CHAPTER 6

Hazard Identification
 Chapter Outline

• Introduction
• Process hazards checklist
• Hazards survey
• HAZOP studies
 Instructional Learning Objectives
After completing this
chapter, students should
be able to do the
following:
• Identify hazards using
process hazards
checklist
• Identify hazards using
Dow indexes
• Identify hazards using
HAZOP
 What is Hazard? What is Risk?

 A hazard is any source of potential damage, harm

or adverse health effects on something or someone
under certain conditions at work.

 A hazard is anything with the potential for

producing/resulting in an accident

What is Risk?

 Risk = Probability of accident x Consequences 
in lost of money/life
 What are examples of a hazard?

 Hazards include practices or conditions that release

uncontrolled energy like:
• an object that could fall from a height (potential
or gravitational energy),
• a run-away chemical reaction (chemical energy),
• the release of compressed gas or steam
(pressure; high temperature),
• entanglement of hair or clothing in rotating
equipment (kinetic energy), or
• contact with electrodes of a battery or capacitor
(electrical energy).
 Introduction

• What are the hazards? (Hazard identification)

• What can go wrong and how?
• What are the chances? (Risk Assessment)
• What are the consequences?

• Risk assessment: determination of events that can

produce an accident, the probability of those events,
and the consequences.
• The consequences include human injury or loss of life,
loss of production, damage to the environment, etc.
• Hazard identification + risk assessment  Hazard
evaluation
 Hazard Identification
Why?  To identify hazards so that they can be 
eliminated or controlled.
How?  Using a number of available methods.
• Procedure for using hazards identification and risk
assessment is given in the next slide.
• Hazards with low probability and minimal consequences
will be the prime target since unnecessary and
expensive safety equipment and methods can be
avoided.
• Many methods are available for hazard identification
and risk assessment and no single approach is best
suited for any application.
 Hazard ID / Risk Assessment Procedure
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION METHODS:
System description
     - Process hazard checklist
     - Hazard survey:  DOW index Hazard identification
     - HAZOP hazard & operability study
     - Safety review Scenario
identification
RISK ASSESSMENT: 
Accident Accident
     - What can go wrong & how ? probability consequences
     - What are the chances ?
     - Consequences ?
Risk determination
EXTREMES: 
     - Low  probability risk &
hazard N
     - Minimal consequences Modify design
acceptable
?
Y
Accept system
 Hazard Identification

• Some of the popular hazards identification

method;
– Process Hazards Checklist
– Hazards survey
– HAZOP studies
• Other hazard identification techniques are
safety review, what if analysis, human error
analysis, failure mode, effects and criticality
analysis (FMECA), etc.
 Process Hazards Checklist (PHC)
• PHC is a list of problems and areas to be checked
• Can be used during the design of a process or before process
operation – reminder on potential problem areas.
• A typical process design safety checklist is given in Figure 10-
2.
• The design of the check-list depends on intent.
• A checklist intended for use during the initial design of the
process will be different from a checklist used for a process
change.
• Checklists should be applied only during the preliminary
stages of hazard identification and should not be used as a
replacement for a more complete hazard identification
procedure.
• Checklists are most effective in identifying hazards arising
from process design, plant layout, storage of chemicals,
electrical systems, etc.
11
 Hazard Survey

• Can be a simple inventory of hazardous materials or a

complicated rigorous procedure
• Use rating system and rank the hazards based on the
relative ranking. May contain a mechanism for
estimating the dollar loss in the event of accident.
• Two established hazard survey are:
– Dow Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI)
– Dow-Chemical Exposure Index (CEI).
 Hazard Survey
Dow F&EI Procedure
Dow F&EI Procedure
• Divide the process into separate process units (pump, heat exchanger,
reactor, etc)
• Determine material factor (MF) from Table 10-1. (More rigorous data
available from Dow’s Chemical Exposure Index Guide, 4th Ed. (AIChE,
1994).
• Assess the general process hazards by using penalties factor
• General process hazards factor (F1) and special process hazards (F2) are
multiplied to give unit hazard factor (F3).
• The Dow F&EI is computed using F3 x MF.
• Identify the degree hazards using Table 10-2.
• The consequences of an accident is determined using maximum probable
property damage (MPPD) and the maximum probable days outage
(MPDO)
• The completed analysis is given by the Risk Analysis Summary from
Figure 10-4.
14
15
 Example - Dow F&EI Procedure
Your plant is considering the installation of a new railcar tank
unloading facility. The facility will unload nominal 25,000-gal tank
cars containing either pure butadiene or cyclohexane. The
unloading system will be equipped with an emergency shutdown
system with remotely operated block valves. The unloading
operation will be done by computer control. The railcars are inerted 
with nitrogen to a pressure of 40 psig, and the railcar relief 
system has a set pressure of 75 psig. The unloading operating
instructions are written and have been reviewed by the corporate
technical staff. Determine the Dow F&EI for this operation.

