LAWYER & THE PROFESSION

CANON 9.01 & 9.02 OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

CANON 34 OF THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

CASES:

FORTUNATO HALILI V. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ET. AL.

LUZVIMINDA LIJAUCO V. ATTY. ROGELIO TERRADO

DR. ELMAR PEREZ V. ATTY. TRISTAN CATINDIG & ATTY. KAREN BAYDO

CANON 9.01 OF THE CPR

A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by

law may only be performed by a member of the bar in good standing

Unqualified Person is not only limited to non-lawyers but also to lawyer who are not in good standing

and lawyers who are unqualified.

Lawyer and the non-legal staf
The lawyer should give such assistants appropriate instructions and supervision concerning the ethical aspects of

their employment, particularly regarding the obligation not to disclose information relating to representation of
the client, and should be responsible for their work product.
It should be noted that there are professional duties which may be delegated to the office staf but for which the

lawyer must assume complete and total professional accountability for the work output.

Lawyer and the law student

A lawyer cannot delegate his professional responsibility to a law student employed in his office.

CANON 9.01 OF THE CPR

Professional Responsibilities of a lawyer
which cannot be delegated to a law
student
Conducting court trials
Giving professional advice to clients
Drawing legal documents

Other fields of the lawyers work which

can be delegated to a law student

Examination of case law

Finding and interviewing witnesses
Making collections of claims
Examining Court Records
Delivering papers
Conveying important messages
Other similar matters

The student in all his work must act as agent for the lawyer employing him, who must supervise his work
and be responsible for his good conduct.

CANON 9.01 OF THE CPR

Law Student Practice Rule

Section 1. Conditions for student practice. A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd

year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear
without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal,
board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
Section 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under

the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly
accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be
filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
Section 3. Privileged communications. The Rules safeguarding privileged communications

between attorney and client shall apply to similar communications made to or received by
the law student, acting for the legal clinic.
Section 4. Standards of conduct and supervision. The law student shall comply with the

standards of professional conduct governing members of the Bar. Failure of an attorney to

provide adequate supervision of student practice may be a ground for disciplinary action. (Circular No.
19, dated December 19, 1986).

CANON 9.01 OF THE CPR

Exception to the rule requiring lawyer supervision:

Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
In the court of justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or

friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct
his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.
Right to proceedings in propria persona or to self-representation
Exception: Criminal Cases

CANON 9.01 OF THE CPR

Reasons for the need of a supervising lawyer for a practicing law student
To ensure that there will be no miscarriage of justice as a result of incompetence or inexperience of

law students, who, not having as yet passed the test of professional competence, are presumably not
fully equipped to act as counsels on their own
To provide a mechanism by which the accredited law school clinic may be able to protect

itself from any potential vicarious liability arising from some culpable action by their law
students
To ensure consistency with the fundamental principle that no person is allowed to practice a

particular profession without possessing the qualifications, particularly a license, as required

by law.

Non-lawyers before the NLRC

Art. 222 of the Labor Code states that non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any labor arbiter

only:
If they represent themselves; or
If they represent their organization or the members thereof

No attorneys fees for they are not lawyers they are called representatives

CANON 9.02 OF THE CPR

General Rule: A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services

with persons not licensed to practice law

EXCEPTIONS:
Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the latters death,

money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to persons specified in the
agreement; or
Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer; or
Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan even if the plan is

based in whole or in part, on a profit sharing agreement

Duty to Maintain the Integrity of the Lawyers Fees

The fees for legal services are the fruits earned from the proper application of the study of law.
Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court the statutory basis for the entitlement of attorneys

fees necessarily requires the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition for the
recovery of attorneys fees

CANON 34 OF CPE

No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a

division of service or responsibility

No agreement to divide fees from future business
Agreement for the payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage of the fees received

from the future business of the deceased lawyers clients

Reason: the recipients of such division are not lawyers and because such payments will not represent service

or responsibility on the part of the recipient

HALILI V. CIR, ET. AL.

