Game Theory

Game and Evolutionary Game in
Communication Networks
Yuedong Xu
2013.12.04
Outline
Game Theory: A Premier

Evolutionary Game

Applications to Networks

Potential Research Fields
Using as less math
as possible !
What is game about?
Game of Chicken
driver who swerves away looses

What should drivers do?
To swerve or to stay?

2
2
What is game about?
Game of Chicken
driver who swerves away looses

2
2
swerve stay
swerve 0, 0 -1, 5
stay 5, -1 -10, -10
Driver 1
Driver 2
Drivers want to
do opposite of
one another
A Game consists of
at least two players
a set of strategies for each player
a payoff for each strategy profile
Basic assumption (rationality of players)
Nash Equilibrium
no player can improve its payoff by unilaterally
changing its strategy
Pareto optimality, price of anarchy
Non-Cooperative (Competitive) Games
individualized play

Cooperative Games
play as a group

Repeated, Stochastic and Evolutionary Games
not one shot
Classification 1:
Classification 2:
Non-cooperative Cooperative
Static Dynamic (repeated)
Strategic-form Extensive-form
Perfect information Imperfect information
Complete information Incomplete information

Internet Application
Selfish Routing game
s
v
w
t
C(x) = 1
C(x) = x
C(x) = 1
C(x) = x
C(x) = 0

P2P Networks: Bittorrent, Xunlei, Pplive, PPStream, QQLive

Internet Ecosystem (Business Models)

Cloud Computing game

Online Social Networks

Network Security Game

Wireless Application
802.11 multiple access game

3G/4G Power Control Game

Packet forwarding game
?
?
Blue
Green

Cognitive radio network game
Wireless jamming and eavesdrop games
E
Outline

Evolutionary Game


Recap
Classical game theory (CGT)
Outcome depends on strong rationality
assumption
Each individual uses a strategy that is the "best
response" to other players choice

Question: what is the meaning of a symmetric NE
(
), given a large number of players ?

Follow the crowd!
Evolutionary game theory
Evolutionary game theory (EGT)

refinement of CGT
game in a population
dynamics of strategy adoption
mutual learning among players
Evolutionary game theory differs from classical game theory by focusing
more on the dynamics of strategy change as influenced not solely by the
quality of various competing strategies, but by the effect of frequency
with which the various competing strategies are found in the population.
Evolutionary game theory (EGT)
Usually two types of game: games against the field
and games with pairwise contests

A game against the eld is one in which there is no specic opponent
for a given individual - their payoff depends on what everyone in the
population is doing. Ex: Choice of Gender
A pairwise contest game describes a situation in which a given
individual plays against an opponent that has been randomly selected
(by nature) from the population and the payoff depends just on what
both individual do. Ex: Hawk-Dove Game
A profile of evolutionary game

Payoff (fitness)
Given a set of pure strategy S. A population prole is a vector x that
gives a probability x(s) with which each strategy s S is played in the
population.
Consider a particular individual in the population with prole x. If
that individual uses a profile ={p s , s }, the individuals payoff is
denoted as (, ). The payoff of this strategy for a pair-wise game is
, = , = (
) ,

Evolutionary stable strategy (ESS)

Theorem (ESS)
An evolutionarily stable strategy is a strategy which, if adopted by a
population of players, cannot be invaded (or replaced) by any
alternative strategy that is initially rare.
Example (Hawk-Dove Game)
H: aggressive; D: mild
Population strategy = (, 1 )
Mixed strategy (H,D) of an individual = (, 1 )
Payoff matrix (v<c):

Suppose the existence of an ESS
= (
, 1
)

Example (Hawk-Dove Game) cont
In the population, the payoff of a mutant is


ESS
no statement of dynamics
monomorphic / polymorphic

Replicator Dynamics
individuals, called replicator, exist in several different
types (e.g Hawk and Dove)
each type of individual uses a pre-programmed
strategy and pass it to its descendants
individuals only use PURE strategy in a finite set
the population state is (
1
,
2
, ,
) where
is
fraction of individuals using strategy

Replicator Dynamics

Fixed point:
= 0
Stability of fixed point:

Stability proof:

, )
Lyapunov stability vs asymptotic stability
Lyapunov function and Engenvalue approach
ESS vs NE in associated two-player game

An ESS is a (mixed) NE
A NE might not be an ESS
Asymmetric NE in monomorphic population
Unstable NE
Replicator dynamics and NE
In a two-strategy game
Any NE is a fixed point of replicator dynamics
Not every fixed point corresponds to a NE
Replicator dynamics and ESS
ESS is an asymptotically stable fixed point
Two strategy pair-wise contest

More than two strategies
ESS Asymp. Stable f.p. sym. NE f.p.
ESS Asymp. Stable f.p. sym. NE f.p.
Outline

Evolutionary Game


Peer-to-peer file sharing
Wireless networks
File Piece (e.g. chunk, block)
A content is split in pieces
Each piece can be independently downloaded
Leecher
A peer that is client and server
In the context of content delivery
Has a partial copy of the content
Seed
A peer that is only server
In the context of content delivery
Has a full copy of the content
Great improvement
over customer-server
mode
Ideal system: single
chunk, fully cooperative
Big System: many peers,
many chunks, stochastic
system

time
t=0
t=T
t=2T
Seed
34
Which peers shall I serve
in each time slot?
If no good incentive strategy
Slow service
Even overwhelmed by requests

