Business Process Reengineering:

Rest in Peace?

Peter Seddon, PhD

Senior Lecturer
Department of Information Systems
The University of Melbourne
p.seddon@dis.unimelb.edu.au
http://www.dis.unimelb.edu.au/staff/peter
Business Process Reengineering:
Rest in Peace?

Chinese version translated by

Bin Hu
Department of Information Systems
The University of Melbourne
bin@staff.dis.unimelb.edu.au
Business Process Reengineering:
RIP?
1.Definition and brief history of BPR
2.Four BPR success stories, pre 1995
3. BPR Success factors
4. Research findings
5. Summary and Lessons

3
Business Process Reengineering:
RIP?
1.Definition and brief history of BPR
2.Four BPR success stories, pre 1995
3. BPR Success factors
4. Research findings
5. Summary and Lessons

4
1. BPR: Definition and history

“Reengineering is the radical redesign of business

processes for dramatic improvement.”

Hammer, M., Beyond Reengineering, NY:

Harper Business, 1996, p.xii

5
1. BPR: Definition and history
“A business process is a set of logically related tasks that use
the resources of an organization to achieve a defined business
outcome.”

Davenport, T. and Short, J., The new

industrial engineering: information technology
and business process redesign, Sloan
Management Review, #32 1990: 11-27.
6
 BPR: Definition and history
 Popularized by Michael Hammer, Tom
Davenport, and others: 1988-1995.
Hammer, M., “Don’t Automate, Obliterate”,
Harvard Business Review Jul-Aug,1990
Hammer, M. and Champy, J. Reengineering
the Corporation, Harper Business, 1993
(H&C)
 By mid-1994, 1.7 million copies of H&C had been
sold around the world (translated into 19 languages)

7
 BPR: Definition and history
 Hammer et al. argued that many things were done
in organizations because “that was the way they
had always been done”, not because they added
value.
 He said: computer technology made it possible to
combine simple tasks previously performed by
many different people into more complex one-
person jobs that provided higher levels of customer
service.

8
 Traditional Functional Organization

Strategic level Senior managers

Management level Middle managers

Knowledge and
Knowledge level
data workers

Operational level Operational

managers

Sales Manufac Finance etc. HR

turing

9
 Hammer’s Process-Centred Organization
Hammer, Beyond Reengineering, 1996, p.126
(and Harvard Business Review, Nov-Dec 1999)

Owner C
U
Processes Owner S
T
Owner O
M
E
R
Centres of S
Excellence

Coach Coach Coach Coach

10
 BPR: Definition and history
Before:
Financin Credit Approval Issuance
g checking
Credit Credit
request decision

After:
Credit Credit
request decision
Case manager

IBM Credit (Source: Sia and Neo, JMIS 1997, p.71) 11

 BPR: Definition and history
 In addition, and consistent with Deming’s
work on Total Quality Management (TQM),

Hammer argued that if employees were

treated as creative, responsible people
(empowered), they would contribute much
more value to the organization.

12
 BPR: Definition and history
 In the period 1988-1995 there was huge interest in BPR in the USA & Europe.
 Consultants made a lot of money helping firms reengineer.
 However, for many people today, “BPR” is a dirty word.
 BPR is now associated with massive retrenchments, turmoil, and failed plans for restructuring organizations.

13
 BPR: Definition and history
Here are some definitions Strassmann collected about Reengineering:
 taking and axe and machine gun to your existing organization;
 reengineering will require a lobotomy
 what you do with the existing structure is nuke it!
 break legs

14
 BPR: Today’s presentation
 Today, I will argue that BPR has passed through both its hype and disillusionment phases, and
has now emerged a useful way of describing IT-based process change.
 e.g., Electronic Commerce can be defined as “reengineering the supply chain”.