This four cases involves disputes regarding claims for overtime of more than five hundred bus

drivers and conductors of Halili Transit. Litigation initially commenced with the filing of a
complaint for overtime with the defunct Court of Industrial Relations. The disputes were
eventually settled when the parties reached an agreement. The parties have agreed, inter alia,
that:
The ESTATE shall deliver or cause to be delivered, to the UNION the following:
Deed of Transfer of a parcel of land situated in Caloocan City to be made, upon authority and approval granted by the

Court of First Instance of Rizal, in the name of the Halili Bus Drivers & Conductors Union, free from any and all liens
encumbrances, and any and all claims whatsoever.
Negotiable Check for TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND (P25,000.00) PESOS in the name of Domingo D. Cabading, President of

the UNION.

the transfer of the said parcel of land and receipt of the amount of P25,000.00 constitute the full and final

satisfaction of the claims and award in said case, as well as any and all attorney's liens in said case.

Pursuant to the Agreement, the administratrix of the estate of Fortunato F, Halili executed a Deed

of Conveyance of Real Property, transferring the aforementioned parcel of land to the Halili Bus
and Conductors Union in trust for the members of the union claimants. The parcel of land was
eventually registered in the name of the Union.

HALILI V. CIR, ET. AL.

The Union, through Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda, filed an urgent motion with the Ministry of Labor and

Employment requesting for authority to sell and dispose of the property. The motion was granted. A
prospective buyer, the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, inc. expressed its misgivings on the authority
of the Union to sell the property in view of sec. 66 of PD 1529 which requires no less than an order
from a court of competent jurisdiction as authority to sell property in trust. So, Atty. Pineda filed a
motion with the Supreme Court requesting for authority to sell the property, the SC, however, merely
noted the motion in a resolution.
Nevertheless, Atty. Pineda, without authority from the SC but relying on the earlier authority given

him by the Ministry of Labor, filed another urgent motion with the latter, praying that the Union be
authorized to sell the lot to the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. and to make arrangements with
it such that payment will be advanced for the real estate taxes inclusive of penalties, attorney's
lien which is equivalent to a thirty-five percent (35%) of the total purchase price, and
home developer's fee of P69,000.00. Apparently, the prospective purchaser had decided to withdraw
its objection regarding the Union's authority to sell. In an order, Labor Arbiter Valenzuela granted the
motion. So, the sale was finally consummated resulting in the execution of an escrow agreement
wherein the purchase price was deposited under escrow with the Manila Bank-Cubao Branch. The
Bank then released the amounts due the claimants in accordance with the escrow agreement.

HALILI V. CIR, ET. AL.

When Atty. Jose C. Espinas (herein movant and alleged original counsel for the Union) learned of

the sale and apportionment of the proceeds from past Union president Amado Lopez, he
requested Labor Arbiter Raymundo Valenzuela to allow him to look into the records of the case.
The latter, however, told him that the records were missing. Hence, Atty. Espinas filed the
urgent motion with prayer for a temporary mandatory restraining order. The records of the case
were eventually found and Atty. Espinas was dully informed of the development.
The above two motions question the legality of the orders issued by Labor Arbirter Valenzuela which

authorized the sale of the awarded property and the distribution of the proceeds from such purchase.

Movants Union and counsel Espinas filed an urgent motion praying, inter alia, to:
Require Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda to deposit with the NLRC the amount of P712,992.00 paid to him or

deposited to his account at Manila Bank, Cubao Branch,allegedly representing 35% attorney's fees on
the sale of the lot registered in the name of the Union
Nullify the order of Labor Arbiter Valenzuela insofar as it allows Atty. Pineda 35% attorneys fees

Atty. Pineda failed to comply with the temporary mandatory restraining order issued by the SC

HALILI V. CIR, ET. AL.

ISSUE: W/N Atty. Pineda should be held in contempt
Supreme Court Ruling:

The SC retraced certain crucial facts which have surfaced and which precipitated the issuance of a resolution
declaring the orders of Labor Arbiter Valenzuela null and void.

It appears that the Union President (former) informed J.C. Espinas and Associates that the general membership of the union had
authorized a 20% contingent fee for the law firm based on whatever amount would be awarded the Union. Atty. Espinas, the
original counsel, established the award of 897 workers claim in the main cases. In one case, the notice of judgment was served
to J.C. Espinas and Associates and, in one case, the notice of judgment was served to B.C. Pineda and Associates. When Atty.
'Pineda appeared for the Union in these cases, still an associate of the law firm, his appearance carried the firm name B.C.
Pineda and Associates," giving the impression that he was the principal lawyer in these cases. When Atty. Pineda joined the
Espinas Firm, he did not reveal to his partners that he had a retainers contract with the officers of the union.

