FMEA

Intelligent use of FMEA

This guideline is for training purposes only; Not ISO controlled

 Potential
__ System
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
__ Subsystem (Design FMEA)
__ Component FMEA Number:
Page 1 or 1
Model Year/Vehicle(s): Design Responsibility Prepared by: Lee Dawson
FMEA Date (Orig.):
Core Team: Key Date:

Item C Potential O Current Current D Responsibility Action Results

Potential Potential S L C E R. Recommended
Cause(s)/ Design Design & Target
Failure Effect(s) of E A Mechanism(s) C T P. S O D R.
Controls Controls Action(s) Completion Actions E C E P.
Mode Failure V S U E N.
Date
Function S Of Failure R Prevention Detection C Taken V C T N.

2
 What Is An FMEA?

 Opportunity to Defeat Murphy’s Law

 Focus on Prevention MURPHY’S
LAW
 Failure Mode And Effects Analysis is
An assessment of Risk
Safety
Regulatory
Customer Satisfaction
Program
Coordinated/Documented team effort
To determine what can go wrong
A method to determine the need and priority of
actions

3
 Plan & D efine Section 1 RELIABILITY BY DESIGN
ID E A APQP Tool Linkage
D esign & D evelopment - Section I I
O pportunity Process D esign & D evelopment - Section I I I
D efined GD & T
- D rawings Process F low
- M ath D ata F inalized
F orm T eam
- T iming
Prototype C ontrol C haracteristic
- Resources DFME A Special Characteristics

?
of
DFME A Plan

Pro
M atrix Pre - L aunch

ke
C ontrol Plan
Process Validation - Sectio

sta
Mi
C ustomer - R isk/ Action
C ollect PF M E A YES
Wants/ N eeds/ D esires - Special C haracteristics
M arket R esearch - M anufacturing IF Process T rial
- Q FD - C urrent C ontrols
- Assembly R un
Packaging
NO M in 300
pcs/ H its/ shots V alidation
D esign T est Plans D esigns
D esign A ctions T esting
I nput Priorities D evelopCChange
oncepts - D esign Verification Special
C ontrols Plan
F rom Wants/ N eeds/ - Product Process V alidation Plan
5 D esires - Process - G age P lan GR & R
No IF - G age Plan Repeatability OK?
D esign - C apability Plan
- F ailure M ode Reproducibility
A nalysis OK I nstructions
- H istory D evelop Product Yes - I nitial IF
Feasibility NO
- P ast P erformance Specifications
- T eam
- L essons L earned - L inked to C ustomers Statistics
D esign R isk A ssessment Revisit III YES
- Via C ontrol Plans
Process Development - O pen I ssues
- Spec. A greements
PF M E A
For Additional
- Capability Plan
IF N o - M aterials Potential
Feasible - Budget Failures STA BLE ?
- M anufacturing Process R isk A ssessment IF
Concept Yes NO
- Program R isks - E quipment YES
Initiation/Approval - Gages YES
Can w e chang e
- Controls
Program p ro ce ss to I F
- I nstructions C A PA BL E?
Approval Prototype Pilot Launch - E quipment I nstallation co n t a in ? NO
- Plans IF
- T ooling Progress - Status of O pen I ssues NO
K ick O ff T ools / E quipment G ages
PLANNING - G age D esign & P rogress
I nitial Process PLANNING D esign YES
C hange Sample T he
PRODUCT DESIGN AND DEV.
B ack to II
C reate Production - Source Wa
PROCESS DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT. C ontrol Plan - Supportin
- L evel of P
PRODUCT AND PROCESS VALIDATION. - R ed u c e d (n )
- R ed u c e d (f)
- O p t im izin g C h ar a c t e ris tic s
PRODUCTION

FEEDBACK ASSESSMENT AND CORRECTIVE ACTION

Open Issues / Time Line
CONTROL PLANS
 Requirements
Cascade
How Fmea fits into Product and
Process Development