16
17
 Solution - Dow F&EI Procedure

 The resulting calculation shows an F&EI value of 106

 This unloading station is an intermediate hazard.

18
 Hazard Survey
Dow CEI Procedure
• Dow CEI is a method of rating the relative acute
health hazard potential for people in neighboring
plants or communities arising from possible chemical
release incidents.
• The following items are required for CEI
determination;
– Plot plan of plant and surrounding area
– PFD of the plant
– Physical and chemical properties of the materials
investigated
– ERPG values (Table 5-7)
– Dow CEI guide (AIChE, 1994)
– CEI from (Figure 10-6)
• The CEI procedure is given in the flowchart of Figure
10-7.
 Hazard Survey
Dow CEI Procedure
• Dow CEI Procedure
– Define the possible release incidents (such as from pipes,
vessels, reactor, etc). Table 4-5 can be used as guidelines.
– Use source models to estimate release rate of material.
– Use dispersion model to determine the dispersed
concentration of materials.
– Use ERPG standard to determine CEI value and
downwind hazard distances
• Hazard surveys are suitable for identifying hazards
associated with equipment design, layout, material
storage, etc.
• They are not suitable for identifying hazards
resulting from improper operation or upset
conditions.
21
 A scenario…
You and your family are on a road trip by using a
car in the middle of the night. You were replying
a text message while driving at 100 km/h and it
was raining heavily. The car hits a deep hole and
one of your tire blows. You hit the brake, but due
to slippery road and your car tire thread was
thin, the car skidded and was thrown off the
road.
What is the cause of the accident?

What is the consequence of the event?

What can we do to prevent all those things to

happen in the first place?
 Can we make it more systematic?
Parameter Guideword Possible Consequences Action Safeguard
Causes

Car speed Too fast Rushing Skidded when - Slow down -ABS brake system
Too slow emergency brake - Speed up -Safety belt
- Air bag

Tire No thread Tire too old, Car skidded - Check frequently

Less thread often speeding - Have spare tire
and emergency
break

Window Low Rain Cannot see the

visibility Very low road

Car light Dim -Stop car

No light -Go to nearest
garage
-Use emergency
signal

Road With holes Breaks the car tire - Put a signboard

Rocky -Street lights

Travel time Night No street light -Travel during daylight

Foggy 23
 What is HAZOP?
• Systematic technique to IDENTIFY potential HAZard and
OPerating problems
• A formal systematic rigorous examination to the process and
engineering facets of a production facility
• A qualitative technique based on “guide-words” to help
provoke thoughts about the way deviations from the intended
operating conditions can lead to hazardous situations or
operability problems
• HAZOP is basically for safety
• Hazards are the main concern
• Operability problems degrade plant performance (product
quality, production rate, profit)
• Considerable engineering insight is required - engineers working
independently could develop different results
 Objective & Purpose of HAZOP
• For identifying cause and the consequences of 
perceived mal-operations of equipment and associated
operator interfaces in the context of the complete system.
• It emphasizes upon the operating integrity of a system,
thereby leading to most potential and detectable deviations
which could possibly arise in the course of normal
operating routine
- including "start-up " and "shut-down" procedures
- as well as steady-state operations.
• It is important to remember at all times that HAZOP is an
identifying technique and not intended as a means of
solving problems nor is the method intended to be used
solely as an undisciplined means of searching for
hazardous scenarios.
 HAZOP Study Application
HAZOP study are applied during :
• Normal operation
• Foreseeable changes in operation, e.g. upgrading,
reduced output, plant start-up and shut-down
• Suitability of plant materials, equipment and
instrumentation
• Provision for failure of plant services, e. g . steam,
electricity, cooling water
• Provision for maintenance.
Relevant Question About HAZOP
Question : How can one be certain to identify all
possible deviations ?

Answer : No absolute certainty as the study is

subjective and 100 % achievement in this context can
have no significance. Any individual or corporate effort
will yield results directly proportional to the appropriate
background experience of those taking part.
However, with the appropriate levels of individual
project-related expertise , such a procedure is fully
capable of identifying at least 80 % of potential
deviations which could rise during normal operation.
Relevant Question About HAZOP

Separate consideration is demanded for other operating

modes, such as commissioning, emergency shut-down
procedures and isolation of equipment for maintenance or
modification.

Once an installation is endorsed by a properly-conducted

HAZOP study, it is these non-steady state circumstances
which benefit particularly from the technique throughout the
life time of the installation.

‘Operability' must also consider the human factors involved as

well as the prediction of equipment behavior.
 Features of HAZOP Study
Subsystems of interest Line and valve, etc
Equipment, Vessels

Modes of operation Normal operation

Start -up mode
Shutdown mode
Maintenance /construction /
inspection mode

Trigger events Human failure

Equipment /instrument/
component failure
Supply failure
Emergency environment event
Other causes of abnormal
operation, including instrument
disturbance
 Features of HAZOP Study

Effects within plant Changes in chemical conditions

Changes in inventory
Change in chemical physical conditions

Hazardous conditions Release of material

Changes in material hazard characteristics
Operating limit reached
Energy source exposed etc.

Corrective actions Change of process design

Change of operating limits
Change of system reliability
Improvement of material containment
Change control system
Add/remove materials
 Features of HAZOP Study

How would hazardous During normal operation

conditions detected ? Upon human failure
Upon component failure
In other circumstances

Contingency actions Improve isolation

Improve protection
Documents Needed for HAZOP Study
• For Preliminary HAZOP
– Process Flow Sheet ( PFS or PFD )
– Description of the Process

• For Detailed HAZOP

– Piping and Instrumentation Diagram ( P & ID )
– Process Calculations
– Process Data Sheets
– Instrument Data Sheets
– Interlock Schedules
– Layout Requirements
– Hazardous Area Classification
– Description of the Process
 Before Detailed HAZOP

• The development of the detailed P&I Diagram is the last

stage of the process design.

• The development will follow a normal standard procedure

and include the following considerations :
– Basic process control system - this is a closed loop control to
maintain process within an acceptable operating region.
– Alarm system - this is to bring unusual situation to attention of a
person monitoring the process in the plant
– Safety interlock system - this is to stop operation or part of the
process during emergencies.
– Relief system - this is to divert material safely during emergencies.
 P&ID

• A Piping and Instrumentation Diagram -

P&ID, is a schematic illustration of functional
relationship of piping, instrumentation and
system equipment components.
• P&ID represents the last step in process
design.
• P&ID shows all of piping including the
physical sequence of branches, reducers,
valves, equipment, instrumentation and
control interlocks. 
• P&ID is normally developed from process
flow diagram (PFD).
• The P&ID are used to operate the process
system.
• A process cannot be adequately designed
 P&I D
A P&ID should include: (Basically every mechanical aspect of the plant with
some exceptions)
• Instrumentation and designations
• Mechanical equipment with names and numbers
• All valves and their identifications
• Process piping, sizes and identification
• Miscellaneous - vents, drains, special fittings, sampling lines, reducers,
increasers and swagers
• Permanent start-up and flush lines
• Flow directions
• Interconnections references
• Control inputs and outputs, interlocks
• Interfaces for class changes
• Seismic category
• Quality level
• Annunciation inputs
• Computer control system input
• Vendor and contractor interfaces
• Identification of components and subsystems delivered by others
• Intended physical sequence of the equipment
 HAZOP Study Procedure

• Procedure in HAZOP study consist of examining the

process and instrumentation (P&I) line diagram ,
process line by process line .
• A list of guide words is used to generate deviations
from normal operation corresponding to all conceivable
possibilities.
• Guide words covering every parameter relevant to the
system under review :i.e. flow rate and quality,
pressure, temperature, viscosity, components etc.
• Flowchart for application of HAZOP is shown in figure.
 HAZOP Study Procedure
HAZOP keeps all team
members focused on the
same topic and enables
them to work as a team
1+1=3

NODE: Concentrate on one location in the process

PARAMETER: Consider each process variable individually

(P, T, L, composition, operator action, etc.)

