 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is

the principal judicial organ of the United

Nations (UN). It was established in June
1945 by the Charter of the United
Nations and began work in April 1946.
 The seat of the Court is at the Peace
Palace in The Hague (Netherlands). Of
the six principal organs of the United
Nations, it is the only one not located in
New York (United States of America).
 The Court is composed of 15 judges, who are
elected for terms of office of nine years by the
United Nations General Assembly and the
Security Council. It is assisted by a Registry, its
administrative organ. Its official languages are
English and French.
 Judges are elected to nine-year terms of office
by the United Nations General Assembly and
the Security Council. These organs vote
simultaneously but separately. In order to be
elected, a candidate must receive an absolute
majority of the votes in both bodies.
 The International Court of Justice acts as a
world court. The Court has a dual
jurisdiction :
 it decides, in accordance with international
law, disputes of a legal nature that are
submitted to it by States (jurisdiction in
contentious cases); and
 it gives advisory opinions on legal questions at
the request of the organs of the United Nations
or specialized agencies authorized to make
such a request (advisory jurisdiction).
 ICJ covers legal disputes which the
States refer to it.
 (a) the interpretation of a treaty;
 (b) any question of international law;
 (c) the existence of any fact which, if
established, would constitute a breach
of an international obligation; and
 (d) the nature or extent of the
reparation to be made for the breach of
an international obligation.
 The ICJ also has jurisdiction to give an advisory
opinion on any legal question as may be
requested by the General Assembly or the
Security Council or on legal questions arising
within the scope of the activities of other
organs and specialized agencies of the U.N.
upon their request and when so authorized by
the General Assembly. (Article 96, U.N. Charter)
 only States may be parties in cases before the
ICJ and their consent is needed for the ICJ to
acquire jurisdiction
 On October 22nd, 1946, two British
cruisers and two destroyers, coming
from the south, entered the North
Corfu Strait. The channel they were
following, which was in Albanian
waters, was regarded as safe: it had
been swept in 1944 and check-
swept in 1945.
 One of the destroyers, the
Saumarez, when off Saranda, struck
a mine and was gravely damaged.
 The other destroyer, the Volage,
was sent to her assistance and,
while towing her, struck another
mine and was also seriously
damaged. Forty-five British officers
and sailors lost their lives, and
forty-two others were wounded.
 An incident had already occurred in
these waters on May 15th, 1946: an
Albanian battery had fired in the
direction of two British cruisers. The
United Kingdom Government had
protested, stating that innocent
passage through straits is a right
recognised by international law; the
Albanian Government had replied that
foreign warships and merchant vessels
had no right to pass through Albanian
territorial waters without prior
authorisation;
 and on August 2nd, 1946, the
United Kingdom Government had
replied that if, in the future, fire
was opened on a British warship
passing through the channel, the
fire would be returned. After the
explosions on October 22nd, title
United Kingdom Government sent
a Note to Tirana announcing its
intention to sweep the Corfu
Channel shortly.
 His reply was that this consent would not
be given unless the operation in question
took place outside Albanian territorial
waters and that any sweep undertaken in
those waters would be a violation of
Albania's sovereignty. The sweep effected
by the British Navy took place on
November 12th/13th 1946, in Albanian
territorial waters and within the limits of
the channel previously swept. Twenty two
moored mines were cut; they were mines
of the German GYtype.
 Holding that the responsibility of the Albanian
Government was involved, the Government of
the United Kingdom, following upon diplomatic
correspondence with Tirana, submitted the
matter to the Security Council. That body invited
Albania, which is not a Member of the United
Nations, to participate in the discussions, on
condition that she accepted all the obligations of
a Member in a similar case. Albania accepted
and, on April 9th, 1947, the Security Council
adopted a resolution recommending the
Governments concerned immediately to refer the
dispute to the Court in accordance with the
provisions of its Statute.
 On July 23rd, 1947, the Albanian Government
deposited with the Registry of the Court a
letter dated July 2nd in which it expressed the
opinion that the Application of the United
Kingdom was not in conformity with the
Security Council's recommendation of April
9th, 1947, because the institution of
proceedings by unilateral application was not
justified by the Charter, by die Statute or by
general international law.
 Nevertheless, it fully accepted the Security
Council's recommendation profoundly
convinced of the justice of its case and
resolved to neglect no opportunity of giving
evidence of its devotion to the principles of
friendly collaboration between nations and of
the pacific settlement of disputes, it was
prepared, notwithstanding the irregularity in
the action taken by the United Kingdom
Government, to appear before the Court.
