Ethical Relativism

2002 Copyright Donald Hubin Revised by Makoto Suzuki

Aims for Day 2

1. 2.

3.

4.

Distinguishing Descriptive theories and Normative theories Understanding an argument for Descriptive Ethical Relativism (DER) and its Weaknesses Understanding an argument for Normative Ethical Relativism (NER) and its Weaknesses Understanding the implications of NER

Descriptive vs. Normative Ethics

Descriptive ethics is an enterprise that seeks to describe and explain peoples moral attitudes and the moral practices of societies. It is concerned with what is believed to be good, right or virtuous and with what practices societies do have.

Moral psychology, sociology and anthropology on mores engage in descriptive ethics.

Normative ethics is concerned with the determination of what is good, right or virtuous and of what practices society ought to have.

Moral philosophy primarily engages in normative ethics.

Relativism and Universalism

People often define Ethical (or Moral) Relativism as the view that there are no universal ethical standardsevery ethical standard is relative to a society (this is an aspect of Cultural Relativism) or to an individual. They define Ethical (or Moral) Universalism as the view that at least some ethical judgments are universal. But these definitions are ambiguous: they do not distinguish normative from descriptive theories. It is important to distinguish different senses of ethical relativism. As Rachels says, some of them might be false even if others are true. (p.19)

Descriptive Ethical Relativism (DER) Even at the most fundamental level, there are no ethical
judgments that are universally shared, and no moral practices that are universally adopted (or accepted).

Descriptive Ethical Universalism (DEU) At least at the most fundamental level, there are some (at least one) ethical judgments that are
universally shared or some (at least one) ethical practices that are universally adopted. This is the denial of DER.

Normative Ethical Relativism (NER) There are no universally correct

ethical judgments and there are no practices that it would be correct to adopt universally. (This seems to be the thesis five on Rachels, p.19.)

Normative Ethical Universalism (NEU) There are some (at least one) universally correct ethical judgments and there are some (at
least one) practices that it would be correct to adopt universally. This is the denial of NER.

Descriptive vs. Normative

Remember: Descriptive theories concern what moral views or practices are ACTUALLT APPLIED or ADOPTED (i.e., what things people BELIEVE to be good, right or virtuous, or what practices they DO have). Normative theories concern what moral views or practices are CORRECT (i.e., what things are REALLY good, right or virtuous).

The Positions
(Relativism and Universalism in the same level are mutually exclusive.)
Descriptive Normative Relativism
Universalism

DER DEU

NER NEU

Philosophical Questions About Ethical Relativism/Universalism

We will focus on DER and NER. Then, the philosophical questions are:

Do the established facts support DER? (Rachels, 2.5, .6 and pp. 27-8)

Does DER support NER? (Rachels, 2.3) What are the implications of NER? (Rachels, 2.4)

Evaluating the Evidence for DER

The Evidence
There

are cultural (and/or individual) variations in peoples ethical judgments. (Rachels 2.3) to the Best Explanation

The Argument
Inference

The variation is best explained by DER. Generally speaking, the best account is probable. So, DER is probably true.

Argument for DER:

Different Social Practices/ Different Derivative Judgments

Different Foundational Ethical Judgments

Criticism: Alternative Explanations

Rachels point: ethical judgments might differ from culture to culture NOT because peoples fundamental beliefs differ, but because peoples (1) circumstances or (2) factual beliefs are different. (This is the answer to Q4.) (1) Circumstantial variation

(Rachels 2.5 and p. 28):

Many ethical judgments are different from culture to culture because their circumstances are different. The fundamental ethical principles are shared, but the circumstances are different, so (only) derived ethical judgments are different.

Circumstantial Variation: Example

As Rachels suggests on p. 28, people might share the fundamental principle that one should adopt the practice that promotes the welfare of people whose lives are affected by the practice. Notice that different judgments are derived from this fundamental principle, depending on the circumstances people live. If Eskimos environment is tough as Rachels suggests, then the fundamental principle might permit Eskimo to take possibly even infanticide; though it does not permit us, those living in less harsh environment, to take the actions.

Alternative Explanation 2: Difference in Factual Beliefs

Many ethical judgments are different from culture to culture not because peoples fundamental principles are different, but because their factual beliefs are different.

The fundamental ethical principles are shared, but their factual beliefs are different, so (only) derived ethical judgments are different.

Alternative Explanation 2: Difference in Factual Beliefs: Example

Rachels example of the people who do not eat cows (p.23) What is the different belief the people have? The belief that after death the souls of humans inhabit the bodies of animals, especially cows. Then, this difference in factual belief explains why we and they have different derivative ethical judgments. If they share our ethical judgment that it is wrong to kill and eat humans, given their belief, they will conclude that it is wrong to kill and eat cows.

Criticism of the Argument for DER: Alternative Explanations

Different Social Practices/ Different Derivative Judgments

Shared Foundational Ethical Judgments

Different Circumstances or Different Factual Beliefs, or Both

So?

Different circumstances and/or different factual beliefs might better explain the variations in peoples ethical judgments than DER does. Then, DER is perhaps not the best account of the variations of peoples ethical judgments. Thus, the argument for DER fails to show DER is true. Caution: This only means that one argument for DER fails. DER might still be true. (Consider the relationship between the following argument and its conclusion: All bats are animals; some animals fly; therefore, all bats fly. This type of argument fails to support the conclusion, but the conclusion might still be true.)

Philosophical Questions About Ethical Relativism/Absolutism

Do the established facts support DER?

Does DER support NER? What are the implications of NER?

As is explained, the established facts might not support DER. However, suppose that DER is true. Then, does DER support NER? (Rachels, 2.3)

From DER to NER ???

Normative Ethical Relativism (NER) does not follow automatically from Descriptive Ethical Relativism (DER). Confusing the different meanings of Ethical Relativism leads some to think it does.
This point is made by Rachels on pp. 20-1.

From DER to NER (contd.)

In general, the fact that people have different beliefs (about the truth of a judgment) does NOT show that there is no objective truth or that the truth is relative to different people. This is the point Rachels uses the example in geography to illustrate. (So the above is the answer to Q1.) Peoples different beliefs about the shape of the earth, and the existence of the objective truth (p. 20) Other examples: peoples different beliefs about causes (of diseases, fire etc.), about past events, and the elements of the universe, and so on.

From DEU to NEU ???

To be fair to Normative Ethical Relativists: for the very same reason that Normative Ethical Relativism (NER) doesnt follow automatically from Descriptive Ethical Relativism (DER), neither does Normative Ethical Universalism (NEU) follow automatically from Descriptive Ethical Universalism (DEU).

From DER to NER: A Better Route

Perhaps Rachels is too quick to conclude that NER rests on a bad argument. (p. 29) Even if DER does not imply NER, it might be used to support NER. Best Explanation Argument The best explanation for why DER is true is NER. That is, if, even at the most fundamental level, there are no ethical judgments that are universally shared, this is best explained by the hypothesis that there are no universally correct ethical judgments. Generally speaking, the best account is probable. So, NER is probably true.

Does the Best Explanation Argument from DER to NER Succeed?

To get the argument off the ground, one must show that NER is the best explanation: i.e., that other explanations for why people have fundamentally different ethical judgments are less adequate. This has not been shown yet. Can you hit upon alternative explanations? Here is one. There are non-relative ethical truths, but they are hard to know. Consequently, people have fundamentally different ethical judgments. Is this explanation of DER less adequate than the explanation of DER by NER?