GUIDE WORD: Pose a series of standard questions about deviations

from normal conditions. We assume that we know a safe “normal”
operation.
 HAZOP Study Procedure

NODE: Pipe after pump and splitter

PARAMETER*: Flow rate

GUIDE WORD*: Less (less than normal value)

• DEVIATION: less flow than normal
A group
• CAUSE: of deviation, can be more than one members focus
on the same
• CONSEQUENCE: of the deviation/cause issue
• ACTION: initial idea for correction/ simultaneously
prevention/mitigation
 HAZOP Study Procedure
1. Detailed flow sheet—break into a number of process units
2. Choose a study node (e.g., vessel, line, operating instruction)
3. Design intent of study node – e.g. V-1 to store benzene liquid
4. Pick a process parameter – e.g. flow, level (Table 10-4 & 10-5)
5. Apply guide word to process parameter to suggest possible
deviations – e.g. NO, MORE, LESS, etc. (Refer Table 10-3)
6. (if deviation applicable) Possible causes? (Note protective systems)
7. Evaluate consequences of deviation (if any)
8. Recommend action (what? by whom? by when?)
9. Record all information
10. Repeat steps 5 – 9 until all applicable guide words have been
applied to chosen process parameter
11. Repeat steps 4 – 10 until all applicable process parameters have
been considered for given study node
12. Repeat steps 2 – 11 until all study nodes have been considered.
Proceed to next section on flow sheet
HAZOP Study Flow Chart Select Line

Select deviation
e. g more flow

Move on to next Is more flow possible

deviation

Is it hazardous or does it Consider

prevent efficient operation ? other causes
of more flow

What change in plant

Will the operator know that
will tell him ?
there is more flow ?

What changes in plant or Consider other

method will prevent the deviation change(s) or
or make it less likely or protect agreed to accept
against the consequences ? hazard

Is the cost of the change justified ?

Agree change (s)

Agree who is responsible for
action

Follow up to see action has been

taken
Guidelines for Division into Sections
• Choices of lines – P&ID must be divided logically. Not too many
sections. Factors to be considered :
– Each section should contain active components, which gives rise to
deviations. E.g. piping which contains control valves can give rise to
flow deviations, heat exchangers can cause T deviations.
– Materials in section – contain significant amount of hazardous
materials.
– Section based on process and states of materials. Only 1 process
operation per 1 section.
 General guidelines :
• Define each major process component as a section. Usually anything
assigned equipment number should be considered a major process
component.
• Define one line section between each major process component.
• Define additional line sections for each branches off the main process
flow.
• Define a process section at each connection to existing equipment.
 HAZOP Study Procedure

GUIDE WORDS *

POSSIBLE CAUSES DEVIATION ( FROM DESIGN AND/OR

OPERATING INTENT )

CONSEQUENCES

ACTION(S) REQUIRED OR
RECOMMENDEED
43
 Guide Words
NONE No forward flow when there should be
MORE More of any parameter than there should be,
e.g more flow, more pressure, more
temperature, etc.
LESS As above, but "less of" in each instance
PART System composition difference from what it
should be
MORE  THAN More "components" present than there
should be for example, extra phase,
impurities
OTHER What needs to happen other than normal
operation, e.g. start up,shutdown,
maintenance
 Guide Words

NONE e.g., NO FLOW caused by blockage; pump

failure; valve closed or jammed : leak: valve open;
suction vessel empty; delivery side over -
pressurized : vapor lock ; control failure
REVERSE  e.g., REVERSE FLOW caused by pump failure :
NRV failure or wrongly inserted ; wrong routing;
delivery over pressured; back- siphoning ; pump
reversed
MORE  OF e.g., MORE  FLOW  caused by reduced delivery
head ; surging ; suction pressurised ; controller
failure ; valve stuck open leak ; incorrect
instrument reading.
 Guide Words

