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Oxfam International July 2012 This paper was written by Deepayan Basu Ray, Martin Butcher and Ben Murphy. Oxfam acknowledges the assistance of ATT Legal, Ed Cairns, Tom Fuller, Christian Gauthier, Daniel Gorevan, Libby Hayward, Robert Lindner, Anna Macdonald, John Magrath, Jonathan Mazliah, Claire Mortimer, Chris StevensonDrake, Nicolas Vercken and Helena Whall in its production. Primary research for Chapter 4 was conducted by Holger Anders. For further information on the issues raised in this paper, please e-mail advocacy@oxfaminternational.org This publication is copyright but the text may be used free of charge for the purposes of advocacy, campaigning, education, and research, provided that the source is acknowledged in full. The copyright holder requests that all such use be registered with them for impact assessment purposes. For copying in any other circumstances, or for re-use in other publications, or for translation or adaptation, permission must be secured and a fee may be charged. E-mail policyandpractice@oxfam.org.uk. The information in this publication is correct at the time of going to press. Published by Oxfam GB for Oxfam International under ISBN 978-1-78077-083-3 in July 2012. Oxfam GB, Oxfam House, John Smith Drive, Cowley, Oxford, OX4 2JY, UK.
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CONTENTS
Foreword ........................................................................................ 5 1 Overview ..................................................................................... 7
Grasping a historic opportunity .................................................................................. 7 Why this Treaty and why now? .................................................................................. 8 The solutions are right before our eyes ..................................................................... 9 A logical solution to a complex problem..................................................................... 9 Call to action and recommendations for negotiators ................................................ 10
Notes ............................................................................................ 35
FOREWORD
Conventional arms, and particularly small arms like pistols and rifles, have posed the greatest threat to human security since the end of World War II. While there are a number of treaties controlling the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, no similar agreements exist for conventional arms. It is not difficult to fathom that conventional arms have an incalculable destructive capacity the history of the 20th century is replete with examples of the chaos they can create. It is, however, more difficult to reconcile that their international trade has little to no legally binding global rules. This lack of comprehensive regulation remains an absurd reality of the 21st century. This lack of comprehensive control has resulted in incalculable costs to lives and livelihoods around the world. Irresponsible arms transfers have initiated or exacerbated armed violence and armed conflict to epidemic levels in some communities, robbing families of futures, and paralyzing communities. A number of countries have resolved to deal with the problem of an unregulated arms trade through the development of high national, sub-regional, or regional standards. Unfortunately, they have too often fallen victim to the activities of those who operate outside their jurisdiction. Without a set of global rules that binds everyone to a certain standard, it remains impossible to make meaningful progress, particularly on arms control issues. Following three years of heavy civil society lobbying, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution in 2006 to begin discussions on what a global Arms Trade Treaty ought to look like. Three years later, in 2009, the General Assembly passed a resolution to set in motion a formal procedure that would culminate in July 2012 with a four-week long Diplomatic Conference for the Negotiation of an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). The Diplomatic Conference for an ATT therefore represents a historic opportunity to put in place meaningful controls on the international sale and transfer of arms, including ammunition, parts, and components. However, this negotiation will not be a straightforward process. Many fundamental challenges remain to be ironed out by negotiations. This set of briefings outlines some of the key elements that must be in an ATT for it to protect lives. That includes: (a) legally binding criteria to assess risks emerging from arms sales; (b) the inclusion of items of control like ammunition; (c) the risk of irresponsible transfers of arms on socio-economic development; and (d) the role that the international trade in parts and components for weapons and military equipment now plays in the modern arms trade. These are some of the key elements that the ATT must effectively address, along with other key issues such as a comprehensive list of all conventional arms and ammunition, and risk assessment criteria that not only includes development, but also human rights, humanitarian law, the potential for armed violence including gender based violence, corruption, and diversion of arms to other groups. There is a lot riding on these negotiations. But as the following briefings suggest, most of the answers already exist. The challenge will be in not compromising, in staying ambitious, and finding the political will to define and agree a treaty that will have a meaningful impact for generations to come.
1 OVERVIEW
Chapter summary
In July 2012, governments have a historic opportunity to create a strong Arms Trade Treaty that saves lives and livelihoods and builds a more secure future for all the worlds citizens. Strong treaties gain new members and set international standards; weak treaties rarely get stronger. Governments must not compromise during the final countdown for the sake of securing universal agreement. The Treaty must cover all conventional arms, ammunition, parts and components, and all types of arms transfers. It must include strong criteria that prevent arms being transferred where there is a substantial risk that they will be used in violation of international human rights or humanitarian law, or will undermine development. It must have strong measures for transparency and accountability, and an effective implementation and enforcement mechanism. These must also assist countries to effectively implement and monitor the Treaty.
2. The ATT must be comprehensive in the scope of weapons and types of transfers covered. The ATT must include all weapons that is, all military, security and police arms, related equipment and ammunition, components, expertise, and production equipment. It must also include all types of transfers: import, export, re-export, temporary transfer, and transhipment, in the state-sanctioned and commercial trade, plus transfers of technology, loans, gifts, and aid. And it must include all transactions, including those by dealers or brokers, and those providing 19 technical assistance, training, transport, storage, finance, and security. Precedents already exist in the form of a number of regional and multilateral instruments, such as the ECOWAS Convention, the Best Practice Guidelines on the Implementation of the Nairobi Protocol, the EU Common Position, and the Wassenaar Arrangement. These identify a broad range of weapons, transfers, and transactions to apply controls over. 3. The ATT must include strong, effective international assistance and co-operation mechanisms to help countries ratify and implement the Treaty. For many states with limited national transfer control systems, well-defined mechanisms for assistance and co-operation will be vital for effective implementation of the Treaty. The international co-operation and assistance framework proposed under the Treaty will have a critical bearing on its success. Therefore, the ATT must include effective mechanisms to identify and match needs with resources. These mechanisms should be explicitly linked to complementary and existing initiatives (such as bilateral and multilateral assistance 20 mechanisms, and thematic assistance like that of SSR) for maximum impact.
