, he mistakenly stated that he was a resident of Marikina City at the time of publication of the claimed defamatory article because he understood the term address to mean the place where he originally came from. Nevertheless, the error was rectified by his supplemental affidavit which indicated Quezon City as his actual residence at the time of publication of the 13 July 1996 issue of Abante. On 22 January 1998, private respondent filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration to which he attached an affidavit executed by a certain Cristina B. Del Rosario, allegedly the owner of the house and lot in Sikatuna Village, Quezon City, where private respondent supposedly lived from July 1996 until May 1997. She also stated in her affidavit that she was not aware of any inquiry conducted by the barangay officials of Barangay Malaya regarding the residency of private respondent in their locality. Through an Order dated 12 February 1998, the trial court denied private respondents motion for reconsideration, ruling thus: [Del Rosarios] affidavit appears to have been executed only on 19 January 1998 to which fact the court can only chuckle and observe that evidently said affidavit is in the nature of a

curative evidence, the weight and sufficiency of which is highly suspect.[17] Undaunted, the public and the private prosecutors filed a notice of appeal before the court a quo.[18] In the Decision now assailed before us, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial courts conclusion and ordered the remand of the case to the court a quo for further proceedings. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts decision reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order dated November 24, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, Quezon City, in Criminal Case No. Q-97-71903, dismissing the case filed against herein accused-appellees on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered remanding the case to the court a quo for further proceedings.[19] The Court of Appeals held that jurisprudentially, it is settled that the residence of a person must be his personal, actual or physical habitation or his actual residence or abode and for the purpose of determining venue, actual residence is a persons place of abode and not necessarily his legal residence or domicile.[20] In this case, the defect appearing on the original complaint wherein the residence of private respondent was indicated to be Marikina City was subsequently cured by his supplemental-affidavit submitted during the preliminary investigation of the case. Moreover, as the amendment was made during the preliminary investigation phase of this case, the same could be done as a matter of right pursuant to the Revised Rules of Court.[21] As for the barangay certifications issued by the barangay chairmen of Barangay Malaya and Barangay Sto. Nio, the Court of Appeals ruled that they had no probative value ratiocinating in the following manner: . . . With respect to the requirement of residence in the place where one is to vote, residence can mean either domicile or temporary residence (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution A Primer, 3rd Ed., p. 209). Therefore, one who is a resident of Quezon City can be a voter of Marikina if the latter is his domicile. Conversely, a person domiciled in Marikina can vote in Quezon City if he resides in the latter. It is just a matter of choice on the part of the voter. Thus, logic does not support the supposition that one who is not a registered voter of a place is also not a resident theref. Furthermore, the right to vote has the corollary right of not exercising it. Therefore, one need not even be a registered voter at all. The same principle applies to the certification issued by the barangay in Marikina.[22] The appellate court likewise gave weight to the affidavit executed by Del Rosario and observed that petitioners failed to controvert the same. The petitioners thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution promulgated on 6 January 2003.[23] Hence, this petition raising the following issues: I THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY HAS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIME CHARGED. II THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ADMITTING THE AFFIDAVIT OF CRISTINA B. DEL ROSARIO. III

18

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING RESPONDENT TRINIDADS PERSONALITY TO APPEAL A CRIMINAL CASE.[24] Petitioners insist that the evidence presented before the trial court irrefutably established the fact that private respondent was not a resident of Quezon City at the time the alleged libelous publication saw print. According to them, the information dated 10 July 1997 filed before the RTC of Quezon City indicated private respondents address to be in Karen St., Paliparan, Sto. Nio, Marikina City. Further supporting this claim were the affidavitcomplaint[25] and the memorandum for preliminary investigation[26] where references were explicitly made to said address. Thus, petitioners are of the view that the Court of Appeals erred in relying on the supplemental affidavit executed by private respondent claiming that its execution amounted to nothing more than a mere afterthought. In addition, petitioners argue that the appellate court erred when it took into account the affidavit executed by Del Rosario. They insist that its belated submission before the trial court and the prosecutions failure to present the affiant to testify as regards the veracity of her statements undermined the evidentiary value of her affidavit. More, as the affidavit was not formally offered as evidence, it was only proper that the trial court disregarded the same in dismissing the case. Finally, petitioners contend that private respondent did not have the requisite personality to appeal from the decision of the trial court as it is only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which is authorized by law to institute appeal of criminal cases. Thus, the Court of Appeals made a mistake in holding that While it is true that only the OSG can file an appeal representing the government in a criminal proceeding, the private complainant nevertheless may appeal the civil aspect of the criminal case. The case at bar was dismissed due to the alleged improper laying of venue resulting in the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and not based on the merits of the case. It cannot therefore be argued that private complainants appeal pertains to the merits of the criminal case as what happened in accused-appellees cited case in the motion to strike, VicentePalu-ay vs. Court of Appeals (GR No. 112995, July 30, 1998). Needless to say, the private complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the dismissed criminal case which he had the right to protect. In the interest of justice and fair play, therefore, the Brief filed by private complainant in the present case should be treated as pertaining only to the civil aspect of the case.[27] In his Comment/Opposition dated 25 April 2003,[28] private respondent reiterated his position that the RTC of Quezon City had jurisdiction over this libel case. According to him, the affidavit executed by Del Rosario, the alleged owner of the house he leased in Sikatuna Village, Quezon City, established, beyond doubt, that he resided in said place during the time the claimed defamatory article appeared on the pages of Abante. In addition, he draws attention to the fact that petitioners and their co-accused furnished him a copy of the petition for review, filed before the DOJ, at the aforementioned address in Quezon City. Anent the affidavit of Del Rosario, private respondent maintains that the prosecution exerted efforts to present the affiant before the trial court. Unfortunately, Del Rosario was out of town when she was supposed to be presented and so the public and the private prosecutors decided to submit for resolution their motion for reconsideration sans the affiants testimony. Citing the case ofJoseph Helmuth, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, et al.,[29] private respondent avers that this Court had previously admitted the affidavits of witnesses who were not presented during the trial phase of a case. As regards the petitioners contention that he (private respondent) did not have the personality to bring this case to the appellate level, private respondent contends that the

proper party to file the Notice of Appeal before the trial court is the public prosecutor as what happened in this case. On its part, the OSG filed its Comment dated 07 July 2003[30] wherein it prayed for the dismissal of this petition based on the following: First, as the petition is concerned with the determination of the residence of private respondent at the time of the publication of the alleged libelous article, Rule 45 should be unavailing to the petitioners because this remedy only deals with questions of law.

Second, venue was properly laid in this case as private respondents residency in Quezon City during the time material to this case was sufficiently established. The OSG claims that the errors appearing in the memorandum for preliminary investigation and in the affidavit complaint with regard to private respondents residence were corrected through the supplemental affidavit private respondent executed during the preliminary investigation before the Quezon City prosecutors office. Third, the OSG takes the view that the public prosecutor was the proper party to file the notice of appeal before the trial court since its (OSGs) office is only authorized to bring or defend actions on appeal on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Honorable Court of the Court of Appeals.
We find merit in the petition and therefore grant the same. Jurisdiction has been defined as the power conferred by law upon a judge or court to try a case the cognizance of which belongs to them exclusively[31] and it constitutes the basic foundation of judicial proceedings.[32] The term derives its origin from two Latin words jus meaning law and the other, dicere meaning to declare.[33] The term has also been variably explained to be the power of a court to hear and determine a cause of action presented to it, the power of a court to adjudicate the kind of case before it, the power of a court to adjudicate a case when the proper parties are before it, and the power of a court to make the particular decision it is asked to render.[34] In criminal actions, it is a fundamental rule that venue is jurisdictional. Thus, the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.[35] In the case of Uy v. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines,[36] this Court had the occasion to expound on this principle, thus: It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.[37] The law, however, is more particular in libel cases. The possible venues for the institution of the criminal and the civil aspects of said case are concisely outlined in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363. It provides: Art. 360. Persons responsible. - . . . The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First

19

Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published. In Agbayani v. Sayo,[38] we summarized the foregoing rule in the following manner: 1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published. 2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense. 3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. 4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.[39] In the case at bar, private respondent was a private citizen at the time of the publication of the alleged libelous article, hence, he could only file his libel suit in the City of Manila where Abantewas first published or in the province or city where he actually resided at the time the purported libelous article was printed. A perusal, however, of the information involved in this case easily reveals that the allegations contained therein are utterly insufficient to vest jurisdiction on the RTC of Quezon City. Other than perfunctorily stating Quezon City at the beginning of the information, the assistant city prosecutor who prepared the information did not bother to indicate whether the jurisdiction of RTC Quezon City was invoked either because Abante was printed in that place or private respondent was a resident of said city at the time the claimed libelous article came out. As these matters deal with the fundamental issue of the courts jurisdiction, Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, mandates that either one of these statements must be alleged in the information itself and the absence of both from the very face of the information renders the latter fatally defective. Sadly for private respondent, the information filed before the trial court falls way short of this requirement. The assistant city prosecutors failure to properly lay the basis for invoking the jurisdiction of the RTC, Quezon City, effectively denied said court of the power to take cognizance of this case. For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this Court finds it appropriate to reiterate our earlier pronouncement in the case of Agbayani, to wit: In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written defamation, the complaint or information should contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was committed, the offended party was a public officer or a private individual and where he was actually residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place

where the written defamation was printed and first published should likewise be alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua non if the circumstance as to where the libel was printed and first published is used as the basis of the venue of the action.[40] Anent private respondent and OSGs contention that the supplemental affidavit submitted during the preliminary investigation of this libel suit cured the defect of the information, we find the same to be without merit. It is jurisprudentially settled that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information.[41] In resolving a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction, the general rule is that the facts contained in the complaint or information should be taken as they are.[42] The exception to this rule is where the Rules of Court allow the investigation of facts alleged in a motion to quash[43] such as when the ground invoked is the extinction of criminal liability, prescriptions, double jeopardy, or insanity of the accused.[44] In these instances, it is incumbent upon the trial court to conduct a preliminary trial to determine the merit of the motion to dismiss. As the present case obviously does not fall within any of the recognized exceptions, the trial court correctly dismissed this action. In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals likewise put premium on the affidavit executed by Del Rosario which was attached to private respondents supplemental motion for reconsideration. According to the appellate court, said document supports private (respondents) claim that indeed, he was a resident of Quezon City at the time the alleged libelous article was published.[45] The pertinent provision of the Rules of Court, under Rule 10, Section 6 thereof, states: Sec. 6. Supplemental Pleadings. - Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. The adverse party may plead thereto within ten (10) days from notice of the order admitting the supplemental pleading. By the very nature of a supplemental pleading, it only seeks to reinforce and augment the allegations contained in the principal pleading. It does not serve to supplant that which it merely supplements; rather, it ought to co-exist with the latter. Further, the admission of a supplemental pleading is not something that parties may impose upon the court for we have consistently held that its admittance is something which is addressed to the discretion of the court.[46] Explicit in the aforequoted provision of the Rules of Court is the requirement that the contents of a supplemental pleading should deal with transactions, occurrences or events which took place after the date of the pleading it seeks to supplement. A reading of the supplemental motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent discloses no additional or new matters which transpired after he filed his original motion for reconsideration. The fact that he attached thereto the affidavit of his alleged lessor fails to persuade us into giving to said supplemental motion the same evidentiary value as did the Court of Appeals. For one, private respondent did not even bother to explain the reason behind the belated submission of Del Rosarios affidavit nor did he claim that he exerted earnest efforts to file it much earlier in the proceedings. He must, therefore, bear the consequences of his own lethargy. Finally, we come to the issue of whether the private prosecutor and the public prosecutor had the personality to file the notice of appeal before the trial court. Petitioners insist that the OSG should have been the one to file said notice in its capacity as the sole representative of the [g]overnment in the Court of Appeals in criminal cases.[47] Under Presidential Decree No. 478, among the specific powers and functions of the OSG was to represent the