 Following upon the deposit of the Albanian
Government's letter, an Order was made
fixing the time-limits for the presentation of a
Memorial by the Government of the United
Kingdom and of a Counter-Memorial by the
Albanian Government.
 Within the time-limit fixed for the latter, the
Albanian Government submitted a
"preliminary objection to the Application on
the ground of inadmissibility“ because it
contravened the provisions of Articles 40
(ground of the inadmissibility of the
Application) and 36 (relates exclusively to the
Court's jurisdiction) of the Statute.
 When, in fact, the Albanian Government
states in its letter that it is prepared,
notwithstanding the "irregularity in the
action taken by the Government of the United
Kingdom, to appear before the Court", it is
clear that it waived the right to adduce the
objection that the Application was
inadmissible.
 And when it expressly refers to "its
acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction to this
case", these words constitute a voluntary and
indisputable acceptance of the Court's
jurisdiction.
 In this connection, the Court recalls that
while the consent of the parties confers
jurisdiction on the Court, such consent need
not be expressed in any special form. In
particular, as the Permanent Court of
International Justice decided in 1928, the
previous formal conclusion of a special
agreement is unnecessary. In submitting the
case by Application, the United Kingdom
gave the Albanian Government an
opportunity of accepting die jurisdiction of
the Court; and this acceptance was given in
the Albanian letter of July 2nd, 1947.
 For these reasons, the Court rejects the
objection; and it fixes time-limits for the
subsequent pleadings on the merits
 On the same day, March 25th, 1948 the two
Parties concluded a Special Agreement: asking
the Court to give judgment on the following
questions:
 1. Is Albania responsible for the explosions, and
is there a duty to pay compensation?
 2. Has the United Kingdom violated international
law by the acts of its Navy in Albanian waters,
first on the day on which the explosions occurred
and, secondly, on November 12th and 13th, 1946,
when it undertook a sweep of the Strait?
 In its Judgment the Court declared on the first
question, by 11 votes against 5, that Albania
was responsible.
 In regard to the second question, it declared
by 14 votes against 2 that the United Kingdom
did not violate Albanian sovereignty on
October 22nd; but it declared unanimously
that it violated that sovereignty on November
12th/13th, and that this declaration, in itself,
constituted appropriate satisfaction.
 In a Judgment given on April 9th, 1949, the
Court held Albania responsible, under
international law, for the explosions which
occurred on October 22nd, 1946, in Albanian
waters, and for the damage and loss of human
life that resulted to the United Kingdom. In
the same Judgment, the Court concluded that
it had jurisdiction to assess the amount of the
compensation, but it was not able to do so
immediately, as certain information was
lacking.
 Albania decided not to take any further part in
the proceedings. At a public hearing on
November 17th, 1949, the Court, after hearing the
representatives of the United Kingdom, ordered
an examination of the figures and estimates
produced by the United Kingdom to be entrusted
to experts, owing to the technical nature of the
question raised.
 These experts, who were two specialists in naval
construction and in warships, of Netherlands
nationality, handed in their report on December
2nd; at a subsequent meeting of the Court, they
answered questions put to them by certain
Judges who desired further enlightenment.
 the Court states that, as the Albanian
Government has failed to defend its case,
procedure in default of appearance is brought
into operation.
 The Court having given a decision in its
Judgment of April 9th that it has jurisdiction
to assess the compensation, the matter is res
judicata and no longer in discussion.
 But even in procedure in default of
appearance, the Court is bound to satisfy
itself that the claim is well founded in fact
and law.
 On the first two heads of the claim the Court
states that, in the view of the experts appointed
by it, the figures given by the United Kingdom
Government may be held to be an exact and
reasonable estimate of the damage sustained.
 As regards the claim for compensation in respect
of naval personnel, the Court considers that the
documents produced by the United Kingdom
Government are sufficient proof.
 The Court therefore gives judgment in favour of
the claim of the United Kingdom and condemns
Albania to pay to that country a total
compensation of £843,947.
 Temple of Preah Vihear, an ancient sanctuary,
partially in ruins, stood on a promontory of the
Dangrek range of mountains which constituted the
boundary between Cambodia and Thailand. The
dispute had its fans et origo in the boundary
settlements made in the period 1904-1908 between
France, then conducting the foreign relations of
Indo-China, and Siam. The application of the
Treaty of 13 February 1904 was, in particular,
involved. That Treaty established the general
character of the frontier the exact boundary of
which was to be delimited by a Franco-Siamese
Mixed Commission.
