Space Shuttle

Columbia disaster

on February 1, 2003
Kennedy Space Centre, Florida
Crews:
Rick D. Husband - mission commander
Kalpana Chawla - mission specialist
William C. McCool - pilot
David M. Brown - mission specialist
Laurel B. Clark - mission specialist
Michael P. Anderson - mission specialists
Ilan Ramon - payload specialist representing the Israeli Space Agency
Space shuttle Columbia launch
The loss of Columbia was a result of damage sustained during launch when a piece of foam
insulation the size of a small briefcase broke off the Space Shuttle external tank (the main
propellant tank) under the aerodynamic forces of launch. The debris struck the leading edge of
the left wing, damaging the Shuttle's thermal protection system (TPS). While Columbia was still
in orbit, some engineers suspected damage, but NASA managers limited the investigation on the
grounds that little could be done even if problems were found.
Close-up of the Left Bipod Foam Ramp that broke off and damaged the Shuttle wing
Foam model of the shuttle left
bipod ramp. The black line
indicates the approximate
area and mass of foam that
was shed 82 seconds into the
flight of Columbia.
Debris strike during launch

Approximately 82 seconds after launch, a suitcase-size piece of thermal insulation foam broke off the
External Tank (ET), striking Columbia's left wing Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) panels. This likely
created a 6 to 10 inch (15 to 25 cm) diameter hole, allowing hot gases to enter the wing when Columbia
later reentered the atmosphere. At the time of the foam strike, the orbiter was at an altitude of about
66,000 feet (20,115 m), traveling at Mach 2.46 (1,870 mph, or 837 meters per second). The foam
fragment was about 1.2 pounds (0.54 kg) in mass and impacted the wing at roughly 800 feet per second
(244 meters per second).
 Major findings

The board found both the immediate

physical cause of the accident and
also what it called
organizational causes.

Organizational cause of the

accident:-
The problem of debris shedding from the external tank was well known and had caused
shuttle damage on every prior shuttle flight. The damage was usually, but not always,
minor. Over time, management gained confidence that it was an acceptable risk. The board
found that this should not have happened.
The shuttle organization is very large, and decision makers cannot embody all
information. Organizational mechanisms are responsible for properly informing and guiding
decision makers. The report placed equal weight on organizational failings as the cause of
the accident.
The damage allowed super-heated gases to enter the wing structure during re-entry into
the earth's atmosphere and caused the destruction of the Columbia.
Grid on the floor of the Reusable Launch Vehicle Hangar where workers in the field
bring in pieces of Columbia's debris. The Columbia Reconstruction Project Team
attempted to reconstruct the bottom of the orbiter as part of the investigation into the
accident.
A makeshift memorial at the main entrance to the Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas