Abad, Maria Teresa Ambait, Valerie Barquin, Ian Ted Bernardo, Joseph Aries Holasca, Kenneth Michael Labalan,

Jonalyn Marta, Marc Leo Oquio, Desiree Ongbit, Tom Anthony Paa, James Ian Robio, Nile April GROUP 1 LAW III A

1. Arbitration 2. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter over Unfair Labor Practices 3. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter over:
* Termination disputes * Money Claims * Claims for damages * Strikes and Lockouts * Intra-corporate disputes

4.

Cases on conflict of jurisdiction between Labor Tribunals and Regular Courts

Arbitration, a form of alternative dispute resolution, is a legal technique for the resolution of disputes outside the courts, where the parties to a dispute refer it to one or more persons (the "arbitrators", "arbiters" or "arbitral tribunal"), by whose decision they agree to be bound.
(source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arbitration)

Arbitration, in labor relations, is generally understood as the mode or process of settlement of labor or industrial disputes by an impartial third person or entity whose decision is final and binding upon the parties.

VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION Arbitration is voluntary, where a labor dispute is referred by voluntary agreement of the parties, to an impartial person(s) for resolution on the basis of the evidence and arguments of the parties who agree in advance to accept the decision of the arbitrator as final and binding. COMPULSORY ARBITRATION Arbitration is compulsory, when the Government requires the parties to a dispute to appear before an arbitration tribunal, which, after examining the facts and arguments submitted to it and considering other relevant information makes an award. The NLRC is the administrative machinery that settles labor disputes falling under its jurisdiction through compulsory arbitration.

Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and management, including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, disrupt industrial peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-management relations. Consequently, unfair labor practices are not only violations of the civil rights of both labor and management but are also criminal offenses against the State which shall be subject to prosecution and punishment as herein provided. Article 247, Labor Code of the Philippines

Concept of Unfair Labor Practice?

Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional right of workers and employees to selforganization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and management, including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, disrupt industrial peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-management relations. Consequently, unfair labor practices are not only violations of the civil rights of both labor and management but are also criminal offenses against the State which shall be subject to prosecution and punishment as herein provided. Article 247, Labor Code of the Philippines

ARTICLE 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice:

(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization;
(b) To require as a condition of employment that a person or an employee shall not join a labor organization or shall withdraw from one to which he belongs; (c) To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization;

(d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization, including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizers or supporters;

(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.

(f) To dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for having given or being about to give testimony under this Code;
(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code; (h) To pay negotiation or attorneys fees to the union or its officers or agents as part of the settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute; or (i) To violate a collective bargaining agreement. The officers and agents of corporations, associations or partnerships who have actually participated in, authorized or ratified unfair labor practices shall be held criminally liable. (As amended by B.P. Blg 130, Aug. 21, 1981).

ARTICLE 249. Unfair labor practices of labor organizations. It shall be unfair labor practice for a labor organization, its officers, agents or representatives: (a) To restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to selforganization; (b) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee, including discrimination against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or to terminate an employee on any ground other than the usual terms and conditions under which membership or continuation of membership is made available to other members;

(c) To violate the duty, or refuse to bargain collectively with the employer, provided it is the representative of the employees; (d) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree to pay or deliver any money or other things of value, in the nature of an exaction, for services which are not performed or not to be performed, including the demand for fee for union negotiations;

(e) To ask for or accept negotiation or attorneys fees from employers as part of the settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute; or
(f) To violate a collective bargaining agreement. The officers, members of governing boards, representatives or agents or members of labor associations or organizations who have actually participated in, authorized or ratified unfair labor practices shall be held criminally liable. (As amended by B.P. Blg. 130, August 21, 1981).

Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and management, including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, disrupt industrial peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-management relations. Consequently, unfair labor practices are not only violations of the civil rights of both labor and management but are also criminal offenses against the State which shall be subject to prosecution and punishment.

The jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters in unfair labor practice cases applies only to the administrative or civil aspect. Consequently, they can only rule on the civil aspects of unfair labor practice which may include claims for actual, moral, and exemplary and other form of damages and attorneys fees.

Labor Arbiters are not empowered to rule on the criminal aspect of unfair labor practice which is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The rationale behind the limitation is because criminal unfair labor practice cases require evidence beyond reasonable doubt for the conviction of the accused which can be proved only after thorough trial before the regular courts.

Answer: NO, if the violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement is minor in character.
YES, if the violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement is gross in character. xxx. Accordingly, violations of the CBA, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the CBA. xxx (Article 261, Labor Code of the Philippines)

Original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural in termination disputes.

Just causes for dismissal of employee may be defined as those lawful or valid grounds for termination of employment which arise from causes directly attributable to the fault or negligence of the erring employee. Just causes are usually serious or grave in nature and attended by willful or wrongful intent or they reflected adversely on the moral character of the employees. As opposed to authorized causes under Article 283 wherein the termination of employment is dictated by necessity of the business, the dismissal under just causes is imposed by the employer to the erring employee as a punishment for the latters acts or omission.

Just causes for termination under the Labor Code are found in Article 282 and enumerated here as follows: (a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work; (b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative; (d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; (e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

1. Abandonment. Abandonment of job is a form of neglect of duty. There is abandonment when the employee leave his job or position with a clear and deliberate intent to discontinue his employment without any intention of returning back. 2. Gross inefficiency. Gross inefficiency is analogous to and closely related to gross neglect for both involve acts or omissions on the part of the employee resulting in damage to the employer or to his business. 3. Disloyalty/conflict of interest. Disloyalty exists when one asserts an interest, or performs acts adverse to ones employer, such as secretly engaging in a business which renders him a competitor and rival of his employer. It constitutes a breach of an implied condition of the contract of employment. 4. Dishonesty. Acts of dishonesty deemed to be patently inimical to the employer is analogous to breach of trust and is a valid cause for termination of employment.

An employee who is terminated from employment for a just cause is not entitled to payment of separation benefits. Section 7, Rule I, Book VI, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides: Sec. 7.Termination of employment by employer. The just causes for terminating the services of an employee shall be those provided in Article 282 of the Code. The separation from work of an employee for a just cause does not entitle him to the termination pay provided in Code, without prejudice, however, to whatever rights, benefits and privileges he may have under the applicable individual or collective bargaining agreement with the employer or voluntary employer policy or practice.

As maybe broadly defined, authorized causes for dismissal of employee refer to those lawful grounds for termination which in general do not arise from fault or negligence of the employee. Authorized causes are distinguished from just causes under Article 282 in that the latter are always based on acts attributable to the employees own fault or negligence.

Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof.

Art. 283. In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year.

Art. 284. Disease as ground for termination. An employer may terminate the services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees: Provided, That he is paid separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month salary or to one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, whichever is greater, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.

1. YES. In SMC vs NLRC, GR No. 108001, March 15, 1996, the Supreme Court held: The law in point is Article 217(a) of the Labor Code. It is elementary that this law is deemed written into the CBA. The law speaks in plain and unambiguous terms that termination disputes, together with unfair labor practices, are matters falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, to wit: Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide.the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or nonagricultural: (1) Unfair labor practice cases; (2) Termination disputes; xxx

We subjected the records of this case, the CBA to meticulous scrutiny and we find no agreement between SMC and the respondent union that would state in unequivocal language that petitioners and the respondent union conform to the submission of termination disputes and unfair labor practices to voluntary arbitration. We however find that based on the circumstances surrounding this case and settled jurisprudence, the complaint filed by the private respondents alleges facts sufficient to constitute a bona fide case of unfair labor practice, and therefore properly cognizable by the Labor Arbiter under Article 217(a) of the Labor Code.

2. YES. In Sanyo Phil. Workers Union PSSLU vs Canizares, GR No. 101619, July 8, 1992, the Supreme Court held: We hold that the Labor Arbiter and not the Grievance Machinery provided for in the CBA has the jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaints of the private respondents. While it appears that the dismissal of the private respondents was made upon the recommendation of PSSLU pursuant to the union security clause provided in the CBA,

 We are of the opinion that these facts do not come within the phrase "grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of their CBA and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies," the jurisdiction of which pertains to the Grievance Machinery or thereafter, to a voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. Article 260 of the Labor Code on grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrator states that "the parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement shall include therein provisions that will ensure the mutual observance of its terms and conditions.

YES. In Sanyo Phil. Workers Union PSSLU vs Canizares, GR No. 101619, July 8, 1992, the Supreme Court held: It need not be mentioned that the parties to a CBA are the union and the company. Hence, only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators.

In the instant case, both the union and the company are united or have come to an agreement regarding the dismissal of some employees. No grievance between them exists which could be brought to grievance machinery. The problem or dispute in the present case is between the union and the company on the one hand, and some union and non-union members who were dismissed, The dispute has to be settled by an impartial body. The grievance machinery with members designated by the union and the company cannot be expected to be impartial against the dismissed workers grievances. Since there has already been an actual termination, the matter falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.

HELD: Money claims of workers which now fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters are those money claims which have some reasonable causal connection with the employer-employee relationship. Exception: In cases where the claim to the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. In such situations, resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor management relations nor in wage structures and other terms and conditions of employment, but rather in the application of the general civil law.

HELD:
The question of whether or not there is cause of action for back salaries and wages calls for the presentation of evidence before the Labor Arbiter who has jurisdiction over the matter and cannot be determined in a certiorari case. The claim for the delivery of a house and lot as prize for being a top salesman arose from an employer-employee relation. To hold that such claim for the prize should be passed upon by the regular court of justice, independently and separately from his claim for back salaries, retirement benefits and damages would be to sanction split jurisdiction and multiplicity of suits which are prejudicial to the orderly administration of justice.

The Secretary or his duly authorized representatives shall issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor employment and enforcement officer and raises issues supported by documentary proofs which were not considered in the course of inspection. (As amended by Republic Act No. 7730, June 2, 1994).

Held: Three Elements to Divest to the Regional Director of his representatives of jurisdiction under the exception clause: 1. That the employer contests the findings of the labor regulations officer and raises issues thereon; 2. That in order to resolve such issues, there is a need to examine evidentiary matters; and 3. That such matters are not verifiable in the normal course of inspection.

Upon complaint of any interested party, the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment or any of the duly authorized hearing officers of the Department is empowered, through summary proceeding and after due notice, to hear and decide any matter involving the recovery of wages and other monetary claims and benefits, including legal interest, owing to an employee or person employed in domestic or household service or househelper under this Code, arising from employeremployee relations: Provided, That such complaint does not include a claim for reinstatement: Provided further, That the aggregate money claims of each employee or househelper does not exceed Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).

The Regional Director or hearing officer shall decide or resolve the complaint within thirty (30) calendar days from the date of the filing of the same. Any sum thus recovered on behalf of any employee or househelper pursuant to this Article shall be held in a special deposit account by, and shall be paid on order of, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Regional Director directly to the employee or househelper concerned. Any such sum not paid to the employee or househelper because he cannot be located after diligent and reasonable effort to locate him within a period of three (3) years, shall be held as a special fund of the Department of Labor and Employment to be used exclusively for the amelioration and benefit of workers.

Any decision or resolution of the Regional Director or hearing officer pursuant to this provision may be appealed on the same grounds provided in Article 223 of this Code, within five (5) calendar days from receipt of a copy of said decision or resolution, to the National Labor Relations Commission which shall resolve the appeal within ten (10) calendar days from the submission of the last pleading required or allowed under its rules.

The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representative may supervise the payment of unpaid wages and other monetary claims and benefits, including legal interest, found owing to any employee or househelper under this Code. (As amended by Section 2, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)

As a rule, labor arbiters and the National Labor Relations Commission have no power or authority to grant reliefs from claims that do not arise from employeremployee relations. They have no jurisdiction over torts that have no reasonable causal connection to any of the claims provided for in the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements.

In the case of Evelyn Tolosa vs. NLRC, Evelyn Tolosa was the widow of Captain Virgilio Tolosa who was hired by QwanaKaiun, through its manning agent, Asia Bulk Transport Phils. Inc to be the master of the Vessel named M/V Lady Dona. That during 'channeling activities' upon the vessel's departure from Yokohama sometime on November 6, 1992, CAPT. TOLOSA was drenched with rainwater. The following day, November 7, 1992, he had a slight fever and in the succeeding twelve (12) days, his health rapidly deteriorated resulting in his death on November 18, 1992. Evelyn Tolosa filed a case in NLRC against the management claiming damages for the failure to provide her husband adequate medical assistance.

The Supreme Court decided the case based on whether the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case. We stress that the case does not involve the adjudication of a labor dispute, but the recovery of damages based on a quasi delict. The jurisdiction of labor tribunals is limited to disputes arising from employer-employee relations, as we ruled in Georg Grotjahn GMBH & Co. v. Isnani: "Not every dispute between an employer and employee involves matters that only labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising from an employeremployee relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code other labor statutes, or their collective bargaining agreement."

Claims for damages under paragraph 4 of Article 217 must have a reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in the article in order to be cognizable by the labor arbiter. Only if there is such a connection with the other claims can the claim for damages be considered as arising from employeremployee relations. In the present case, petitioner's claim for damages is not related to any other claim under Article 217, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements.

It is not the NLRC but the regular courts that have jurisdiction over actions for damages, in which the employeremployee relation is merely incidental, and in which the cause of action proceeds from a different source of obligation such as a tort. Since petitioner's claim for damages is predicated on a quasi delict or tort that has no reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in Article 217, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements, jurisdiction over the action lies with the regular courts -- not with the NLRC or the labor arbiters.

Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against the employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. A money claim by a worker against the employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter only if there is a reasonable causal connection between the claim asserted and employee-employer relation. Absent such a link, the complaint will be cognizable by the regular courts of justice. Actions between employees and employer where the employer-employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action precedes from a different source of obligation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular court.(Eviota vs CA)

 It will be recalled that years prior to R.A. 6715, jurisdiction

over all money claims of workers, including claims for damages, was originally lodged with the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC by Article 217 of the Labor Code.
On May 1, 1979, however, Presidential Decree No. 1367

amended said Article 217 to the effect that

"Regional Directors shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters shall

not entertain claims for moral or other forms of damages."

This limitation in jurisdiction, however, lasted only briefly

since on May 1, 1980, P.D. No. 1691nullified P.D. No. 1367 and restored Article 217 of the Labor Code almost to its original form.

 Presently, and as amended by R.A. 6715, the jurisdiction

of Labor Arbiters and the NLRC in Article 217 is comprehensive enough to include claims for all forms of damages "arising from the employer-employee relations"
Not every dispute between an employer and employee

involves matters that only labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article

217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their collective bargaining agreement.

Yes, There is no mistaking the fact that in the case before us, private respondents claim against petitioner for actual damages arose from a prior employer-employee relationship. In the first place, private respondent would not have taken issue with petitioner's "doing business of his own" had the latter not been concurrently its employee

The trial court should not have held itself without jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 92-2486. It is true that the loan and cash advances sought to be recovered by petitioner were contracted by private respondent Romana Lanchinebre while she was still in the employ of petitioner. Nonetheless, it does not follow that Article 217 of the Labor Code covers their relationship. Civil Case No. 92-2486 is a simple collection of a sum of money brought by petitioner, as creditor, against private respondent Romana Lanchinebre, as debtor. The fact that they were employer and employee at the time of the transaction does not negate the civil jurisdiction of the trial court. The case does not involve adjudication of a labor dispute but recovery of a sum of money based on our civil laws on obligation and contract.

Labor Arbiters have jurisdiction over the issue of legality of strikes and lockouts, EXCEPT those staged in industries indispensable to the national interest which may be assumed by the DOLE Secretary and decide the issues himself or certify them to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration.

a.

No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry. No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.

Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of any unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.

b.

No person shall obstruct, impede, or interfere with, by force, violence, coercion, threats or intimidation, any peaceful picketing by employees during any labor controversy or in the exercise of the right to self-organization or collective bargaining, or shall aid or abet such obstruction or interference.
No employer shall use or employ any strike-breaker, nor shall any person be employed as a strike-breaker.

c.

d. No public official or employee, including officers and personnel of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Integrated National Police, or armed person, shall bring in, introduce or escort in any manner, any individual who seeks to replace strikers in entering or leaving the premises of a strike area, or work in place of the strikers. The police force shall keep out of the picket lines unless actual violence or other criminal acts occur therein: Provided, That nothing herein shall be interpreted to prevent any public officer from taking any measure necessary to maintain peace and order, protect life and property, and/or enforce the law and legal order. (As amended by Executive Order No. 111, December 24, 1986)

e.

No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employers premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 227, June 1, 1982)

Sec 1 of Rule XI of the Revised Rules of Procedure of NLRC

Art. 218. Powers of the Commission. The Commission shall have the power and authority:

xxx xxx e. To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party:

 Provided, That no temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute as defined in this Code shall be issued except after hearing the testimony of witnesses, with opportunity for cross-examination, in support of the allegations of a complaint made under oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if offered, and only after a finding of fact by the Commission, to the effect:

1. That prohibited or unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed and will be continued unless restrained, but no injunction or temporary restraining order shall be issued on account of any threat, prohibited or unlawful act, except against the person or persons, association or organization making the threat or committing the prohibited or unlawful act or actually authorizing or ratifying the same after actual knowledge thereof; 2. That substantial and irreparable injury to complainants property will follow;

3. That as to each item of relief to be granted, greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting of relief; 4. That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and 5. That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainants property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.

Such hearing shall be held after due and personal notice thereof has been served, in such manner as the Commission shall direct, to all known persons against whom relief is sought, and also to the Chief Executive and other public officials of the province or city within which the unlawful acts have been threatened or committed, charged with the duty to protect complainants property: Provided, however, that if a complainant shall also allege that, unless a temporary restraining order shall be issued without notice, a substantial and irreparable injury to complainants property will be unavoidable, such a temporary restraining order may be issued upon testimony under oath, sufficient, if sustained, to justify the Commission in issuing a temporary injunction upon hearing after notice. .

. Such a temporary restraining order shall be effective for no longer than twenty (20) days and shall become void at the expiration of said twenty (20) days. No such temporary restraining order or temporary injunction shall be issued except on condition that complainant shall first file an undertaking with adequate security in an amount to be fixed by the Commission sufficient to recompense those enjoined for any loss, expense or damage caused by the improvident or erroneous issuance of such order or injunction, including all reasonable costs, together with a reasonable attorneys fee, and expense of defense against the order or against the granting of any injunctive relief sought in the same proceeding and subsequently denied by the Commission. .

. The undertaking herein mentioned shall be understood to constitute an agreement entered into by the complainant and the surety upon which an order may be rendered in the same suit or proceeding against said complainant and surety, upon a hearing to assess damages, of which hearing, complainant and surety shall have reasonable notice, the said complainant and surety submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the Commission for that purpose. .

. But nothing herein contained shall deprive any party having a claim or cause of action under or upon such undertaking from electing to pursue his ordinary remedy by suit at law or in equity: Provided, further, That the reception of evidence for the application of a writ of injunction may be delegated by the Commission to any of its Labor Arbiters who shall conduct such hearings in such places as he may determine to be accessible to the parties and their witnesses and shall submit thereafter his recommendation to the Commission. (As amended by Section 10, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)

Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code provides the limitation to the exercise by Labor Arbiters in strike and lock-out cases which provides that : g. When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. .

Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code provides the limitation to the exercise by Labor Arbiters in strike and lock-out cases which provides that : . Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return-to-work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.

In cases where there are no collective agreements or recognized labor unions, the employers and workers shall endeavor to correct such distortions. Any dispute arising there from shall be settled through the National Conciliation and Mediation Board and, if it remains unresolved after ten (10) calendar days of conciliation, shall be referred to the appropriate branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). It shall be mandatory for the NLRC to conduct continuous hearings and decide the dispute within twenty (20) calendar days from the time said dispute is submitted for compulsory arbitration. (Art 124, par 5, Labor Code as amended by RA 6727)

 Any compromise settlement, including those involving labor

standard laws, voluntarily agreed upon by the parties with the assistance of the Bureau or the regional office of the Department of Labor, shall be final and binding upon the parties. The National Labor Relations Commission or any court shall not assume jurisdiction over issues involved therein except in case of: 1. Non-compliance thereof 2. If there is a prima facie evidence that the settlement was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion (Art 227, Labor Code)

 A person who is to be engaged, is engaged, or has been

engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a legal resident.

to be engaged in a remunerated activity Refers to an applicant worker who has been promised or assured of employment overseas and acting on such promise or assurance, sustains damage and/or injury. (Sec 2, IRR of RA 8042)

 Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the

Labor Arbiters of the NLRC shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages. Consistent with this mandate, the NLRC shall endeavor to update and keep abreast with the development in the global services industry.

The liability of the principal/employer and then recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall b incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.

Any compromise / amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on money claims inclusive of damages under this section shall be paid within four (4) months from the approval of the settlement by the appropriate authority. (Sec. 10, RA No. 8042)

Santiago vs. CF Sharp Crew Management Inc. (GR No. 162419, July 10, 2007)
Considering that petitioner was not able to depart from the airport or seaport in the point of hire, the employment contract did not commence, and no employer-employee relationship was created between the parties. However, a distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract and the commencement of the employer-employee relationship. The perfection of the contract, which in this case coincided with the date of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner and respondent agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the rest of the terms and conditions therein. ....

Santiago vs. CF Sharp Crew Management Inc. (GR No. 162419, July 10, 2007)
.... The commencement of the employer-employee relationship, as earlier discussed, would have taken place had petitioner been actually deployed from the point of hire. Thus, even before the start of any employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party. Thus, if the reverse had happened, that is the seafarer failed or refused to be deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.

Santos vs Servier Philippines, Inc. (GR No. 166377, November 28, 2008)
Contrary to the Labor Arbiter and NLRCs conclusions, petitioners claim for illegal deduction falls within the tribunals jurisdiction. It is noteworthy that petitioner demanded the completion of her retirement benefits, including the amount withheld by respondent for taxation purposes. The issue of deduction for tax purposes is intertwined with the main issue of whether or not petitioners benefits have been fully given her. It is, therefore, a money claim arising from the employeremployee relationship, which clearly falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.

 An

intra-corporate dispute or controversy is one which arises between a stockholder and the corporation. [Tabang vs. NLRC (1997)]

 In order to determine whether a dispute constitutes an intra-

corporate controversy or not, the Court considers two elements, namely: (a) the status or relationship of the parties (Relationship Test); (b) the nature of the question that is the subject of the controversy (Nature of the Controversy Test) [Mainland Construction Co. vs. Movilla, et al. (1995)]

 Under the Relationship Test, in order that the RTC can take

cognizance of a case, the controversy must pertain to any of the following relationships: a) between the corporation, partnership or association and the public; b) between the corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners, members or officers; c) between the corporation, partnership or association and the State as far as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; and d) among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves.

 Under the nature of the controversy test, the incidents of

that relationship must also be considered for the purpose of ascertaining whether the controversy itself is intracorporate. The controversy must not only be rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship, but must as well pertain to the enforcement of the parties correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation. If the relationship and its incidents are merely incidental to the controversy or if there will still be conflict even if the relationship does not exist, then no intra-corporate controversy exists.

Thus: The first element requires that the controversy must arise out of intra-corporate or partnership relations as provided under Sec.5 (b) of PD 902-A. The second element requires that the dispute among the parties be intrinsically connected with the regulation of the corporation. If the nature of the controversy involves matters that are purely civil in character, necessarily, the case does not involve an intra-corporate controversy.

Sec. 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations, partnerships and other forms of associations registered with it as expressly granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving.

xxx (b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders, members, or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity; and xxx

Sec. 5.2. The Commissions jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court: Provided, that the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending cases involving intra-corporate disputes submitted for final resolution which should be resolved within one (1) year from the enactment of this Code. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending suspension of payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of 30 June 2000 until finally disposed.

Where the seafarer has already signed a POEAapproved employment contract but was not deployed overseas. It was ruled that despite the absence of an EMPLOYER- EMPLOYEE relationship between petitioner and respondent , the NLRC has jurisdiction over petitioners complaint. The Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters is not limited to claims arising from employer- employee relationship under section 10 of R.A No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 ) which cover money claims arising out of an employer- employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual , moral , exemplary and other forms of damages.

In Georg Grotjahn GMBH & Co. v. Isnani, the Court held that not every dispute between an employer and employee involves matters that only labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their collective bargaining agreement.

Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against the employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. Actions between employees and employer where the employer-employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action precedes from a different source of obligation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular court. Here, the employer-employee relationship between the parties is merely incidental and the cause of action ultimately arose from different sources of obligation, i.e., the Constitution and CEDAW.

There is this appraisal of the nature of the action instituted against them (i.e, petitioners) by private respondent ,the Social Security System : Clearly , the complainant for damages is deeply rooted from the labor dispute certified by the President of the Philippines and from which resulted a collective bargaining agreement that was adopted as the court award. This award , in turn , branched out to disputes that led to the strike. On the basis of the strike , the SSS petitioned the CIR to declare the strike illegal , to dismiss the striking employees , and to declare the officers in contempt of court. And the claim for damages is the result of the strike.. As far back as Associated Labor Union vs Gomez (L-25999 , Feb. 9 , 1967 , 19 SCRA 304 ), the exclusive jurisdiction of the court of Industrial Relation was upheld. To hold otherwise is to sanction split jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.

In Holganza vs Apostol , supra , the Supreme Court implied that the CIR had jurisdiction over the civil cases for damages filed by the SSS against its striking employees. Inasmuch as the CIR has been abolished by ART. 298 of the Labor Code and replaced with the NLRC , Does the NLRC have jurisdiction over cases for damages arising from labor disputes which the SSS may file against its own employees or their union? It is submitted that the NLRC does not have jurisdiction on the ground that the SSS is a government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter and , therefore covered by the Philippine Civil Service ( sec. 2 (1) , Art. IX- B , 1986 Constitution). If ever , it is the Public Sector Labor Management Council , created under Executive Order No. 180 of President Corazon C. Aquino, that has jurisdiction over such cases for damages.

Issue: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have jurisdiction over the case filed by Oscar Salvador?

Ruling:
PNOC subsidiaries , whether or not originally

created as government owned or controlled corporation, are governed by the CIVIL SERVICE LAW.
PNOC-EC being admitted a subsidiary affiliate of

PNOC is therefore unmistakably within the scope of the CIVIL SERVICE LAW and beyond the jurisdiction of the Ministry of LABOR or any of its agencies. Having been rendered without jurisdiction , the assailed decision of the Labor Arbiter which was affirmed by the NLRC is NULL and VOID.

 The only question here is whether or not Local water District are government-owned or controlled corporations whose employees are subject to the CIVIL SERVICE LAW. The Labor Arbiter asserted jurisdiction over the alleged dismissal of Villanueva by relying on section 25 of P.D. No. 198 , known as the Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973 , which provides as follows:

 Exemption from Civil service- The district and its

employees , being engaged in a proprietary function are hereby exempt from the provisions of the Civil Service Law.
The Labor Arbiter however failed to take into account the

provisions of P.D. No. 1479, which went into effect on June 11, 1978. P.D. No. 1479 wiped away Sec. 25 of P.D. No. 198.
Thus , Section 25 of P.D. No. 198 exempting the

employees of the water districts from the application of the Civil Service Law was removed from the statute books.

 Does

Labor Tribunal have jurisdiction over employees of immune entities, when said entities perform proprietary activities(as distinguished from governmental functions)?
Labor Arbiters have no jurisdiction over labor cases

involving entities immune from suit.

Exception: when said entities perform proprietary

activities

The Supreme Court ruled that it enjoys immunity from legal process of every form and , therefore , the suit cannot prosper. ADBs officers , on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts perform by them in their official capacity. The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities and privileges are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippine Government which must be respected.

When the function of the foreign entity otherwise immune from suit , partakes of the nature of a PROPRIETARY activity , such as the restaurant services offered at JOHN HAY AIR STATION undertaken by the United States Government as a commercial activity for profit and not in its governmental capacity, the case for illegal dismissal filed by a Filipino cook working therein is well within the jurisdiction of the Philippine courts. The reason is that by entering into the employment contract with the cook in the discharge of its Proprietary functions , it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.

Issue:
Is the contention of the water district tenable?

Ruling:

Petitioner never raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction before the executive labor arbiter, the NLRC or even this court in G.R. Nos. 95219-20. in fact petitioner itself filed the complaint before the executive labor arbiter in NLRC case no. rab-ix-030090-87, sought affirmative relief therefrom and even participated actively in the proceedings below. It is only now in this case before us, after the NLRC ordered payment of backwages, that the petitioner raises the issue of lack of jurisdiction. Indeed, it is not fair for a party who has invoked the jurisdiction of a tribunal in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief therefrom, to afterwards repudiate and deny that the very same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.xxx.

Issue:
Does the trial court have jurisdiction over the case?