This guideline is for training purposes only; Not ISO controlled

 Potential KPC Development

Requirements Documents

•Regulatory
•Dimensional
•Cosmetic
Robustness Tools
Req. Spec. Document
Drawings Boundary Diagram
Warranty History P-Diagram Item / C O Current D Action Results
Process Potential Response &
Potential Potential S l c Design e R

Interface Matrix
Step Cause(s)/ Recommended Target S O D R
Failure Effect(s) of e a c Controls t P Action
Mechanism(s) Actions Complete
Mode Failure v s
Of Failure
u e N
Date Taken E C E P
s r c V C T N
Function Prevent Detect

DFMEA

Special Characteristics Matrix

10 POTENTIAL CRITICAL CHARACTERISTICS

S 9 Safety/Regulatory
E 8 POTENTIAL
V 7 SIGNIFICANT
Cascade Technical E
R
6
5
CHARACTERISTICS
Customer Dissatisfaction

Requirements Into Special I

T
4
3
ANOYANCE
ZONE
Product Characteristics
ALL OTHER CHARACTERISTICS
Y 2
Appropriate actions /
1 controls already in place

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
OCCURRENCE

6
 Special

Sources

•Drawings
•Regulations
•DFMEA (Potential
Characteristics
Potential Critical and Significant

SEAL

FACE
KPCs: Significant and

SHOULDER
Critical Characteristics)