It also appears that Atty. Pineda commenced the proceedings before the NLRC asking for authority to sell the property as well as
authority to distribute without notice to other lawyers and parties. Only Atty. Pineda and the lawyer of the purchasers were
informed.

Lastly, Atty. Pineda appears to have donated 5% of his attorneys fees to the Union

The alleged retainer's contract between Atty. Pineda and the Union appears anomalous and even illegal as well as
unethical considering, inter alia, that:

The contingent fee of 30% for those who were still working with Halili Transit and the 45% fee for those who were no longer
working worked to the prejudice of the latter group who should and were entitled to more benefits. Thus, too, when the alleged
retainer's contract was executed in 1967, the Halili Transit had already stopped operations in Metro Manila. By then, Atty. Pineda
knew that all the workers would be out of work which would mean that the 45% contingent fee would apply to all.

HALILI V. CIR, ET. AL.

The 45% attorney's lien on the award of those union members who were no longer working

and the 30% lien on the benefits of those who were still working as provided for in the alleged
retainer's contract are very exorbitant and unconscionable in view of Section 11, Rule VIII of
Book III which explicitly provides:
Sec. 11. Attorney's feesAttorney's fees on any judicial or administrative proceedings for the recovery

of wages shall not exceed 10% of the amount awarded. The fees may be deducted from the total
amount due the winning party.

The amount of P101,856.00 which Atty. Pineda donated to the Union and which actually

corresponds to 5% of the total 35% attorney's fees taken from the proceeds appears improper
since it amounts to a rebate or commission. This amount was subsequently treated as union
miscellaneous operating expenses without the consent of the general membership.
In the case of Amalgamated Laborers' Association vs. Court of Industrial Relations
We strike down the alleged oral agreement that the union president should share in the attorney's fees. Canon 34

of Legal Ethics condemns this arrangement in terms clear and explicit. It says: 'No division of fees for legal
services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility.' The union
president is not the attorney for the laborers. He may seek compensation only as such president. An agreement
whereby a union president is allowed to share in attorney's fees is immoral. Such a contract we emphatically
reject. It cannot be justified.

LIJAUCO V. TERRADO

Complainant Luzviminda Lijauco filed an Administrative Case against

respondent Atty. Rogelio Terrado for gross misconduct, malpractice,

and conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court when he neglected
a legal matter entrusted to him despite receipt of payment
representing attorneys fees.
According to Complainant, she engaged the services of respondent for P70,000:
To assist in recovering her deposit with Planters Development Bank (P180,000)
To assist the release of her foreclosed house and lot in Laguna which was subject of a

petition for the issuance of a writ of possession then pending. (LRC CASE)

LIJAUCO V. TERRADO
Complainant alleged that respondent failed to appear in the hearing

of the LRC Case and did not protect her interests in the Compromise
Agreement which she subsequently entered into to end the case
Respondent denied the allegation and averred that the P70,000 he received was

for the recovery of the deposit with Planters Development Bank and did not
include the LRC Case

IBP Findings:
Respondent is guilty of Canons 1.01 and 9.02 of the CPR
P70,000 legal fees is too high
Respondent actively acted as complainants lawyer to efectuate the compromise

agreement
By openly admitting he divided the legal fees to other individuals as commission/

referral fees, respondent violated canon 9.02 of the CPR

LIJAUCO V. TERRADO
ISSUE: W/N Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct, malpractice, and conduct

unbecoming of an officer of the court

Supreme Court:
Yes. Lawyers are prohibited from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful

conduct and are mandated to serve their clients with competence and diligence. They shall
not neglect a legal matter entrusted to them, and this negligence in connection therewith
shall render them liable.
Respondents claim that the legal fees pertains only to the recovery of the deposit cannot be

sustained. Records show that he acted as complainants counsel in the drafting of the
compromise agreement. Also, Respondent admitted that he explained the contents of the
agreement to complainant before the latter affixed her signature.
The P70,000 legal fee for the recovery of P180,000 deposit is unreasonable. A lawyer shall

charge only fair and reasonable fees. Respondents admission that he divided the legal
fees with two other people as a referral fee does not release him from liability. A lawyer shall
not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to
practice law, except in certain cases.