 My goal today is to show how usage of the

term BPR (or BPDesign, or BPChange) has
evolved, and what it means today.
15
Business Process Reengineering:
RIP?
1.Definition and brief history of BPR
2.Four BPR success stories, pre 1995
3. BPR Success factors
4. Research findings
5. Lessons

16
2.Four BPR success stories, pre 1995

1: Hammer’s Ford Accounts Payable

2: Banca di America e di Italia (Deutche
bank)
3: PBX sales at AT&T
4: Siemens Nixdorf Service

Example 1: Hammer and Champy, 1993, pp.39-44.

Examples 2,3,4: Hall, G., Rosenthal, and Wade, “How
to Make Reengineering Really Work”, Harvard
Business Review, Nov-Dec 1993, pp.119-131.) 17
1: Hammer’s Ford Accounts Payable example
 In the late 1980s, Ford had a traditional purchasing and
accounts payable system:
Purchase Requisitions (from manufacturing), Purchase
orders, Receiving reports, Supplier invoices, Statements
 Clerks in Accounts payable checked to ensure Purchase
Requisitions (from manufacturing), Purchase orders,
Receiving reports, Supplier invoices, Statements that for
each invoice, there was both a purchase order and a
receiving report. If OK, they authorized payment.
 From an internal control point of view, there were good
reasons for this process design.
 There were 500 staff in Ford’s Accounts Payable dept.
Presumably, the dept. was running efficiently.
18
1: Hammer’s Ford Accounts Payable example

 In the late 1980’s, Ford bought a 25% stake in Mazda and compared
staffing levels in different departments. There were only 5 staff in
Mazda’s Accounts Payable. Yet Mazda was not 100 times smaller.

 Q: How come?
 A: Mazda had a different process.

 So Ford changed its process and reduced Accounts Payable staff by

about 75%. (370 people; more than $10M p.a.)

 Q: What did they do?

19
1: Hammer’s Ford Accounts Payable example

 A: They placed computer terminals in the Receiving dept.

When goods arrived, Receiving checked the goods had been
ordered. If accepted, funds were transferred automatically to
the supplier.
 Hammer argues that to save the money, Ford had to shift from
functional thinking, i.e., improving the efficiency of the
Accounts Payable dept., to process thinking.
 The process was procurement: ordering, receiving, and paying.
 The Accounts Payable function added little of value to the
process (and ultimately to the customer).

20
1: Hammer’s Ford Accounts Payable example

Summary

 “Reengineering is the radical redesign of

business processes for dramatic
improvement.” (Hammer, 1996)
 radical: 500 staff dropped to 130
 process: cross-functional
 computer technology: enabling

21
2: Banca di America e di Italia (Deutche bank)

 After 1993, when you deposited cheques at BAI, the

teller ran them through a scanner at the counter, and
funds were automatically transferred, there and then,
from accounts at the other banks. There was no back
office.
 BAI top executives wanted to create a “paperless” bank.
80% of the bank’s revenue came from retail operations.
 Top executives spent 20% - 60% of their time on the
project.

22
2: Banca di America e di Italia (Deutche bank)

 In Oct. 1988, “two teams systematically diagnosed processes and

redesigned them without considering the constraints of the
current organization.” p.125
 First, the organization team broke down all transaction types into
“families”, such as payments, deposits, withdrawals, money
orders, bills, consumer credit, foreign exchange, credit cards
(merchant and card holder), sourcing, and end-of-day processing.
 They documented in detail one process for each family, then
redesigned it from scratch.

23
2: Banca di America e di Italia (Deutche bank)

 The cheque deposit “transaction”, for instance:

 Before: 64 activities, 9 forms, and 14 accounts.
 After: 25 activities, 2 forms, and 2 accounts.

 The redesigned process then became the prototype for all

transactions in the family.
 Finally, the organization team handed off the design to the
technology team. That team suggested a client-server
architecture.

24
2: Banca di America e di Italia (Deutche bank)

 In April 1989 (7 months after start), the organization team

began redesigning all processes in each transaction family
based on the original prototype. A total of 300 processes were
redesigned.
 Meanwhile, the technology team began to build systems.
Branch managers and tellers helped design the screens.
 February 1990, software began to be rolled out, one process at
a time. Tellers were given a five-day training period.
Branches were restructured. The manager was placed out in
front, with the customers.