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4. The ATT must be ambitious but realistic in terms of national implementation obligations, ratification, and dispute resolution. The Treaty must set the minimum requirements for national implementation, which include provisions for transparency, monitoring mechanisms, and evidence of capacity to enforce the 21 Treaty and thereby demonstrate compliance. Establishment of these mechanisms and processes will place states in a much stronger position to control and monitor all movements of arms and ammunition from, through, and to their national territory. The Treaty should also outline a realistic mechanism for resolution of disputes, which may include referral to external bodies, such as the International Court of Justice, if a state party is confirmed to be in persistent and agrant violation of the Treaty. Finally, the Treaty must ensure that entry into force requirements are not dependent on any one country or specific group of countries.
If this Treaty conference is to become a historic moment, and have a meaningful impact on the lives of millions of vulnerable people around the world, governments must keep this simple message in mind: there can be no compromise on the key elements needed for a strong Treaty. To compromise would create a weak Treaty, full of loopholes and inconsistencies. A robust and ambitious ATT, on the other hand, would oblige states to exert more scrutiny over arms exports and limit the ability of unscrupulous arms dealers. It would prevent irresponsible arms transfers, limit the ability of human rights abusers to obtain deadly weapons and ammunition, and reduce the extent to which much-needed resources are diverted from essential services in order to buy arms. It would strengthen democratic control and oversight on a deadly trade still fraught with corrupt practices, which has a devastating impact on the peace and security of regions and communities. In short, states must remain ambitious, accept no compromise, and ultimately agree an Arms Trade Treaty that will save lives. There can be no other rationale.
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Chapter summary
The absence of comprehensive, international legal obligations to prevent irresponsible transfers of arms has resulted in at least $2.2bn worth of arms and ammunition being imported by countries under arms embargoes between 2000 and 2010; To have real impact, a prospective Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) must include legally binding criteria that prevent arms transfers to abusers of human rights or into situations where there is a substantial risk that they will undermine development or exacerbate armed violence; The ATT can build on existing regional and sub-regional initiatives: as of 2012, 100 countries are already party to various regional agreements that include legally binding obligations to control the trade of arms and ammunition.
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2. The failure of embargoes and other instruments to prevent arms transfers Oxfams estimate, that $2.2bn worth of arms was imported by states in contravention of embargoes, is conservative; the actual amount is likely to be much higher. There is a lack of data on arms transfers for many of the relevant countries. In addition, Oxfams estimates do not capture the substantial volumes of arms transfers into fragile situations just before arms embargoes were imposed, as took place in Cte 31 dIvoire, Iran, and Syria. They also do not include cases where arms embargoes could not be agreed multilaterally, despite the existence of a strong moral and humanitarian case for doing so. The failure by the UN Security Council in 2011-2012 to impose an arms embargo on Syria while the Syrian government continues to import arms and ammunition freely is just the most recent illustration of this. The humanitarian impact of the arms transfers to Cote dIvoire while it was under an arms embargo is stark. In 2006, approximately 26,000 Ivoirians sought refuge in other countries, and 709,000 remained internally displaced.
Source: UNHCR 2006 Statistical Yearbook http://www.unhcr.org/478ce34a2.html; UNHCR Global Report 2006
http://www.unhcr.org/4666d2340.html
Furthermore, states must learn the lessons of previous efforts at arms control particularly the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (UNPoA). The UNPoA is not a legally binding mechanism, and so has not been able to develop a globally applicable rules-based system. As a result, the UNPoA has generated little or no meaningful humanitarian impact since its establishment in 2001. 3. Ensuring clear guidance on legal obligations The ATT must include unambiguous legal obligations and clear guidance to member states. This will minimise the scope that states have for interpretation of their responsibilities. Space for interpretation can result in dangerous oversight or inaction. For example, the EU has imposed an arms embargo on Syria, which all member states have been obliged to enforce since May 2011. However, lack of specific guidance on how to enforce this resulted in Cypriot authorities failing to stop a cargo vessel containing arms and ammunition from Russia bound for Syria 32 when it transited through the port of Limassol in January 2012. 4. Minimising opportunities for the misuse of arms Unambiguous guidelines for governments making risk assessments when considering the transfer of arms and ammunition are critical to the success of the ATT. Recent transfers of arms to the Middle East and North Africa suggest that European arms exporters did not believe that there was a significant likelihood of these heavy weapons being used against domestic civilian 33 populations. This assumption was used to justify arms sales to the governments of Libya as 34 recently as 2010, despite credible evidence to the contrary. Subsequently, some of these weapons were used to deliberately target civilian protesters and were also used in indiscriminate attacks in civilian areas.
