Ethical Relativism

2002 Copyright Donald Hubin

Revised by Makoto Suzuki
 Aims for Day 2
1. Distinguishing Descriptive theories and
Normative theories
2. Understanding an argument for
Descriptive Ethical Relativism (DER)
and its Weaknesses
3. Understanding an argument for
Normative Ethical Relativism (NER)
and its Weaknesses
4. Understanding the implications of NER
 Descriptive vs. Normative Ethics
 Descriptive ethics is an enterprise that seeks to
describe and explain people’s moral attitudes and
the moral practices of societies. It is concerned
with what is believed to be good, right or virtuous
and with what practices societies do have.
 Moral psychology, sociology and anthropology on
mores engage in descriptive ethics.
 Normative ethics is concerned with the
determination of what is good, right or virtuous
and of what practices society ought to have.
 Moral philosophy primarily engages in normative ethics.
 Relativism and Universalism
 People often define Ethical (or Moral) Relativism as
the view that there are no universal ethical
standards—every ethical standard is relative to a
society (this is an aspect of ”Cultural Relativism”)
or to an individual.
 They define Ethical (or Moral) Universalism as the
view that at least some ethical judgments are
universal.
 But these definitions are ambiguous: they do not
distinguish normative from descriptive theories.
 It is important to distinguish different senses of
ethical relativism. As Rachels says, “some of them
might be false even if others are true.” (p.19)
 Descriptive Ethical Relativism
(DER)
 Even at the most fundamental
level, there are no ethical
judgments that are universally
shared, and no moral practices
that are universally adopted (or
accepted).
Descriptive Ethical Universalism
(DEU)
 At least at the most fundamental
level, there are some (at least
one) ethical judgments that are
universally shared or some (at
least one) ethical practices that
are universally adopted.
 This is the denial of DER.
Normative Ethical Relativism
(NER)
 There are no universally correct
ethical judgments and there are
no practices that it would be
correct to adopt universally.
(This seems to be the thesis five
on Rachels, p.19.)
 Normative Ethical
Universalism (NEU)
 There are some (at least one)
universally correct ethical
judgments and there are some (at
least one) practices that it would
be correct to adopt universally.
 This is the denial of NER.
 Descriptive vs. Normative
 Remember:
 Descriptive theories concern what moral views
or practices are ACTUALLT APPLIED or
ADOPTED (i.e., what things people BELIEVE
to be good, right or virtuous, or what practices
they DO have).
 Normative theories concern what moral views
or practices are CORRECT (i.e., what things
are REALLY good, right or virtuous).
 The Positions
(Relativism and Universalism in the
same level are mutually exclusive.)

Descriptive Normative

Relativism DER NER

Universalism DEU NEU

 Philosophical Questions About Ethical
Relativism/Universalism
 We will focus on DER and NER. Then, the
philosophical questions are:

 Do the established facts support DER?

(Rachels, 2.5, .6 and pp. 27-8)
 Does DER support NER? (Rachels, 2.3)
 What are the implications of NER?
(Rachels, 2.4)
 Evaluating the Evidence for DER
 The Evidence
 There are cultural (and/or individual)
variations in people’s ethical judgments.
(Rachels 2.3)
 The Argument
 “Inference to the Best Explanation”
The variation is best explained by DER.
Generally speaking, the best account is
probable. So, DER is probably true.
 Argument for DER:

Different Social Practices/

Different Derivative Judgments

Different Foundational Ethical Judgments

 Criticism: Alternative Explanations
(Rachels 2.5 and p. 28):
Rachels’ point: ethical judgments might differ from
culture to culture NOT because people’s
fundamental beliefs differ, but because people’s (1)
circumstances or (2) factual beliefs are different.
(This is the answer to Q4.)
(1) Circumstantial variation
 Many ethical judgments are different from culture
to culture because their circumstances are
different.
 The fundamental ethical principles are shared, but
the circumstances are different, so (only) derived
ethical judgments are different.
 Circumstantial Variation: Example
 As Rachels suggests on p. 28, people might share
the fundamental principle that one should adopt
the practice that promotes the welfare of people
whose lives are affected by the practice.
 Notice that different judgments are derived from
this fundamental principle, depending on the
circumstances people live.
 If Eskimo’s environment is tough as Rachels
suggests, then the fundamental principle might
permit Eskimo to take possibly even infanticide;
though it does not permit us, those living in less
harsh environment, to take the actions.
Alternative Explanation 2:
Difference in Factual Beliefs
 Many ethical judgments are different
from culture to culture not because
people’s fundamental principles are
different, but because their factual
beliefs are different.
 The fundamental ethical principles are
shared, but their factual beliefs are
different, so (only) derived ethical
judgments are different.
 Alternative Explanation 2:
Difference in Factual Beliefs: Example
 Rachel’s example of the people who do not eat
cows (p.23)
 What is the different belief the people have?
 The belief that after death the souls of humans
inhabit the bodies of animals, especially cows.
 Then, this difference in factual belief explains
why we and they have different derivative
ethical judgments. If they share our ethical
judgment that it is wrong to kill and eat
humans, given their belief, they will conclude
that it is wrong to kill and eat cows.
 Criticism of the Argument for
DER: Alternative
Explanations
Different Social Practices/
Different Derivative Judgments

Shared Foundational Different Circumstances

Ethical Judgments or Different Factual
Beliefs, or Both
 So?
 Different circumstances and/or different factual beliefs
might better explain the variations in people’s ethical
judgments than DER does.
 Then, DER is perhaps not the best account of the
variations of people’s ethical judgments.
 Thus, the argument for DER fails to show DER is true.
 Caution: This only means that one argument for DER
fails. DER might still be true. (Consider the relationship
between the following argument and its conclusion: “All
bats are animals; some animals fly; therefore, all bats
fly.” This type of argument fails to support the
conclusion, but the conclusion might still be true.)
 Philosophical Questions About
Ethical Relativism/Absolutism
 Do the established facts support
DER?
 Does DER support NER?
 What are the implications of NER?

As is explained, the established facts might not

support DER. However, suppose that DER is
true. Then, does DER support NER? (Rachels,
2.3)
From DER to NER ???
 Normative Ethical Relativism (NER) does
not follow automatically from Descriptive
Ethical Relativism (DER).
 Confusing the different meanings of “Ethical
Relativism” leads some to think it does.
 This point is made by Rachels on pp. 20-1.
 From DER to NER (cont’d.)
 In general, the fact that people have different beliefs
(about the truth of a judgment) does NOT show that
there is no objective truth or that the truth is relative
to different people.
 This is the point Rachels uses the example in
geography to illustrate. (So the above is the answer to
Q1.)
 People’s different beliefs about the shape of the earth,
and the existence of the objective truth (p. 20)
 Other examples: people’s different beliefs about
causes (of diseases, fire etc.), about past events, and
the elements of the universe, and so on.
 From DEU to NEU ???
 To be fair to Normative Ethical Relativists:
for the very same reason that Normative
Ethical Relativism (NER) doesn’t follow
automatically from Descriptive Ethical
Relativism (DER), neither does Normative
Ethical Universalism (NEU) follow
automatically from Descriptive Ethical
Universalism (DEU).
From DER to NER: A Better Route
 Perhaps Rachels is too quick to conclude that
NER rests on a bad argument. (p. 29)
 Even if DER does not imply NER, it might be
used to support NER.
 Best Explanation Argument
 The best explanation for why DER is true is
NER.
 That is, if, even at the most fundamental
level, there are no ethical judgments that are
universally shared, this is best explained by
the hypothesis that there are no universally
correct ethical judgments.
 Generally speaking, the best account is
probable. So, NER is probably true.
 Does the Best Explanation Argument
from DER to NER Succeed?
 To get the argument off the ground, one must
show that NER is the best explanation: i.e., that
other explanations for why people have
fundamentally different ethical judgments are less
adequate.
 This has not been shown yet.

 Can you hit upon alternative explanations?

 Here is one. There are non-relative ethical truths,
but they are hard to know. Consequently, people
have fundamentally different ethical judgments.
 Is this explanation of DER less adequate than the
explanation of DER by NER?