Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Corporate Valuation,
Value-Based Management and
Corporate Governance
1
Topics in Chapter
Corporate Valuation
Value-Based Management
Corporate Governance
2
Intrinsic Value: Putting the Pieces Together
Weighted average
cost of capital
(WACC)
4
Assets-in-Place
Assets-in-place are tangible, such as
buildings, machines, inventory.
Usually they are expected to grow.
They generate free cash flows.
The PV of their expected future free
cash flows, discounted at the WACC, is
the value of operations.
5
Value of Operations
∞
Vop = Σ
t=1
FCFt
(1 + WACC)t
6
Nonoperating Assets
Marketable securities
Ownership of non-controlling interest in
another company
Value of nonoperating assets usually is
very close to figure that is reported on
balance sheets.
7
Total Corporate Value
Total corporate value is sum of:
Value of operations
Value of nonoperating assets
8
Claims on Corporate Value
Debtholders have first claim.
Preferred stockholders have the next
claim.
Any remaining value belongs to
stockholders.
9
Applying the Corporate
Valuation Model
Forecast the financial statements, as
shown in Chapter 12.
Calculate the projected free cash flows.
Model can be applied to a company that
does not pay dividends, a privately held
company, or a division of a company,
since FCF can be calculated for each of
these situations.
10
Data for Valuation
FCF0 = $24 million
WACC = 11%
g = 5%
Marketable securities = $100 million
Debt = $200 million
Preferred stock = $50 million
Book value of equity = $210 million
Number of shares =n = 10 million
11
Value of Operations: Constant
FCF Growth at Rate of g
∞
Vop = Σ
t=1
FCFt
(1 + WACC)t
∞
= Σ
t=1
FCF0(1+g)t
(1 + WACC)t
12
Constant Growth Formula
FCF0(1+g)
= (WACC - g)
14
Find Value of Operations
FCF0 (1 + g)
Vop =
(WACC - g)
24(1+0.05)
Vop = = 420
(0.11 – 0.05)
15
Total Value of Company (VTotal)
Voperations $420.00
+ ST Inv. 100.00
VTotal $520.00
16
Intrinsic Value of Equity (VEquity)
Voperations $420.00
+ ST Inv. 100.00
VTotal $520.00
− Preferred Stk. 50.00
− Debt 200.00
VEquity $270.00
17
Intrinsic Stock Price per Share, P
Voperations $420.00
+ ST Inv. 100.00
VTotal $520.00
− Preferred Stk. 50.00
− Debt 200.00
VEquity $270.00
÷n 10
P $27.00
18
Intrinsic Market Value Added
(MVA)
Intrinsic MVA = Total corporate value of firm
minus total book value of capital supplied by
investors
Total book value of capital = book value of
equity + book value of debt + book value of
preferred stock
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Breakdown of Corporate Value
Intrinsic MVA
600
100 Debt
0 Marketable
Sources Claims Market securities
of Value on Value vs. Book Value of operations
20
Expansion Plan: Nonconstant
Growth
Finance expansion by borrowing $40
million and halting dividends.
Projected free cash flows (FCF):
Year 1 FCF = -$5 million.
Year 2 FCF = $10 million.
Year 3 FCF = $20 million
FCF grows at constant rate of 6% after
year 3.
(More…)
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The weighted average cost of capital,
WACC, is 10%.
The company has 10 million shares of
stock.
22
Horizon Value
Free cash flows are forecast for three
years in this example, so the forecast
horizon is three years.
Growth in free cash flows is not
constant during the forecast, so we
can’t use the constant growth formula
to find the value of operations at time
0.
23
Horizon Value (Cont.)
Growth is constant after the horizon (3
years), so we can modify the constant
growth formula to find the value of all
free cash flows beyond the horizon,
discounted back to the horizon.
24
Horizon Value Formula
FCFt(1+g)
HV = Vop at time t =
(WACC - g)
0 WACC =10%
1 2 3 g = 6%
8.264 $20(1.06)
15.026 0.10−0.06
398.197 $530 = Vop at 3
416.942 = Vop $530/(1+WACC)3
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Intrinsic Stock Price per Share, P
Voperations $416.942
+ ST Inv. 0
VTotal $416.942
− Preferred Stk. 0
− Debt 40.000
VEquity $376.942
÷n 10
P $37.69
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Value-Based Management
(VBM)
VBM is the systematic application of the
corporate valuation model to all
corporate decisions and strategic
initiatives.