 In the eastern sector of the Dangrek range, in
which Preah Vihear was situated, the frontier
was to follow the watershed line. For the
purpose of delimiting that frontier, it was
agreed, at a meeting held on 2 December 1906,
that the Mixed Commission should travel
along the Dangrek range carrying out all the
necessary reconnaissance, and that a survey
officer of the French section of the
Commission should survey the whole of the
eastern part of the range.
 The final stage of the delimitation was the
preparation of maps. The Siamese
Government, which did not dispose of
adequate technical means, had requested that
French officers should map the frontier
region. These maps were completed in the
autumn of 1907 by a team of French officers,
some of whom had been members of the
Mixed Commission, and they were
communicated to the Siamese Government in
1908. Amongst them was a map of the
Dangrek range showing Preah Vihear on the
Cambodian side when in fact it was on
Thailand side..
 It was clear from the record, however, that the
maps were communicated to the Siamese
Government as purporting to represent the
outcome of the work of delimitation; since there
was no reaction on the part of the Siamese
authorities, either then or for many years, they
must be held to have acquiesced.
 The maps were moreover communicated to the
Siamese members of the Mixed Commission,
who said nothing, to the Siamese Minister of the
Interior, Prince Damrong, who thanked the
French Minister in Bangkok for them, and to the
Siamese provincial governors, some of whom
knew of Preah Vihear. If the Siamese authorities
accepted the Annex I map without investigation,
they could not now plead any error vitiating the
reality of their consent.
 From these facts, the court concluded that
Thailand had accepted the Annex I map. Even if
there were any doubt in this connection,
Thailand was not precluded from asserting that
she had not accepted it since France and
Cambodia had relied upon her acceptance and
she had for fifty years enjoyed such benefits as
the Treaty of 1904 has conferred on her.
Furthermore, the acceptance of the Annex I map
caused it to enter the treaty settlement; the Parties
had at that time adopted an interpretation of that
settlement which caused the map line to prevail
over the provisions of the Treaty and, as there
was no reason
 to think that the Parties had attached any special
importance to the line of the watershed as such,
as compared with the overriding importance of a
final regulation of their own frontiers, the Court
considered that the interpretation to be given
now would be the same. The Court therefore felt
bound to pronounce in favour of the frontier
indicated on the Annex I map in the disputed
area and it became unnecessary to consider
whether the line as mapped did in fact
correspond to the true watershed line. For these
reasons, the Court upheld the submissions of
Cambodia concerning sovereignty over Preah
Vihear.
 In its Judgment on the merits the Court, by nine
votes to three, found that the Temple of Preah
Vihear was situated in territory under the
sovereignty of Cambodia and, in consequence, that
Thailand was under an obligation to withdraw any
military or police forces, or other guards or
keepers, stationed by her at the Temple, or in its
vicinity on Cambodian territory.
 By seven votes to five, the Court found that
Thailand was under an obligation to restore to
Cambodia any sculptures, stelae, fragments of
monuments, sandstone model and ancient pottery
which might, since the date of the occupation of
the Temple by Thailand in 1954, have been
removed from the Temple or the Temple area by
the Thai authorities.
 The Court begins by recalling that by a letter dated
27 August 1993, filed in the Registry on 3
September 1993, the Director-General of the World
Health Organization officially communicated to
the Registrar a decision taken by the World Health
Assembly to submit a question to the Court for an
advisory opinion. The question set forth in
resolutionWHA46.40, adopted by the Assembly on
14 May 1993, reads as follows:
 "In view of the health and environmental effects,
would the use of nuclear weapons by a State in
war or other armed conflict be a breach of its
obligations under international law including the
WHO Constitution?
 The Court found, by 11 votes to 3, that it was
not able to give the advisory opinion requested
by the World Health Organization on the
question of the Legality of the Use by a State of
Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict.
 The Court considered that there are three
conditions which must be satisfied in order to
found the jurisdiction of the Court when a
request for an advisory opinion is submitted to
it by a specialized agency:
 the agency requesting the opinion must be duly
authorized, under the Charter of the United Nations,
to request opinions from the Court;
 the opinion requested must be on a legal question;
and
 this question must be one arising within the scope of
the activities of the requesting agency.
 The first two conditions had been met. With regard
to the third, however, the Court found that
although according to its Constitution the World
Health Organization (WHO) is authorized to deal
with the effects on health of the use of nuclear
weapons, or of any other hazardous activity, and
to take preventive measures aimed al: protecting
the health of populations in the event of such
weapons being used or such activities engaged in,
the question put to the Court in the present case
relates not to the effects of the use of nuclear
weapons on health, but to the legality of the use of
such weapons in view of their health and
environmental effects.