20

government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings. This provision has been carried over to the Revised Administrative Code particularly in Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 thereof. Without doubt, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all criminal cases. In such capacity, it only takes over a

criminal case after the same has reached the appellate courts.[48]

The next question should then be: when does the jurisdiction of the trial court end and that of the Court of Appeals commence? Happily, the Revised Rules of Court is clear on this point. Rule 41, Section 9 of the Rules states that (i)n appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.[49] When a party files a notice of appeal, the trial courts jurisdiction over the case does not cease as a matter of course; its only effect is that the appeal is deemed perfected as to him.[50] As explained by our former colleague, Justice Florenz Regalado . . . [I]n the meantime, the trial court still retains jurisdiction over the case. However, where all the parties have either thus perfected their appeals, by filing their notices of appeal in due time and the period to file such notice of appeal has lapsed for those who did not do so, then the trial court loses

Petitioner, Solemnidad M. Buaya, in the instant petition for certiorari, seeks to annul and set aside the orders of denial issued by the respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XIX on her Motion to Quash/Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration in Criminal Case No. L-8322252 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Solemnidad M. Buaya." The Motion to Dismiss was anchored on the following grounds (a) the court has no jurisdiction over the case and (b) the subject matter is purely civil in nature. It appears that petitioner was an insurance agent of the private respondent, who was authorized to transact and underwrite insurance business and collect the corresponding premiums for and in behalf of the private respondent. Under the terms of the agency agreement, the petitioner is required to make a periodic report and accounting of her transactions and remit premium collections to the principal office of private respondent located in the City of Manila. Allegedly, an audit was conducted on petitioner's account which showed a shortage in the amount of P358,850.72. As a result she was charged with estafa in Criminal Case No. 83-22252, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XIX with the respondent Hon. Wenceslao Polo as the Presiding Judge. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. which motion was denied by respondent Judge in his Order dated March 26, 1986. The subsequent motion for reconsideration of this order of denial was also denied. These two Orders of denial are now the subject of the present petition. It is the contention of petitioner that the Regional trial Court of Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City and necessarily the funds she allegedly misappropriated were collected in Cebu City. Petitioner further contends that the subject matter of this case is purely civil in nature because the fact that private respondent separately filed Civil Case No. 83-14931 involving the same alleged misappropriated amount is an acceptance that the subject transaction complained of is not proper for a criminal action. The respondents on the other hand, call for adherence to the consistent rule that the denial of a motion to dismiss or to quash, being interlocutory in character, cannot be questioned by certiorari and it cannot be the subject of appeal until final judgment or order rendered (See. 2, Rule 41, Rules of Court). the ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to enter a Plea, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment (Newsweek Inc. v. IAC, 142 SCRA 171). The general rule is correctly stated. But this is subject to certain exceptions the reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of proper venue. Here, petitioner questions the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to take cognizance of this criminal case for estafa. It is well-settled that the averments in the complaint or information characterize the crime to be prosecuted and the court before which it must be tried (Balite v. People, L21475, Sept. 30,1966 cited in People v. Masilang, 142 SCRA 680). In Villanueva v. Ortiz, et al . (L-15344, May 30, 1960, 108 Phil, 493) this Court ruled that in order to determine the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases, the complaint must be examined for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the facts set out therein and the punishment provided for by law fall within the jurisdiction of the court where the complaint is filed. The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information, and not by the findings the court may make after the trial (People v. Mission, 87 Phil. 641).

jurisdiction over the case as of the filing of the last notice of appeal or the expiration of the period to do so for all the parties.[51]

Applied to the case at bar, we deem it proper that the notice of appeal was filed by the private and the public prosecutors before the trial court. The Rules cannot be any clearer: until the filing of the last notice of appeal and the expiration of the period to perfect an appeal by all the parties, the lower court still has jurisdiction over the case. It is only after the occurrence of these two incidents when the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals begins and at which time the OSG is supposed to take charge of the case on behalf of the government. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 22 March 2002 and Resolution dated 6 January 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the 24 November 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, Quezon City, dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-97-71903 is hereby REINSTATED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Austria-Martinez,

Callejo,

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-75079 January 26, 1989 SOLEMNIDAD M. BUAYA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Presiding Judge, Branch XIX, Regional Trial) Court of Manila and the COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondents.

Apolinario M. Buaya for petitioner. Romeo G. Velasquez for respondent Country Bankers Insurance Corporation.

PARAS, J.:

21

The information in the case at reads as follows: The undersigned accuses Solemnidad Buaya of the crime of estafa, committed as follows: That during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Country Bankers Insurance Corporation represented by Elmer Banez duly organized and earth under the laws of the Philippine with principal address at 9th floor, G.R. Antonio Bldg., T.M. Kalaw, Ermita, in said City, in the following manner, to wit. the said having been authorized to act as insurance agent of said corporation, among whose duties were to remit collections due from customers thereat and to account for and turn over the same to the said Country Bankers Insurance Corporation represented by Elmer Banez, as soon as possible or immediately upon demand, collected and received the amount of P368,850.00 representing payments of insurance premiums from customers, but herein accused, once in possession of said amount, far from complying with her aforesaid obligation, failed and refused to do so and with intent to defraud, absconded with the whole amount thereby misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount of P358,850.00 to her own personal used and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said Country Bankers Insurance Corporation in the amount of P358,850.00 Philippine Currency. CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 44, Rollo) Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any of the essential elements thereof took place. The subject information charges petitioner with estafa committed "during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982 inclusive in the City of Manila, Philippines . . . ." (p. 44, Rollo) Clearly then, from the very allegation of the information the Regional Trial Court of Manila has jurisdiction. Besides, the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense which may be prosecuted at the place where any of the essential elements of the crime took place. One of the essential elements of estafa is damage or prejudice to the offended party. The private respondent has its principal place of business and office at Manila. The failure of the petitioner to remit the insurance premiums she collected allegedly caused damage and prejudice to private respondent in Manila. Anent petitioners other contention that the subject matter is purely civil in nature, suffice it to state that evidentiary facts on this point have still to be proved. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XIX for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC G.R. No. L-53373 June 30, 1987 MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner, vs. HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.: The issue raised in this ease is whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits. On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City which was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCCIX-52 (Quezon) '77.1 When the case was set for arraigment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. 2 A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford nine for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court. 3 A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. 4 In an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until further orders of the Court. 5 In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he recommended that the petition be given due course. 6 On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review. 7 On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. 8 A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial court, 9 attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition thereto. 10On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the arraigniment stating: ORDER For resolution is a motion to dismiss this rase filed by the procuting fiscal premised on insufficiency of evidence, as suggested by the Undersecretary of Justice, evident from Annex "A" of the motion wherein, among other things, the Fiscal is urged to move for dismissal for the reason that the check involved having been issued for the payment of a pre-existing obligation the Hability of the drawer can only be civil and not criminal.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairperson), Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

22

The motion's thrust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence not before it but on that adduced before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not only disregards the requirements of due process but also erodes the Court's independence and integrity, the motion is considered as without merit and therefore hereby DENIED. WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is hereby set for December 18, 1978 at 9:00 o'clock in the moming. SO ORDERED. 11 The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP08777. 12 On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused until further orders from the Court. 13 In a decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of January 23, 1979. 14 A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution of February 19, 1980. 15 Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by accused whereby petitioner prays that said decision be reversed and set aside, respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from enforcing his threat to proceed with the arraignment and trial of petitioner in said criminal case, declaring the information filed not valid and of no legal force and effect, ordering respondent Judge to dismiss the said case, and declaring the obligation of petitioner as purely civil. 16 In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of this Court without giving due course to the petition required the respondents to comment to the petition, not to file a motiod to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. In the comment filed by the Solicitor General he recommends that the petition be given due course, it being meritorious. Private respondent through counsel filed his reply to the comment and a separate conunent to the petition asking that the petition be dismissed. In the resolution of February 5, 1981, the Second Division of this Court resolved to transfer this case to the Court En Banc. In the resolution of February 26, 1981, the Court En Banc resolved to give due course to the petition. Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be reversed and that respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss the information. It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or information, follow or not fonow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 18 The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the complainant. 20 Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them by law, not only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according to the evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of their office. 21 They have equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an investigation they become convinced that the

evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. 22 It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation 23 that the fiscal determines the existence of a puma facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is not prudent or even permissible for a Court to compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him on an information, if he finds that the evidence relied upon by him is insufficient for conviction. 24 Neither has the Court any power to order the fiscal to prosecute or file an information within a certain period of time, since this would interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of criminal prosecutions. 25 Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so, and Courts that grant the same commit no error. 26 The fiscal may re-investigate a case and subsequently move for the dismissal should the re-investigation show either that the defendant is innocent or that his guilt may not be established beyond reasonable doubt. 27 In a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. 28 On the other hand, neither an injunction, preliminary or final nor a writ of prohibition may be issued by the courts to restrain a criminal prosecution 29 except in the extreme case where it is necessary for the Courts to do so for the orderly administration of justice or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an op pressive and vindictive manner. 30 However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the rase be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court. 31 The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. 32 When after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submited himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 33 The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. 34 While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the rase thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court, 35 The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused. 36 or the right of the People to due process of law. 36a Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.

23

However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice will there not be a vacuum in the prosecution? A state prosecutor to handle the case cannot possibly be designated by the Secretary of Justice who does not believe that there is a basis for prosecution nor can the fiscal be expected to handle the prosecution of the case thereby defying the superior order of the Secretary of Justice. The answer is simple. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for the People of the Philippines even under such circumstances much less should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and void. 37 The least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the prosecution although he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his direction and control. 38 The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation. In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 169004

-versus-

SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and ROLANDO PLAZA, Respondents.

DECISION PERALTA, J.: For this Court's resolution is a petition[1] dated September 2, 2005 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court that seeks to reverse and set aside the Resolution[2] of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division), dated July 20, 2005, dismissing Criminal Case No. 27988, entitled People of the Philippines v. Rolando Plaza for lack of jurisdiction. The facts follow. Respondent Rolando Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu, at the time relevant to this case, with salary grade 25, had been charged in the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 89 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, or The Auditing Code of the Philippines for his failure to liquidate the cash advances he received on December 19, 1995 in the amount of ThirtyThree Thousand Pesos (P33,000.00) . The Information reads:

Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur. Teehankee, C.J., took no part.

That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused ROLANDO PLAZA, a high-ranking public officer, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and committing the offense, in relation to office, having obtained cash advances from the City Government of Toledo in the total amount of THIRTY THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P33,000.00), Philippine Currency, which he received by reason of his office, for which he is duty bound to liquidate the same within the period required by law, with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances ofP33,000.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount. CONTRARY TO LAW.

Thereafter, respondent Plaza filed a Motion to Dismiss[3] dated April 7, 2005 with the Sandiganbayan, to which the latter issued an Order[4] dated April 12, 2005 directing petitioner to submit its comment. Petitioner filed its Opposition[5] to the Motion to Dismiss on April 19, 2005. Eventually, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Resolution[6] onJuly 20, 2005 dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to its filing before the proper

24

court. The dispositive portion of the said Resolution provides: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing in the proper court. SO ORDERED.