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If a robust and comprehensive mechanism controlling arms transfers had been in place, it would have been very difficult for non-state armed actors like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to acquire sophisticated Chinese weapons and ammunition during the 20-year conflict in Sri Lanka. There is evidence that the LTTE purchased both small arms and ammunition for heavier weapons (such as mortars and artillery) from China. One report stated that, Recent photographs of rebel troops available on pro-LTTE websites show a range of evidently new Chinese weaponry including the modern 5.56 mm QBZ-95 bullpup-design assault rifle, which 35 cannot have been captured from government forces. This contributed to the escalation of the conflict between the LTTE and government forces with devastating consequences for civilians in Sri Lanka. The UN estimates that between 80,000 and 100,000 people have been killed and 36 more than 200,000 people displaced since the war in Sri Lanka began in the 1980s. The ATT represents a historic opportunity to bring together complementary, thematic, regional, and parallel initiatives on arms transfer controls under one comprehensive framework. Legally binding criteria enacting high standards are not an anomaly: 100 countries that are party to various regional mechanisms have already agreed to robust, legally binding obligations to 37 control the trade of arms and ammunition. A further 35 countries are party to arms control instruments that seek to create a common operational standard: the Wassenaar Arrangement and the OSCE instrument on small arms and light weapons. Each of these mechanisms articulate the key elements necessary to make the ATT effective namely, prohibitive decisionmaking processes if there is a risk that the arms would negatively impact on human rights and development or contribute to corruption or armed violence. The ATT would harmonise these initiatives into one comprehensive, legally binding, and universal instrument.
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3. Global standards must not be lower than existing regional and multilateral agreements A global treaty must build on existing agreements to avoid any uncertainty about acceptable thresholds for arms transfers. The criteria for arms transfers in the ATT must be wholly consistent with and no less ambitious than existing mechanisms such as the EU Common Position, the ECOWAS Convention, the Nairobi Protocol, and the OAS Model Legislation. All of these regional agreements include comprehensive criteria and legally binding obligations built on shall not language in their respective texts. The 2012 ATT DipCon is an historic opportunity for UN member states to define acceptable parameters for arms transfers, and to make these legally binding. To this end, negotiators must not compromise on the robustness of the transfer criteria. In situations where there is a high risk of negative consequences, arms transfers must be explicitly prohibited.
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3 ARMED ROBBERY
How the poorly regulated arms trade is paralysing development
Chapter summary
The poorly regulated global trade in arms and ammunition weakens the ability of governments to sustain progress in development, both by fuelling and exacerbating conflicts and armed violence, and by diverting resources away from poverty reduction activities. Military expenditure in fragile and conflict-affected countries grew by 15 per cent between 2009 and 2010, while Official Development Assistance (ODA) to these countries grew by only 9 per cent. Irresponsible arms transfers fuel corruption, with knock on effects on development and accountability. All low- and lower middle-income countries which allocated more than 10 per cent of their central government expenditure to the military in 2009 scored poorly in corruption indices. Through a strong focus on development, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) can help prevent serious impediments to development, consolidate regional initiatives to safeguard development, and strengthen national capacity to become treaty-compliant. Existing funding mechanisms are already in place which could help countries become ATT-compliant. In 2010 alone, 101 countries received development assistance of direct relevance to national implementation of the ATT.
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when hospitals must instead treat patients injured by gunshot wounds or anti-personnel land mines, at a cost of between $100 and $3,000 each. In even relatively stable countries such as Zambia, evidence continues to suggest that paying for the effects of armed violence undermines service delivery. As a result, the benefits of stability and peace are slow to reach the most vulnerable members of society. This is more evident still in fragile or conflict-affected states and in countries that have recently emerged from conflict. This insecurity often creates conditions that drive demand for tools of violence, in turn undermining the rule of law, diminishing security, and deepening poverty and suffering in a vicious cycle.
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Corrupt arms deals not only affect the security of the recipient country, but also pose a significant opportunity cost for countries to consider. In 1999, an arms deal between South Africa and a number of European defence companies triggered numerous allegations of corruption. The initial budget was estimated to be R9.2bn ($1.2bn), but by 2005 this had 57 increased to an estimated R66bn ($9.1bn). To put this into context, by 2008, for every R1 spent by the government of South Africa on providing assistance to South Africans living with 58 AIDS, an equivalent R7.63 was being spent on financing the arms deal. In a country where the formal unemployment rate is around 30 per cent, the additional finances that were allocated for 59 this deal could have been invested into significant productive and socially beneficial initiatives. In summary, the irresponsible transfer of arms undermines development efforts when: The easy availability of and access to conventional arms and ammunition initiate, prolong, and aggravate armed violence and conflict; Arms transfers affect prospects for peace, and undermine the rule of law and reconciliation efforts in post-conflict environments; Expenditure on arms increases national debt and diverts vital and limited funds away from public services such as education and health care; Expenditure on arms involves or encourages systemic corruption.
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3. Strengthening national capacity to become treaty-compliant Many states have suggested that the ATT must put in place mechanisms to curtail the diversion of arms from the proper authorities and markets to illicit, terrorist, or clandestine groups. One way to do this is to ensure that security sector officials are appropriately trained and incentivised to do their jobs to the highest standards. Projects focusing on security sector reform aim to do just that, and three areas of this are directly relevant to the ATT. These are: Monitoring, training, or retraining civil administrators and police forces in routine policing functions; Training in customs and border control procedures; Civilian oversight and democratic control of security expenditure.
The international assistance and co-operation mechanisms for the ATT must link explicitly to these complementary initiatives. This is primarily because the areas relevant for the ATT are also eligible for existing funding mechanisms through ODA budgets in particular. In fact, statistics show that states are prepared to financially support these priorities. Cumulative expenditure on ODA-eligible security sector activities by major donors in 2010 amounted to 64 $832.5m. Even after adjusting for Afghanistan ($124.3m), global ODA-eligible security sector expenditure in 2010 amounted to over $708m. Including Afghanistan, 101 countries received assistance in 2010, with Indonesia, Angola, Sudan, and Haiti each receiving in excess of $20m 65 in funds.