SERATION DAMAGE
Matrix

JACK SHAFT SEAL AGAINST

SEAL COMPRESSION HEIGHT

Relative Importance
DOWEL PINS 0.260 TO 0.270 " TO

Weighted Importance
BUSHING TO FACE OF JACK SHAFT
Special Characteristics

Direction of Improvement

BEARING FLUSH TO SNAP RING FACE

PRIMARY GASKET SEAL SURFACE FINISH

1.090 TO 1.110 " FACE OF PRIMARY HOUSING

5
9
9
3
9
3
5
Severity

0 Receive Material

81 Material handling

F
81 Shipping Damage

F
72 Component Manufacture

Y
0 Vehicle Assembly

Op 100 Step 1
9 PRE-LOAD DOWEL PINS TO

H
FIXTURE
Op 100 Step 2
41 PRE-LOAD JACK SHAFT

G
G
SEAL TO FIXTURE
IF

Op 100 Step 3
END

0 PRE-LOAD PRIMARY
START

HOUSING BUSHING TO
YES

FIXTURE

Op 110
0
OPERATION
OPERATION

Pre-load bearing to fixture #2

NO
Flow

Op 120
27 Pre-load main shaft oil seal to

H
mandrel

54 Op 200
Process

H
Housing to fixture #1

261 Op 210

F
F
F
F

H
Operate press

Op 220
3
G

Retaining ring to top groove

0 Op 230
Reload fixture #1

54 Op 300
H
H

Housing to fixture #2

81 Op 310
F

Operate press
Process Steps

3 Op 320
G

Retaining ring to top groove

0 Op 330
Mandrel to main shaft bore I.D.

0 OP 340
Operate press

0 Op 350
Re-load fixture #2 and mandrel

27 Op 400
Primary Drive Manufacturing Process Steps

Housing to table

0 Op 410
Reserved
Op 420
45
F

Chain adj sub assy to housing

Op 430
9
G

Lubricate bushing & seal

9 Op 445
G

Move or stage for final assy

0 Op 10
O-ring to shifter tube

0 Op 500
Shifter tube to housing

0 Op 510
Clamp to shifter tube

0 Op 20
Assemble shifter lever

0 Op 520
Wave washer to shifter lever

0 Op 530
Shifter lever to shifter tube
0 Op 535
Que for final assy line
Customer
Assessment

7
Characteristics Matrix Development
 Potential Critical and Significant

SEAL

FACE

SHOULDER

SERATION DAMAGE
Matrix
Sources

JACK SHAFT SEAL AGAINST

SEAL COMPRESSION HEIGHT

Relative Importance
DOWEL PINS 0.260 TO 0.270 " TO

Weighted Importance
BUSHING TO FACE OF JACK SHAFT
Special Characteristics

Direction of Improvement

BEARING FLUSH TO SNAP RING FACE

PRIMARY GASKET SEAL SURFACE FINISH

1.090 TO 1.110 " FACE OF PRIMARY HOUSING
Critical Characteristics
from DFMEA & Other

5
9
9
3
9
3
5
Potential Significant and

Severity

0 Receive Material

81 Material handling

F
81 Shipping Damage

F
72 Component Manufacture

H
Y
0 Vehicle Assembly
Op 100 Step 1
9 PRE-LOAD DOWEL PINS TO

relative to risk
FIXTURE

of process steps
Op 100 Step 2

Prioritized ranking
41 PRE-LOAD JACK SHAFT

G
G
SEAL TO FIXTURE
Op 100 Step 3
PRE-LOAD PRIMARY
0
HOUSING BUSHING TO
FIXTURE
Op 110
0 Pre-load bearing to fixture #2
Op 120
27 Pre-load main shaft oil seal to

H
mandrel
Importance

Op 200
54
Characteristics

H Housing to fixture #1
Op 210
Ranked in order of

F
F
F
F

261 H H Operate press

Op 220
3
G

Retaining ring to top groove

Op 230
0
Reload fixture #1
Op 300
54
H
H

Housing to fixture #2
Op 310
81
F
H
H

Operate press
Process Steps

Op 320
3
G

Retaining ring to top groove

Op 330
0 Mandrel to main shaft bore I.D.
OP 340
0
Operate press
Op 350
0
Re-load fixture #2 and mandrel
Op 400
27
H

Housing to table
Op 410
0 Reserved
Primary Drive Manufacturing Process Steps

Op 420
45
F

Chain adj sub assy to housing

Op 430
9 Lubricate bushing & seal
Op 445
9
G G

Move or stage for final assy

Op 10
0 O-ring to shifter tube
Op 500
0 Shifter tube to housing
PFMEA

Op 510
0
Clamp to shifter tube
Process Operation

Op 20
from Process Flow

0 Assemble shifter lever

Op 520
0
Wave washer to shifter lever
Op 530
0
causes/failure modes in

Shifter lever to shifter tube

Op 535
0
Que for final assy line
High/Medium Interactions are
Customer
Assessment

8
Characteristics Matrix
 FMEA Deployment

 A layered approach is highly

recommended as FMEAs can get
complex.
 FMEAs are like ONIONS/LAYERS.
Each layer is closer to the root cause
Each layer is more detailed
The closer to core the more detail
Core gets to the root cause
Do too many and you will cry.

9
 System Boundary Diagram
Cylinder Head Compression Brake
on
Vi rati
br Vib
at
Additional Clearances ion
Arm Group Assembly Shaft Assembly
•Injector & Spring •Intake rocker assembly •Shaft
Intake Rocker Assembly Clearance Valve Cover
•Exhaust rocker assembly •Cup
•Injector & Spring Base Exhaust Rocker Assembly
•Stand(s) W & W/o oil supply •Pin
•Body
•Injector & retainer •Shaft Assembly
•Insert
•Injector & Bridge •Mounting Bolt
•Roller
•Spring/Spacer
•Injector & injector clamp •Pin
•Clip
Valve Floating Bridge Lube Oil
Pushrod
•Injector oil •Rod
•Cup
Spring Group •Ball
•Inner & Outer Springs
Cylinder Head Load •Spring Base
•Retainer/Rotator
Lifter Assembly
•Valve Keeper
ok e •Body
str
Valve Stem Seal at full
Clear Valve Group •Insert
•Intake Valve •Roller
•Exhaust Valve •Pin
•Intake Seat •Clip
Lube Oil •wire Oscillating Lifter
•Exhaust Seat
•Valve Guide •Pressure Lube
CAM Shaft
Cylinder Head •Valve Guide Seal OR
Bore in Block
Valve Seat CAM Bearings
•Pressure Lube
Seat Insert
Thrust Plate
Cylinder Head
Cylinder Block
 P-Diagram
Noise Factors