25
2: Banca di America e di Italia (Deutche bank)


By 1993, the bank had
 50 new branches, with no increase in personnel
 revenue doubled,1987 to 1994 (1/4 due to BPR),
 average personnel per branch dropped from 8 to 4
 daily cashier closing time from 2 hours to 10 mins
 Summary: Used computer technology to achieve significant
improvements in process performance.
 Aside: Today, many Australian banks are closing branches, and the
potential of internet banking means that more change may be
coming their way.

26
3: PBX sales at AT&T
 US$4B annual sales of PBX equipment
 By 1989, each year the business had met higher performance
targets for individual functions, but overall profit did not increase.
 The president decided to redesign the business’s core processes.
 He appointed a top-performing sales branch manager as team
leader, plus a full-time team from a wide range of functions:
sales, services, product management, Bell Labs, manufacturing,
materials management, information systems, and training.
 He told them that if they failed, the business would be sold or
liquidated.

27
3: PBX sales at AT&T: June 1989-Feb 1990
 Team surveyed steps from initial customer contact through to collection
of funds.
 Interviewed employees and customers and constructed 24 cases which
they then analyzed in great detail.
 They identified every person involved, their activities, and how their
time was spent.
 Details:
 an account executive negotiated the sale,
 a system consultant determined the specifications for the system,
 a technician installed the hardware

28
3: PBX sales at AT&T
 In all, 16 handoffs were required to install a new system.
 No one had responsibility for the entire transaction.
 It could take up to a year to get a large system installed, by which time
customer needs might have changed  dissatisfaction.
 Front-line employees lacked information on profit contribution of their
actions. Marketing often concentrated on low-profit customers. Sales
concentrated on maximizing revenue, not profit.
 Too much use of headquarters staff for various tasks, but little value
added.
 Sales staff worked for AT&T, not the PBX firm, and their main sales
were not PBXs. So sales staff knew little about PBXs, which did not
impress customers.

29
3: PBX sales at AT&T: Redesign
 Appointed Pat Russo to build and run a new PBX sales
force.
 Her goal was to maximize profit and minimize time
between sale and installation.
 Redesign team proposed a new position, called Project
Manager, defined tasks that cut handoffs down from 12 to
3, and estimated that for a typical small system:
 the cycle time could be cut from 3 months to 3 weeks,
 costs would drop by one third
 errors would approach zero.

30
3: PBX sales at AT&T: Redesign
 “The team then turned its attention to the organizational
ramifications of the redesign. The radically different job
responsibilities posed an immense human-resource
problem.” p.127
 Using PCs and off-the-shelf software existing systems
were simplified, and new systems designed to reduce cycle
times and provide accurate profit estimation and job
tracking.
 Rollout April 1991-April 1992

31
3: PBX sales at AT&T
 Results
 Customer willingness to repurchase: 53% 82%
 adjustments dropped from 4% to 0.6% of revenues
 bills paid in 30 days from installation: 31% 71%
 88% of customers rate project management of their sale and
installation as “excellent”
 Summary
 Redesigning the process caused these improvements. The
actual PBXs did not change. By changing process, it was
possible to produce big increases in value to the customer.

32
4: Siemens Nixdorf Service

 DM 3.4B (=US $2.1B) revenue Siemens Nixdorf Service

(SNS) installs, services, maintains, and networks software
and hardware sold by Siemens Nixdorf.
 By late 1990, the 12,900-person company was still making
profits but forecasting losses by 1995.
 General manager, Gerhard Radtke assembled a ten-person
team to restructure headquarters to reduce personnel by
50%.