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The scope of the ATT must ensure that it is all-encompassing. It must include the tools of violence that significantly undermine poverty reduction efforts in particular small arms and light weapons, and the ammunition that make these weapons lethal. The co-operation and international assistance mechanisms outlined by the ATT must ensure that states take proactive measures to realise the goals and objectives of the treaty. Practically, this should include promoting or strengthening development programmes and co-operation at the national, regional, and international levels. This means that assistance has to be about more than technology transfers or bureaucratic assistance the projects and programmes must help to meet the development goals and priorities of partner countries. Finally, to improve transparency and accountability, the implementation requirements of the treaty must oblige States Parties to publish accurate and comprehensive, annual national reports on international transfers of conventional arms.
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Chapter summary
Guns are useless without bullets. An Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) that does not control ammunition will not achieve its purposes. Ammunition is bigger business than weapons. Twelve billion bullets are produced each year nearly two bullets for every person in the world. The global trade in ammunition for small arms and light weapons is worth more than the trade in firearms and light weapons themselves: an estimated $4.3bn per annum. The international trade in ammunition is even less accountable and transparent than the trade in arms. Ammunition flows are difficult to monitor, so the risk of diversion to unauthorised or illicit users is increased. Several countries, including the USA, China, Egypt and Syria, are arguing that ammunition should be excluded from the ATT. Some of these countries say the sheer volume of trade makes it too difficult to monitor. This would be a colossal mistake. There are now several reasonably simple and effective ways to track ammunition transfers. Inclusion in the ATT would significantly strengthen these mechanisms and the resolve to implement them. Failure would undermine what best practice already exists.
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ammunition to unauthorised end users. Rather, under the ATT, transfer licensing authorities would apply a systematic methodology that considers past trends or patterns, intelligence, and credible information about prior misuse or diversion by the stated end-user. Such assessments would also consider whether there is a substantial risk of ammunition being used to commit serious human rights violations. Exporting states would be obliged to consider the track record of the end user and bear a share of the responsibility if arms or ammunition were subsequently diverted. In fact, in some ways it should be easier to monitor end use and identify sources of diversion of ammunition than of firearms. This is because ammunition used in conflicts typically originates from state actors who were originally in legal possession of it, rather than from private individuals. A job lot of small arms ammunition produced for state actors is typically only transferred to a single, or a small number of, end users.
3. Transparency and reporting Given that current levels of public reporting on the transfer of ammunition are so low, improved reporting on such transfers, as a discrete category under an ATT, would greatly reduce the significant gaps in information which currently blight the system. Improved public reporting on authorised ammunition transfers would increase opportunities for citizens to scrutinise and hold their governments to account for their arms transfer decisions. It would also provide a valuable source of 85 information for UN Groups monitoring implementation of UN Security Council embargoes. Existing best practice for reporting on ammunition transfers has not been shown to pose undue logistical challenges. Despite claims that ammunition transfers are so large as to represent an unmanageable part of the global arms trade, the number of licences that EU member states granted for ammunition transfers in 2010 amounted to a mere 4.8 per cent of the number of 86 licences granted for all military equipment. Since the ATT will apply only to international transfers, reporting will not oblige states to divulge 87 sensitive information, such as existing stockpile quantities or domestic production. Additionally, as reporting will occur months, if not years, after a transfer has been authorized, sensitive security information about military operations will not be jeopardised.
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States should strongly consider including additional categories in reports that identify broad ammunition types (e.g. small arms ammunition), sub-categories such as machine pistol or assault rifle ammunition, or even calibre sizes. This more detailed information would be consistent with the current reporting standards of many countries including the UK, Romania, Germany, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro. Additionally, more detailed information has proven highly useful to map and verify patterns of ammunition acquisition in particular conflict situations or following a violent event, and could play an instrumental role in preventing subsequent transfers where a risk of diversion or misuse is 88 high.
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Chapter summary
Modern weapons and military equipment cannot be made or maintained without parts and components. But these are traded around the world in a globalised market that is poorly regulated. Between 2008 and 2011, the global trade in parts and components was worth at least $9.7bn. Weapons are assembled from components sourced from all corners of the world frequently from countries without any effective arms transfer controls. The poorly regulated trade in spare parts allows irresponsible users to circumvent arms embargoes. The Arms Trade Treaty provides a unique opportunity to regulate the specialised parts and components used in the arms trade and, indeed, will be fatally flawed if it does not do so.
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The case for global regulation of the trade in parts and components
Modern weapons and military equipment cannot be made or maintained without the parts and components that are traded around the world in a globalised market. Without regulating this trade alongside the trade in complete weapons, it will be impossible to reduce the impact of irresponsible arms transfers on human rights, security, and development. Between 2008 and 2011, the global trade in parts and components was worth at least $9.7bn. This vast stockpile of weapons parts ranged from high-end components for aircraft to parts for small arms and light weapons (SALW). Without this huge movement of parts and components, the arms trade as we know it could not exist.
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All governments should ensure that: The ATT includes in its scope all specialised parts and components designed and produced for the arms industry or able to be used in defence equipment; Just like all completed weapons and systems, the transfer of parts and components is subject to comprehensive risk assessments undertaken by exporting authorities particularly because exports of obscure components may well have a critical role in reviving the full lethal capacity of a weapon or system; Transfers of such parts and components are fully included in ATT reporting requirements, with reports made public to enhance transparency and accountability.