Incentive model
A strategy is the behavior (providing/rejecting a
service) of a peer against other peers
A policy is the set of rules of for incentivization
A point is a utility measure of peers
A system is robust : convergence and cooperation

Q. Zhao, J. Lui, D. ChiuA Mathematical Framework for Analyzing Adaptive
Incentive Protocols in P2P Networks, IEEE/ACM Trans. Networking, 2012
Incentive model (cont)
Strategy = type of peer
Finite strategies
{cooperator, defector, reciprocator}

Always serve Always reject
Serve cooperators and reciprocators
with certain probabilities,
reject defectors
Incentive model (cont)
System description:

Incentive scheme (esp. for reciprocators)

At the beginning of each time slot, each peer randomly
selects another peer to request for service. The selected
peer chooses to serve the request based on his current
strategy. A peer obtains points if its request is served
and loses (=1) points if it provides service to others.
() - Prob. that a type i peer provides service to a type j peer

Utility model
After a long way, the points gained by a type-i peer

We can now study
equilibrium state (given G)
is the equilibrium stable?
how to reach this equilibrium?
how good is the incentive scheme

3
=1
3
=1

= 1

Type-i payoff
Network payoff
Is this enough?
Learning model in P2P networks
Current best learning model

At the end of each slot, a peer chooses to switch to
another strategy s with certain prob. To decide which
strategy to choose, the peer learns from other peers.
+ 1 =
, ,
+1 =
)
3
=1,

Needs to compute the gains of all other peers !
Learning model in P2P networks
Opportunistic learning model

At the end of each slot, each peer chooses another peer
as its teacher with certain prob. If the teacher is of a
different type and performs better, this peer adapts to
the teachers strategy with another prob.
+1 =
)
Simpler !
Now we can study
Robustness of incentive scheme

Mirror incentive policy
reciprocators are tit-for-tat
Proportional incentive policy
A reciprocators always serves any other reciprocator
Linear incentive policy

Each scheme generates a different matrix G !
Prob. That reciprocators serve other types of peers!
In relation to EG
pair-wise contest population game
peers players; chunk exchange2 players games

) Opp. Learning
, ) =

After some efforts
, )
Replicator dynamics

Curr. Best Learning
Large-scale wireless networks
Random multiple access (slotted ALOHA)
A node transmits with prob. p in each slot
Simultaneous transmission collisions
Power control game
(signal to noise interference ratio, SINR)

Large power better throughput
Large power more interference to other
receivers
Sad facts:
Selfishness is unsuccessful
Optimal cooperation is hard in a large distributed
networks (bargaining, Shapley value)

Evolutionary game kicks in!

H. Tembine, E. Altman, Evolutionary Games in Wireless
Networks, IEEE Trans. Syst. Man Cyber. B, 2010
What if wireless nodes learn from each other
in local interactions?
Challenges
Standard EGT: a player interacts with all other
players (or average population)
Large-scale wireless networks:
no longer strategic pair-wise competition
random number of local players
non-reciprocal interactions
Finite strategies of a player
{transmit, stay quiet} in multiple access game
{high power, low power} in power control game

Non standard EGT
Standard EGT
WCDMA power control game
SINR with distance r between transmitter and
receiver of node i is given by

P
H
P
L
P
H
Pi : the strategy of node i (i.e., PH or PL)
x : the proportion of the population choosing PH
g : channel gain, r0 is the radius-of-reception circle of receiver
: the attenuation order with value between 3 and 6, : the noise
power, and : the inverse of processing gain
I(x) : total interference from all nodes to the receiver of node i
Payoff of node i is as follows:

R : transmission range
wp : cost weight due to adopting power
Pi (e.g. energy consumption)
(r) : probability density function given the density of receiver
Existence of uniqueness of ESS
Replicator dynamics

This function is continuous and strictly monotonic,
which is required for the proof of stability based on
sufficient condition
Some other related works
Extensions to EGT

Applications
P. Coucheney, C. Touati. Fair and Efficient User-Network Association
Algorithm for Multi-Technology Wireless Networks, IEEE Infocom 2009 (mini)
S. Shakkottai, E. Altman. The Case for Non-cooperative Multihoming of Users
to Access Points in IEEE 802.11 WLANs, IEEE Infocom 2006
C. Jiang, K. Liu, Distributed Adaptive Networks: A Graphical Evolutionary
Game-Theoretic View, IEEE Trans. Signal Processing, 2013
E. Altman, Y. Hayel. Markov Decision Evolutionary Games, IEEE Trans. Auto.
Ctrl. 2010
X. Luo and H. Tembine. Evolutionary Coalitional Games for Random Access
Control, IEEE Infocom 2013 (mini)
Summary
P2P : practical problem EG theory
WCDMA: EG theory practical problem

Common Challenges:
difficult to find important problem
difficult to have theoretical contributions to EGT

Two different styles !
Thank you!

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Game and Evolutionary Game in

), given a large number of players ?

() - Prob. that a type i peer provides service to a type j peer

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