Regulating Termination Charges for

Telecommunications Networks

by
Joshua S. Gans †
Stephen P. King †

Abstract:
This paper considers the effects of regulating termination for interconnected, but
otherwise unregulated, telecommunications networks. We develop two models, the
first that involves fixed market shares and the second, based on the work of Laffont,
Rey and Tirole (1998a), which allows for subscriber competition. We show that if a
dominant network (i.e. one with the greatest market share) has its termination
charges regulated then this will tend to lower the average price of calls. It is also
likely to lead to other networks raising their termination charges. If market shares
are fixed, then extending termination regulation to non-dominant networks lowers
call prices and is unambiguously welfare improving. However, if networks actively
compete for subscribers then extending termination charge regulation to a non-
dominant network may lead to higher call prices. This is most likely if the non-
dominant network has a very low market share relative to the dominant network.

Keywords:
TELECOMMUNICATIONS; INTERCONNECTION; NETWORK COMPETITION;
DOMINANT FIRM; PRICE REGULATION.

† Melbourne Business School, University of Melbourne, 200 Leicester Street, Carlton,

VIC 3053. Email: J.Gans@unimelb.edu.au

We thank the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) for providing funds for
this project. The views expressed are solely those of the authors and do not reflect those of the
ACCC.

Australian Journal of Management, Vol. 27, No. 1, June 2002, © The Australian Graduate School of Management

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1. Introduction

W orldwide deregulation of the telecommunications industry has resulted in

markets that were previously dominated by public or private monopolists
being opened to network competition. To facilitate this competition most
jurisdictions have used regulation to ensure that new entrants can interconnect with
incumbent carriers, so customers on each network are able to call one another.
Without such interconnection, incumbent carriers would have a considerable
competitive advantage due to their installed customer base. In the extreme, an
absence of interconnection would make it impossible for any new entrant to
survive.
A key part of interconnection is the supply to new entrants of termination
services on the previous monopoly carrier’s network. A terminating service
involves the carriage of a call from a point of interconnection between two
networks to the consumer who receives the call. The terminating network directly
bears the trunk and connection costs from the point of interconnection to the
receiving consumer while the originating network bears the costs from the caller to
the point of interconnection. Under the standard caller-pays principle of charging,
however, the caller is charged for both the originating and terminating services.
The originating network collects the call charge and that network and the
terminating network must, in turn, transact for the terminating service. Our analysis
in this paper focuses on the price charged for this terminating service. Not
surprisingly, as this price becomes part of the marginal cost of the call service, it is
an important factor in the overall price of the call.
Previous research has noted that, in the absence of regulation, interconnection
charges may be used by an incumbent firm either to prevent rival networks from
becoming effective competitors (Armstrong 1998) or to facilitate collusive
outcomes under network competition (Laffont, Rey & Tirole 1998a, 1998b;
Armstrong 1998; Carter & Wright 1999). Both possibilities suggest a role for the
regulation of termination charges.
Regulators, however, face a number of tensions when determining rules and
charges for termination. If only the dominant carrier’s termination charges are
regulated, entrant networks may have a competitive advantage and competition
may be able artificially biased in favour of new entrants. At the same time, if
regulators limit the termination charges of non-dominant carriers, this can affect an
important source of revenue, thereby, making entry less attractive for new
networks.
This paper uses a well-known model of network competition to investigate
these issues.1 We show that if only a dominant carrier’s termination charges are
regulated then call prices may be reduced, but that this reduction will be mitigated
by an increase in the (unregulated) termination charges of other networks. To see
this, suppose that the termination charge of one network, with the largest market
share, is regulated while other termination charges remain unregulated. Then, all
other things being equal, the regulated network faces higher costs than the

1. In so doing, we assume that the dominant network is relatively unconstrained in its retail pricing. In
some circumstances this is a reasonable assumption as dominant networks face a price cap only on a
basket of their products. In other circumstances, however, individual price caps on calls may bind.
Laffont and Tirole (1999) provide a more complete discussion of such interrelationships. For the
exercise here, it is more convenient to assume that retail pricing is fully deregulated.

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unregulated one. This is because the termination charges the regulated network
pays to other unregulated networks will tend to be higher than the charges the
unregulated networks pay to both the regulated network and to each other. If firms
charge the same price for calls that terminate on their own and on other networks,
then the regulated network will face high costs relative to the unregulated
networks. Hence, it will find it more difficult to compete aggressively on price. The
end result of this is to relieve competitive pressure on other networks.
Consequently, any reduction in termination charges through regulation will not be
fully passed on to consumers.
Moreover, the unregulated networks are likely to raise termination charges to
the regulated network and exacerbate this effect. There are a number of reasons for
this. First, with fixed market shares, lowering one network’s termination charges
will flow through into the prices charged by other networks. Any double
marginalisation effects are reduced and average prices fall. But, at the same time,
non-dominant networks have an incentive to partially undermine this flow through
and seize some of the benefits for themselves by raising their termination charges.
Second, the reduction in termination charges will tend to alter the way each
network, including the dominant carrier, sets its prices and attracts subscribers.
With uniform prices, reducing a dominant firm’s termination prices tends to lower
non-dominant firms’ prices, as noted above, and this leads to a competitive
response from the dominant carrier. But this is partially offset by the reduction in
the dominant network’s termination revenues. Carriers use these revenues to
compete more vigorously for subscribers, and reducing these for one carrier
reduces that network’s competitive position. This said, we show below that, if the
regulated carrier is dominant, the overall effect of regulation is lower call prices.
If a dominant carrier is regulated, should this regulation be extended to non-
dominant networks termination charges? We show that this extension of regulation
has an ambiguous effect on call prices. To see this, we have to distinguish between
the termination charges non-dominant networks set for each other and the charge
they would set for termination of calls from the dominant (regulated) network.
Between two non-dominant networks, a regulated termination charge can increase
competition and lead to lower prices. The reason call prices are reduced is that in
the absence of regulation, termination charges are set too high—once again due to
the problems of horizontal and vertical separation—and competition between
networks only partly alleviates the consequent double marginalisation effect.
Regulating non-dominant networks’ termination charges will reduce their profits
but only to the extent that they were earning monopoly rents. It will, therefore,
have the effect of securing lower call prices without the additional costs of over-
investment in duplicate networks.
However, if we consider the termination charges that non-dominant networks
set for the regulated carrier, the effect of regulation is ambiguous. On the one hand,
regulation will lower the overall costs of the dominant network and enable it to
profitably lower call prices. However, regulation will reduce the non-dominant
networks’ benefits from attracting customers away from the dominant network.
Without regulation, if a customer switched to its network, a non-dominant carrier
would receive the termination revenues from calls made to that customer.
However, with regulation, those revenues are reduced and hence, so are the

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potential benefits from attracting marginal customers. This will tend to put upward
pressure on call prices.
Ultimately, the desirability of regulating a non-dominant network’s
termination charges rises as their market share grows. When the non-dominant
network has a sizeable market share, regulating its termination charge will put
upward pressure on its call price but it will put downward pressure on the dominant
network’s call prices. This may lower prices on average. In contrast, when the non-
dominant network is relatively small, the dominant network may actually raise its
call price in response to the higher price by the non-dominant network.
The paper is organised as follows. We begin (in section 2), by considering
unregulated outcomes to predict what will happen when each network freely
determines termination charges. In section 3, we then consider the impact of
regulation—both on the dominant and non-dominant networks. Section 4
concludes; identifying key directions for future research.

2. Dominant Network Regulation

In this section and the next we provide a detailed, technical analysis of the results
and conclusions discussed above. We begin by considering the outcome when only
the dominant network is regulated. By dominant, we mean the network with the
largest historic market share. In section 3, we consider the implications of
regulation of non-dominant networks and derive socially optimal regulatory prices.

2.1 Model Set-Up and Assumptions

Suppose there are n telecommunications networks, each owned by a separate firm
and each interconnected to one another. Let si be the market share of network i. We
will assume that each network employs a similar technology and hence, has
equivalent termination costs. Let f be the per customer fixed cost of connecting to
one network.2 Let cT denote the marginal cost of terminating a call on each network
while the remaining originating and trunk costs of a call originating from network i
are given by ci.
Let Pij be the price set by network i for a call from i to network j. While these
prices might differ depending on the identity of the terminating network, customers
will often be unable to distinguish between these networks. Unless a customer
knows the network choice of the person they are calling, they will be unable to
determine the exact call price. Even though a network may set different inter-
network call prices, these prices will only influence consumers’ decisions to the
extent that they influence the average price of inter-network calls. This average
price determines demand and is given by Pi = ∑ j ≠i s j Pij .
This ‘customer ignorance’ about the identity of the terminating network will
often be important, particularly where there is number portability between
networks. Consequently, throughout our analysis, we will retain the assumption
that each network only sets a single call price. The networks cannot effectively
price discriminate because of customer ignorance.3

2. This cost will be important when we consider network competition below.

3. See Gans and King (2000) for a more detailed discussion of customer ignorance in the context of
telecommunications.

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If a consumer subscribes to network i, their demand for calls is given by q(Pi).