33
4: Siemens Nixdorf Service
 September-December 1991: The team confirmed the profit
forecasts but argued that reducing HQ staff would not be
sufficient. Instead, they suggested the entire 11,400 person
field-servicing organization needed to be streamlined.
 SNS had 30 support centres in Germany, fully staffed with
specialists continuously available for telephone enquiries.
Some specialists only received a few phone calls per day.
Most times when technicians visited a site, they identified
the problem, then returned to base for parts (two trips per
call).

34
4: Siemens Nixdorf Service
Redesign proposals for SNS
 Reduce the number of support centres 30  5.
 Found that in 80% of cases, and expert could diagnose the problem
over the phone. Once diagnosed, could airfreight parts to customer
or place in technician’s car  most repairs could be completed on
first service call.
 Team also proposed
 reducing management hierarchy by two levels,
 creating a new team structure for field technicians,
• reducing HQ personnel from 1,600 to 800.

35
4: Siemens Nixdorf Service
 August-October 1992:
trialled the proposal in Frankfurt, good results:
 35% reduction in personnel
 technicians productivity doubled (24/day)
 November 1992 - December 1993: Rollout
 Results:
 % of problems solved remotely 10%  25%
 profit and cost improvements in excess of 10%
 employee headcount reduced by 20% (through voluntary retirement and
severance packages)
 plan to service other non-SN equipment in future

36
 Summary: Four BPR success stories,
pre 1995
 Reengineering (BPR) meant radical change in business
processes (not 5-10% improvements).
 Usually it meant cross-functional change.
 It could be applied to all sorts of organizations (e.g.,
manufacturing and service) in all sorts of processes
(e.g., sales and support).
 Usually it referred to administrative processes, not
manufacturing. (Manufacturing is the domain of TQM,
which was about incremental, not radical change.)

37
 Summary: Four BPR success stories,
pre 1995
 In some cases, BPR led to dramatic improvements
in performance.
 In many other cases, BPR projects failed.
 BPR was often associated with downsizing.
 Firms in financial trouble often attempted to use
BPR, in a last-ditch attempt to cut costs.
 BPR appealed to senior management ego
38
Business Process Reengineering:
RIP?
1.Definition and brief history of BPR
2.Four BPR success stories, pre 1995
3. BPR Success factors
4. Beyond reengineering?
5. Research findings
6. Lessons

39
 3. BPR Success factors
Hammer, M. & Stanton, S., The Reengineering
Revolution: A Handbook, Harper Business, 1995

Ch.2: Ten Top Ways to Fail at Reengineering

Ch.3: The Primary Ingredient: Leadership
Ch.4: The 2nd Ingredient: The Reengineering Team
Ch.5: Do you need help? Consultants
Ch.6: Are you ready for reengineering? (Checklist)
Ch.8: The Hardest Part of Reengineering
40
Ch. 2: Ten Top Ways to Fail at
Reengineering
1. Don’t reengineer but say that you are.
2. Don’t focus on processes.
3. Spend a lot of time analyzing the current
situation.
4. Proceed without strong executive leadership.
5. Be timid in redesign.

41
Ch. 2: Ten Top Ways to Fail at
Reengineering
6. Go directly from conceptual design to
implementation.
7. Reengineer slowly.
8. Place some aspects of the business off-limits.
9. Adopt a conventional implementation style.
10. Ignore the concerns of your people.

42
Ch.3: The Primary Ingredient:
Leadership
 “It is an unalterable axiom of reengineering that it
only succeeds when driven from the topmost
levels of an organization.” (p.34)
 “In our experience, the quality of an
organization’s leadership is an absolute predictor
of its reengineering success. Companies with
strong leadership will succeed because they will
do what it takes to ensure…” (p.36)

43
Ch.3: The Primary Ingredient:
Leadership
 “Does it have to be the CEO? No. Put most
simply, a leader is someone in a position to
compel the compliance of all parties involved in
reengineering.” (p.36)
 “If there is a single word that captures an
effective leader’s style it is relentlessness.” (p.41)
 “The leader is the motivator, the cheerleader, the
spiritual advisor...” (p.46)

