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Consequence Analysis

Risk Management

Risk Assessment

Hazard identification
Hazard assessment(qualitative
& probabilistic)
Quantification of hazards or
consequence analysis
Risk estimation

Hazard Identification

Objective : to identify the


chemicals and unit operations that
constitute potential hazard

FEDI,TDI are calculated

Hazard Assessment

Qualitative

HAZOP

Probabilistic

Fault tree
Event tree

Consequence Analysis

Assessment of likely consequences


of an accident scenario

Risk Estimation

Risk(fatalities per year) =


consequence(fatalities per event)
probability(event per year)

Evaluated risk is compared with


normally accepted standards.

Risk Estimation
Representation
FN curves
Frequency of occurrence v.s.
Number of fatality
Risk contours
Risk circles are plotted over the site.

Fatality F/N Curve

Risk Matrix

Definition

Techniques and tools to analyze


consequences of likely accidents.

Definition

Evaluate the
Physical effects of the release
of hazardous substances
Or energy
Following the accidental event

Structure

1-Scenario development
Most credible scenarios
Credibility:damage & probability
Damage:FEDI & TDI
Probability : FTA

Scenario Development

Failure mechanism
Volume of material in system
Chemical composition
Process conditions
Mechanical features
Safety systems

EPAs RMP Rule


Worst case release scenario
Release of the largest amount regulated
substance
Single vessel or process line failure
Results in greatest distance to an end point
(where serious injuries from short-term
exposure will not occur)

EPAs RMP Rule


Alternative release scenario:
More likely
Reaches an end point offsite

Structure
2- source term characterization
Depends on typology of accidental
event
Allows to identify the
characteristics of release
e.g.

Structure

Physical State (Vapor, Liquid, Aerosol, Ice)


Density (Lighter or Heavier than Air)
Release Rate & Velocity(Pre and Post
expansion)
Release Temperature (Pre and Post
expansion)
Temporal Distribution of Release
Physical Constraints

Range of release types from a pressurized


vessel containing liquefied gas

Structure
3- Identification& study of
physical phenomena
Based on source term characteristics
and external conditions:
Meteorological conditions
Presence and type of ignition,etc.

Structure

Allows to identify the intermediate


and final phenomena
Using mathematical models to
evaluate the effect of:
Thermal radiation
Overpressure
Missile generation,etc

Consequence Modeling

Source Models
Rate of release of hazardous material
Degree of flashing
Rate of evaporation

Consequence Modeling

Fire & Explosion Models


Characteristics of fire & explosion
Impact intensity model
Predict damage zones due to
Fire
Explosion
Toxic load

Consequence Modeling

Toxic gas models


Human response to different levels
of exposure to toxic chemicals

Dispersion

Selecting consequence model

Ability of model to simulate specific


release
Model validation data
Availability of required model input data
Regulatory acceptance

Common Models

ARCHIE

ADAM

DEGADIS

OB/DG

SLAB

INPUFF

HGSYSTEM

OOMS

SPILLS

RVD

Bitter &
McQuaid

OME

AFTOX

Proprietary Models

SuperChem
PHAST
CHARM
GASTAR
FOCUS
TRACE

Structure
4- Damage assessment
Determine damage from
Thermal radiation
Overpressure effects
Toxic material
On the population and property

Structure
Consequences are quantified in terms
of:
Damage radii: Radius of area in which
the damage would readily occur
Damage to property:Shattering of
window panes, Caving of buildings
Toxic effects: Chronic/acute toxicity,
mortality

Case Study # 1
Ethylene Oxide & Azinphos
Methyl
Storage in Ikonio/Piraeus
harbor, Greece

Material
Ethylene Oxide
Highly Flammable
Toxic

Azinophose Methyl
Pesticide
Produces toxic
gaseous products
when burning

Wind

Avg. Wind speed = 1.8 m/s


Prevailing wind directions
south
southeast

Accident Scenarios and


Consequence Estimation
Scenario 1:ethylene Oxide
Dispersion

1-Southeast Wind

1000 Kg EO is stored in a container under


pressure
Fall and rupture of container
EO is released into the atmosphere as a
horizontal jet
Resulting cloud travels a long distance until
is fully mixed with air
Southeast wind : Cloud will cover the school

Emission Rate

Hole diameter = 5
cm

EXPERT model

Result

Value

Emission rate

15.586 Kg/s

Exit velocity

9.37 m/s

Used release
duration

64.16 s

Vapor fraction

5.860 E-2

Exit pressure

115 Kpa

Concentration Profile

EXPERT Model
Results

SLAB Model

Change of EO concentration with time


at a specified point

Definitions
IDLH: Immediately Dangerous to
Life & Health concentration limit.
Concentrations which one could
escape within 30 min without any
escape impairing symptoms &
irreversible health effects

Definitions
Toxic end point:
The threshold concentration value
for serious injury from exposure to
a toxic substance in the air

Definitions
Toxic Dos(toxic.D)
Lowest dose by which a degree of
toxic effect is still possible
LD50
A dose by which 50% of exposed
population will be fatally injured.

Toxic Endpoint=90 mg/m3

IDLH=1460 mg/m3

LFL=54017 mg/m3

TD is calculated via:

TD

Cdt

to

1530

TD3

TD for each point by integration of the


corresponding curve:
277

1530

Cdt C dt 701 ppm 1300 277 s C dt 837.360 ppm.s


1

1300

Results

LD50 for EO = 12038 g.s/m3 > TDs

Toxic.D = 108 g.s/ m3 <TD3


EO cloud will not affect students fatally
but they will appear to have symptoms:
Dizziness ,nausea, difficulty in breathing,
vomiting
TD4<<Tox.D Block no.4 is beyond
dangerous zone.