Code of the Philippines, this Court cited the case of Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.[10] as a background on the conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, thus:

Thus, the present petition. Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan has criminal jurisdiction over cases involving public officials and employees enumerated under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, (as amended by Republic Act [R.A.] Nos. 7975 and 8249), whether or not occupying a position classified under salary grade 27 and above, who are charged not only for violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or any of the felonies included in Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, but also for crimes committed in relation to office. Furthermore, petitioner questioned the Sandiganbayans appreciation of this Court's decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan,[7] claiming that the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 7975 and R.A. 8249, which was made applicable to cases concerning violations of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed in relation to public office. In his Comment[8] dated November 30, 2005, respondent Plaza argued that, as phrased in Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, it is apparent that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was defined first, while the exceptions to the general rule are provided in the rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs of Section 4; hence, the Sandiganbayan was right in ruling that it has original jurisdiction only over the following cases: (a) where the accused is a public official with salary grade 27 and higher; (b) in cases where the accused is a public official below grade 27 but his position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1) (a) to (g) of P. D. 1606, as amended and his offense involves a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and (c) if the indictment involves offenses or felonies other than the three aforementioned statutes, the general rule that a public official must occupy a position with salary grade 27 and higher in order that the Sandiganbayan could exercise jurisdiction over him must apply. In a nutshell, the core issue raised in the petition is whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines. This Court has already resolved the above issue in the affirmative. People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante[9] is a case with uncanny similarities to the present one. In fact, the respondent in the earlier case, Victoria Amante and herein respondent Plaza were both members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. The only difference is that, respondent Amante failed to liquidate the amount of Seventy-One Thousand Ninety-Five Pesos (P71,095.00) while respondent Plaza failed to liquidate the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos (P33,000.00). In ruling that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing

x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.[11] P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[12] P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. x x x .

Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. 8249, is the law that should be applied in the present case, the offense having been allegedly committed on or about December 19, 1995 and the Information having been filed on March 25, 2004. As extensively explained in the earlier mentioned case,

The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.[13] The exception contained in R. A. 7975, as well as R. A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R. A. No. 3019, as amended, R. A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states: Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal

25

Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: x x x.[14]

prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor; (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of governmentowned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations; (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office. C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. Again, the earlier case interpreted the above provisions, thus: The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4 (a), the following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below

Like in the earlier case, the present case definitely falls under Section 4 (b) where other offenses and felonies committed by public officials or employees in relation to their office are involved where the said provision, contains no exception. Therefore, what applies in the present case is the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The present case having been instituted on March 25, 2004, the provisions of R.A. 8249 shall govern. P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 8249 states that: Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving: A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; (b) City mayors, vice mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads. (c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; (e) PNP superintendent and officers of higher rank; chief PNP

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and

26

may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-govenors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads; city mayors, vicemayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[15] Clearly, as decided in the earlier case and by simple application of the pertinent provisions of the law, respondent Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod during the alleged commission of an offense in relation to his office, necessarily falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Finally, as to the inapplicability of the Inding[16] case wherein it was ruled that the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, are included within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade and which the Sandiganbayan relied upon in its assailed Resolution, this Court enunciated, still in the earlier case of People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante,[17] that the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. As thoroughly discussed: x x x In the Inding case, the public official involved was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod with Salary Grade 25 and was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the said public official, this Court concentrated its disquisition on the provisions contained in Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, where the offenses involved are specifically enumerated and not on Section 4 (b) where offenses or felonies involved are those that are in relation to the public officials' office. Section 4 (b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, provides that:

b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office. A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public officials enumerated in Sec. 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to their office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to those that are committed in relation to the public official or employee's office. This Court had ruled that as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted for an offense committed in relation to his office.[18] Thus, in the case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et al..,[19] where the crime involved was murder, this Court held that: The phrase other offenses or felonies is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accuseds official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. x x x Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,[20] where the public official was charged with grave threats, this Court ruled: x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the accused, petitioner herein, took advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan when he committed the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal councilor. The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to kill Legaspi during a public hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioners administration. Clearly, based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge of petitioners official functions. This was elaborated upon by public respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein it held that the accused was performing his official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said public hearing and that accuseds violent act was precipitated by complainants criticism

27

of his administration as the mayor or chief executive of the municipality, during the latters privilege speech. It was his response to private complainants attack to his office. If he was not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or angered by whatever private complainant might have said during said privilege speech. Thus, based on the allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case. Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the Information filed against respondent Amante for violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said offense was committed in relation to her office, making her fall under Section 4 (b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended. According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the intention of the law had been to extend the application of the exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan could assert jurisdiction, then there would have been no need to distinguish between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on the one hand, and other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office on the other. The said reasoning is misleading because a distinction apparently exists. In the offenses involved in Section 4 (a), it is not disputed that public office is essential as an element of the said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and felonies involved in Section 4 (b), it is enough that the said offenses and felonies were committed in relation to the public officials or employees' office. In expounding the meaning of offenses deemed to have been committed in relation to office, this Court held: In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the

Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provisions of Section 4 (b) does not mention any qualification as to the public officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and

employees mentioned in subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it

refers to those public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,[22] unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.[23] The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. (Italics supplied.)[24]

With the resolution of the present case and the earlier case of People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante,[25] the issue as to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has now attained clarity. WHEREFORE, the Petition dated September 2, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated July 20, 2005 is herebyNULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 167304 : August 25, 2009 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (third division) and VICTORIA AMANTE, Respondents. DECISION PERALTA, J.: Before this Court is a petition1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated February 28, 2005 dismissing Criminal Case No. 27991, entitled People of the Philippines v. Victoria Amante for lack of jurisdiction. The facts, as culled following:cra:nad Victoria from the records, are the

Court elaborated on the scope and reach of the term offense committed in relation to [an accuseds] office by referring to the principle laid down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49 (1951)], and to an exception to that principle which was recognized in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the accuseds office if the offense cannot exist without the office such that the office [is] a constituent element of the crime x x x. In People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract, the facts in a particular case may show that x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accuseds] respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. x x x[21]

Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of Cebu at the time

pertinent to this case. On January 14, 1994, she was able to get hold of a cash advance in the amount of P71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher in order to defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and Environmental Protection, which she headed. As of December 19, 1995, or after almost two years since she obtained the said cash advance, no liquidation was made. As such, on December 22, 1995, Toledo City Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao issued a demand letter to respondent Amante asking the latter to settle her unliquidated cash advance within seventy-two hours from receipt of the same demand letter. The Commission on Audit, on May 17, 1996, submitted an

28

investigation report to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas), with the recommendation that respondent Amante be further investigated to ascertain whether appropriate charges could be filed against her under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, otherwise known as The Auditing Code of the Philippines. Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas, on September 30, 1999, issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Malversation of Public Funds against respondent Amante. The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the OMBVisayas' Resolution, on April 6, 2001, prepared a memorandum finding probable cause to indict respondent Amante. On May 21, 2004, the OSP filed an Information3 with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445, which reads as follows:cra:nad That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused VICTORIA AMANTE, a highranking public officer, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and committing the offense in relation to office, having obtained cash advances from the City Government of Toledo in the total amount of SEVENTYONE THOUSAND NINETY-FIVE PESOS (P71,095.00), Philippine Currency, which she received by reason of her office, for which she is duty-bound to liquidate the same within the period required by law, with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances of P71,095.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in aforesaid amount. CONTRARY TO LAW. The case was raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, Amante filed with the said court a MOTION TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION4 dated November 18, 2004 stating that the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) dated September 14, 1999 at Cebu City from of an incomplete proceeding in so far that respondent Amante had already liquidated and/or refunded the unexpected balance of her cash advance, which at the time of the investigation was not included as the same liquidation papers were still in the process of evaluation by the Accounting Department of Toledo City and that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the said criminal case because respondent Amante was then a local official who was occupying a position of salary grade 26, whereas Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have original jurisdiction only in cases where the accused holds a position otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, R.A. No. 6758. The OSP filed its Opposition5 dated December 8, 2004 arguing that respondent Amante's claim of settlement of the cash advance dwelt on matters of defense and the same should be established during the trial of the case and not in a motion for reinvestigation. As to the assailed jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the OSP contended that the said court has jurisdiction over respondent Amante since at the time relevant to the case, she was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, therefore, falling under those enumerated under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249. According to the OSP, the language of the law is too plain and unambiguous that it did not make any distinction as to the salary grade of city local officials/heads. The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution6 dated February 28, 2005, dismissed the case against Amante, the dispositive portion of which reads:cra:nad WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this case is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The dismissal,

however, is without prejudice to the filing of this case to the proper court. The Motion for Reinvestigation filed by the movant is hereby considered moot and academic. SO ORDERED. Hence, the present petition. Petitioner raises this lone issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER A CASE INVOLVING A SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD MEMBER WHERE THE CRIME CHARGED IS ONE COMMITTED IN RELATION TO OFFICE, BUT NOT FOR VIOLATION OF RA 3019, RA 1379 OR ANY OF THE FELONIES MENTIONED IN CHAPTER II, SECTION 2, TITLE VII OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE. In claiming that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case in question, petitioner disputes the former's appreciation of this Court's decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan.7 According to petitioner, Inding did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration in Section (a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249, which was made applicable to cases concerning violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed in relation to public office. Respondent Amante, in her Comment8 dated January 16, 2006, averred that, with the way the law was phrased in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, it is obvious that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was defined first, enumerating the several exceptions to the general rule, while the exceptions to the general rule are provided in the rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs of Section 4. Therefore, according to respondent Amante, the Sandiganbayan was correct in ruling that the latter has original jurisdiction only over cases where the accused is a public official with salary grade 27 and higher; and in cases where the accused is public official below grade 27 but his position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended and his offense involves a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and if the indictment involves offenses or felonies other than the three aforementioned statutes, the general rule that a public official must occupy a position with salary grade 27 and higher in order that the Sandiganbayan could exercise jurisdiction over him must apply. The same respondent proceeded to cite a decision9 of this Court where it was held that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or law; it cannot be fixed by the will of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of the parties, neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court. In its Reply10 dated March 23, 2006, the OSP reiterated that the enumeration of public officials in Section 4(a)(1) to (a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606 as falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan should include their commission of other offenses in relation to office under Section 4(b) of the same P.D. No. 1606. It cited the case of Esteban v. Sandiganbayan, et al.11 wherein this Court ruled that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if the offense is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions.

29

The petition is meritorious. The focal issue raised in the petition is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As a background, this Court had thoroughly discussed the history of the conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,12 thus:cra:nad x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.13 cra P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.14 cra P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. x x x Specifically, the question that needs to be resolved is whether or not a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26 who was charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. This Court rules in the affirmative. The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. The alleged commission of the offense, as shown in the Information was on or about December 19, 1995 and the filing of the Information was on May 21, 2004. The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.15 The exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states:cra:nad Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:cra:nad A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:cra:nad The present case falls under Section 4(b) where other offenses and felonies committed by public officials or employees in relation to their office are involved. Under the said provision, no exception is contained. Thus, the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense applies in this present case. Since the present case was instituted on May 21, 2004, the provisions of R.A. No. 8249 shall govern.

