Ongsuco vs.

Malones

Report By: Angelo Miguel Lopez

Petitioners Ongsuco and Salaya are public stall holders at the Maasin
Public Market, newly renovated
On Aug. 6, 1998, the Municipal Mayor informed petitioners of a
meeting on Aug. 11, 1998 concerning the municipal public market.
Revenue measures were discussed during the meeting, including
increase in rentals and imposition of goodwill fess amounting to
P20,000, payable every month
On Aug. 17, 1998, the said increases and for stall holders to have a
standard contract of lease was incorporated in Municipal Ordinance
NO. 98-01, entitled The Municipal Revised Revenue Code approved by
the Sangguniang Bayan
On Sept. 18, 1998, Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin approved Resolution
No. 68, moving to have the Aug. 11 hearing inoperative as a public
hearing, because majority of the persons affected by the goodwill fee
failed to agree to said measure. Respondent Mayor Malones vetoed
said Resolution.

FACTS

On January 22, 1999, another purported public hearing was held.

On June 9, 1999, Mayor Malones wrote to petitioners that they were
occupying the newly renovated municipal public makret without any
lease contract, thus the petitioners stalls were considered vacant and
open for qualified and interested applicants
Petitioners then filed before the RTC on June 25, 1999 a Petition for
Prohibition/Mandamus, with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or writ of Preliminary Injuncition agains
Mayor.

FACTS

Petitioners prayed that respondents be enjoined from imposing

goodwill fees pending the determination of the reasonableness
thereof, and from barring petitioners from occupying the stalls at the
public market. They alleged that public hearing was mandatory
RTC found that petitioners could not avail themselves of the remedy
of mandamus or prohibition. It reasoned that mandamus would not
lie because petitioners failed to show a clear legal right to the use of
market stalls. Prohibition would also not lie because respondent
Mayors acts sought to be enjoined did not involve the exercise of
judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
When Petitioners appealed to the CA, the CA ruled again in
respondents favor additionally holding that the latters acts in
question did not involve the exercise of ministerial functions, as
required by Sec. 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
CA also said that petitioners did not exhaust administrative remedies,
thus their Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus before RTC was
premature

FACTS

Whether or not Prohibition/Mandamus is the right

remedy for petitioners

ISSUE

Yes, but as petitioners primary intention is to prevent respondent

from implementing Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, i.e., by collecting
the goodwill fees from petitioners and barring them from occupying
the stalls, the writ petitioners seek is more in the nature of prohibition
(commanding desistance), rather than mandamus (compellling
performance)

Supreme Courts Ruling: Right Remedy

For a writ of prohibition, the requisites are:

The impugned act must be of a tribunal, corporation, officer, or

person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions
There is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law

Supreme Courts Ruling: Requisites

The Court held that respondent herein is performing a ministerial

function

A ministerial function is one that an officer or tribunal performs in the

context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard
for the exercise of his or its own judgment, upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done

Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 (The Subject Matter) enjoys the

presumption of validity, thus respondent has the duty to carry out the
provisions of the ordinance

Supreme Courts Ruling: Ratio # 1

The Court noted that respondent already deemed petitioners stalls at the
public market vacated. Without such stalls, petitioners would be unable to
conduct their businesses, thus, depriving them of their means of
livelihood.
It is thus imperative on the petitioners to have the implementation of
Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 by respondent stopped at the soonest
There is no more need to exhaust administrative remedies, the
fundamental issue id one of law, over which the courts have competence
and jurisdiction.
Thus, there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy for petitioners
in the ordinary course of law, except to seek from the courts the issuance
of a writ of prohibition commanding the respondent to desist from
continuing to implement what is allegedly an invalid ordinance.

Supreme Courts Ruling: Ratio # 2

A public hearing should be help prior to the enactment of an ordinance

levying taxes, fees, or charges; and that such public hearing be conducted
as provided under Sec. 277 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
the Local Government Code.
Since no public hearing had been duly conducted prior to the enactment
of Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, said ordinance is void and cannot be
given any effect.
Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 is Declared void and ineffective
A writ of Prohibition is ISSUED commanding the Mayor of the
Municiplaity of Maasin, Iloilo, to permanently desist from enforcing
the said ordinance.

Supreme Courts Ruling: Invalidity of

Municipal Ordinance