Toxic Endpoint=90 mg/m3

IDLH=1460 mg/m
LFL=54017 mg/m3

Results

TD5 = 623.300 ppm.s


LD50 for EO = 12038 g.s/m3 > TD5

Toxic.D = 108 g.s/ m3 <TD5

There will be poisoning symptoms


as previously.

Scenario 2: Ethylene
Oxide Fireball

Scenario

High exit velocity(9.37 m/s)


Brief release time(64.16 s)

Immediately after the entire amount has


been released its concentration is above
LFL.

BLEVE

Upon meeting ignition source the


cloud will turn into a fireball
BLEVE Model

Radiation levels
Thermal doses
Diameter of
fireball=58 m
Duration of
fireball=4.5 s

120 Kw/m2 : fatal burns


50 Kw/m2:
Probability of death 34%
probability of second degree burns effect 46%
Probability of effect of first degree burns : 20%

11 Kw/m2 : Tolerated by humans for


4.5 s duration of fireball

Fatal burns:120 Kw/m2

11 Kw/m2
50 Kw/m2

Results

Radiation level at block no.4 is too low


to cause burns even of the first degree.

The pedestrians walking along the


avenue no.6 will be fatally injured.

Results

At block no.5:
6% probability for third degree burns
20% for second degree burns
74% for first degree burns.
At the school area:
2% for third degree
5% for second degree
93% for first degree.
Thermal radiation will be perceptible over 1
km away from point of accident.

Scenario 3 : Ethylene
Oxide Vapor Cloud
Explosion (VCE)

Simulation

Multi-Energy explosion model


Input data : 3 levels of overpressure

300 KPa : Fatal

51 KPa : 5% probability of fatal


injury due to collision of the
victim with a stable surface

3.5 KPa : Tolerated by humans

300 KPa:Severe Risk

51 Kpa:High Risk

3.5 KPa:Moderate Risk

Results
Avenue no.6
15% probability of fatal collision of
victim with a stable surface
50% probability of eardrum rupture
Passing cars will turn over

Loaded train carriages turn over just


at 51 KPa overpressure)

Results
Block no.5 & school no.3
Similar effects as before
50-75% of all outer walls will lightly to
heavily damaged
Most of the houses in the area are old
so the damage will not be repairable

Results

For those found in one of these


buildings
50-80% probability of injury
20-50% probability of being fatally
squashed by crumbling walls
Block no.4 : minor damage is expected
(e.g. breakage of window panes)

Results

Damage to buildings is possible even at 1


Kpa overpressure.
TNT equivalency model(appropriate for
estimating the long distance consequences)

This overpressure would be developed a 955


m distance.

The blast will also affect densely


populated areas

Scenario no.4: Dispersion


of toxic substances
yielded during combustion
of Aziniphos-Methyl

Scenario

A batch of 1000 Kg pesticide is assumed to


catch fire as it is stored in warehouse no.2
Typical burning rate for material on fire in
an enclosed space = 0.08 Kg/s
Liquid spilled is assumed to be in the area
of warehouse = 52 m2
Perfect combustion assumed , Products:NO2
,CO2
Products will travel into the atmosphere
forming a toxic cloud

Dispersion of Toxic NO2


DEGADIS Model Determines
toxic gas concentrations
of episodic releases
from single source
over flat terrain
at particular
meteorological
conditions
for the duration of

Southeast Wind

215 ppm

500 ppm

50 ppm

South Wind

215 ppm

500 ppm

50 ppm

Results

TD is calculated for each point as


mentioned before
LD50 for NO2= 285.500 ppm
NO2 doses will be lethal at points
3,4 and 5 for more than 50% of the
totally affected population

Particles of burning liquid carried away by


gaseous products

Assumed : Curve of pesticide


follows the curve of CO2 during the
cloud travel at a proportion of 10%

Southeast Wind

LC50 for AM=25 mg/m3

South Wind

LC50 for AM=25 mg/m3

CA Results

Toxic gas dispersion(sc. 1 & 4) :


Acute effect on pupils of school
and local inhabitants.
Consequence would be poisoning
or even fatal for a large part of the
affected population.

CA Results

Fireball event:
Emits high amounts of thermal
radiation
Would cause burns to humans at
distance less than 132m
Pupils of school and inhabitants would
be endangered

CA Results

Vapor cloud explosion:


Fatal consequence to nearby
populations
Induce damage to houses within a
radius of 1 Km

Recommendations

Exclusion/reduction of the quantities

Indoor storage of containers to give


time for emergency plan

Use inert gas for dilution of


hazardous gas below hazard limit

Case Study # 2
Sulfolane manufacturing
plant , India
(Khan & Abbasi,2001)

Final Notes

Identify Areas Vulnerable to an


Accidental Release
Emergency Response Planning
Land Use Planning

Further Reading

Transportation of goods, (Tixier et.


al. ,2002)
Hydrogen accidents,(Breitung &
Royl,2000)
Titanium sponge production plant,
(Roy et. al, 2003)
Fusion energy power plant (Reyes
et. al.,2001)
LPG ,(Ditalia et. al.,2000)