Professional Documents
Culture Documents
“IDIB Portfolio”
• Describe My Vision of the “Future”of SCM
• Examples
– USAF Logistics Command Consumable
Inventory System
– IBM Service-Parts Inventory System
Consequences of this:
• Capabilities
– Broadcast SKU-level Data Across the Chain
– Observe Status ==> Implemetation
“Contractible”
• Results:
– Huge Reductions in Buffers ==> Lower
Operating Costs
– Improved Competitiveness
• Lower Prices
• More Customization
• Higher Availability
• Development of Technologies to Support
Multiple-Owner SCM
• Internet is Providing Experience
• E-Markets
– Providing Buyer-Supplier Linkages
• Data Standardization; e.g. RosettaNet
a.k.a.
The Information, Decision-Making,
Implementation, Buffer Portfolio
“Managing” anything can be
viewed as 4 related activities:
• Getting Information
• Making Decisions
• Implementing Decisions
• Buffering against Imperfections in
information, decision-making, or
implementation
Every “Management System” is,
in fact, 4 Sub-Systems
• The Information System provides
information
• The Decision-Making System makes
decisions
• The Implementation System implements
decisions
• The Buffer System copes with imperfections
in information, decision-making, or
implementation
Each Sub-System has Cost and
Quality Characteristics
The Information System
– Quality Characteristics
• Accuracy
• Leadtime
• Aggregation Level
• Horizon
• Etc.
– Cost: Increasing and Marginally-Increasing
with Quality
Each ... Characteristics (cont.)
The Decision-Making System
– Quality Characteristics
• “Optimality”; i.e., “how good”?
• Leadtime; i.e., “how long to make”?
• Etc.
• What if:
– Production was instantaneous?
– Production Decision and Implementation
Leadtime ≤ “Horizon” of Known Demand?
What is the Value-Added of the
IDIB Paradigm?
• Vantage Point on the Majority of
Operations-Research Models
“Do-Nothing-in-Excess Axiom”
The Future of Supply-Chain
Management Involves
Collaborative Decision-Making
and/or Implementation
Why?
• For Supply Chains that already share
information, the returns from additional
information sharing are diminishing
Step 8: Resolve/Collaborate on
Exception Items
Federated
Department Stores
CORNING
Consumer Products
FIELDCREST CANNON
JCPenney Staples
Mead Schnuck
School & Office
Markets
Benchmarking
Partners QRS
CPFR History:
• ‘95/96: Wal-Mart Warner-Lambert
“CFAR” Pilot
• ‘97: VICS Develops CPFR Initiative
• ‘98: VICS CPFR Guidelines Published
• ‘99: Pilots Between
– Kimberly-Clark & K-Mart,
– P&G & Meier, Target, Wal-Mart
– Nabisco & Wegman’s, etc.
• ‘00:1st Production Rollout: K-Mart
CPFR’s Future:
• “n-Tier” Collaboration
– Extension to Include Master-Scheduling
Decisions
– Include Transportation
Research Topics in CPFR:
• Process Model: How and Where does the
CPFR model (e.g., forecast collaboration)
fit into the supply-chain process?
• Front-End Agreements: How Should
agreements be structured, performance
measured, and benefits shared?
• Data Sharing: How should data be shared
(aggregation/disaggregation issues)?
• Exception Processing: What constitutes an
exception?
Secure Supply-Chain
Collaboration
with
Mikhail Atallah
&
Vinayak Deshpande
The Starting Point....
“Information Asymmetry” is one of the
major sources of inefficiency in Managing
Supply Chains
==> Wrong Investment in Capacity
==> Misallocation of Resources
==> Distorted Prices
==> Reduced Customer Service
==> Unnecessary Additional Costs
.... there are Very Good Reasons
for Keeping Private Information
Private
It Depends
If the Value of Private
Information is the Information
Itself, then..
...obviously, information
must be disclosed for value
to be created
But, if the Value of Private
Information is a Decision .......
In CPFR:
Determine agreed-upon planned
orders without sharing forecasts, etc.
Secure Multi-Party Computation
• SMC is Decades Old
• Elegant Theory
• General Results w.r.t. Existence,
Complexity, etc.
• Recently, Practical Protocols for Specific
Problems
Ex. Electronic Voting
Information Retrieval
SMC Paradigm
• Alice has Private Information: XA
• Bob has Private Information: XB
• Want to Determine f(XA, XB)
• f(XA, XB) is well defined
r(q) = i - q
• Several Very Interesting Results
– Retailers will over-order even if Pareto allocation
mechanism is used
– Supplier and Supply-Chain Profit can increase if a
truth-telling mechanism is replaced by manipulable
one.
Deshpande & Schwarz (‘02)
• Examine this scenario — and a newsvendor
scenario — from perspective of maximizing
Supply-Chain Profit assuming truth-telling
• Derive conditions under which two
commonly-used allocation mechanisms
maximize supply-chain profit
• Our SSCC Protocols use these mechanisms
without revealing the retailers’ i’s
Allocation Mechanisms
• Supplier has Capacity K
• Retailers place orders: q1, q2, q3,..qN
• Assume qi > K
• Shipping Proxies
We Have Only Just Begun...
• Tough Issues to Deal with:
– SMC Complexities; e.g.,
• How to Deal with Collusion
• Computational Complexity (e.g., simultaneity)