 The Court therefore concluded that the
responsibilities of WHO are necessarily
restricted to the sphere of public "health“ and
cannot encroach on the responsibilities of other
parts of the United Nations system, and that
there is no doubt that questions concerning the
use of force, the regulation of armaments and
disarmament are within the competence of the
United Nations and lie outside that of the
specialized agencies. The request for an
advisory opinion submitted by WHO thus does
not relate to a question which arises "within the
scope of [the] activities" of that Organization.
 On 2 November 1998 Indonesia and Malaysia
notified to the Registrar of the Court a Special
Agreement between the two States, signed at
Kuala Lumpur on 31 May 1997 and having
entered into force on 14 May 1998. In that
Special Agreement they requested the Court to
determine on the basis of the treaties,
agreements and any other evidence furnished
by the Parties, whether sovereignty over Pulau
Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan belongs to the
Republic of Indonesia or to Malaysia.
 On 13 March 2001, the Republic of the
Philippines filed in the Registry of the Court an
Application for permission to intervene in the
case, invoking Article 62 of the Statute of the
Court. By a Judgment rendered on 23 October
2001, the Court found that the Application of
the Philippines could not be granted.
 In its Judgment in the case concerning
Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau
Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), the Court
found, by sixteen votes to one, that
"sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau
Sipadan belongs to Malaysia". Ligitan and
Sipadan are two very small islands located in
the Celebes Sea, off the north-east coast of the:
Island of Borneo.
 The Court notes that Indonesia's claim to
sovereignty over the islands of Ligitan and
Sipadan rests primarily on the Convention
which Great Britain and the Netherlands
concluded on 20 June 1891 for the purpose of
"defining the boundaries between the
Netherland possessions in the Island of Borneo
and the States in that Island which [were]
under British protection". Indonesia also relies
on a series of effectivités (acts undertaken by the
Parties in their sovereign capacity with regard
to the two islands), both Dutch and Indonesian,
which it claims confirm its conventional title.
 For its part, Malaysia contends that it acquired
sovereignty over the islands of Ligitan and
Sipadan following a series of alleged
transmissions of the title originally held by the
former sovereign, the Sultan of Sulu. Malaysia
claims that the title subsequently passed, in
succession, to Spain, to the United States, to
Great Britain on behalf of the State of North
Borneo, to the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, and finally to Malaysia
itself. It argues that its title, based on this series
of legal instruments, is confirmed by a certain
number of British and Malaysian effectivités over
the islands.
 The Court first recalls the statement by the
Permanent Court of International Justice
in the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland
(Denmark v. Norway) case: "a claim to
sovereignty based not upon some
particular act or title such as a treaty of
cession but merely upon continued
display of authority, involves two
elements each of which must be shown to
exist: the intention and will to act as
sovereign, and some actual exercise or
display of such authority.
 Turning then to the effectivités relied on by
Indonesia, the Court begins by pointing
out that none of them is of a legislative or
regulatory character. It finds, moreover,
that it cannot ignore the fact that
Indonesian Act No. 4 of 8 February 1960,
which draws Indonesia's archipelagic
baselines, and its accompanying map do
not mention or indicate Ligitan and
Sipadan as relevant base points or
turning points.
 The Court notes that the activities relied
upon by Malaysia, both in its own name
and as successor State of Great Britain,
are modest in number but that they are
diverse in character and include
legislative, administrative and quasi-
judicial acts. They cover a considerable
period of time and show a pattern
revealing an intention to exercise State
functions in respect of the two islands in
the context of the administration of a
wider range of islands.
 In this regard, the Court notes that in 1962
and 1963 the Indonesian authorities did not
even remind the authorities of the colony of
North Borneo, or Malaysia after its
independence, that the construction of the
lighthouses at those times had taken place
on territory which they considered
Indonesian;
 even if they regarded these lighthouses
as merely destined for safe navigation in
an area which was of particular
importance for navigation in the waters
off North Borneo, such behaviour is
unusual
 Given the circumstances of the case, and
in particular in view of the evidence
furnished by the Parties, the Court
concludes that Malaysia has title to
Ligitan and Sipadan on the basis of the
effectivités referred to above.
 The Court first recalls that on 10
December 2003 the Secretary-General of
the United Nations officially
communicated to the Court the decision
taken by the General Assembly to submit
the question set forth in its resolution ES-
10/14, adopted on 8 December 2003 at its
Tenth Emergency Special Session, for an
advisory opinion. The question is the
following:
 “What are the legal consequences arising
from the construction of the wall being
built by Israel, the occupying Power, in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem,
as described in the report of the
Secretary-General, considering the rules
and principles of international law,
including the Fourth Geneva Convention
of 1949, and relevant Security Council
and General Assembly resolutions?”