LIJAUCO V. TERRADO
Respondents disregard for his clients interests is evident in the iniquitous stipulations in the

compromise agreement where the complainant conceded the validity of the foreclosure of
her property; that the redemption period has already expired thus consolidating ownership in
the bank, and that she releases her claims against it. Complainant agreed to these
concessions because respondent misled her to believe that she could still redeem the
property after three years from the foreclosure. The duty of a lawyer to safeguard his
clients interests commences from his retainer until his discharge from the case or
the final disposition of the subject matter of litigation. Acceptance of money from
a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of
fidelity to the clients cause. The canons of the legal profession require that once
an attorney agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with zeal, care
and utmost devotion.
A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his clients case. Once

he agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with dedication and care.

PEREZ V. CATINDING & BAYDO

Dr. Elmar Perez, Complainant, filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against

respondents Atty. Tristan Catindig & Atty. Karen Baydo for gross immorality and violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility
Complainant alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been friends when they were both students.

They lost touch after their graduation but after 23 years their paths crossed again. It was at that time
Atty. Catindig started courting Dr. Perez. Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already
married to Lily Corazon Gomez at the Central Methodist Church which was followed by a Catholic
wedding at the Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes. Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process
of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and that he would
eventually marry her once the divorce had been decreed. After sometime, Atty. Catindig and Gomez
obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic. In 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in
the United States of America. Years later, Dr. Perez found that their marriage is a nullity since the
divorce decree is not recognized by Philippine Law. When she confronted Atty. Catindig, the latter
allegedly assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize their union once he obtains a declaration of nullity
of his marriage to Gomez.

PEREZ V. CATINDING & BAYDO

In 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter informing her of Atty.

Catindigs scandalous afair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love
letter written and signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig
professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his impediment is removed.
Apparently, five months into their relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to put a
halt to their afair until such time that he is able to obtain the annulment of his marriage
Later that year, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son. He moved to an upscale

condominium in Makati where Atty. Baydo was frequently seen.

PEREZ V. CATINDING & BAYDO

Atty. Catindig filed his comment alleging that:
He married Gomez but after the wedding, the latter showed signs that she was incapable of complying

with her marital obligations. Eventually, their irreconcilable diferences led to their de facto separation.
He and Gomez obtained a divorce decree in Dominican Republic. Also, they filed a petition for

dissolution of Conjugal Partnership before the RTC.

Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that the Divorce Decree does not have any efect.

That notwithstanding, Dr. Perez demanded that Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty. Catindig married
Dr. Perez in USA.
Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not valid since his previous marriage to Gomez was still

subsisting, and that he only married Dr. Perez because he loved her and that he was afraid of losing
her if he did not.
His relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour and eventually, he left home. But Atty. Baydo was not the

reason he left.

PEREZ V. CATINDING & BAYDO

IBP Findings:
The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD issued a report which recommended the disbarment of

Atty. Catindig for gross immorality, violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Atty. Catindigs act of marrying Dr. Perez despite knowing fully well that his
previous marriage to Gomez still subsisted was a grossly immoral and illegal conduct, which warrants
the ultimate penalty of disbarment.
For Atty. Baydo, the charge shall be dismissed for dearth of evidence; Dr. Perez failed to present clear

and preponderant evidence in support of the alleged afair between the respondents.

ISSUE: W/N the respondents committed gross immorality, which would warrant their

disbarment

PEREZ V. CATINDING & BAYDO

Supreme Court Ruling:
Yes. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is

concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character is not only a condition
precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain
ones good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity.
Thus, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended

from the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct.
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indiference to the

opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of decency.

Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly

immoral conduct.
Atty. Catindigs subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one definitely manifests a deliberate

disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our
laws. By his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of marriage, taking advantage of
his legal skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a
member of the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of disbarment.