MORE OF MORE TEMPERATURE, pressure caused by external

fires; blockage ; shot spots; loss of control ; foaming;
gas release; reaction; explosion; valve closed; loss of
level in heater; sun. 
LESS OF  e.g., LESS FLOW caused by pump failure; leak; scale
in delivery; partial blockage ; sediments ; poor suction
head; process turndown.
LESS e.g., low temperature, pressure caused by Heat loss;
vaporisation ; ambient conditions; rain ; imbalance of
input and output ; sealing ; blocked vent .
PART OF Change in composition high or low concentration of
mixture; additional reactions in reactor or other
location ; feed change.
 Guide Words

MORE THAN Impurities or extra phase Ingress of

contaminants such as air, water, lube oils;
corrosion products; presence of other process
materials due to internal leakage ; failure of
isolation ; start-up features.
OTHER Activities other than normal operation start-up
and shutdown of plant ; testing and inspection ;
sampling ; maintenance; activating catalyst;
removing blockage or scale ; corrosion;
process emergency ; safety procedures
activated ; failure of power, fuel, steam , air,
water or inert gas; emissions and lack of
compatibility with other emission and effluents.
 Strength of HAZOP
• HAZOP is a systematic, reasonably comprehensive
and flexible.
• It is suitable mainly for team use whereby it is possible
to incorporate the general experience available.
• It gives good identification of cause and excellent
identification of critical deviations.
• The use of keywords is effective and the whole group
is able to participate.
• HAZOP is an excellent well-proven method for
studying large plant in a specific manner.
• HAZOP identifies virtually all significant deviations on
the plant, all major accidents should be identified but
not necessarily their causes.
 Weakness of HAZOP

• HAZOP is very time consuming and can be laborious

with a tendency for boredom for analysts.
• It tends to be hardware-oriented and process-oriented,
although the technique should be amenable to human
error application.
• It tends to generate many failure events with
insignificance consequences and generate many
failure events which have the same consequences.
• It stifles brainstorming although this is not required at
the late stage of design when it is normally applied.
• HAZOP does not identify all causes of deviations and
therefore omits many scenarios.
 Weakness of HAZOP
• It takes little account of the probabilities of events or
consequences, although quantitative assessment are
sometime added. The group generally let their collective
experiences decide whether deviations are meaningful.
• HAZOP is poor where multiple-combination events can
have severe effects.
• It tends to assume defects or deterioration of materials of
construction will not arise.
• When identifying consequences, HAZOP tends to
encourage listing these as resulting in action by
emergency control measures without considering that
such action might fail. It tends to ignore the contribution
which can be made by operator interventions
 Preliminary HAZOP Example
Refer to reactor system shown.
Cooling
Coils The reaction is exothermic. A cooling
Monomer
Feed system is provided to remove the
excess energy of reaction. In the event
Cooling Water to of cooling function is lost, the
Sewer
temperature of reactor would increase.
This would lead to an increase in
Cooling reaction rate leading to additional
Water In energy release.

The result could be a runaway reaction

with pressures exceeding the bursting
pressure of the reactor. The
temperature within the reactor is
TC measured and is used to control the
Thermocouple cooling water flow rate by a valve.

Perform HAZOP Study

Preliminary HAZOP on Reactor - Example

Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action

NO No cooling Temperature
increase in
reactor
REVERSE Reverse Failure of
cooling water source
flow resulting in
backward flow
MORE More Instruct
cooling operators on
flow procedures
AS WELL AS Reactor Check
product in maintenance
coils procedures
and schedules
OTHER THAN Another Water source
material contaminated
besides
cooling
water
 Preliminary HAZOP on Reactor - Answer
Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action
NO No cooling Cooling water Temperature Install high
valve increase in reactor temperature
malfunction alarm (TAH)
REVERSE Reverse Failure of water Less cooling, Install check
cooling flow source resulting possible runaway valve
in backward flow reaction
MORE More cooling Control valve Too much cooling, Instruct
flow failure, operator reactor cool operators on
fails to take procedures
action on alarm
AS WELL AS Reactor More pressure in Off-spec product Check
product in reactor maintenance
coils procedures and
schedules
OTHER THAN Another Water source May be cooling If less cooling,
material contaminated ineffective and TAH will detect.
besides effect on the If detected,
cooling water reaction isolate water
source. Back up
water source?
 Case Study – Shell & Tube Heat
Exchanger