 The Court recalls its previous case law,
which emphasized that current
developments in “international law in
regard to non-self-governing territories,
as enshrined in the Charter of the United
Nations, made the principle of self-
determination applicable to all [such
territories]”, and that the right of peoples
to self-determination is today a right erga
omnes.
 Whilst taking note of the assurance given by
Israel that the construction of the wall does not
amount to annexation and that the wall is of a
temporary nature, the Court nevertheless
considers that the construction of the wall and
its associated regime create a “fait accompli”
on the ground that could well become
permanent, in which case, and notwithstanding
the formal characterization of the wall by
Israel, it would be tantamount to de facto
annexation.
 In sum, the Court is of the opinion that the
construction of the wall and its associated regime
impede the liberty of movement of the inhabitants
of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (with the
exception of Israeli citizens and those assimilated
thereto) as guaranteed under Article 12, paragraph
1, of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. They also impede the exercise by
the persons concerned of the right to work, to
health, to education and to an adequate standard
of living as proclaimed in the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
and in the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child.
 While Israel has the right, and indeed the duty
to respond to the numerous and deadly acts of
violence directed against its civilian
population, in order to protect the life of its
citizens, the measures taken are bound to
remain in conformity with applicable
international law. Israel cannot rely on a right
of self-defence or on a state of necessity in
order to preclude the wrongfulness of the
construction of the wall. The Court accordingly
finds that the construction of the wall, and its
associated regime, are contrary to international
law.
 The Court recalls the established jurisprudence
that “The essential principle contained in the
actual notion of an illegal act . . . is that reparation
must, as far as possible, wipe out all the
consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the
situation which would, in all probability, have
existed if that act had not been committed.” Israel
is accordingly under an obligation to return the
land, orchards, olive groves and other immovable
property seized from any natural or legal person
for purposes of construction of the wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory. The Court
considers that Israel also has an obligation to
compensate, in accordance with the applicable
rules of international law, all natural or legal
persons having suffered any form of material
damage as a result of the wall’s construction.
 The Court considers that it has a duty to draw
the attention of the General Assembly, to which
the present Opinion is addressed, to the need
for these efforts to be encouraged with a view
to achieving as soon as possible, on the basis of
international law, a negotiated solution to the
outstanding problems and the establishment of
a Palestinian State, existing side by side with
Israel and its other neighbours, with peace and
security for all in the region.
 Having regard to the Application filed in the
Registry of the Court on 31 March 2008, the
Republic of Ecuador instituted proceedings
against the Republic of Colombia in respect of a
dispute concerning “Colombia’s aerial
spraying of toxic herbicides at locations near, at
and across its border with Ecuador” which
“has already caused serious damage to people,
to crops, to animals, and to the natural
environment on the Ecuadorian side of the
frontier, and poses a grave risk of further
damage over time”,
 In a letter dated 12 September 2013 and
received in the Registry on the same day,
the Agent of Ecuador, referring to Article
89 of the Rules of Court and to an
Agreement between the Parties dated 9
September 2013 “that fully and finally
resolves all of Ecuador’s claims against
Colombia” in the case, notified the Court
that his Government wished to
discontinue the proceedings in the case.
 A letter was immediately communicated to the
Government of Colombia, which was asked,
pursuant to Article 89, paragraph 2, of the Rules of
Court, to inform the Court, by a letter to be
transmitted at the meeting which the President
had called with the Agents of the Parties for 12
September 2013, if Colombia objected to the
discontinuance;
 In a letter dated 12 September 2013, handed in at
the above —mentioned meeting, the Agent of
Colombia informed the Court that his Government
made no objection to the discontinuance of the case
as requested by Ecuador
 According to the letters received from the Parties,
the Agreement of 9 September 2013 establishes,
inter alia, an exclusion zone, in which Colombia will
not conduct aerial spraying operations, creates a
Joint Commission to ensure that spraying
operations outside that zone have not caused
herbicides to drift into Ecuador and, so long as
they have not, provides a mechanism for the
gradual reduction in the width of the said zone;
and whereas, according to the letters, the
Agreement sets out operational parameters for
Colombia’s spraying programme, records the
agreement of the two Governments to ongoing
exchanges of information in that regard, and
establishes a dispute settlement mechanism.
 On 13 September 2013, the President of the
International Court of Justice issued an Order
in the case concerning Aerial herbicide spraying
(Ecuador v. Colombia), recording the
discontinuance of the proceedings and directing the
removal of the case from the Court’s list.