Verily, the pertinent provisions of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by R.A. No. 8249 are the following:cra:nad Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving: A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; (b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads. (c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; (e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor; (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations; (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office. C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4(a), the following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others,

30

officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers , and other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4(b) of the same law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, respondent Amante, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the alleged commission of an offense in relation to her office, falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution, dismissed the case with the following ratiocination:cra:nad x x x the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Inding case, stating that the Congress' act of specifically including the public officials therein mentioned, "obviously intended cases mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, when committed by the officials enumerated in (1)(a) to (g) thereof, regardless of their salary grades, to be tried by the Sandiganbayan." Obviously, the Court was referring to cases involving violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code only because they are the specific cases mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended, so that when they are committed even by public officials below salary grade '27', provided they belong to the enumeration, jurisdiction would fall under the Sandiganbayan. When the offense committed however, falls under Section 4(b) or 4(c) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended, it should be emphasized that the general qualification that the public official must belong to grade '27' is a requirement so that the Sandiganbayan could exercise original jurisdiction over him. Otherwise, jurisdiction would fall to the proper regional or municipal trial court. In the case at bar, the accused is a Sangguniang Panlungsod member, a position with salary grade '26'. Her office is included in the enumerated public officials in Section 4(a) (1) (a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975. However, she is charged with violation of Section 89 of The Auditing Code of the Philippines which is not a case falling under Section 4(a) but under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended. This being the case, the principle declared in Inding is not applicable in the case at bar because as stated, the charge must involve a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, in the instant case, even if the position of the accused is one of those enumerated public officials under Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g), since she is being prosecuted of an offense not mentioned in the aforesaid section, the general qualification that accused must be a public official occupying a position with salary grade '27' is a requirement before this Court could exercise jurisdiction over her. And since the accused occupied a

public office with salary grade 26, then she is not covered by the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner is correct in disputing the above ruling of the Sandiganbayan. Central to the discussion of the Sandiganbayan is the case of Inding v. Sandiganbayan16 where this Court ruled that the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4(a)(1) of P. D. No. 1606, as amended are included within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade. According to petitioner, the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. This observation is true in light of the facts contained in the said case. In the Inding case, the public official involved was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod with Salary Grade 25 and was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the said public official, this Court concentrated its disquisition on the provisions contained in Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, where the offenses involved are specifically enumerated and not on Section 4(b) where offenses or felonies involved are those that are in relation to the public officials' office. Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, provides that:cra:nad b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office. A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public officials enumerated in Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to their office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to those that are committed in relation to the public official or employee's office. This Court had ruled that as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted for "an offense committed in relation" to his office.17 Thus, in the case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary,18 where the crime involved was murder, this Court held that:cra:nad The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accused's official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. x x x. Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,19 where the public official was charged with grave threats, this Court ruled:cra:nad x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the accused, petitioner herein, took advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan when he committed the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal councilor. The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to kill Legaspi during a public hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioner's administration. Clearly, based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge of petitioner's official functions. This was elaborated upon by

31

public respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein it held that the "accused was performing his official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said public hearing" and that "accused's violent act was precipitated by complainant's criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief executive of the municipality, during the latter's privilege speech. It was his response to private complainant's attack to his office. If he was not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or angered by whatever private complainant might have said during said privilege speech." Thus, based on the allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case. Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the Information filed against respondent Amante for violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said offense was committed in relation to her office, making her fall under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended. According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the intention of the law had been to extend the application of the exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan could assert jurisdiction, then there would have been no need to distinguish between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on the one hand, and other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office on the other. The said reasoning is misleading because a distinction apparently exists. In the offenses involved in Section 4(a), it is not disputed that public office is essential as an element of the said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and felonies involved in Section 4(b), it is enough that the said offenses and felonies were committed in relation to the public officials or employees' office. In expounding the meaning of offenses deemed to have been committed in relation to office, this Court held:cra:nad In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and reach of the term "offense committed in relation to [an accused's] office" by referring to the principle laid down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49 (1951)], and to an exception to that principle which was recognized in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the accused's office if "the offense cannot exist without the office" such that "the office [is] a constituent element of the crime x x x." In People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that "although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract," the facts in a particular case may show that x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accused's] respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. x x x20 cra Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provision of Section 4(b) does not mention any qualification as to the public officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of the same section . Therefore, it refers to those public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,21 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.22 The intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed.23 cra WHEREFORE, the Petition dated April 20, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan

(Third Division) dated February 28, 2005 is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, let the case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings. SO ORDERED. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

[G.R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008] HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, G.R. No. 162059 Petitioner, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. DECISION REYES, R.T., J.: CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholaran iskolar ng bayan a** accused, along with her brother, of swindling government fundsccused of being the swindler ng bayan? MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at ang kanyang kapatid, na kapwa pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng bayan? The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction certiorari assailing the Resolutions[1] of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying petitioners motion to quash the information and herdenying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The Antecedents

Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of thePhilippines-Cebu (UP). A student of a state university is known as a government scholar. She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000. In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman.[2] On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).[3] One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex.[4]President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according to the information, wais disputed the Office of the President. The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.[5] The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state university, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.[6] On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana forof estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan.[7] The Information against her reads: The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA and JADE IAN D. SERANA of the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended committed as follows: That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent

32

thereto, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA,a high-ranking public officer, being then the Student Regent of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain,conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government by falsely and fraudulently representing to former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the University of the Philippines will be renovated and renamed as President Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall, and for which purpose accused HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which check was subsequently encashed by accused Jade Ian D. Serana on October 25, 2000 and misappropriated for their personal use and benefit, and despite repeated demands made upon the accused for them to return aforesaid amount, the said accused failed and refused to do so to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount. CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied) Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent. Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.[8]It has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.[9] It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. ShePetitioner also arguedreasoned that it was President Estrada, and not the government, that was duped. Even assuming that she received the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada, and not from the coffers of the government.[10] Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person. AShe claimed that as a student regent, she was not a public officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents whothat held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She addsed that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a student regent. Petitioner She further contended also claimed that she had no power or authority to receive monies or funds. She claimed such power was vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Hence, Since it was not alleged in the information that it was among her functions or duties to receive funds, or that the crime was committed in connection with her official functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.[11] The Ombudsman opposed the motion.[12] It disputed petitioners interpretation of the law. Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains the catch -all phrase in relation to office, thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the charges against petitioner. In the same breath, the prosecution countered that the source of the money is a matter of defense. It should be threshed out during a full-blown trial.[13] According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, iwas a public officer. As a member of the BOR, she hads the general powers of administration and exerciseds the corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechems

definition of a public office, petitioners stance that she was not compensated, hence, thus not a public officer, is erroneous. Compensation is not an essential part of public office. Parenthetically, compensation has been interpreted to include allowances. By this definition, petitioner was compensated.[14] Sandiganbayan Disposition In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for lack of merit.[15] It ratiocinated: The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over this case. It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses covered by Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code are within the jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly pointed out by the prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other offenses committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office. From this provision, there is no single doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa committed by a public official in relation to his office. Accused-movants claim that being merely a member in representation of the student body, she was never a public officer since she never received any compensation nor does she fall under Salary Grade 27, is of no moment, in view of the express provision of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which provides: Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: (A) x x x

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: x x x x

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of

government-owned or controlled universities or educational foundations. (Italics

corporations, institutions

supplied)

state or

It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses involving the officials enumerated in subsection (g), irrespective of their salary grades, because the primordial consideration in the inclusion of these officials is the nature of their responsibilities and functions. Is accused-movant included in the contemplated provision of law? A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents, to which accused-movant belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of administration and corporate powers in the university, such as: 1) To receive and appropriate to the ends specified by law such sums as may be provided by law for the support of the university; 2) To prescribe rules for its own government and to enact for the government of the university such general ordinances and regulations, not contrary to law, as are consistent with the purposes of the university; and 3) To appoint, on recommendation of the President of the University, professors, instructors, lecturers and other employees of the University; to fix their compensation, hours of service, and such other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant to them in its discretion leave of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any other provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after an investigation and hearing shall have been had.

33

It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through its board of directors, or board of trustees in the case of non-stock corporations. The board of directors or trustees, therefore, is the governing body of the corporation. It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines is performing functions similar to those of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock corporation. This draws to fore the conclusion that being a member of such board, accused-movant undoubtedly falls within the category of public officials upon whom this Court is vested with original exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she does not occupy a position classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. Finally, this court finds that accused-movants contention that the same of P15 Million was received from former President Estrada and not from the coffers of the government, is a matter a defense that should be properly ventilated during the trial on the merits of this case.[16] On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.[17] The motion was denied with finality in a Resolution dated February 4, 2004.[18] Issue Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND DISMISING THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION.[19] In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below, namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged was not committed in relation to her office; (d) the funds in question personally came from President Estrada, not from the government. Our Ruling The petition cannot be granted.

the court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a few examples of the exceptions to the general rule. In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition against the City Court of Manila and directed the respondent court to dismiss the case. In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to quash based on lack of jurisdiction over the offense, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent court from further proceeding in the case. In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on improper venue, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge from taking cognizance of the case except to dismiss the same. In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar by prior judgment, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to dismiss the case. In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the Statute of Frauds, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint. In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition for certiorari after the motion to quash based on double jeopardy was denied by respondent judge and ordered him to desist from further action in the criminal case except to dismiss the same. In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash based on prescription was set aside on certiorari and the criminal case was dismissed by this Court.[24] We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of discretion.

Preliminarily, quash is

the not

denial of correctible

a motion to by certiorari.

We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari outright on procedural grounds. Wellestablished is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash.[20]Remedial measures as regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed.[21] The evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action.[22] In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[23] the Court clearly illustrated explained and illustrated the rule and the exceptions, thus: As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot be subject of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. The same rule applies to an order denying a motion to quash, except that instead of filing an answer a plea is entered and no appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal. This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorarior prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not

The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
We first address petitioners contention that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is determined by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). We note that petitioner refers to Section 4 of the said law yet quotes Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash before the Sandiganbayan.[25] She repeats the reference in the instant petition for certiorari[26]and in her memorandum of authorities.[27] We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or typographical error. It bears stressing that petitioner repeated this claim twice despite corrections made by the Sandiganbayan.[28] Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No.1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history of the statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.[29] P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D.

34

No. 1606 expanded Sandiganbayan.[30]

the

jurisdiction

of

the

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following: Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: "_____ (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of thesangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; "_____(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; "_____(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; " _____(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; "_____(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintended or higher; " _____(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; " _____(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. " _____(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade Grade '27' and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; " _____(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; " _____(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and " _____(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade Grade '27' and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the

public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office. C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. " _____In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade Grade '27' or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. " _____The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or order of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. " _____The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court. " _____The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may thereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. " _____In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them. " _____Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall, at all times, be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint

35

determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned." Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17, 1960. The said law represses certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.[31] Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law should be filed with the Sandiganbayan.[32] R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private individuals. We quote: Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person having family or close personal relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other person having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the government, in which such public official has to intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The word close personal relation shall include close personal friendship, social and fraternal connections, and professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free access to such public officer. (b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof. In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices and provides for their penalties.

Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to excludeestafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly,estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office. In Perlas, Jr. v. People,[37] the Court had occasion to explain that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an indictment for estafa versus a director of the National Parks Development Committee, a government instrumentality. The Court held then: The National Parks Development Committee was created originally as an Executive Committee on January 14, 1963, for the development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks (Executive Order No. 30). It was later designated as the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia were designated Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of Forest Development, Department of Natural Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter of Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November 27, 1975), the NPDC has remained under the Office of the President (E.O. No. 709, dated July 27, 1981). Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC as a regular government agency under the Office of the President and allotments for its maintenance and operating expenses were issued direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3). The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated with greater firmness inBondoc v. Sandiganbayan.[38] Pertinent parts of the Courts ruling in Bondoc read: Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondocs cases to the Regional Trial Court, for the simple reason that the latter would not have jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above intimated, the inability of the Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of Bondocs cases and those of the government employees separately charged for the same crimes, has not altered the nature of the offenses charged, as estafathru falsification punishable by penalties higher than prision correccionalor imprisonment of six years, or a fine of P6,000.00, committed by government employees in conspiracy with private persons, including Bondoc. These crimes are within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be taken cognizance of by the regular courts, apart from the fact that even if the cases could be so transferred, a joint trial would nonetheless not be possible.

Sandiganbayan has the offense

jurisdiction of

over estafa.

Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among those crimes cognizable byover which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. We note that in hoisting this argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said provision. The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.[33] Interpretatio talis in

ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as

will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan mayroong kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap at katawa-tawa. Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature.[34] The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be taken into view.[35] In other words, petitioners interpretation lies in direct opposition to the rule that a statute must be interpreted as a whole under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself.[36] Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. Ang isang batas ay marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na interpretasyon ay ang mismong batas. Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads: B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

Petitioner is

UP

student public

regent officer.

Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary or remuneration as a UP student regent. This is not the first or likely the last time that We will be called upon toare required to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, We ruled that it is difficult to pin down the definition of a public officer.[39] The 1987 Constitution does not define who are public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are found in different statutes and jurisprudence. In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,[40] the Court held that: A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public office under our political system is therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it exists at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold

36

office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881). In Laurel v. Desierto,[41] the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a public office: A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.[42] Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People,[43] We held that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law.[44] Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. We find no reason to disturb the findings of the Sandiganbayan that Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a nonstock corporation.[45] By express mandate of law, We find that petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606 the statute defining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office.[46] At most, it is merely incidental to the public office.[47] We uphold that the conclusions of the Sandiganbayan that Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.[48] The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate governmental function by providing advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving professional and technical training.[49] Moreover, UP is maintained by the Government and it declares no dividends and is not a corporation created for profit.[50] Petitioner is therefore a public officer by express mandate of P.D. No. 1606 and jurisprudence.

defendant or respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash.[52]Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of defendant or respondent.[53] In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a student regent of U.P., while in the performance of her official functions,committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government x x x. (Underscoring supplied) Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the information based on this ground.

Source of funds is be raised during

a defense that trial on the

should merits.

It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estradas private funds and not from the government coffers. Petitioner insists the charge has no leg to stand on. We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of the President and not its then occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the information, it is averred that petitioner requested the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00). Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that should be ventilated during the trial on the merits of the instant case.[54]

A and

lawyer owes honesty to

candor, the

fairness Court.

As a parting note, petitioners counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz, misrepresented his reference to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as a quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of his motion to quash, the instant petition for certiorari and his memorandum, unveils the misquotation. We urge petitioners counsel to observe Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that a lawyer shall not misquote or misrepresent. The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v. Ramos,[55] where Atty Dionisio D. Ramos used the name Pedro D.D. Ramos in connection with a criminal case. The Court ruled that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a name different from that with which he was authorized. We severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a repetition may warrant suspension or disbarment.[56] We admonish petitioners counsel to be more careful and accurate in his citation. A lawyers conduct before the court should be characterized by candor and fairness.[57]The administration of justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not act with complete candor and honesty before the courts.[58] WHEREFORE, merit DUE SO the petition is DENIED for lack of COURSE andDISMISSED. ORDERED.

The in to

offense charged relation to public the

was office,

committed according Information.

Petitioner likewise argues that even public officer, the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over the offense because relation to

assuming that she is a would still not have it was not committed in her office.

According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the approval of the BOR. She adds there was no Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract with then President Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the governing body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private capacity and not in relation to public office. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information.[51]More than that, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by

Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Corona, and Nachura, JJ., concur.

37

[G.R. No. 158187. February 11, 2005]

accused Geduspan was a Regional Director of Philhealth, Region VI, a position classified under salary grade 26. In a resolution dated January 31, 2003, the respondent court denied the motion to quash. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution dated May 9, 2003. Hence, this petition. Petitioner Geduspan alleges that she is the Regional Manager/Director of Region VI of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth). However, her appointment paper and notice of salary adjustment[2] show that she was appointed as Department Manager A of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) with salary grade 26. Philhealth is a government owned and controlled corporation created under RA 7875, otherwise known as the National Health Insurance Act of 1995. Geduspan argues that her position as Regional Director/Manager is not within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. She cites paragraph (1) and (5), Section 4 of RA 8249 which defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan: Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving: a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758); specifically including;

MARILYN GEDUSPAN and DRA. EVANGELYN FARAHMAND, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents. DECISION CORONA, J.: Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a regional director/manager of government-owned or controlled corporations organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code for purposes of RA 3019, the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act? Petitioner Marilyn C. Geduspan assumes a negative view in the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Office of the Special Prosecutor contends otherwise, a view shared by the respondent court. In the instant Rule 65 petition for certiorari with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or issuance of a temporary restraining order, Geduspan seeks to annul and set aside the resolutions[1] dated January 31, 2003 and May 9, 2003 of the respondent Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division. These resolutions denied her motion to quash and motion for reconsideration, respectively. On July 11, 2002, an information docketed as Criminal Case No. 27525 for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended, was filed against petitioner Marilyn C. Geduspan and Dr. Evangeline C. Farahmand, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) Regional Manager/Director and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc., respectively. The information read: That on or about the 27th day of November, 1999, and for sometime subsequent thereto, at Bacolod City, province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused MARILYN C. GEDUSPAN, a public officer, being the Regional Manager/Director, of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, Regional office No. VI, Iloilo City, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with DR. EVANGELINE C. FARAHMAND, a private individual and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc., Mandalangan, Bacolod City, with deliberate intent, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously release the claims for payments of patients confined at L.N. Memorial Hospital with Philippine Health Insurance Corp., prior to January 1, 2000, amounting to NINETY ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTY-FOUR and 64/100 (P91,954.64), Philippine Currency, to Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc. despite clear provision in the Deed of Conditional Sale executed on November 27, 1999, involving the sale of West Negros College, Inc. to Tiong Bi, Inc. or Tiong Bi Medical Center, that the possession, operation and management of the said hospital will be turned over by West Negros College, Inc. to Tiong Bi, Inc. effective January 1, 2000, thus all collectibles or accounts receivable accruing prior to January 1, 2000 shall be due to West Negros College, Inc., thus accused MARILYN C. GEDUSPAN in the course of the performance of her official functions, had given unwarranted benefits to Tiong Bi, Inc., Tiong Bi Medical Center, herein represented by accused DR. EVANGELINE C. FARAHMAND, to the damage and injury of West Negros College, Inc. CONTRARY TO LAW. Both accused filed a joint motion to quash dated July 29, 2002 contending that the respondent Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over them considering that the principal

xxx

xxx

xxx (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

The petition lacks merit. The records show that, although Geduspan is a Director of Region VI of the Philhealth, she is not occupying the position of Regional Director but that of Department Manager A, hence, paragraphs (1) and (5) of Section 4 of RA 8249 are not applicable. It is petitioners appointment paper and the notice of salary adjustment that determine the classification of her position, that is, Department Manager A of Philhealth. Petitioner admits that she holds the position of Department Manager A of Philhealth. She, however, contends that the position of Department Manager A is classified under salary grade 26 and therefore outside the jurisdiction of respondent court. She is at present assigned at the Philhealth Regional Office VI as Regional Director/Manager. Petitioner anchors her request for the issuance of a temporary restraining order on the alleged disregard by respondent court of the decision of this Court in Ramon Cuyco v. Sandiganbayan.[3] However, the instant case is not on all fours with Cuyco. In that case, the accused Ramon Cuyco was the

38

Regional Director of the Land Transportation Office (LTO), Region IX, Zamboanga City, but at the time of the commission of the crime in 1992 his position of Regional Director of LTO was classified as Director II with salary grade 26. Thus, the Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over his person. In contrast, petitioner held the position of Department Director A of Philhealth at the time of the commission of the offense and that position was among those enumerated in paragraph 1(g), Section 4a of RA 8249 over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction: Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows: Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving: a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense;

wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office. To recapitulate, petitioner is a public officer, being a department manager of Philhealth, a government-owned and controlled corporation. The position of manager is one of those mentioned in paragraph a, Section 4 of RA 8249 and the offense for which she was charged was committed in relation to her office as department manager of Philhealth. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over her person as well as the subject matter of the case. WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, CarpioMorales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

JEJOMAR C. BINAY, petitioner, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and the DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,respondents.

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: (a) xxx (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of governmentowned and controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. (Underscoring supplied).

[G.R. No. 128136. October 1, 1999]

MARIO C. MAGSAYSAY, FRANCISCO B. CASTILLO, CRISTINA D. MABIOG, REGINO E. MALAPIT, ERLINDA I. MASANGCAY and VICENTE DE LA ROSA, petitioners, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, HON. OMBUDSMAN and its PROSECUTOR WENDELL BARERRASSULIT and STATE PROSECUTORS ERIC HENRY JOSEPH F. MALLONGA and GIDEON C. MENDOZA, respondents. DECISION KAPUNAN, J.: Pursuant to Section 4, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, Presidential Decree No. 1486 created an AntiGraft Court known as the Sandiganbayan. Since then the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has under gone various changes,[1] the most recent of which were effected through Republic Act Nos. 7975[2] and 8249.[3] Whether the Sandiganbayan, under these laws, exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving municipal mayors accused of violations of Republic Act No. 3019 [4] and Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code[5] is the central issue in these consolidated petitions. In G.R. Nos. 120681-83, petitioner Jejomar Binay seeks to annul, among others, the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to refer Criminal Case Nos. 21001, 21005 and 21007 to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati and declaring that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over said cases despite the enactment of R.A. No. 7975. In G.R. No. 128136, petitioner Mario C. Magsaysay, et the October 22, 1996 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, reversing its Order of June 21, 1996 which suspended the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 23278 in

It is of no moment that the position of petitioner is merely classified as salary grade 26. While the first part of the abovequoted provision covers only officials of the executive branch with the salary grade 27 and higher, the second part thereof specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Hence, respondent court is vested with jurisdiction over petitioner together with Farahmand, a private individual charged together with her. The position of manager in a government-owned or controlled corporation, as in the case of Philhealth, is within the jurisdiction of respondent court. It is the position that petitioner holds, not her salary grade, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

al. [4] ruled:

This Court in Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et

A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten

al. assail

39

deference to whatever ruling this Court will lay down in the Binay cases. The facts, as gathered from t he records, are as follows:

G.R. Nos. 120681-83

On September 7, 1994, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan three separate informations against petitioner Jejomar Binay, one for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code,[6] and two for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.[7] The informations, which were subsequently amended on September 15, 1994, all alleged that the acts constituting these crimes were committed in 1987 during petitioners incumbency as Mayor of Makati, then a municipality of Metro Manila. Thereafter, petitioner moved to quash the informations. He contended that the six-year delay from the time the charges were filed in the Office of the Ombudsman on July 27, 1988 to the time the informations were filed in the Sandiganbayan on September 7, 1994 constituted a violation of his right to due process. Arraignment of the accused was held in abeyance pending the resolution of this motion. On March 29, 1995, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners motion to quash. Petitioners motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the prosecution, was likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan. The resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, however, was issued before the petitioner could file a reply to the prosecutions opposition to the motion for reconsideration. In the meantime, on March 31, 1995, the prosecution filed a Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite. The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated April 25, 1995, granted the motion and ordered the suspension of petitioner for ninety days from receipt of the resolution. The court ruled that the requisites for suspension pendente lite were present as petitioner was charged with one of the offenses under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019[8] and the informations containing these charges had previously been held valid in the resolution denying the motion to quash and the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. Petitioner thus filed before this Court a petition for certiorari,[9] to set aside the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration, claiming that he was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan ordered his suspension pendente lite before he could file a reply to the prosecutions opposition to his motion for reconsideration of the resolution denying the motion to quash. In a Resolution dated April 28, 1995, the Court directed the Sandiganbayan to, among other things, permit petitioner to file said reply. After allowing and considering petitioners reply, the Sandiganbayan, on June 6, 1995, issued a Resolution reiterating the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to quash. On the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued another resolution reiterating the order suspending petitioner pendente lite. Meanwhile, R.A. No. 7975, redefining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, took effect on May 16, 1995.[10] On June 13, 1995, petitioner filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to refer his cases to the proper court for further proceedings, alleging that when the two Resolutions, both dated June 6, 1995, were issued by the Anti-Graft Court, it had already lost jurisdiction over the subject cases. The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated July 4, 1995, denied petitioners motion, holding thus: There is no question that Municipal Mayors are classified as Grade 27 under the compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989. Since, at the time of the commission of the offenses charged in he above-entitled cases, the accused

Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a Municipal Mayor, although in an acting or interim capacity, the Sandiganbayan, has, under Section 4 (e) 5, original jurisdiction over the cases therein filed against him. The allegation that Mayor Binay ought to have been classified with a salary grade lower than Grade 27, because at the time of the commission of the offenses charged he was paid a salary which merits a grade lower than Grade 27 does not hold water. In 1986 when the herein offenses were committed by the accused, the Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989 was not as yet in existence. From the very definition of he very Act itself, it is evident that the Act was passed and had been effective only in 1989. The Grade classification of a public officer, whether at the time of the commission of the offense or thereafter, is determined by his classification under the Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989. Thus since the accused Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a Municipal Mayor at the time of the commission of the offenses and the Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989 classifies Municipal Mayors as Grade 27, it is a conclusion beyond cavil that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the accused herein. As of July 1, 1989, when Republic Act No. 6758 took effect, Municipal Mayor Jejomar C. Binay had begun receiving a monthly salary of P15,180.00 which is equivalent to Grade 28 under the salary scale provided for in Section 27 of the said Act. Under the Index of Occupational Services, the position titles and salary grades of the Compensation & Position classification system prepared by the Department of Budget and Management pursuant to Section 6 of Republic [A]ct No. 6758, the position of Municipal Mayor had been classified as Grade 27.[11] On July 7, 1995, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over Criminal Case Nos. 21001, 21005 and 21007. He prayed, among others, that the Court annul and set aside: (1) the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 6, 1995 reiterating the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the motion to quash; (2) the Resolution of the same court also dated June 6, 1995 reiterating the order suspending petitioner pendente lite; and (3) the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated July 4, 1995 denying the motion to refer case to the RTC. Petitioner also asked that the Court issue a temporary restraining order preventing the suspension and arraignment of petitioner. The Court on July 7, 1995, resolved, among others, to issue the temporary restraining order prayed for. On July 14, 1995, petitioner filed an Addendum to Petition (To allow the introduction of alternative reliefs), praying that, should this Court hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the cases, the criminal cases filed against him be dismissed just the same on the ground that the long delay of the preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman prior to the filing of the informations, deprived him of his right to due process; and that, moreover, there was no probable cause to warrant the filing of the informations.

G.R. No. 128136

Petitioner Mario Magsaysay is the Mayor of the Municipality of San Pascual, Batangas. Save for petitioner Vicente dela Rosa, all of Mayor Magsaysays co-petitioners are officials of the same municipality. In a complaint dated April 16, 1994, Victor Cusi, then Vice-Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas, charged petitioners along with Elpidia Amada, Jovey C. Babago, and Brigido H. Buhain, also officials of San Pascual Batangas, with violation of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. The complaint charged the respondent municipal officials of overpaying Vicente de la Rosa of TDR Construction for the landscaping project of the San Pascual Central School. This was docketed in the Office of the Ombudsman as OMB-1-94-1232.

40

In a Resolution dated June 14, 1995, Graft Investigation Officer Lourdes A. Alarilla recommended the filing of an information for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, against petitioners with the Sandiganbayan. Director Elvis John S. Asuncion concurred in the resolution, and Manuel C. Domingo, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, recommended approval of the same. The resolution was approved by then Acting Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa with the following marginal note: Authority is given to the deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to cause the preparation of the information and to approve the same for filing with the proper court.[12] On August 11, 1995, an Information for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) was filed against petitioners and Jovey C. Babago, not with the Sandiganbayan per the June 14, 1995 Resolution, but with the RTC of Batangas City. The information was signed by a Lourdes A. Alarilla, the same Graft Investigation Officer who recommended the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan. In the meantime, a group denominated as the Concerned Citizens of San Pascual, Batangas filed a complaint before the Ombudsman against petitioners, and Elpidia Amada and Brigido Buhain, with violations of R.A. No. 3019. The complaint also alleged, among others, the overpricing of the landscaping project of San Pascual Central School. The case was docketed as OMB-0-94-0149. In a Resolution dated July 27, 1995, Graft Investigation Officer Ernesto M. Nocos recommended the filing of an information charging petitioners with violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended with proper court. The resolution, which was recommended for approval by Nicanor J. Cruz, OIC-Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, and approved by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, adopted the findings and conclusions in the resolution in OMB-1-94-1232 that the landscaping project was overpriced. On February 9, 1996, another Information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, was filed against petitioners for the overpricing of the landscaping project, this time before the Sandiganbayan. The information was subsequently amended on May 17, 1996. Except for the date the alleged crime was committed, the information charged essentially the same inculpatory facts as the information filed in the RTC. The case was docketed in the Sandiganbayan as Crim. Case No. 22378. On June 1, 1996, the accused filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the information in Crim. Case No. 22378 on the following grounds: that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case; that the accused were charged with the same offense in two informations; and that the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan would expose petitioners to double jeopardy. The Sandiganbayan denied the accuseds motion to quash in a Resolution dated June 21, 1996. The court, however, suspended proceedings in the case until the Supreme Court resolved the question of the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction involved in the Binay petition. Meanwhile, on June 7, 1996, Prosecutor Eric Mallonga filed a motion before the RTC to refer the R.A. No. 3019 case pending therein to the Sandiganbayan, arguing that under R.A. No. 7975 the Sandiganbayan, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over the case. On July 3, 1996, the RTC issued an order holding in abeyance the resolution of the motion to refer the case since the issue of jurisdiction was pending before the Sandiganbayan. Back at the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution, on July 24, 1996, filed a motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayans Order dated June 21, 1996. On August 2, 1996, filed their own motion for the reconsideration of the same order. On October 22, 1996, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution and set the case for arraignment. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the October 22, 1996

Resolution ordering their arraignment, which motion was denied on February 17, 1997. On February 27, 1997, the accused filed the present petition. On October 1, 1997, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order to prevent respondents from further proceeding with Crim. Case No. 23278 of the Sandiganbayan. The petition raises the following issues: I Had the Sandiganbayan been ousted of its jurisdiction over the case of municipal mayor after the passage of Republic Act No. 7975, coupled with the filing earlier of an information for the same offense before the Regional Trial Court having territorial jurisdiction and venue of the commission of the offense? II Are the respondents Ombudsman and the prosecutors estopped by laches or waiver from filing and prosecuting the case before respondent Sandiganbayan after the filing earlier of the information in the proper court, thereafter repudiating it, seeking another court of the same category and finally to respondent court? III Whether or not the filing of two (2) informations for the same offense violated the rule on duplicity of information? IV Whether or not the trial to be conducted by respondent court, if the case shall not be dismissed, will expose the petitioners who are accused therein to double jeopardy? V Under the circumstances, are the respondent Ombudsman and the prosecutors guilty of forum shopping?[13] On October 6, 1997, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 128136 (the Magsaysay petition) with G.R. Nos. 120681-83 (the Binay petition). In resolving these consolidated petitions, the Court shall first address the common question of the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. I The Court rules that it is the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the subject cases. The informations against Mayor Binay were filed in the Sandiganbayan on July 7, 1994, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1606,[14] as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1861,[15] the pertinent provisions of which state: SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise: (a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; (2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled

41

corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court. xxx. On May 16, 1995, R.A. No. 7975 took effect. At this time, Mayor Binay had not yet been arraigned in the Sandiganbayan. On the other hand, R.A. No. 7975 was already in effect when the information against Mayor Magsaysay et al., was filed on August 11, 1995 in the RTC of Batangas City. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 amended Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 to read as follows: Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving: a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads; (b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; (c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; (e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations; (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office. c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. xxx. While the cases against petitioners were pending in this Court, congress enacted R.A. No. 8249, again redefining the jurisdiction of the Anti-Graft Court. This law took effect, per Section 10 thereof, on February 23, 1997, fifteen days after its complete publication on February 8, 1997 in the Journal and Malaya, two newspapers of general circulation. As further amended by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 now reads: SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at he time of the commission of the offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the position of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads; (b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; (c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher; (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

42

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of he Constitution; and (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to heir office. d. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided inBatas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. Petitioners contend that they do not come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because: (1) At the alleged time of the commission of the crimes charged, petitioner municipal mayors were not classified as Grade 27. (2) Municipal mayors are not included in the enumeration in Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975. (3) Congressional records reveal that the law did not intend municipal mayors to come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

x x x that the basic monthly salary received by Mario C. Magsaysay, Municipal Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas with Salary Grade 27 is ELEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT PESOS (P11,828.00) per month as of November 3, 1993 equivalent only to Grade 25, Step 5 of RA 6758, the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. Section 444(1) (Grad[e] 27) of RA 6758 is not as yet implemented due to budgetary constraints. This certification is issued to Mayor Mario C. Magsaysay this 30th day of May 1996 at San Pascual, Batangas for whatever legal purpose and/or purposes it may serve. The Court does not subscribe to the manner by which petitioners classify Grades. The Constitution[19] states that in providing for the standardization of compensation of government officials and employees, Congress shall take into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions, thus: The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions. Corollary thereto, Republic Act No. 6758[20] provides in Section 2 thereof that differences in pay are to be based upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions. In short, the nature of an officials position should be the determining factor in the fixing of his or her salary. This is not only mandated by law but dictated by logic as well. Consistent with these policies, the law employs the scheme known as the grade defined in Presidential Decree No. 985[21] as including xxx all classes of positions which, although different with respect to kind or subject matter of work, are sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work to warrant the inclusion of such classes of positions within one range of basic compensation.[22] The grade, therefore, depends upon the nature of ones position -- the level of difficulty, responsibilities, and qualification requirements thereof -- relative to that of another position. It is the officials Grade that determines his or her salary, not the other way around. It is possible that a local government officials salary may be less than that prescribed for his Grade since his salary depends also on the class and financial capability of his or her respective local government unit.[23]Nevertheless, it is the law which fixes the officials grade. Thus, Section 8 of R.A. 6758 fixes the salary grades of the President, Vice-President, Senate President, Speaker, Chief Justice, Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, as well as the Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions. Section 8 also authorizes the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to determine the officials who are of equivalent rank to the foregoing officials, where applicable and to assign such officials the same Salary Grades subject to a set of guidelines found in said section. For positions below those mentioned under Section 8, Section 9 instructs the DBM to prepare the Index of Occupational Services guided by the Benchmark Position prescribed in Section 9 and the factors enumerated therein. To determine whether an official is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, therefore, reference should be made to R.A. No. 6758 and

In support of his contention that his position was not that of Grade 27, Mayor Binay argues: xxx. The new laws consistent and repeated reference to salary grade show[s] an intention to base the separation of jurisdiction between the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts on pay scale. Grades are determined by compensation. The essence of grades is pay scales. Therefor, pay scales determine grades.[16] Mayor Binay, thus, presented a Certification[17] from the City Personnel Officer of Makati stating that petitioner as mayor received a monthly salary of only P10,793.00 from March 1987 to December 31, 1988. This amount was supposedly equivalent to Grade 22 under R.A. No. 6758. Mayor Magsaysay, for his part, submitted a similar Certification[18] from the Municipal Treasurer of San Pascual, Batangas, stating:

43

the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades. Salary level is not determinative. An officials grade is not a matter of proof, but a matter of law of which the Court must take judicial notice.[24] As both the 1989 and 1997 versions of the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades list the municipal Mayor under Salary Grade 27, petitioner mayors come within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner mayors are local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, under the catchall provision, Section 4a(5) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975. More accurately, petitioner mayors are [o]fficials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, under Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975.[25]