1. Piece to piece variation 2. Other systems 3. Customer usage/duty cycle

Heat shields Foot peg location After market changes
Pipe maufacturing variation Engine mount -mufflers, foot pegs, decorative covers
Frame variation Change calibrations, runs hotter, componet discoloring, over drive
system, excesive lean angle
Supension changes, lowers bike
Improper storage practices

4. Deterioration/degredagtion over time 4. Environment

Gasket wear Ocean sea side (salt)
Motor mount wear Sand, dust
Corrosion Gravel
Loss of torque on fasteners Parade duty (low speed)

Input Ideal function

Exhaust gases from engine Exhaust Pipes, Front & Rear
Engine vibration
Road vibration Meet Styling Requirements
Transfer of exhaust gas
Adequate clearance to other components
Control factors Meet Durability Requirements

Regulatory Error states

Lean Angle (SAE)
Durability Requirements (GES)
Difficult to service
Does not meet styling review
Difficult to assemble
High warranty
Poor lean angle

11
 FMEA Preparation Vertical Approach

 Key Elements of Efficient Development

 Identify all functions/process steps
Boundary Diagram
P Diagram
 Identify all failure modes via
brainstorming/data/warranty/COQ
 Identify all effects via brainstorming/data
Customer focus
 Develop data pools for
Failure Modes, Effects and Causes for future/ faster
FMEA development

12
 System/Subsystem/ Design FMEA

 Failure Mode: Pure anti-function

FUNCTION

(ANTI)

13
 System/Subsystem/ Design FMEA

 Effect
Customer view/customers words
Regulation violation
Level of dissatisfaction
 Consider All Customers
End User
Engineering Community
Manufacturing Community
(Operators/Employees)
Regulatory Body

14
 Severity Column

Item / C O D Action Results

Process Potential Current Response &
Potential Potential S l c Process e R
Step Cause(s)/ Recommended Traget S O D R
Failure Effect(s) of e a c Controls t P Action
Mechanism(s) Actions Complete E C E P
Mode Failure v s u e N Taken
Of Failure Date V C T N
s r c
Function Prevent Detect

Severity
Column

15
AUTOMOTIVE EXAMPLE SEVERITY EVALUATION CRITERIA

SEVERITY EVALUATION CRITERIA

EFFECT CRITERIA: Severity of Effect RNK.

Hazardous- Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle
without operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulation without
10
warning
warning
Hazardous- Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle
with operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulation with warning
9
warning
Very High Vehicle/item inoperable (loss of primary function). 8

Vehicle/item operable but at a reduced level of performance. Customer very

High dissatisfied. 7

Vehicle/item operable but Comfort/Convenience item(s) inoperable. Customer

Moderate dissatisfied. 6

Vehicle/item operable but Comfort/Convenience item(s) operable at a reduced

Low level of performance. Customer somewhat dissatisfied. 5

Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by most
Very Low customers (greater than 75%). 4

Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by 50% of
Minor customers. 3

Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by
Very Minor discriminating customers (less than 25%). 2

None No discernable effect. 1

16
 FMEA General

For High Severity 9/10

17
 Failure Mode/Cause Relationship
In Different FMEA Levels
Inadequate
Electrical
Connection
Failure
Cause Mode
Motor
Stops
Failure
Mode Inadequate
Electrical Connection

InadequateCauses Harness
Locking Too Short
Feature

18
 Causes

 Causes from P-Diagram

Noise factors
Continue through all failure modes.
 Note that many causes are recurring.