44
Ch.4: The Second Ingredient:
The Reengineering Team
 “The team must transcend the
constituencies it represents…. To this end,
team members should not expect to return
to their home departments when the
reengineering assignment is over.” (p.62)

Content: Understanding the old, inventing the

new, constructing the new, selling the new.
Context: Uncertainty, Experimentation, Pressure
45
Ch. 5: Do you need help?
Consultants
 “Business people don’t all share the same
feelings about consultants:
 Some hate them,
 while others hate them a lot.” (p.68)
 “those who attempt a Himalayan climb for
the first time usually hire an experienced
Sherpa guide.” (p.73)

46
Ch. 5: Do you need help?
Consultants
 “Everyone inside a company has a political
stake in reengineering, some turf or job to
protect, some position to covet. (p.76)
 “Since power is a zero-sum game and
change virtually always disturbs power
relationships, everyone on the inside can
probably be seen as having a vested
interest…” (p.76)
47
Ch. 6: Self-assessment
Diagnostic (20 questions)
Examples:
“1. The leader of reengineering is a senior executive
who is strongly committed to reengineering and
who possesses the title and authority necessary
to institute fundamental change.” (p.86)
“7. The organization as a whole recognizes the need
for reengineering and fundamental change.”
(p.87)

48
Ch. 6: Self-assessment
Diagnostic (20 questions)
“15. The organization places a high value on
serving customers and has a solid
understanding of customer needs.” (p.87)
“20. Measurement systems and performance
goals have been established to chart the
progress of reengineering.” (p.88)
(Will show test of validity of the H&S
diagnostic later in this presentation.)

49
Ch. 8: The Hardest Part of
Reengineering
 Reengineering is “agonizingly, heartbreakingly
tough” (CEO Aetna Life, Hammer and Stanton,
p.117)
 “In our experience with companies struggling to
implement reengineering, the number one source
of their difficulties has been in this area of coping
with the reactions of the people in the organization
to the enormity of the change.” (p.119)

50
Business Process Reengineering:
RIP?
1.Definition and brief history of BPR
2.Four BPR success stories, pre 1995
3. BPR Success factors
4. Research findings
5. Lessons

51
 4. Research findings
 22 papers in the References section of the
paper below relate to academic studies of
various aspects of reengineering (1994-7)
Guha, S., Grover, V., Kettinger, W., and Teng, J.,
“Business Process Change and Organizational
Performance: Exploring an Antecedent Model”
Journal of MIS, (14,1) Summer 1997: 119-154
 I estimate there have been about 50
academic studies of BPR around the world.
52
 Research findings
Today, review results from three studies:
 Stoddard and Jarvenpaa, 1995
 Grover, Jeong, Kettinger, and Teng, 1995
 Murphy, Staples, and Seddon, 1998 & 1999

53
 Stoddard and Jarvenpaa, 1995
 Case studies of three firms in 1993:
Revenue Employees
DefenseCo US$1.3B
FoodCo US$1.5B 3,500
FinanceCo US$ 0.6B 2,000
 8 to 25 interviews at each firm

Stoddard, D.B., and Jarvenpaa, S. “Business Process

Redesign: Tactics for Managing Radical Change”,
Journal of MIS, (12,1) Summer 1995: 81-107. 54
 Stoddard and Jarvenpaa, 1995
Scope Depth of change
DefenseCo Functional Efficiency
FoodCo Cross-funct. Effectiveness
FinanceCo Org-wide Transformation
 Change was initiated in DefenseCo and FinanceCo using revolutionary change
tactics: “If we do not do this, we will not survive.”
 At FoodCo the project was presented as an opportunity to generate more wealth.

55
 Stoddard and Jarvenpaa, 1995
Change practices:
 In both FoodCo and FinanceCo, design involved revolutionary
change, but the pilot and implementation phases were
evolutionary.
 For DefenseCo, a mixture of evolutionary and revolutionary
changes was used in both design and implementation stages.

