Professional Documents
Culture Documents
m On Friday, Sept. 12, traders left the New York Stock Exchange for the
weekend.
m Its stock had fallen sharply due to fears over its financial condition.
m Paulson, Bernanke, and New York Fed President Tim Geithner begin
a series of meetings with top bankers in an effort to engineer a
bailout of Lehman, which had bet heavily in the subprime mortgage
market.
m In a move that would have been unthinkable before the credit crisis
began, the Fed arranges to lend $85 billion
m Even before the deal is finalized, the Dow reverses an earlier loss
and gains 141 points.
m The government bailout of AIG fails to stem investor fears as they
flee to safety.
m j j
reports that Washington Mutual , the nation's
largest thrift, has put itself up for sale
m The Fed moves to pump money into the financial system through
lending programs operated by several overseas central banks and
the Fed's own moves.
m It will be hard to match events that have reshaped the U.S. financial
landscape for years, if not decades to come.
m AIG has grown to become the world's biggest insurer. With
operations in over 130 countries and a customer base of 74 million
worldwide, the company has a balance sheet size in excess of $1
trillion.
m AIG is mainly in the business of life, commercial and property
insurance besides retirement products.
m There is no sudden increase in claims in any of these businesses,
anywhere in the world.
m In fact, these business lines of AIG remain very healthy, are market
leaders in many countries and hold much value.
m All those subsidiaries, like the joint ventures with Tata group in
India, are well capitalised and can service all potential claims.
m However, unlike most other insurers, AIG also had a business of
insuring investors in bonds and credit derivatives against defaults.
m Investors seeking risk protection bought CDS from issuers like AFP,
which stood guarantee against any default by the issuer in case of a
bond or retail borrower in case of a credit derivative like mortgage-
backed securities.
m A CDS contract involves the transfer of the credit risk of municipal
bonds, emerging market bonds, mortgage-backed securities,
or corporate debt between two parties.
m It is similar to insurance because it provides the buyer of the
contract, who often owns the underlying credit, with protection
against default, a credit rating downgrade, or another negative
"credit event.͞
m Seller- receives a periodic protection fee and is obligated to pay
only if a negative credit event occurs.
m It is important to note that the CDS contract is not actually tied to a
bond, but instead references it.
m For this reason, the bond involved in the transaction is called the
"reference entity."
m An investor with a positive view on the credit quality of a company
can sell protection and collect the payments that go along with it
rather than spend a lot of money to load up on the company's
bonds.
m An investor with a negative view of the company's credit can buy
protection for a relatively small periodic fee and receive a big payoff
if the company defaults on its bonds or has some other credit
event.
m CDS contracts are regularly traded.
m Value fluctuates- based on probability.
m Increased probability- worth more for buyer and vice versa.
m Trader speculates that credit quality of reference entity will
deteriorate in the future, he will buy protection for the short term
in the hope of making profit.
m CDS are traded OTC and intricate knowledge of the market.
m CDS issuers like AIG enjoyed AAA credit ratings and hence the
default risk on the insured securities was considered almost
eliminated.
m When defaults are low, CDS is a good business for issuers with
healthy cash flows.
m AIG expanded this business furiously and easily became the market
leader.
m At the peak, AFP had underwritten bonds and credit derivatives
worth nearly $500 billion.
m Sub Prime crisis hit and defaults started rising.
m AIG started shelling out huge sums to settle the claims and made
increasingly higher provisions, quarter after quarter.
m To make it worse, the company also had other businesses directly
related to US mortgages and suffered huge losses there as well.
m This steady erosion forced AIG to raise more than $20 billion in
additional capital earlier this year
m At the beginning of the April-June quarter, the company had more
than $15 billion in additional capital.
m By the first week of September, that excess capital was wiped out
and the company was desperately seeking nearly $25 billion in
additional funds to protect itself from further credit rating
downgrades.
m $25 billion doesn't appear like a big deal for the AIG group which
has investments of over $750 billion.
m But, all that money is insurance premium received from its main
businesses and set aside to cover future liabilities.
m AIG, the parent company, has no access to even a small part of it.
m Desperate attempts to find private investors failed and finally
pushed AIG into the hands of the Fed.
m The Fed's takeover of AIG is not an open ended, sweetheart deal.
Existing shareholders will see their holdings cut to a fifth of what
they were and the Fed will get an 80-per cent stake without paying
a dollar.
m The $80 billion in credit support comes at a very heavy cost, LIBOR
plus 850 basis points.
m Quite profitable for the Fed if AIG repays the loan without defaults.
m The Fed statement makes it clear that the loan is secured by all the
assets of AIG and has to be "repaid from the proceeds of the sale of
the firm's assets͞
m So, the very high interest rate is to force AIG to liquidate its assets
within the loan period of two years.
m If the Fed wants AIG to be liquidated anyway, why not just allow the
company to collapse right now?
m The Fed is not worried about a failure per se, but a "disorderly"
failure will be of serious concern.
m If left alone, AIG will be forced to liquidate its valuable business
assets at very low valuations to meet its liabilities.
m It is quite possible that it will not be able to raise sufficient cash to
meet its CDS obligations.
m That would be disastrous for CDS holders, many of them struggling
global banks.
m This will erode market confidence even further and unleash
another wave of write-downs.
m On the other hand, the Fed's credit facility will enable AIG to meet
its immediate cash requirements.
m This is a far less risky and infinitely more preferable option than
letting AIG go bankrupt.
m In other words, the Fed preferred the slow death of AIG to a quick
kill.
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