For simplicity we will assume that this demand is linear with q ( Pi ) = 2 − Pi . The
linear demand assumption allows us to explicitly calculate prices and charges and
to compare these charges over different regimes. We assume that 2 > ci + cT for all
i.4
Each network sets its own call price, Pi. In so doing it will take account of its
own origination and trunk costs, ci, and the costs of call termination. For calls to its
own network, the marginal termination cost is cT. For inter-network calls, however,
the marginal termination charge is set by a rival network j, at Tji per call (or per call
minute).
A useful benchmark price for our analysis is the uniform monopoly price for
calls. This is the profit maximising price that would be set by a single firm that
owned all networks. We denote this price by P m . It is implicitly defined for a
general demand function by q′( P m ) ( P − ci − cT ) + q( P m ) = 0 . For the linear demand
case P m = 12 (2 + ci + cT ) and the associated monopoly quantity is q m = 12 (2 − ci − cT ) .
Monopoly profits in this situation is Π m = 14 (a − ci − cT ) 2

2.2 Exogenous Market Shares

To begin, suppose that the market shares of each network are fixed or exogenous.
This assumption allows us to analyse the effect of regulation of termination charges
free of any effects on network competition for subscribers. This is also a realistic
assumption if alternative networks’ products are not close substitutes (e.g. one may
be a fixed and the other a mobile network). Below we remove this assumption and
consider the effect of network subscriber competition.
The n networks independently and simultaneously set their linear termination
charges, Tij , then each network sets its call price Pi. Given this (average) price,
customers decide how many calls they will make. Each firm seeks to maximise its
profits and all networks take the subscriber market shares as fixed so that given the
termination charges, network i will set Pi to solve:

 
max Pi  Pi − ci − si cT − ∑ s jT ji  q ( Pi ) .
 j ≠i 

(
The solution to this problem is given by Pi = 12 2 + ci + si cT + ∑ j ≠i s jT ji with )
associated quantity q ( Pi ) = 12 (2 − ci − si cT − ∑ j ≠i s jT ji ) . Taking this into account, each
network will simultaneously set its termination charges to solve:

max{T } si ∑ s j (Tij − cT )q ( Pj ) .
ij j ≠i
j ≠i

The first order conditions for each network’s optimisation problem are given by:

(Tij ) : 2 − ∑ m ≠i , j smTmj − 2siTij − c j + ( si − s j )cT = 0

4. Armstrong (1998) also uses a linear demand specification in the context of network interconnection.

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Solving these first order conditions simultaneously for all termination charges to all
networks gives the Nash equilibrium termination charges.
There are two cases worth more detailed consideration. First, suppose that
there are only two networks. Solving the first order conditions for these two
networks gives the termination charges as Tij = 21s ( 2 − c j + ( si − s j )cT ) for each
i
network i. Network call prices are given by Pi = 14 (6 + ci + cT ) with associated total
quantity q = 14 (2 − ci − cT ) . Note that in this situation call prices are higher than if
there were a single network. This is due to the effect of horizontal separation. Each
network has an incentive to unilaterally raise its termination charge relative to the
monopoly situation as it gains the full price benefit of such a rise but shares any
related loss in sales. This effect tends to be larger for small networks. Note that, as
the market share of any network decreases, its (equilibrium) termination charge
increases. In particular,

∂Tij 1
=− (2 − c j − cT ) < 0 .
∂si 2 si2

At the same time, the share of the other network must increase and its termination
charge will fall. In the linear demand case considered here, these effects exactly
offset each other so that call prices are independent of the shares of the individual
networks even though the specific termination charges do depend on these shares.
The second case of interest allows for competition between an arbitrary
number of symmetric networks with identical originating and trunk costs, c. From
the first order conditions, if there are n carriers each of whom has a market share
of 1 n , each carrier will independently set its termination charge in equilibrium at
Ti = 2 − c . The equilibrium call price is Pi = 21n ( 2(2n − 1) + cT + c ) . This price
increases as the number of networks increases. Differentiating the call price with
respect to n gives:

dPi c +c−2
= − T 2 > 0.
dn 2n

This reflects that, in terms of call prices, there is not really any competition
between networks. Because the person making the call is ignorant of the specific
carrier they are calling, networks have no incentive to compete by offering a lower
termination price. But as the number of networks increases, the effect of horizontal
separation rises and this pushes up the termination charges and call prices.