56
 Stoddard and Jarvenpaa, 1995
Energy
for
radical
change

Design Pilot Implementation

Project Phase

Source: Stoddard & Jarvenpaa, 1995, Figure 3, p.103:

Use of Revolutionary and Evolutionary Tactics 57
 Stoddard and Jarvenpaa, 1995
Conclusions (about BPR as practiced):
 “Use of revolutionary tactics appeared to require a true crisis in the

organization” (p.103)
 “BPR does not always result in radical change in a short period of time”
(p.104)
 “although reengineering can deliver radical designs, it does not
necessarily promise a revolutionary approach to change.” (p.105)

58
 Grover et al. 1995
 Developed a questionnaire about six problem areas for
BPR, containing a total of 64 questions.
 853 Questionnaires sent to members of a US
management organization.
 239/853 responses (= 30%), from a wide range of
industries, all with over 1,000 employees.

Grover, V. Jeong, S. Kettinger, W. and Teng, J. “The

Implementation of Business Process Reengineering”,
Journal of MIS, (12,1) Summer 1995: 109-144. 59
 Grover et al. 1995
 105 organizations had completed at least one BPR project. Example
projects: customer service (13), product development (13), order
management (10).
 Factor analysis indicated there should be nine categories of problem, not six.
 Severity scores (average % of respondents who indicated the issue was a
major or extreme problem) for each of the nine problem categories were
then calculated.

60
 Serious Problem Areas for BPR and
Correlations with Perceived Success
Problem Area Av Severity% Correl
Change Management - Organizat. 22 -0.35**
Technological competence 18 -0.19
Project Planning - strategic 17 -0.28**
Project management -Time frame 16 -0.27**
Management support 16 -0.36**
Change Management - Individual 15 -0.51**
Process delineation 14 -0.30**
Project management- general 12 -0.42**
Project Planning - tactical 10 -0.33**
(**= significantly correlated at p<0.01)

61
 Grover et al. 1995
Conclusions (1):
The most difficult BPR problems to manage in the US in 1994 appear to
have been:
 Organizational Change Management (resistance, politics, communication)

 Technological Competence (lack of IT expertise, insuffic understanding of

data)
 Strategic Project Planning (lack of alignment of corporate and IT planning,

strategic vision)

62
 Grover et al. 1995
Conclusions (2):
The BPR problems most highly correlated with success in the US in 1994 appear to
have been:
 Individual Change Management (inadequate training, insufficient time to develop

new skills, indiv. incentives)

 General Project Management (poor communication in team, lack of methodology,

performance measurement)
 Management Support (lack of senior management leadership, top management

support)

63
 Australian BPR Study
The University of Melbourne
Replication of Grover et al. plus a test of
Hammer and Stanton’s BPR-readiness
diagnostic.
Murphy, F. and Staples, S., Reengineering in
Australia: Factors affecting Success, Australasian
Conference on Information Systems, September, 1997
Murphy, F. and Seddon, P. and Staples, S. Testing
Hammer and Stanton’s Reengineering-Success
Diagnostic, Australasian Conference on Information
Systems, December, 1999 64
 Murphy et al. 1998
 Similar questionnaire to Grover’s. Sent to CEOs of the top 1000
Australian private and public organizations.
 Two parts: senior manager & project leader.
 Senior managers were asked to complete their part of the
questionnaire and pass the other part to a BPR project leader.
 239/1000 responses (24%): 137 from senior managers, and 102
from project leaders who had completed “reengineering” projects.

65
 Murphy et al. 1998
Results with the Australian data
 Only project leaders answered questions about Grover et al.’s 64

items.
 There were many differences in rankings of the 64 problem areas,

but rankings correlated 0.6 with Grover et al.’s rankings.

 There was no significant correlation between rankings of the nine

categories in the two studies (Australia vs US).