19
 Occurrence Column

Item / C O D Action Results

Process Potential Current Response &
Potential Potential S l c Process e R
Step Cause(s)/ Recommended Traget S O D R
Failure Effect(s) of e a c Controls t P Action
Mechanism(s) Actions Complete E C E P
Mode Failure v s u e N Taken
Of Failure Date V C T N
s r c
Function Prevent Detect

Occurrence
Column

20
 Occurrence Evaluation Criteria

SUGGESTED OCCURRENCE EVALUATION CRITERIA

Probability of Likely Failure Rates Over Design Life Ranking
Failure

≥ 100 per thousand vehicles/items 10

Very High: Persistent failures
50 per thousand vehicles/items 9

20 per thousand vehicles/items 8

High: Frequent failures
10 per thousand vehicles/items 7

5 per thousand vehicles/items 6

Moderate: Occasional failures 2 per thousand vehicles/items 5
1 per thousand vehicles/items 4

0.5 per thousand vehicles/items 3

Low: Relatively few failures
0.1 per thousand vehicles/items 2

Remote: Failure is unlikely ≤ 0.01 per thousand vehicles/items 1

*Note: Zero (0) rankings for Severity, Occurrence or Detection are not allowed

21
 Occurrence Rating

 If an action would effectively eliminate

the possibility of the cause occurring,
the action is listed as described earlier.
Occurrence of 1 or 2 require proof using a
surrogate product or mistake proofing.

DATA HARD FACTS

22
Example of Significant/ Critical Threshold

Special Characteristics Matrix

10 POTENTIAL CRITICAL
9 CHARACTERISTICS Safety/Regulatory
S
E 8 POTENTIAL
V 7 SIGNIFICANT
E 6 CHARACTERISTICS
Customer Dissatisfaction
R 5
I 4 ANOYANCE
T 3 ZONE
Y 2 ALL OTHER CHARACTERISTICS

Appropriate actions /
1 controls already in place

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
OCCURRENCE
*Used by permission of Ford Motor Company 23
 Classification And Definition Column

C O D Action Results
Item Potential Response &
Potential Potential S l c Current e R.Recommended
Cause(s) / Target
Failure Effect(s) of e a c Design t P. Actions Actions S O D R.
Mechanism(s) Complete
Mode Failure v s u Controls e N. Taken e c e P.
of Failure Date
Function s r c v c t N.

Classification and
Definition Column

24
 Design Verification (Current Design Controls)

 Think of Design Control in two ways;

Prevention and Detection. List them
separately.
 To save time, add any new (untried)
prevention/detection ideas to the document
under Recommended Actions column.
Prevention is specifically related to reduction or
elimination of a cause.
Detection is how well the test or series of tests
may find the design flaw
Causes
Failure Mode

25
 Detection Rating
SUGGESTED DETECTION EVALATION CRITERIA
DETECTION CRITERIA RNK.

Design Control will not and/or cannot detect a potential cause/ mechanism and
Absolute
subsequent failure mode; or there is no 10
Uncertainty Design Control.

Very Remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and
Very Remote 9
subsequent failure mode.

Remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism and
Remote 8
subsequent failure mode.

Very Low chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and
Very Low 7
subsequent failure mode.

Low chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and
Low 6
subsequent failure mode.

Moderate chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism and
Moderate 5
subsequent failure mode.

Moderately Moderately High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism
4
High and subsequent failure mode.

High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism and
High 3
subsequent failure mode.

Very High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism and
Very High 2
subsequent failure mode.

Almost Design Controls will almost certainly detect a potential cause/ mechanism and
1
Certain subsequent failure mode.