2.3 Regulation of the Dominant Network

Suppose that the termination charges of one firm—the ‘dominant network’ are
regulated while all other networks remain free to choose their termination charges.
Let sD > si for all firms i ≠ D so that firm D is the ‘dominant’ network. The
regulator directly sets its termination charge for inter-network calls at τ . All other
networks then simultaneously set their termination charges. Given these
termination charges, all networks set their call prices.

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Using the first order conditions presented in the previous section, replacing
TDi with τ , we see that unregulated network i will set its termination charge so
that:

(Tij ) : 2 − ∑ m ≠ i , j , D smTmj − sDτ − 2siTij − c j + ( si − s j )cT = 0

(TiD ) : 2 − ∑ m ≠i , D smTmj − 2 siTiD − cD + ( si − sD )cT = 0 .

To simplify, assume that all non-dominant (and non-regulated) mobile networks

are symmetric with market shares si = n1−1 (1 − sD ) and costs ci = c . From the first
order condition for profit maximisation for each non-regulated mobile carrier,

1 (2 − cD )(n − 1) + (1 − nsD )cT

Tij = ( 2 − c − sDτ ) and TiD = .
(1 − sD ) n(1 − sD )

Unregulated networks set a different termination charge to each other than to the
regulated network. Solving for the call prices:

Pi = 1
2( n −1) ( 2 ( 2n − 3) + c + (1 − s D )cT + sDτ )

PD = 1
2n ( 2(2n − 1) + cD + cT ) .

Note that PD > P m even if τ = cT so long as n ≥ 2 . In other words, even if the

regulator requires the dominant carrier to set its termination price at marginal cost,
the resultant call price will always exceed the monopoly price whenever there is at
least one other network.
It is worth considering the case of two firms in more detail. In this situation,
the dominant firm D is regulated but the other network remains unregulated.
Solving for the termination charge of the unregulated firm we find that
TiD = 2(1−1s ) ( 2 − cD + (1 − 2sD )cT ) . The dominant network will then set the price of
calls so that PD = 14 ( 6 + cD + cT ) while Pi = 12 ( 2 + c + (1 − sD )cT + sDτ ) . Notice that the
D

dominant firm’s price is the same as it would set when both networks are
unregulated. However, if both firms have identical technology so that c = cD then
the unregulated network sets its price below the unregulated duopoly level. So
regulation assists in lowering the call price of the unregulated network, although it
still remains inefficiently high.

2.4 Network Subscriber Competition

We now relax the fixed share assumption used above to allow firms to compete for
subscribers. The regulated network, D, competes for market share with a single
unregulated network, U, so that sD is endogenous and depends on the nature of
price competition. We will see that the inefficiencies noted in the previous section
remain relevant and that the need for regulation of the non-regulated network is, in
many respects, even more compelling.

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2.4.1 Customer Preferences Suppose that the two networks, D and U, sell a
differentiated but substitutable product. We model this by assuming that each
network is located at either end of a line of unit length with D located at 0 and U
located at 1. Consumers are located uniformly over the line. Given income y and
outgoing calls q, a consumer located at x and joining network i has utility:

y + v0 − t x − xi + u (qi )

where: v0 = a consumer’s intrinsic value of subscribing to a

network;
t x − xi = the cost of being to a network with location xi.5; and
v( Pi ) = max q [u (qi ) − Pq
i i i] = the consumer’s ‘variable net surplus’ from
subscribing to network i at price Pi . Also assume
that v0 is sufficiently high that both networks have
full coverage over all consumers.

If networks offer consumers a simple per call price, Pi then the market share of
network D, s, is determined by the point of indifference between D and U. That is,

v( PD ) − ts = v( PU ) − t (1 − s )
⇒ s = 12 + σ (v( PD ) − v( PU ))

where: σ = 1/(2t ) = the degree of substitutability between the two networks. It is

useful to note that ∂s ∂PD = −σ qD and ∂s ∂PU = σ qU .