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NOTES
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UN General Assembly Resolution 64/48 from 2009 outlined a timeline of discussions and consultations, culminating in a four-week Diplomatic Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty to be held in July 2012.
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It must be noted that both the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (colloquially referred to as the Mine Ban Treaty) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions are prohibitions/bans, which the ATT is not. Furthermore, both have been negotiated in forums outside the UN.
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D. Basu Ray (2012) The Devil is in the Detail: The importance of comprehensive and legally binding criteria for arms transfers, Oxfam Briefing, Oxford: Oxfam International, May, p. 2
6 7
J. Irish (2012) France to push Russia on Syria sanctions, expels envoy, Reuters, 29 May
D. Basu Ray (2012) Armed Robbery: How a poorly regulated arms trade is paralysing development, Oxford: Oxfam International, June, p. 2
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In Haiti, between 2009 and 2010, development assistance increased threefold (from $1.1bn to $3.0bn), and humanitarian assistance increased eleven-fold (from $142m to $1.56bn (OECD StatExtracts 2012)
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The total cumulative gross domestic product (GDP) of this group of fragile and conflict-affected states amounted to around 0.7 per cent of total global GDP for 2010. Source: OECD StatExtracts 2012; World Development Indicators
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Composite of 2012 World Development Indicators data and OECD StatExtracts 2012 Armed Robbery, op. cit., p. 4
B. Murphy and D. Basu Ray (2012) Stop a Bullet, Stop a War: Why ammunition must be included in the Arms Trade Treaty, Oxford: Oxfam International, May, p. 3 See also P. Dreyfus, N. Marsh, M. Schroeder (2009) Sifting the Sources: Authorized small arms transfers, in Small Arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 7; P. Herron, N. Marsh, M. Schroeder (2011) Larger but Less Known: Authorized light weapons transfers, in Small Arms Survey 2011: States of Security, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 9
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Ibid.
L. Harding (2012) Cyprus stops Syria-bound Russian ammunition ship, the Guardian, 11 January, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/11/cyprus-stops-syria-russian-ship
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M. Butcher and D. Basu Ray (2012) Piecing it Together: Why the Arms Trade Treaty must also regulate parts and components, Oxfam International, June, p. 2
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The Devil is in the Detail, op. cit., p. 4 OECD StatExtracts 2012 The Devil is in the Detail, op. cit., p. 5
Control Arms Coalition (2009) The Vital Components of an Arms Trade Treaty, http://controlarms.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/ATT-one-pager_english.pdf
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This could include, inter alia: (a) development or review of legislation and administrative procedures; (b) development or strengthening of states parties international arms transfer control systems; (c) enhancing the capacity of law enforcement agencies; (d) development of international arms transfer data-management; (e) development of the capability to produce an annual report; (f) development of capacity to prevent diversion; (g) training of relevant personnel; and (h) victim assistance. See: Control Arms Coalition (2011) Promoting Implementation of the ATT, Position Paper No. 4, June, http://controlarms.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Implementation.English.NEW_.final_.pdf Ibid. Whereas the headline figure from the 2011 Report of the Geneva Declaration Secretariat is 526,000 people who are directly killed by armed violence each year, the figure dramatically increases when the indirect conflict deaths are added to the figure, to give an estimate of 742,000 per year averaging to about 2092 deaths per day. Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2011), Global Burden of Armed Violence 2011: Lethal Encounters, Geneva, Geneva Declaration Secretariat, pg.70.
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SIPRI Arms Embargoes Database http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes This figure is derived by an analysis of all arms embargoes that were in force between 2000 and 2010, including UN, regional organisations, and multilateral initiatives. Only full embargoes on UN member states were considered, all partial embargoes or those placed on non-governmental forces were disregarded. Only full years when these embargoes were in effect were counted, disregarding partial years when embargoes were either imposed or lifted. Data from two sources was used: the UNCOMTRADE (http://comtrade.un.org/) and the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers), relying on figures from one or the other to determine imports and/or purchases. In the case of Zimbabwe, where the available data from COMTRADE and the SIPRI database were conflicting, the SIPRI data was used because it more accurately reflected the reality on the ground. The figure of $2.2bn is therefore a conservative estimate, based on the data available for four countries under UN embargoes, five countries under EU embargoes, and one country under an OSCE embargo. Data from a further eight countries under UN embargoes, two countries under EU embargoes, and six embargoes on non-government forces were not available at the time of research. Furthermore, import data from China is not included because China is not under a complete embargo by the EU. However, there is concrete evidence to suggest that EU members have consistently broken the terms of this partial embargo during the period in question. According to the SIPRI database, China has imported in excess of $22bn over the period in question. United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN COMTRADE), http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx. Customs codes referenced: [HS1996 code 930100] Military weapons, other than hand guns, swords, etc; [HS1996 code 930200] Revolvers and pistols; [HS1996 code 930510] Parts and accessories of revolvers or pistols; and [HS1996 code 930690] Munitions of war, ammunition/projectiles and parts. SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, TIV (trend indicator value) tables of arms exports to Syria, 2006-2010, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php United Nations (2011), Top UN human rights body orders inquiry into Syrian violence, 23 August, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39357&Cr=Syria&Cr1 (last accessed 2 April 2012). UN Department of Public Information (2012), Top UN Political Official tells Security Council Talks Started between Israelis, Palestinians in Amman Have Stalled, Time not on Side of Either Party: In Briefing, B. Lynn Pascoe also updates on Rapidly Deteriorating Syria Situation, Transfer of Power in Yemen, Impact of Syria Crisis on Lebanon, Security Council, 6725th Meeting (AM), 28 February, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10560.doc.htm (last accessed 2 April 2012). Human Rights Council (2011), Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, p.15, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/SpecialSession/Session18/AHRC-S-17-2-Add1.pdf Ibid., p.20. According to COMTRADE data, Cte dIvoire imported $36m of heavy weapons in 2004, just prior to the establishment of the UN embargo on 15 November that year. SIPRI data show that Syria imported $167m worth of air defence systems and missiles in 2010, just prior to the start of the civilian protests in 2011 and the EU Embargo of 09 May 2011. Finally, according to SIPRI data, Iran imported $423m worth of aircraft, air defence systems, armoured vehicles, engines, and missiles in 2006, just prior to the UN embargo established on 06 December 2006. T. Grove and M. Kambas (2012), Russian-operated ship with bullets reaches Syria, Reuters, January 13.