66
 Serious Problem Areas for BPR and
Correlations with Perceived Success
Problem Area Aus% US% AusCorr.
Change Management - Org. 27 22 -0.37**
Technological competence 23 18 -0.22
Project Planning - strategic 18 17 -0.31**
Project mgt -Time frame 25 16 -0.42**
Management support 27 16 -0.32**
Change Management - Indiv 31 15 -0.26*
Process delineation 18 14 -0.43**
Project mgt- general 21 12 -0.39**
Project Planning - tactical 18 10 -0.38**
(**= significantly correlated at p<0.01)

67
 Murphy et al. 1998
Conclusions about Grover et al.’s factors
 All nine categories of problems with BPR are either hard to manage or

significantly correlated with success!

 Organizational change management appears as a near-top issue on all

criteria.
 The Australian results are from project managers, who will have been

closely involved in the project, and so may place a higher value on

solving practical problems.

68
 Murphy et al. 1998
Test of Hammer & Stanton’s BPR Readiness Diagnostic
Did your org./project pass threshhold?
Snr Mgr Proj Leader
Reengineering Leadership 40% 42%
Organizational Readiness 76% 54%
Style of Implementation 71% 48%
Overall Score 55% 26%
Perceived Success of subsequent
reengineering project(s) 80% 81% (106/133) (77/95)

69
 Murphy et al. 1998
Test of Hammer & Stanton’s BPR Readiness Diagnostic
Correlation with Perceived Success
Snr Mgr Proj Leader
Reengineering Leadership 0.28** 0.08
Organizational Readiness 0.28** 0.24**
Style of Implementation 0.34** 0.11
Overall Score 0.33** 0.17*

** = significant at p<0.01
* = significant at p<0.05

70
 Murphy et al. 1998
Conclusions about Hammer and Stanton’s diagnostic: Is your
organization ready for BPR?
 the threshold levels appear to be higher than necessary for successful
projects
 H&S’s factors are correlated with 133 senior managers’ perceptions of
subsequent success
 for 95 project leaders, the Organizational readiness factor was also
correlated with subsequent success.

71
Business Process Reengineering:
RIP?
1.Definition and brief history of BPR
2.Four BPR success stories, pre 1995
3. BPR Success factors
4. Research findings
5. Summary and Lessons

72
 5. Summary and Lessons

“Reengineering is the radical redesign of business

processes for dramatic improvement.”

73
 5. Summary and Lessons
“Now, with a critical mass of business
process change (BPC) projects concluded, it
is appropriate to take a retrospective look at
the implications, prescriptions, or lessons we
can extract from these collective experiences.

Grover, V. and Kettinger, W.J., Special

Section: The Impacts of Business Process
Change on Organizational Performance,
Journal of MIS, Summer 1997, 14,1: 9-12.
74
 5. Summary and Lessons
“Assimilated in these experiences is the realization that
reengineering’s operative word is not “radical” but “process”,
with the directive to create end-to-end value for the customer.”
“the ‘obliterate and rebuild’ mentality of earlier years is giving
way to more sober, deliberate, and often moderate approaches to
BPC and process management.” (BPC=business process change)

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 5. Summary and Lessons
 BPR is now perceived as just another example of
major organizational change projects involving IT.
 The critical success factors are those identified in
numerous prior major IT-change projects over the
last 20-30 years. They are no different for BPR.

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 5. Summary and Lessons
 Key success factors seem to be:
– Change management (both organizational and individual learning)
– Top management support
– Project management
 Technology competence is necessary, but is not sufficient for success.
 Because of cultural differences, the factors may be different in China.

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 5. Summary and Lessons
Degree
of Change Management
radical important here
change

Design Pilot Implementation

Project Phase

Based on: Stoddard & Jarvenpaa, 1995, Fig. 3, p.103:

Use of Revolutionary and Evolutionary Tactics 78
 Questions?
Peter Seddon and Bin Hu
Department of Information Systems
The University of Melbourne
p.seddon@dis.unimelb.edu.au
http://www.dis.unimelb.edu.au/staff/peter

Printed material:
– Hammer and Stanton’s diagnostic
– Grover’s 1995 paper

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