Petitioner Binay cites previous bills[29] in Congress dealing with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. These bills supposedly sought to exclude municipal officials from the Sandiganbayans exclusive original jurisdiction to relieve these officials ,especially those from the provinces, of the financial burden brought about by trials in Manila. The resort to congressional records to determine the proper application of the law in this case is unwarranted in this case for the same reason that the resort to the rule of inclusio unius est expressio alterius is inappropriate. Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible to interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication (Samson v. CA., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).[30] Thus, in Rodrigo, petitioners therein argued in their motion for reconsideration: x x x that the inclusion of Municipal Mayors within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan would be inconvenient since the witness in their case would come from Baguio City and San Nicolas, Pangasinan. This, according to petitioners, would defeat one of the purposes of R.A. No. 7975, that is, the convenience of the accused. The Court, in denying the motion for reconsideration, held, among others, that: The legislature has nevertheless chosen the mode and standard by which to implement its intent, and courts have no choice but to apply it. Congress has willed that positions with Grade 27 and above shall come within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and this Court is duty-bound to obey the congressional will. Petitioner Binay also quotes the Sponsorship Speech of Senator Roco, stating: Since February 1979, when the Sandiganbayan was established up to the present, the Court has been confronted with the problem of those accused who are of limited means who stand trial for petty crimes, the so-called small fry -- the barangay officials, the municipal officials and employees, postal clerks and letter carriers and the like -- who are involved with nickel-and-dime cases and money-related cases such as malversation, estafa and theft. xxx xxx xxx xxx

Petitioners, however, argue that they are not included in the enumeration in Section 4a(1). They invoke the rule in statutory construction expressio unius est expressio alterius. As what is not included in those enumerated is deemed excluded, municipal officials are excluded from the Sandiganbayans exclusive original jurisdiction. Resort to statutory construction, however, is not appropriate where the law is clear and unambiguous.[26] The law is clear in this case. As stated earlier, Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975, speaks of [o]fficials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. The Court fails to see how a different interpretation could arise even if the plain meaning rule were disregarded and the law subjected to interpretation. The premise of petitioners argument is that the enumeration in Section 4a(1) is exclusive. It is not. The phrase specifically including after [o]fficials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 necessarily conveys the very idea of non-exclusivity of the enumeration. The principle ofexpressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply where other circumstances indicate that the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive,[27] or where the enumeration is by way of example only.[28] In Conrado B. Rodrigo, et al. vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division), supra, the Court held that the catchall in Section 4a(5) was necessary for it would be impractical, if not impossible, for Congress to list down each position created or will be created pertaining to grades 27 and above. The same rationale applies to the enumeration in Section 4a(1). Clearly, the law did not intend said enumeration to be an exhaustive list. Should there be any doubts as to whether petitioner mayors are under the category of Grade 27, Section 444(d) of the Local Government Code settles the matter: The municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly compensation corresponding to Salary Grade twenty-seven (27) as prescribed under R.A. No. 6758 and the implementing guidelines issued pursuant thereto. In the Courts Resolution in Rodrigo dated July 2, 1999 denying the motion for reconsideration, we treated the above provision as confirmatory of the Salary Grade assigned by the DBM to Municipal Mayors.

Senate Bill No. 1353 modifies the present jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan such that only those occupying high positions in Government and the military fall under the jurisdiction of the court.[31] It is not clear, however, whether Senator Roco meant that all municipal officials are excluded from the jurisdiction

44

of the Sandiganbayan. In any case, courts are not bound by a legislators opinion in congressional debates regarding the interpretation of a particular legislation. It is deemed a mere personal opinion of the legislator.[32] Such opinions do not necessarily reflect the view of the entire Congress.[33]

2. If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has not begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 7975, then R.A. No. 7975 applies. (a) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case before it, then the case shall be referred to the Sandiganbayan. (b) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case before it, the case shall be referred to the regular courts. The trial of the cases involving Mayor Binay had not yet begun as of the date of the approval of R.A. 7975; consequently, the Anti-Graft Court retains jurisdiction over the said cases. In any case, whatever seeming ambiguity or doubt regarding the application of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 should be laid to rest by Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, which states: Sec. 7. Transitory Provision. - This Act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. The latter provision more accurately expresses the legislatures intent and in any event should be applied in this case, R.A. No. 8249 having superseded R.A. No. 7975. In Panfilo M. Lacson vs. The Executive Secretary, et al.,[36] The Court explained the purpose of the foregoing provision.

From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the cases against petitioner Binay cannot be referred to the regular courts under Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975, which provides: Sec. 7. Upon effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts. In construing the correct import of Section 7, it may be helpful to refer to the guidelines in determining jurisdiction laid down in Bengzon vs. Inciong:[34] The rule is that where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. The exception to the rule is where the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment. Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of the statute. R.A. No. 7975, by virtue of Section 7, belongs to the exception rather than the rule. The provision is transitory in nature and expresses the legislatures intention to apply its provisions on jurisdiction to criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan. To this extent, R.A. 7975 is retroactive. Such a transitory provision is not peculiar to R.A. No. 7975; similar provisions are found in other laws reallocating the jurisdiction of the courts.[35] There is no reason why Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 should be any different. The term proper courts, as used in Section 7, means courts of competent jurisdiction, and such jurisdiction is defined in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975. The former should not be read in isolation but construed in conjunction with the latter. The term proper courts as used in Section 7, therefore, is not restricted to regular courts, but includes as well the Sandiganbayan, a special court. If the intent of Congress were to refer all cases the trials of which have not begun to the regular courts, it should have employed the term proper regular courts or regular courts instead of proper courts. Accordingly, the law in the third paragraph of Section 4 P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, uses the term regular courts, not proper courts: The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of regular courts where all the accused are occupying positions lower than salary grade 27, or not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration. [Underscoring supplied.] Construed thus, the effects of Section 7 may be summarized as follows: 1. If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has already begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 7975, R.A. No. 7975 does not apply.

x x x it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of [Sandiganbayans] jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. x x x. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court. x x x. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (RA 8249). [Emphasis in the original.] The possible disruptive effect of the amendments to the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction on pending cases was, therefore, not lost on the legislature. Congress has, furthermore, deemed the commencement of the trial as the crucial point in determining whether a court retains a case pending before it or lose the same on the ground of lack of jurisdiction per the provisions of R.A. 8249. The law obviously does not want to waste the time and effort already devoted to the presentation of evidence if trial had already begun. On the other hand, not much disruption would be caused if the amendment were made to apply to cases the trials of which have not yet to start. The ramifications of Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 may be stated as follows: 1. If trial of the cases pending before whatever court has already begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 8249, said law does not apply. 2. If trial of cases pending before whatever court has not begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 8249, then said law applies. (a) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case pending before it, then it retains jurisdiction. (b) If the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case pending before it, the case shall be referred to the regular courts.

45

(c) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case pending before a regular court, the latter loses jurisdiction and the same shall be referred to the Sandiganbayan. (d) If a regular court has jurisdiction over a case pending before it, then said court retains jurisdiction. Thus, under both R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8429, the Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction over said cases. II Petitioner Binay avers in his Addendum to Petition that his right to speedy disposition has been violated by the inordinate delay in the resolution of the subject cases by the Ombudsman. Article III of the Constitution provides that: Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings.[37] Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.[38] However, the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial,[39] is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.[40] Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.[41] The concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.[42] A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient.[43] In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.[44] In Tatad vs.Sandiganbayan,[45] the Court held that the length of delay and the simplicity of the issues did not justify the delay in the disposition of the cases therein. The unexplained inaction[46] of the prosecutors called for the dismissal of the cases against petitioner Tatad. In Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan,[47] the Court also ruled that there was no violation of the right to speedy disposition. The Court took into account the reasons for the delay, i.e., the frequent amendments of procedural laws by presidential decrees, the structural reorganizations in existing prosecutorial agencies and the creation of new ones by executive fiat, resulting in changes of personnel, preliminary jurisdiction, and the functions and powers of prosecuting agencies. The Court likewise considered the failure of the accused to assert such right, and the lack of prejudice caused by the delay to the accused. In Santiago vs. Garchitorena,[48] the complexity of the issues and the failure of the accused to invoke her right to speedy disposition at the appropriate time spelled defeat to her claim to the constitutional guarantee. In Cadalin vs. POEAs Administrator,[49] the Court, considering also the complexity of the cases (not run-ofthe-mill variety) and the conduct of the parties lawyers,

held that the right to speedy disposition was not violated therein. In petitioner Binays case, the Court finds that there was no undue delay in the disposition of the subject cases. The proceedings conducted before the Office of the Tanodbayan, and later with the Office of the Ombudsman, adequately explains the length of the delay: 1. That on July 27, 1988 Bobby Brillante filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan an affidavit-complaint charging, Jejomar Binay, Sergio Santos, Roberto Chang, Delfin Almeda, Nelson Irasga, Nicasio Santiago, Feliciano Basam, Maria Chan, Romeo Barrios, Azucena Diaz, Virgilio Clarete, Godofredo Marcelo, Armando San Miguel, Salvador Pangilinan and John Does of the following offenses: (a) Massive Malversation of Public Funds; (b) Multiple Falsification of Public Documents; (c) Usurpation of Official Functions; (d) Violation of Election Law; and (e) Violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019. 1.1. Brillantes complaint was based on the initial findings and observations of the COA on the examination of the cash and accounts covering transactions from April 1, 1987 to January 4, 1988 and Post-Audit of Selected Accounts for the last quarter of 1987 of the Municipality of Makati contained in its Report dated January 11, 1988. The COA furnished the Tanodbayan a copy of this report on August 1, 1988 upon request of the latter. 1.2. In the letter of the COA transmitting a copy of the report, the Tanodbayan was informed that this COA audit report of January 11, 1988 is not yet released since the Mayor of Makati was given thirty days within which to explain/clarify the findings in the report and is subject to change or modification depending upon the explanation/clarification to be submitted by the Mayor of Makati. Because of this information from the COA the preliminary investigation was held in abeyance until the submission of the final report. 1.3. On March 1, 1989, the first part of the Final Report on Audit of Makati was received by the Office of the Ombudsman and was transmitted for purposes of the ensuring preliminary investigation to the Tanodbayan which received the same on March 22, 1989. 1.4. This first part of the Final Report contained the fifteen (15) adverse findings, above elsewhere stated as the basis of Bobby Brillantes complaint. 1.5. Eleven (11) COA auditors participated in the documentation and analysis of its findings and preparation of the final report. 1.6. The first part of the final report was followed by a Supplemental Report on Findings No. 1 and 3. This Supplemental Report is dated July 3, 1989.