• Using relevant guide works, perform HAZOP study on shell

& tube heat exchanger

Process
fluid

Cooling water
 HAZOP on Heat Exchanger – Answer
Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action
Less Less flow Pipe Temperature of High
of cooling blockage process fluid Temperature
water remains Alarm
constant
More More Failure of Temperature of Low
cooling cooling process fluid Temperature
flow water valve decrease Alarm
More of More Failure of Bursting of Install high
pressure on process fluid tube pressure alarm
tube side valve
Contamination Contaminat Leakage of Contamination Proper
ion of tube and of process fluid maintenance
process cooling and operator
fluid line water goes alert
in
Corrosion Corrosion Hardness of Less cooling Proper
of tube cooling and crack of maintenance
water tube
 HAZOP on Heat Exchanger – Answer
Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action
NONE No cooling Failure of inlet Process fluid Install
water flow cooling water temperature is not Temperature
valve to open lowered accordingly indicator before
and after the
process fluid line
Install TAH

MORE More cooling Failure of inlet Output of Process Install

water flow cooling water fluid temperature Temperature
valve to close too low indicator before
and after process
fluid line
Install TAL

LESS Less cooling Pipe leakage Process fluid Installation of

water temperature too low flow meter

REVERSE Reverse Failure of Product off set Install check

process fluid process fluid valve (whether it
flow inlet valve is crucial have to
check?)
CONTAMINATION Process fluid Contamination Outlet temperature Proper
contamination in cooling water too low maintenance and
operator alert
 Terminology
Nodes
 The locations (on piping and Instrumentation drawings and
procedures) at which the process parameters are
investigated for deviations is called Nodes.
Intention
 The intention defines how the plant is expected to operate
in the absence of deviations at the study nodes. This can
take a number of forms and can either be descriptive or
diagrammatic; e.g., flowsheets, line diagrams, P&IDs.
 Terminology
Deviation
 Deviations are departures from the intention which are discovered
by systematically applying the guide words (e.g., “more pressure”).
Some deviations can be conveniently derived from a combination
of Guide-Words and Process Parameter. For example NO
(Guideword) FLOW (parameters) produces NO FLOW as deviation.
Causes
 These are the reasons why deviations might occur. Once a
deviation has been shown to have a credible cause, it can be
treated as a meaningful deviation. These causes can be hardware
failures, human errors, an unanticipated process state (e.g.,
change of composition), external disruptions (e.g., loss of power),
etc.
 Terminology
Consequence
 The primary purpose of the HAZOP is identification of scenarios
that would lead to the release of hazardous or flammable material
into the atmosphere, thus exposing workers to injury. In order to
make this determination it is always necessary to determine, as
exactly as possible, all consequences of any credible causes of a
release that are identified by the group. If the team concludes
from the consequences that a particular cause of a deviation
results in an operability problem only, then the discussion should
end and the team should move on to the next cause, deviation or
node. If the team determines that the cause will result in the
release of hazardous or flammable material, then safeguards
should be identified.
 Terminology
Existing Provision / Protection / Safeguard
 Safeguards should be included whenever the team determines that
a combination of cause and consequence presents a credible
process hazard. What constitutes a safeguard can be summarized
based on the following general criteria:
 Those systems, engineered designs and written procedures that are
designed to prevent a catastrophic release of hazardous or
flammable material.
 Those systems that are designed to detect and give early warning
following the initiating cause of a release of hazardous or
flammable material.
 Those systems or written procedures that mitigate the
consequences of a release of hazardous or flammable material.
 Terminology
Action / Recommendation
 Recommendations are made when the safeguards for a
given hazard scenario, as judged by an assessment of the
risk of the scenario, are inadequate to protect against the
hazard. Action Items are those recommendations for
whom an individual or department has been assigned.
 Thank you
for your attention.

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