26
 Analysis Of Risk

 RPN / RISK PRIORITY NUMBER

 What Is Risk?
 Probability of danger
 Severity/Occurrence/Cause

27
 RPN / Risk Priority Number

Top 20% of Failure

Modes by RPN

R
P
N

28
 Evaluation by RPN Only

 Case 1
S=5 O=5 D=2 RPN = 50
 Case 2
S=3 O=3 D=6 RPN = 54
WHICH ONE
 Case 3
IS WORSE?
S=2 O=10, D=10 = 200
 Case 4
S=9 O=2 D=3 = 54

29
 Example

 Extreme Safety/Regulatory Risk

=9 & 10 Severity
 High Risk to Customer Satisfaction
Sev. > or = to 5 and Occ > or = 4

 Consider Detection only as a measure

of Test Capability.

30
Example of Significant/ Critical Threshold

Special Characteristics Matrix

10 POTENTIAL CRITICAL
9 CHARACTERISTICS Safety/Regulatory
S
E 8 POTENTIAL
V 7 SIGNIFICANT
E 6 CHARACTERISTICS
Customer Dissatisfaction
R 5
I 4 ANOYANCE
T 3 ZONE
Y 2 ALL OTHER CHARACTERISTICS

Appropriate actions /
1 controls already in place

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
OCCURRENCE
*Used by permission of Ford Motor Company 31
 Actions

Your Company Name Here Potential

Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
System (Design FMEA) FMEA Number:
Subsystem Page of
Component: Design Responsibility: Prepared by:
Key Date: FMEA Date (Orig.): (Rev.):
Model Year/Vehicle (s):
Core Team:
Item Action Results
c Potential Responsibility
Potential Potential s l o Current D R.
e a Cause (s)/ c P. Recommended & Target Actions
Failure Effect (s) of c Design e
v s Mechanism (s) t N. Action(s) Completion Taken
Mode Failure s u Controls s o D R.
Failure r e Date
c e c e P.
Function v c t N.

32
 Actions

EXAMPLE:

Project: Date Of
Meeting:

Issue Issue Status/ Issue Action Action Action Person Resp. Completion
Number Open Date Champion Number Date Team Date
143

33
 Re-rating RPN After Actions Have Occurred

Your Company Name Here Potential

Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
System (Design FMEA) FMEA Number:
Subsystem Page of
Component: Design Responsibility: Prepared by:
Key Date: FMEA Date (Orig.): (Rev.):
Model Year/Vehicle (s):
Core Team:

Item Action Results

Potential Potential S C Potential O Current D R. Recommended Responsibility
e l c e P.
Failure Effect (s) of v a Cause (s)/ c Design t N. Action(s) & Target S O D R.
Actions
Mode Failure s Mechanism (s) u Controls e Completion e c e P.
s r c Taken v c t N.
Failure Date
Function

34
Re-rating RPN After Actions Have Occurred

 Severity typically stays the same.

 Occurrence is the primary item to reduce /
focus on.
 Detection is reduced only as a last resort.
 Do not plan to REDUCE RPN with detection
actions!!!
100% inspection is only 80% effective!
Reducing RPN with detection does not eliminate
failure mode, or reduce probability of causes
Detection of 10 is not bad if occurrence is 1

35
 FMEA in a continuous flow process

Steel Making example:

Design FMEA was performed on a Crankshaft to

determine the best material for the product
being considered. This was a critical
application.

Key features such as Geometry, Strength, Duty

Cycle, were described to the Steel producer.

36
The key product requirements were mapped
against the required customer features. E.g.
chemistry and microstructure, Internal stress at
ingot level,
Product Grade and requirements documents
created.
Key characteristics mapped against processes
Process FMEA was performed on processes that
affected customer wants based on priority.