46

2. After securing machine copies of the voluminous documents supporting the COA findings, Pros. Margarito Gervacio, Chairman of the Panel of Prosecutors, issued the corresponding subpoena directing the respondents to submit their respective counter-affidavits. 2.1. In compliance with the subpoena, Mayor Jejomar Binay submitted his counter-affidavit on May 18, 1990, Marissa Chan, Feliciano Bascon, Nicanor Santiago, Jr. on June 19, 1990, Renato Manrique on June 4, 1990, Alfredo Ignacio on June 6, 1990, Roberto Chang on August 27, 1990. Feliciano Bascon submitted his Supplemental Affidavit on November 22, 1990. 2.2. Thereafter, clarificatory examinations were conducted on September 27, 1990, October 26, 1990, November 8, 9, 14, 22, 1990. 3. On January 15, 1991 Mayor Jejomar Binay submitted a copy of this Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 92380 which he and the municipality of Makati filed with the Supreme Court against COA Chairman, Eufemio Domingo and the Commission on Audit, with a manifestation that said petition is submitted to support Binays stand as regard COA Finding No. 9 aforestated. 4. On April 2, 1992 respondent Marissa Chan filed an affidavit containing allegations incriminating Jejomar Binay; 5. Upon being ordered to comment on the said April 2, 1992 affidavit of Marissa Chan, Jejomar Binay submitted his comment thereto on April 30, 1992. 6. On August 4, 1993, the Investigation Panel submitted to the Deputy Special Prosecutor its Resolution disposing the preliminary investigation of the case. 6.1. On August 10, 1993 the said Resolution was approved by the Special Prosecutor, who forwarded the same and the entire records to the Office of the Ombudsman for review and/or final action. 6.2. On August 16, 1994, the Review Panel of the Ombudsman submitted to the latter its review action for approval. 6.3. On August 19, 1994, the Ombudsman approved some of the recommendations of the Review Panel and directed the preparation and filing of the informations.[50] Furthermore, the prosecution is not bound by the findings of the Commission on Audit (COA); it must rely on its own independent judgment in the determination of probable cause. Accordingly, the prosecution had to conduct it s own review of the COA findings. Judging from said findings, we find that the cases were sufficiently complex, thus justifying the length of time for their resolution. As held by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated March 29, 1995 denying the Motion to Quash: 2. Ten charges are involved in these cases and the prosecution, unable to rely on the raw findings of the Commission on Audit in 15 reports caused the investigation and examination of thousands of vouchers, payrolls, and supporting documents considering that no less than the Chairman

of the Commission on Audit, assisted by a team supervisor and 10 team members had to take part in the conduct of a final audit consisting of evaluation and analysis of the initial findings in the 15 raw reports, the cases must have involved complicated legal and factual issues which do warrant or justify a longer period of time for preliminary investigation. xxx 5. In the TATAD case, the preliminary investigation was resolved close to three (3) years from the time all the counter-affidavits were submitted to the Tanodbayan, notwithstanding the fact that very few documentary and testimonial evidence were involved. In the above-entitled cases, the preliminary investigation of all ten (10) cases was terminated in merely two (2) years and four (4) months from the date Mayor Binay filed his last pleading, on April 30, 1992.[51] Petitioner claims that the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan ordering his suspension pendente lite is unwarranted since the informations charging him were not valid. This contention, however, must fail in view of our pronouncement that there was no delay in the resolution of the subject cases in violation of his right to speedy disposition. Accordingly, the informations in question are valid an petitioners suspension pendente lite must be upheld. Finally, whether or not there is probable cause to warrant the filing of the subject cases is a question best left to the discretion of the Ombudsman. Absent any grave abuse of such discretion, the Court will not interfere in the exercise thereof.[52] Petitioner in this case has failed to establish any such abuse on the part of the Ombudsman. III Having ruled that the criminal case against petitioners in G.R. No. 128136 is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the Court will now dispose of the following issues raised by them: (1) The Sandiganbayan was ousted of its jurisdiction by the filing of an information alleging the same facts with the Regional Trial Court. (2) Respondents are estopped from filing an information before the Sandiganbayan considering that they had already filed another information alleging the same facts before the Regional Trial Court. (3) The filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan constitutes double jeopardy. The Court tackles these arguments successively then deals with the questions of duplicity of information and forum shopping. Petitioners invoke the rule that the jurisdiction of a court once it attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of such character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.[53] They claim that the filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan was a subsequent happening or event which cannot oust the RTC of its jurisdiction. This rule has no application here for the simple reason that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction never attached to the RTC. When the information was filed before the RTC, R.A. No. 7975 was already in effect and, under said law, jurisdiction over the case pertained to the Sandiganbayan. Neither can estoppel be successfully invoked. First, jurisdiction is determined by law, not by the consent or agreement of the parties or by estoppel.[54] As a consequence of this principle, the Court held in Zamora vs. Court of Appeals[55] that:

47

It follows that as a rule the filing of a complaint with one court which has no jurisdiction over it does not prevent the plaintiff from filing the same complaint later with the competent court. The plaintiff is not estopped from doing so simply because it made a mistake before in the choice of the proper forum. In such a situation, the only authority the first court can exercise is to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. This has to be so as a contrary conclusion would allow a party to divest the competent court of its jurisdiction, whether erroneously or even deliberately, in derogation of the law. It is true that the Court has ruled in certain cases[56] that estoppel prevents a party from questioning the jurisdiction of the court that the party himself invoked. Estoppel, however, remains the exception rather than the rule, the rule being that jurisdiction is vested by law.[57] Even in those instances where the Court applied estoppel, the party estopped consistently invoked the jurisdiction of the court and actively participated in the proceedings, impugning such jurisdiction only when faced with an adverse decision. This is not the case here. After discovering that a similar information had earlier been filed in the RTC, respondents promptly asked the trial court to refer the case to the Sandiganbayan, which motion was followed by a motion to resolve the previous motion. There was no consistent invocation of the RTCs jurisdiction. There were no further proceedings after the filing of the information save for the motion to refer the case precisely on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and the motion to resolve the earlier motion. Finally, the trial court had not rendered any decision, much less one adverse to petitioners. Second, petitioners cannot hold respondents in estoppel for the latter are not themselves party to the criminal action. In a criminal action, the State is the plaintiff, for the commission of a crime is an offense against the State. Thus, the complaint or information filed in court is required to be brought in the name of the People of the Philippines.[58] Even then, the doctrine of estoppel does not apply as against the people in criminal prosecutions.[59] Violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt [60] Practices Act, like attempted murder, is a public offense. Social and public interest demand the punishment of the offender; hence, criminal actions for public offenses can not be waived or condoned, much less barred by the rules of estoppel.[61] The filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan did not put petitioners in double jeopardy even though they had already pleaded not guilty to the information earlier filed in the RTC. The first jeopardy never attached in the first place, the RTC not being a court of competent jurisdiction. There can be no double jeopardy where the accused entered a plea in a court that had no jurisdiction.[62] The remedy of petitioners, therefore, was not to move for the quashal of the information pending in the Sandiganbayan on the ground of double jeopardy.[63] Their remedy was to move for the quashal of the information pending in the RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.[64] The contention that the filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan violated the rule against duplicitous informations is patently unmeritorious. That rule presupposes that there is one complaint or information charging not one offense, but two or more offenses. Thus, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court states: Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. - A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribed a single punishment for various offenses. Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117: Sec. 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds: xxx

(e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses; xxx Here, petitioners are faced not with one information charging more than one offense but with more than one information charging one offense. The Court does not find the prosecution guilty of forum-shopping. Broadly speaking, forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.[65] We discern no intent on the part of the State, in filing two informations in two different courts, to gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Obviously, respondents got their signals crossed. One set of officials, after investigating a complaint filed by the Vice-Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas charging petitioners of overpricing, filed the information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the RTC. Another set of officials investigated another complaint from the Concerned Citizens Group accusing petitioners of, among others, overpricing the same project subject of the previous complaint. Finding probable cause, the second set of officials instituted the criminal action, charging the same offense and alleging essentially the same facts as the first, this time in the Sandiganbayan. Later learning of the procedural faux pas, respondents without undue delay asked the RTC to refer the case to the Sandiganbayan. WHEREFORE, hereby DISMISSED. the consolidated petitions are

Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur. Panganiban, J., see separate opinion. Davide, Jr., C.J., joins J. Panganiban in his separate
opinion. opinion.

Quisumbing, J., concurs with J. Panganibans separate

48

Republic of the Philippines Congress of the Philippines Metro Manila Tenth Congress Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twentythird day of July, two thousand seven. Republic Act No. 8249 February 5, 1997

"(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors engineers and other city department heads; "(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; "(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; "(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher; "(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; "(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations; "(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade'27'and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; "(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; "(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and "(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade'27'and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. "b. Other offenses orfelonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office. "c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. "In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade '27' or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court ' as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. "The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders or regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction orof their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. "The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1,2,14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court. The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. The first paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows: "SECTION 1. Sandiganbayan; Composition, Qualifications; Tenure; Removal and Compensation. - A special court, of the same level as the Court of Appeals and possessing all the inherent powers of a court ofjustice, to be known as the Sandiganbayan is hereby created composed of a presiding justice and fourteen associate justices who shall be appointed by the President." Section 2. Section 2 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows: "SECTION 2. Official Station; Place of Holding Sessions. The Sandiganbayan shall have its principal office in the Metro Manila area and shall hold sessions thereat for the trial and determination of cases filed with it: Provided, however, That cases originating from the principal geographical regions of the country, that is, from Luzon, Visayas or Mindanao, shall be heard in their respective regions of origin except only when the greater convenience of the accused and of the witnesses, or other compelling considerations require the contrary, in which instance a case originating from one geographical region may be heard in another geographical region: Provided, further, That for this purpose the presiding justice shall authorize any divisions of the court to hold sessions at any time and place outside Metro Manila and, where the interest of justice so requires, outside the territorial boundaries of the Philippines. The Sandiganbayan may require the services of the personnel and the use of facilities of the courts or other government offices where any of the divisions is holding sessions and the personnel of such courts or offices shall be subject to the orders of the Sandiganbayan." Section 3. The second paragraph of Section 3 of the same decree is hereby deleted. Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows: "a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: "(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: "(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads;

49

"In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in govemment-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them. "Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had therefore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned." Section 5. Section 7 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows: 'SECTION 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. All decisions and final orders determining the merits of a case or finally disposing of the action or proceedings of the Sandijanbayan shall contain complete findings of the facts and the law on which they are based, on all issues properly raised before it and necessary in deciding the case. "A petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision may be filed within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the final order on judgment, and such motion for reconsideration shall be decided within thirty (30) days from submission thereon. "Decisions and final orders ofthe Sandiganbyan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Whenever, in any case decided by the Sandiganbayan, the penalty of reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death is imposed, the decision shall be appealable to the Supreme Court in the manner prescribed in the Rules of Court. "Judgments and orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be executed and enforced in the manner provided by law. "Decisions and final orders of other courts in cases cognizable by said courts under this decree as well as those rendered by them in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction shall be appealable to, or be reviewable by, the Sandiganbayan in the manner provided by Rule 122 of the Rules of the Court. "In case, however, the imposed penalty by the Sandiganbayan or the regional trial court in the proper exercise of their respective jurisdictions, is death, review by the Supreme Court shall be automatic, whether or not accused files an appeal." Section 6. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to carry out the initial implementation of this Act shall be charged against the current fiscal year appropriations of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, such sums as may be needed for its continued implementation shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act. Section 7. Transitory Provision. - This Act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof Section 8. Separability of Provisions. - If for any reason any provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, such parts or portions not affected thereby shall remain in full force and effect.

Section 9. Repealing Clause. - All acts, decrees, general orders and circulars, or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Section 10. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation. Approved: February 5, 1997 (Sgd.) FIDEL

President of the Philippines

V.

RAMOS

50

Republic of the Philippines Congress of the Philippines Metro Manila Ninth Congress Republic Act No. 7691 March 25, 1994

"(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and "(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof." Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: "(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of which must be specifically alleged: Provided, That interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs shall be included in the determination of the filing fees: Provided, further, That where there are several claims or causes of actions between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions; "(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the questions of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession; and "(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots." Section 4. Section 34 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots where the value of which does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their decisions in these cases shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts." Section 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional amounts mentioned in Sec. 19(3), (4),

AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA, BLG. 129, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980"

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction. "(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; "(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000,00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; "(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the demand or claim exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00); "(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00); "(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations; "(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions; "(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and of the Court of Agrarian Relations as now provided by law; and "(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00)." Section 2. Section 32 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

51

and (8); and Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by this Act, shall be adjusted to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). Five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted further to Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00): Provided, however, That in the case of Metro Manila, the abovementioned jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted after five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00). Section 6. All laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with the provisions of this Act shall be considered amended or modified accordingly. Section 7. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial stage. However, by agreement of all the parties, civil cases cognizable by municipal and metropolitan courts by the provisions of this Act may be transferred from the Regional Trial Courts to the latter. The executive judge of the appropriate Regional Trial Courts shall define the administrative procedure of transferring the cases affected by the redefinition of jurisdiction to the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Section 8. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation. Approved: March 25, 1994