Ruling:
The pivotal question to our mind is whether or not the labor

code has any relevance to the relief sought by the plaintiffs. For if the labor code has no relevance, any discussion concerning the statutes amending it and whether or not they retroactive effect is unnecessary.

It is obvious from the complaint that plaintiffs have not alleged any unfair labor practice. Theirs is a simple action for tortious acts allegedly committed by the defendants. Such being the case, the governing statute is the civil code and not the labor code.xxx

In addition to the foregoing, other issues over which the Labor Arbiter or NLRC has no jurisdiction may be summed up as follows:

1. Cases involving claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits. (Article 217 [6], Labor Code).
2. Issue of replevin intertwined with a labor dispute. (Basaya, Jr. vs. Militante, 156 SCRA 299). 3. Cases arising from violation of training agreement. (Singapore Airlines vs. Hon. Ernani Cruz Pano, G. R. No. L-47739, June 22, 1983; 122 SCRA 671). 4. Cases involving claim for liquidated damages for breach of a contractual obligation. Also the issue of liability in suretyship. (Singapore Airlines vs. Hon. Ernani Cruz Pano, G. R. No. L-47739, June 22, 1983; 122 SCRA 671).

In addition to the foregoing, other issues over which the Labor Arbiter or NLRC has no jurisdiction may be summed up as follows:

5. Cases involving issue of whether sale of property being levied on execution was done in bad faith. (Asian Footwear vs. Soriano, 142 SCRA 49).
6. Cases of contempt involving a judge of the regular court. (Tolentino vs. Inciong, 91 SCRA 563). 7. Cases involving an injunction filed by a third party with the regular court against the sheriff enforcing a decision in a labor case. (Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions [PAFLU] vs. Salas, 158 SCRA 53).

In addition to the foregoing, other issues over which the Labor Arbiter or NLRC has no jurisdiction may be summed up as follows:

8. Cases involving claim of employee for cash prize offered under the Innovation Program of a company which, although arising from employer-employee relationship, require the application of general civil law on contracts. (San Miguel Corporation vs. NLRC, 161 SCRA 719). 9. Cases initiated by employer against an employee for sum of money and damages for cost of repair jobs made on an employees personal cars as well as for the purchase price of parts and vehicles. (Molave Motor Sales, Inc. vs. Laron, 129 SCRA 485). 10. Claims for commissions and certain reimbursements made by an independent contractor. (Sara vs. Agarrado, 166 SCRA 625).

In addition to the foregoing, other issues over which the Labor Arbiter or NLRC has no jurisdiction may be summed up as follows:

11. Cases filed by government-owned corporations performing governmental functions. (National Housing Corporation vs. Juco, 134 SCRA 172; Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Hernandez, 143 SCRA 602; PNOC-Exploration Corporation vs. NLRC, 164 SCRA 501).
12. Violation of labor laws which are penal in nature. Examples are illegal recruitment cases, (Section 10, Rule X, Book II, Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment) or criminal offenses or felonies committed in the course of strikes and lockouts. (Article 264, Labor Code). 13. Insolvency proceedings in the enforcement of the worker preference ordained under Article 110 of the Labor Code.

In addition to the foregoing, other issues over which the Labor Arbiter or NLRC has no jurisdiction may be summed up as follows:

14. Exercise of equity jurisdiction to enjoin activities for purposes of compelling an employer to ignore a clear mandate of the law. (Bulletin Publishing Corporation vs. Sanchez, 144 SCRA 678).
15. Administrative action against the licensee or holder of authority cognizable by the POEA which could proceed independently from the criminal action. (Section 12, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995).

In addition to the foregoing, other issues over which the Labor Arbiter or NLRC has no jurisdiction may be summed up as follows:

16. Review of recruitment violation cases and other related cases decided by the POEA. The Secretary of Labor and Employment has exclusive jurisdiction over these cases. (Section 1, Rule IV, Book VI, Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment). 17. Cases involving issues which do not arise from, or has no reasonable causal connection with, employer-employee relationship. (Pepsi-Cola Distributors vs. Galang, 201 SCRA 695; Grepalife Assurance Corporation vs. NLRC, 187 SCRA 694; Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes vs. Maalat, 187 SCRA 773; Insular Life vs. NLRC, 179 SCRA 459)

- THE END -