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http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/13/syria-russia-ship-idUSL6E8CD4DD20120113
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A.Vranckx, Slijper, F., and R. Isbister (eds.) (2011), Lessons from MENA: Appraising EU Transfers of Military and Security Equipment to the Middle East and North Africa, Gent: Academia Press, pp.10-11, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/Lessons%20from%20MENA%20Nov%202011.pdf See for example, the UK justification for the transfer of armoured personnel carriers to Libya in 2007: Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2008), United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Report 2008, London, pp.13-14. A. Webb-Vidal and A. Davis (2008), Lords of war - running the arms trafficking industry, Janes Intelligence Review, May Ibid. EU Common Position (binding on 25 countries); CIFTA (binding on 35 countries); ECOWAS Convention (binding on 15 countries); the Nairobi Protocol (binding on 12 countries); and the SADC Firearms and Ammunition Protocol (binding on 16 countries, three of which are also signatory to the Nairobi Protocol). The EU Common Position proposes a tiered system which must not be adopted in the ATT. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (2011) Background Paper on SIPRI Military Expenditure Data, 2010, Sweden. http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/factsheet2010 The list of fragile and conflict-affected states is a composite of three indices on fragile states: the World Bank Low-Income Countries Under Stress, the Foreign Policy Fragile States Index, and the Carleton University Failed and Fragile States project. The composite list includes 23 countries that are common
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across all three indices, and also includes Yemen (scoring high on the WB and FP indices, but not appearing on the Carleton index) and Syria (included due to the continued civil unrest that began in January 2010).
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SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (2010), Trend Indicator Value table of Top 200 importers, http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers
Low-income and lower middle-income classifications are based on World Bank country classification
The amount for ODA does not include Humanitarian Assistance, and is the value of Net ODA as indicated in the OECD DAC Statistics database. World Bank (2012), World Development Indicators, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD ; OECD DAC Development Database on Aid from DAC Members, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=TABLE2A
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World Bank (2011) World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development, Washington, p.5. Ibid., p.62. This estimate is based on 2006 projections of ODA increasing to $152bn by 2010, and to $195bn by 2015. The OECD DAC database shows that ODA rose to $141bn in 2010, so these projections remain relevant. UN Millennium Campaign (2006) Expanding the Financial Envelope to Achieve the Goals. http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/table_8.gif All available comparable data on military expenditure and ODA to the composite list of fragile and conflict affected states were tallied, and a percentage change was determined in both sets of data between 2009 and 2010 the most recently available years for the datasets for both categories. World Bank and OECD-DAC data shows that of the list of 25 fragile and conflict affected countries, 12 experienced a reduction in ODA between 2009 and 2010, nine experienced a moderate increase of between $3m$107m, and 4 countries experienced massive increases of at least $900m or more. The ODA data does not include humanitarian assistance delivered in 2010 because humanitarian assistance figures were massively skewed by the Haiti earthquake in January 2010, which resulted in a huge increase to Haiti from 2009 ($142m) to 2010 ($1.56bn). In fact, if ODA and Humanitarian Assistance data were to be combined, and the effect for Haiti to be adjusted in the analysis, then total assistance to this list of fragile and conflict-affected states would have dropped between 2009 and 2010 by 3 per cent. The data for military expenditure is a conservative estimate because the analysis has excluded incomplete data series, where data for only one of the two years was available. This analysis has only used verified data from the SIPRI Military Expenditure database, and not the bracketed estimates provided for some countries and some years. Oxfam, IANSA, and Saferworld (2007) Africas Missing Billions, p.9. http://policypractice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/africas-missing-billions-international-arms-flows-and-the-cost-ofconflict-123908; OECD DAC, Development Database on Aid from DAC Members, op. cit. World Bank (2011) op. cit., p.65. M. Lawson et al. (2007) The World is Still Waiting, Oxfam International, pp.27-28. http://policypractice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/the-world-is-still-waiting-broken-g8-promises-are-costing-millions-oflives-115041 Oxfam, IANSA, and Saferworld (2007), op. cit., p.9. For a definition of armed violence, see: UN, A/64/228 (2009) Promoting Development through the Reduction and Prevention of Armed Violence. http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/UNSG-Report-Armed-Violence.pdf
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World Bank (2011) op. cit., p.65. M. Valenti, C.M. Ormhaug, R.E. Mtonga, and J. Loretz (2007) Armed Violence: A Health Problem, a Public Health Approach, Journal of Public Health Policy (2007) 28, 389400, http://www.ippnw.org/pdf/ValentiOrmhaugMtongaLoretz.pdf Ibid. Unpublished research commissioned by Oxfam GB in 2010. World Bank classifications were used to determine the list of low-income and lower middle-income countries. Of the 91 countries classified in these two categories, there was no data from the past ten years for 41 countries. Of the 50 remaining countries, 2009 data was available for 29, and 2008 data for a further eight (with 2005 data for four countries and 2004 data for two countries, while 2003, 2002, 2001, and 2000 each provided data for one additional country). Eleven countries in 2009, an additional four in 2008, three more in 2005, two more in 2004, and one country in 2000 allocated over 10 per cent of central government expenditures to the military in these years, and on average scored 2.63 out of 10 in the Transparency International CPI rankings. Transparency International (2008) Corruption Perceptions Index. http://bit.ly/auu41z
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See, for example: UK Strategic Export Controls, Session 201011. Evidence submitted by Transparency International. http://bit.ly/dXnkh4 OECD DAC, Development Database on Aid from DAC Members, op. cit. Feinstein (2007) After the Party. A Personal and Political Journey inside the ANC, pp.208-36; J. Cilliers (1999) Defence Acquisitions Unpacking the Package Deals, ISS. http://bit.ly/h2NgSd Feinstein (2007) op. cit. Ibid. K. Kotoglou, D. Basu Ray, and S. Jones (2008) Monitoring Resource Flows to Fragile States 2007, OECD/DAC Fragile States Group, p.40. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/21/41680220.pdf Ibid. A. Hosken (2009) BAE: The Tanzanian connection, BBC, http://bbc.in/4DWSco R. Neate (2010) BAE radar verdict, The Telegraph, http://bit.ly/ef6UqR OECD Stats Extracts (2012) It should be noted that the figure of $832.5m amounts to less than 1 per cent of overall ODA. While Oxfam believes that using limited ODA funds for security sector activities is acceptable and can have long-term benefits on socio-economic development, this expenditure must not become a priority over other critical sectors, such as health, education, or agriculture. Responsible, regulated transfers of military and security equipment can assist a state to fulfil its legitimate defence, military, and policing needs, which can help to provide the security and stability necessary for development. K. Nightingale, (2008) Shooting Down the MGDs, Oxfam International, p.4 http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp120%20Shooting%20down%20the%20MDGs_FINA L%201Oct08.pdf
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Human Rights Watch (2003) Weapons Sanctions, Military Supplies, and Human Suffering: Illegal Arms Flows to Liberia and the JuneJuly 2003 Shelling of Monrovia, Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, p.2. http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/liberia_arms.pdf As well as causing many direct casualties, the assault forced thousands of civilians to flee into the city where they were vulnerable to disease. Oxfam was working in the capital throughout, providing clean water and sanitation. P. Herron, N. Marsh, M. Schroeder, and J. Lazarevic (2010) Emerging From Obscurity: The Global Ammunition Trade, Small Arms Survey 2010: Gangs, Groups and Guns, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.7. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2010/en/SmallArms-Survey-2010-Chapter-01-EN.pdf UN Security Council (2010) Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1853 (2008), Document S/2010/91, p.74. http://somalitalkradio.com/2010/mar/un_report_somalia.pdf UN Security Council (2010) Small Arms: Report of the Secretary-General, Document S/2011/255, p.3. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=s/2011/255&referer=/english/&Lang=E; and R. Stohl and D. Smith (1999) Small Arms in Failed States: A Deadly Combination, Center for Defence Information. http://www.cdi.org/issues/failedstates/march99.html F.L. Keili (2008) Small Arms and light weapons transfer in West Africa: a stock-taking, Disarmament Forum, United Nations, Number 4, p.9. http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2832.pdf P. Herron, N. Marsh, M. Schroeder, and J. Lazarevic (2010) op. cit., p.10. P. Batchelor (2003) Workshops and Factories: Products and Producers. Small Arms Survey 2003: Development Denied, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 13. Ibid., p.7, p.18; P. Dreyfus, N. Marsh, M. Schroeder, and J. Lazarevic (2009) Sifting the Sources: Authorized Small Arms Transfers, Small Arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.7; P. Herron, N. Marsh, M. Schroeder (2011) Larger but less Known: Authorized Light Weapons Transfers, Small Arms Survey 2011: States of Security, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.9. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2011/en/SmallArms-Survey-2011-Chapter-01-EN.pdf P. Herron, N. Marsh, M. Schroeder, and J. Lazarevic (2010) op. cit., p.7, p.18; P. Dreyfus, N. Marsh, M. Schroeder, and J. Lazarevic (2009), op cit., p. 7 P. Herron, N. Marsh, M. Schroeder, and J. Lazarevic (2010) op. cit., p. 27 C.J. Chivers (2009) Arms sent by U.S. may be falling into Taliban hands, New York Times, 20 May 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/20/world/asia/20ammo.html?_r=1&scp=13&sq=gun&st=nyt
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Acting General Rapporteur, Sven Mikser (Estonia) (2011) Preparing the Afghan National Security Forces for Transition, NATO Parliamentary Assembly (211 DSC 10 E bis), http://www.natopa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=2084
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UN Security Council (2008) Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council Resolution 751 (1992), annex to S/2008/769, p.6; and UN Security Council (2010) op. cit., p.7. See Positions for the United States in the upcoming Arms Trade Treat Conference Remarks by Thomas Countryman, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Stimson Center, Washington, DC, April 16, 2012. http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/188002.htm. statement delivered by the Philippine delegation to the 4th Session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2012 United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, 15th February 2012. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmamentfora/att/prepcom4/statements/15Feb_Philippines.pdf , and statement delivered by the Vietnamese delegation to the 2nd Session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2012 United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, 1st March 2011 US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) places comprehensive export controls over transfers of ammunition, ordnance, components, explosives and propellants for small arms and light weapons, export controls that not only include direct transfers, but also re-exports, licensed production and brokering activities. See U.S. Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (2009), International Traffic in Arms Regulations 2009. http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/regulations_laws/itar_official.html In the EU, ammunition is specifically included in the list of equipment covered by the EU Common Position and by participating countries of the Wassenaar Agreement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. The common military list of the EU and the munitions list of the Wassenaar Arrangement both contain precise and comprehensive definitions of equipment, which, in both instances, include almost all varieties of conventional ammunition. Both control lists cover ammunition in category ML3. Excluded materials include smooth-bore weapons used for hunting or sporting purposes if not designed for military use or fully automatic, as well as arms and weapons manufactured before 1938. See Council of the European Union (2010) Common Military List of the European Union, Official Journal of the European Union, Volume C 69/19, March. http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:069:0019:0051:EN:PDF; and Wassenaar Arrangement (2011) Munitions List, updated list, http://www.wassenaar.org/controllists/index.html
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Economic Community of Western African States (2006) ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Material. http://www.iagagi.org/bdf/docs/ecowas_convention_small_arms.pdf; and Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA) (2005) Best Practice Guidelines for the Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms and Light Weapons, http://www.recsasec.org/pdf/Best%20Practice%20Guidlines%20Book.pdf Amnesty International (2011) Our Right to Know: Transparent Reporting Under an Arms Trade Treaty, Amnesty International Publications, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ACT30/116/2011/en/c6a0310e-81fa-47eb-be1087e596823f16/act301162011en.pdf The states are: Albania, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Macedonia, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States. Reports are available on the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) National Reports Database at: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/transparency/national_reports/ See UN Security Council (2011) Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan, established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005), Document S/2011/111, pg. 12. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/111 and Anders, H (2012), Ammunition controls, the ATT, and Africa challenges, requirements, and scope for action, Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la scurit (GRIP) European Union (2011) Thirteenth Annual Report according to Article 8(2) of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment, 2011/C 382/01, pp. 435, 446. http://eurlex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2011:382:SOM:EN:HTML H. Anders (2012) op. cit, p. 14. The Syrian Arab Republic, for example, argued that the issue of ammunition is a purely security item and noted concerns around how national stockpiles might be regulated under an ATT. See statement nd delivered by the delegation of the Syrian Arab Republic to the 2 Session of the Preparatory th Committee of the 2012 United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, 28 February 2011.
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For example, data submitted to UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade) in 2005 detailing an export of 8kg of small arms ammunition worth $41,300 was useful in tracking the original source of illicit ammunition found in Cte dIvoire in 2010. See UN Comtrade database, category 930630 (Small arms ammunition). http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx
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UN Comtrade Database 200811, http://comtrade.un.org/db/ D. Hillier (2007) Africas Missing Billions, IANSA, Oxfam, and Saferworld, http://policypractice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/download?Id=366084&dl=http://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/ox fam/bitstream/10546/123908/1/bp-africas-missing-billions-111007-en.pdf O. Sprague (2006) The AK-47: The Worlds Favourite Killing Machine, Oxfam International and Control Arms Campaign. Africas Missing Billions, op. cit., p. 21 P. Wezeman et al. (2011) Arms Flows to Sub-Saharan Africa, SIPRI Policy Paper 30, December 2011, Ibid. Ibid, p.9. Note also that DICON itself states a partnership with Chinese defence manufacturer PolyTechonolgies China. See http://www.dicon.gov.ng/military1.html See, for example: http://www.gunaccessories.com; http://www.gunspares.co.uk; and http://www.armas.es. Such businesses make the global free market in components easily available to all, not just to governments. See: http://www.army-technology.com/projects/challenger2/ Defense Industry Daily (2012) Egypt orders more M1A1 tanks, 10 January 2012. http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/egypt-847m-request-for-125-m1a1-tanks-03684/ Defense Industry Daily (2010) Chinas K-8 jets: a killer for Myanmar, 30 June 2010. http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Chinas-K-8-Jets-A-Killer-for-Myanmar-06457/ International Institute for Strategic Studies (2010) Military Balance 2010, p.263. A.H. Cordesman and R. Faith (2004) Military Balance in the Middle East, CSIS, p.96. http://csis.org/publication/military-balance-middle-east-0 See: http://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=121151 A.H. Cordesman and A. Wilner (2012) U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions, CSIS, pp.33-38. http://csis.org/files/publication/120221_Iran_Gulf_MilBal_ConvAsym.pdf Ibid., p.34. U.S. Department of Justice (2011) Summary of Major U.S. Export Enforcement and Embargo-Related Criminal Prosecutions: 2007 to the Present, September 2011. http://www.justice.gov/nsd/docs/summary-eaca.pdf Ibid. For example, Chips Investment Casting Inc of Taiwan supplies parts for a variety of different weapons and vehicles. It produces small, specialised parts for weapons, from pistols and shotguns to turbopropellers for aero engines, and sells to defence companies in Asia, the Middle East, Australia, Europe, and the Americas. Details drawn from various websites, including: http://www.importgenius.com/suppliers/chips-investment-casting-inc; http://electronics.taiwantrade.com.tw/ORG/front/searchserv.do?method=listProductProductDetail&local e=2&MEMBER_TYPE=4&WEB_OPEN=0&DOMAIN_NAME=chips&DOMAIN_NAME_FLAG=0&compa ny_id=7008&catalog_id=123944&come_soon=0; and http://en.chips-casting.com/profile.
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