2.4.2 Price Competition for Given Termination Charges Suppose that D’s
termination charge is regulated at t and U’s is currently, T. Then the profits of each
network are:

π D = s ( ( PD − c − scT − (1 − s)T ) q( PD ) − f + (1 − s )(τ − cT )q( PU ) ) (1)

π U = (1 − s ) ( ( PU − c − sτ − (1 − s )cT ) q( PU ) − f + s (T − cT )q( PD ) ) (2)

Note that each network earns profits from all calls made from its network as well as
termination profits from inter-network calls made to its network. Each firm will
choose its price to maximise its profits. Notice that increasing price has two effects.
First, it increases infra-marginal revenue. Second, it causes a reduction in the
network’s market share and demand. The former is particularly costly as the firm
will lose termination revenue as well as retail call revenue from its consumers.
Hence, the existence of termination revenues makes networks tougher price
competitors than might otherwise be the case.
It is interesting to consider the effect of a change in termination charges on
the degree of price competition. For this we have the following proposition.

5. This is essentially the model structure of Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a, 1998b).

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Proposition 1. Suppose that s > ½, then an increase in t will result in increases

in both PD and PU. For s < ½, an increase in T will cause PD and
PU to rise.
2 2
PROOF: Observe that ∂∂P π∂P , ∂∂P π∂P ≥ 0 and
D
D
U D
U
U

∂ 2π D
= −σ q ( PD )q( PU ) (1 − 2s ) > (<)0 for s > (<) 12
∂PD ∂τ
∂ 2π U
= − s (1 − s )q′( PU ) − (1 − 2s )σ q( PU ) 2
∂PU ∂τ

which is also positive for s > ½. This proves the comparative

static result (Milgrom & Roberts 1990). For T, the proof is
symmetric.

Thus, if for some reason, one network is larger than the other, then an increase in
that network’s termination charge will soften price competition between the
networks. In particular, if s > ½, then reducing t will reduce call prices. Of course,
given our previous analysis, this reduction will be in part offset by an increase in
the unregulated network’s termination charge T.
When the unregulated network sets its termination charge, it will continue to
ignore the effect on the other firm’s profits. Consequently, it will set its termination
charge above marginal cost and, moreover, call prices would be higher than they
would be if termination charges equalled cT. In general, higher termination charges
soften price competition; so networks may wish to agree to these as an instrument
of price collusion (see Armstrong 1998).

2.5 Conclusion
The broad conclusion here is that, in general, in the absence of regulation,
termination charges are set above marginal cost in a way that leads to call prices
above their monopoly level. Regulation of a single network will reduce call prices
but it also creates an incentive for unregulated networks to raise their termination
charges to each other and the regulated network. However, the unregulated
networks’ termination charges to each other will be lower than their charges to the
regulated network. Consequently, the regulated network will be at a competitive
disadvantage relative to the unregulated ones; they face higher costs and lower
termination revenues from their customers. This will reduce the market share of the
regulated network and consumers more reliant on that network will be worse off.

3. Regulation of Non-Dominant Networks

We now turn to the issue of the regulation of termination on non-dominant
networks.

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3.1 Exogenous Market Shares

Suppose networks have fixed market shares (e.g. they sell highly differentiated
products). Under consumer ignorance we saw that termination charges were set too
high although regulation of the dominant carrier tended to reduce call prices. In this
environment, regulating all carriers can reduce call prices further. Indeed, if
termination charges equal marginal cost, the resulting call prices will reduce to
their monopoly level.
In order to obtain more efficient call prices, closer to true marginal cost,
termination charges would have to be reduced below marginal termination cost.
Indeed, given the symmetry in calling patterns, a ‘bill and keep’ regime could be
implemented without a disproportionate burden falling on networks of different
sizes (Williams 1995).6

3.2 Subscriber Competition

Suppose networks actively compete for subscribers. Then the effects of regulation
of non-dominant networks are more complex. Take, for example, our previous
situation with only two networks. If the dominant network (that with the highest
market share) has its termination price regulated at t, what is the effect of
regulating the termination charge of the non-dominant network?
Such regulation will have the effect of reducing T. For the non-dominant
network, this will weaken its incentives to build market share as:

∂ 2π U
= π U = σ (1 − 2s )q( PD )q( PU ) < 0 .
∂PU ∂T

Thus, all other things being equal, a reduction in T will put upward pressure on PU.
This, however, will be mitigated, if a reduction in T creates incentives for D to
lower PD. If this mitigating effect is strong, PU may fall as a result of a reduction in
T.
Turning then to D, the effect of a reduction in T is more complex. A reduction
in T will strengthen D’s incentives to offer low prices if:

∂ 2π D
= −σ (2 − PD ) 2 ( 2 s − 1) + s (1 − s ) > 0
∂PD ∂T
s (1 − s )
⇒ > σ (2 − PD ) 2
2s − 1

which only holds for s close to ½. Basically, a lower T, reduces D’s costs;
encouraging it to lower price. However, it also makes D less concerned about
market share; weakening its incentive to use price to build market share. The
former effect dominates the latter only when D’s market share is relatively low. If
it is high, D faces much larger consequences from a high termination charge paid to
U. A reduction in this charge will, therefore, cause it to soften its price competition.
Therefore, when D is very dominant (high s), both

6. See also Carter and Wright (1999).

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∂ 2π U ∂ 2π D
and
∂PU ∂T ∂PD ∂T
will be negative and a reduction in T will unambiguously raise call prices.

4. Discussion and Future Directions

In this paper we have considered the effects of regulating termination charges
between competing networks. Our analysis provides some general results. In
particular, regulating a dominant carrier’s termination charges will tend to raise the
termination charges of other carriers but will lower average call prices. However,
extending regulations to non-dominant carriers leads to ambiguous effects. If
subscriber competition is muted then regulating non-dominant carriers’ termination
charges can further reduce call prices. But such regulation can affect subscriber
competition. If subscriber competition is an important competitive factor limiting
call prices then extending regulation to non-dominant carriers’ termination charges
may raise call prices. This is most likely when the dominant carrier has a very high
market share.
A key factor driving our analysis is ‘customer ignorance’. Customers do not
know the identity of the carrier that terminates any particular call. As a result,
customers base decisions on average prices. This creates a horizontal externality
between carriers and raises termination charges. It suggests that appropriate
regulatory policy should include measures that identify terminating networks to
calling customers.
Network identification encompasses a range of policies that may relieve
consumer ignorance. As noted earlier, this is difficult to do when there is number
portability. Nonetheless, education campaigns and more information on customers’
bills (including the network of numbers called) could assist in this. Network
identification allows consumers to discriminate between calls on the basis of the
terminating carrier and, as a result, means that customers can distinguish different
prices for intra-network and inter-network calls. To see the effects of customer
identification, consider that market shares are given and suppose that there is no
substitution in calling patterns; so that a consumer demands a call to a particular
person who is connected to a specific network and no other call is a relevant
substitute. The relevant quantity is then the length of the call. With network
identification each terminating carrier and each originating carrier are like a pair of
sequential monopolists. The inter-network call price would be set at the ‘double
marginalisation’ price 14 (6 + ci + cT ) . In contrast, the price of an intra-network call
would be the monopoly price. Network identification will have reduced the price of
inter-network calls whenever there are more than two networks, by eliminating the
horizontal externality between different networks.
As different calls become more substitutable, then carrier identification will
tend to further reduce inter-network call charges. In the extreme, suppose that each
customer has a variety of potential calls that are perfect substitutes. The customer
always has the option of calling alternative parties that are on different networks.
Then termination charges will be forced to marginal cost. Any network that sets a
higher termination charge will have a higher price from the customer’s perspective
and the customer will substitute to another call. Note, however, that this leads to

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the price of both intra-network and inter-network calls being identical, and set to
the monopoly price.
Allowing discriminatory pricing and network identification with endogenous
market shares and uniform pricing may be problematic. If the networks were close
substitutes (so that σ was large), then each network would have an incentive to
increase inter-network call charges and create a network externality that benefited
itself. In particular, if there were a ‘dominant’ network that had an advantage in
gaining (or retaining) customers, then this network would have an advantage in
using discriminatory pricing based on customer identification to prevent significant
competition.
This paper has taken a preliminary look at the principles and issues behind the
setting of termination charges for non-dominant networks. However, in many
respects the analysis here is static. There are issues of investment (particularly in
network coverage) and the question of entry itself that would require more analysis.
Also, the model of competition is based on simple linear pricing. In many areas,
telecommunications pricing is involving more non-linear pricing forms; such as
two-part tariffs.7 In this environment, the principles governing the regulation of
termination charges are likely to be different. Hence, the ultimate application of
regulatory rules to termination charges will need to be considered on a case-by-
case basis with regard to the maturity of the telecommunications industry and the
market environment

(Date of receipt of final transcript: November, 2001.

Accepted by Robert Marks, Area Editor.)

References
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7. Such a model is analysed in Gans and King (2001).

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