How the things get their denomination (eponymian iskhei)?

Phaedo 100b, the most robust proposition:

The hypothesis that harmonizes with it:

I. e., relational facts are to be explained via participation.

Simmias is large and called large because he participates in

largeness.
= he has largeness in himself.
But he is small, either (there is smallness in him).
1. How to avoid the contradiction?
2. Is the largeness in Simmias the same as Largeness itself?

Interpretations:
1. The cause of the truth of Simmias exceeds Socrates is not
the nature of Simmias (or the form of being Simmias, if
there is something like that).
2. Distinction between to be (something) (esti) and to have
(to happen to have) something (ekhei).
Traditional interpretation: substantial and accidental
(necessary and contingent) predication.

 Opposition between Largeness itself and largeness in us

Both exclude smallness (absolutely, not dependent from
conditions)
Largeness in us is one, not many (in the terms of Resp.)
But it can perish (not like the ideas)
Let us call largeness in us and the like characters (after Leibniz)

Exclusion of opposites.
Answer to an anonymous interlocutor, with reference to the
circularity argument:

Distinction between being and having again

Things are named after the presence of the opposites
themselves (characters) inside them.
Having: relation between thing and character

 A thing may have a character under certain conditions (time,

relation, aspect).
Ekhei-propositions claim that.
A thing cant have opposite characters under the very same
conditions (Resp. principle of exclusion).
A character or a Form cannot be the opposite of what it is.
Characters are potential properties of (visible) things (dynameis).
A visible thing is a set of (maybe inconsistent) characters.
Forms and characters can be said one visible things are
multiples.

Aristotle
Organon: The first (collection of) logical treatise(s)
Traditional order:
Categories theory of concepts
De interpretatione propositions
Analytica Priora syllogisms
An. Postera - demonstrative syllogism
Topica dialectic sylls
Sophistici Elenchi eristic sylls

Development theory:
Cat. early, platonistic work
Top., Soph. Elench. handbook of dialecitcs, logical theory is not
separated yet.
De Int., An. Post. B: beginnings of the mature logic. Letters as (term)
variables are used now, but not in a clear and consequent way.
An. Pr., An. Post A: Aristotles mature logic (and theory of science).
Problems:
Mutual cross-references
A. repeats the De Int. theory of logical quadrat in An. Pr. in a clear
simplified form.

Cat. 2: foundations of the theory of first substances

Two dichotomies:
Be/not be in a subject: dependent/independent being
(accident/substance)
Said/not said of a subject: universal/particular

Cat. 5:

The units, the things that may be called one are the primary
substancess.
The problem of change is solved by the theory of actual and