37
 Phase I QFD Product
Specifications

Phase
Progressi
on
Systems / Sub-
Phase II Systems / Components

QFD

Customer
Wants
(Marketing
Information)

DFMEA Failure Modes

Product
Specifications System DFMEA
Sub-System DFMEA
Component DFMEA
Inputs
•Drawings•Boundary
Diagram
•Warranty
•P-Diagram
•FMA
•Interface
Matrix

QFD Phase Progression

38
 Potential Critical and Significant

SEAL

FACE

SHOULDER

SERATION DAMAGE
Matrix

JACK SHAFT SEAL AGAINST

SEAL COMPRESSION HEIGHT

Relative Importance
DOWEL PINS 0.260 TO 0.270 " TO

Weighted Importance
BUSHING TO FACE OF JACK SHAFT
Special Characteristics

Direction of Improvement

BEARING FLUSH TO SNAP RING FACE

PRIMARY GASKET SEAL SURFACE FINISH

1.090 TO 1.110 " FACE OF PRIMARY HOUSING

5
9
9
3
9
3
5
Severity
DFMEA
and Critical

0 Receive Material

81 Material handling

F
Characteristics from
Potential Significant

81 Shipping Damage

F
72 Component Manufacture

Y
H
0 Vehicle Assembly
Op 100 Step 1
9 PRE-LOAD DOWEL PINS TO

relative to risk
FIXTURE

of process steps
Op 100 Step 2

Prioritized ranking
41 PRE-LOAD JACK SHAFT

G
G
SEAL TO FIXTURE
Op 100 Step 3
PRE-LOAD PRIMARY
0
HOUSING BUSHING TO
FIXTURE
Op 110
0 Pre-load bearing to fixture #2
Op 120
27 Pre-load main shaft oil seal to
H
mandrel
Importance

Op 200
54
Characteristics

H
H
Housing to fixture #1
Op 210
Ranked in order of

F
F
F
F

261
H

Operate press
Op 220
3
G

Retaining ring to top groove

Op 230
0
Reload fixture #1
Op 300
54
H
H

Housing to fixture #2
Op 310
81
F
H
H

Operate press
Process Steps

Op 320
3
G

Retaining ring to top groove

Op 330
0 Mandrel to main shaft bore I.D.
OP 340
0
Operate press
Op 350
0
Re-load fixture #2 and mandrel
Op 400
27
H

Housing to table
Op 410
0 Reserved
Primary Drive Manufacturing Process Steps

Op 420
F

45 Chain adj sub assy to housing

Op 430
9
G

Lubricate bushing & seal

Op 445
9
G

Move or stage for final assy

Op 10
0 O-ring to shifter tube
Op 500
0 Shifter tube to housing
PFMEA

Op 510
0
Clamp to shifter tube
Process Operation

Op 20
from Process Flow

0 Assemble shifter lever

Op 520
0
Wave washer to shifter lever
Op 530
0
causes/failure modes in

Shifter lever to shifter tube

Op 535
0
Que for final assy line
High/Medium Interactions are
Customer
Assessment

39
The Completed Characteristics Matrix
 Phase III Process
System DFMEA
Sub-System DFMEA
QFD Operations

Phase IV
Component DFMEA
QFD
Process
Parameters /
High Priority Variables
Process Operations

SC’s & CC’s

Classification
of Causes
Characteristi from
cs DFMEA’s
Special Characteristics Matrix
10 CRITICAL CHARACTERISTICS

S 9 Safety/Regulatory

E 8 SIGNIFICANT
V 7 CHARACTERISTICS
E 6 Customer Dissatisfaction
R 5
I 4 ANNOYANCE
T 3 ZONE
SC’s & CC’s
ALL OTHER CHARACTERISTICS
Y 2 Appropriate actions /
1 controls already in place
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
OCCURRENCE
Process Related
SC’s & CC’s Failure Causes on
From all DFMEA’s Modes on PFMEA Key Control
PFMEA Characteristi
Process FMEA cs
Inputs
•Failure •Process
Data Flow Control Plan
•Process •Line Layout
Capability •MFMEA

QFD Phase Progression 40

 Summary

FMEA can be used creatively in continuous

processing.

Linking key customer requirements to process

outputs instead of standard product grade is
valuable.

Future customer requirements will drive new and

modified processes to achieve specialty results as a
normal practice

41
Q&A

This guideline is for training purposes only; Not ISO controlled