The objective of VBM is to increase
Market Value Added (MVA)
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MVA and the Four Value
Drivers
MVA is determined by four drivers:
Sales growth
Operating profitability (OP=NOPAT/Sales)
Capital requirements (CR=Operating
capital / Sales)
Weighted average cost of capital
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MVA for a Constant Growth
Firm
MVAt =
Salest(1 + g) CR
OP – WACC
WACC - g (1+g)
30
Insights from the Constant
Growth Model
Salest(1 + g)
WACC - g
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Insights (Cont.)
The second bracket is the operating
profit (as a %) the firm gets to keep,
less the return that investors require for
having tied up their capital in the firm.
CR
OP – WACC
(1+g)
32
Improvements in MVA due to
the Value Drivers
MVA will improve if:
WACC is reduced
operating profitability (OP) increases
the capital requirement (CR) decreases
33
The Impact of Growth
The second term in brackets can be either
positive or negative, depending on the
relative size of profitability, capital
requirements, and required return by
investors.
CR
OP – WACC
(1+g)
34
The Impact of Growth (Cont.)
If the second term in brackets is
negative, then growth decreases MVA.
In other words, profits are not enough
to offset the return on capital required
by investors.
If the second term in brackets is
positive, then growth increases MVA.
35
Expected Return on Invested
Capital (EROIC)
39
What is the impact on MVA if
growth goes from 5% to 6%?
Division A Division B
OP 6% 6% 4% 4%
CR 78% 78% 27% 27%
Growth 5% 6% 5% 6%
MVA (300.0) (360.0) 300.0 385.0
41
Analysis of Growth Strategies
The expected ROIC of Division A is less than
the WACC, so the division should postpone
growth efforts until it improves EROIC by
reducing capital requirements (e.g., reducing
inventory) and/or improving profitability.
The expected ROIC of Division B is greater
than the WACC, so the division should
continue with its growth plans.
42
Six Potential Problems with
Managerial Behavior
Expend too little time and effort.
Consume too many nonpecuniary
benefits.
Avoid difficult decisions (e.g., close
plant) out of loyalty to friends in
company.
(More . .)
43
Six Problems with Managerial
Behavior (Continued)
Reject risky positive NPV projects to avoid
looking bad if project fails; take on risky
negative NPV projects to try and hit a home
run.
Avoid returning capital to investors by making
excess investments in marketable securities
or by paying too much for acquisitions.
Massage information releases or manage
earnings to avoid revealing bad news.
44
Corporate Governance
The set of laws, rules, and procedures
that influence a company’s operations
and the decisions made by its
managers.
Sticks (threat of removal)
Carrots (compensation)
45
Corporate Governance Provisions
Under a Firm’s Control
Board of directors
Charter provisions affecting takeovers
Compensation plans
Capital structure choices
Internal accounting control systems
46
Effective Boards of Directors
Election mechanisms make it easier for
minority shareholders to gain seats:
Not a “classified” board (i.e., all board
members elected each year, not just those
with multi-year staggered terms)
Board elections allow cumulative voting
(More . .)
47
Effective Boards of Directors
CEO is not chairman of the board and
does not have undue influence over the
nominating committee.
Board has a majority of outside
directors (i.e., those who do not have
another position in the company) with
business expertise.
(More . .)
48
Effective Boards of Directors
(Continued)
(More . .)
49
Effective Boards of Directors
(Continued)
50
Anti-Takeover Provisions
Targeted share repurchases (i.e.,
greenmail)
Shareholder rights provisions (i.e.,
poison pills)
Restricted voting rights plans
51
Stock Options in
Compensation Plans
Gives owner of option the right to buy a
share of the company’s stock at a
specified price (called the strike price or
exercise price) even if the actual stock
price is higher.
Usually can’t exercise the option for
several years (called the vesting
period).
52
Stock Options (Cont.)
Can’t exercise the option after a certain
number of years (called the expiration,
or maturity, date).
53
Problems with Stock Options
Manager can underperform market or
peer group, yet still reap rewards from
options as long as the stock price
increases to above the exercise cost.
Options sometimes encourage
managers to falsify financial statements
or take excessive risks.
54
Block Ownership
Outside investor owns large amount
(i.e., block) of company’s shares
Institutional investors, such as CalPERS or
TIAA-CREF
Blockholders often monitor managers
and take active role, leading to better
corporate governance
55
Regulatory Systems and Laws
Companies in countries with strong
protection for investors tend to have:
Better access to financial markets
A lower cost of equity
Increased market liquidity
Less noise in stock prices
56